Hans Jonas's Ethic of Responsibility

From Ontology to Ecology

Theresa Morris

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781438448824
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Despite his tremendous impact on the German Green Party and the influence of his work on contemporary debates about stem cell research in the United States, Hans Jonas's (1903–1993) philosophical contributions have remained partially obscured. In particular, the ontological grounding he gives his ethics, based on a phenomenological engagement with biology to bridge the "is-ought" gap, has not been fully appreciated. Theresa Morris provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of Jonas's philosophy that reveals the thread that runs through all of his thought, including his work on the philosophy of biology, ethics, the philosophy of technology, and bioethics. She places Jonas's philosophy in context, comparing his ideas to those of other ethical and environmental philosophers and demonstrating the relevance of his thought for our current ethical and environmental problems. Crafting strong supporting arguments for Jonas's insightful view of ethics as a matter of both reason and emotion, Morris convincingly lays out his account of the basis of our responsibilities not only to the biosphere but also to current and future generations of beings.

Part One

ORIGINS

1

The Philosophical Genesis of the Ecological Crisis

When I see the blind and wretched state of man, when I survey the whole universe in its dumbness and man left to himself with no light, as though lost in this corner of the universe, without knowing who put him there, what he has come to do, what will become of him when he dies, incapable of knowing anything, I am moved to terror, like a man transported in his sleep to some terrifying desert island, who wakes up quite lost and with no means of escape. Then I marvel that so wretched a state does not drive people to despair.

—Pascal, Pensées

1. Crisis

In his essay “Philosophy at the End of the Century,” Hans Jonas describes the crisis he sees arising from “the threat we pose to the planet's ecology,” one that forces us to look anew at “one of the oldest philosophical questions, that of the relationship between human being and nature, between mind and matter—in other words, the age-old question of dualism.” ¹ Jonas sees the ecological crisis originating in unrestrained scientific and technological development occurring without an objective ethical framework to serve as a guide. Ethics lags behind action and consists of weak attempts to circumscribe the potentially negative consequences of actions already set in motion.

Yet a crisis can also be a turning point—the moment when things come to a head and a new direction is taken. Through a reexamination of the development of the Cartesian worldview, Jonas provides a way to heal the separation between psyche and physis initiated by Descartes, a separation he finds at the root of the environmental crisis. He seeks to restore value to nature and return the human to a meaningful place within nature. In effect, the human world is reintegrated into the lifeworld as the inherent value of nature becomes clear and the relation of the human being to the natural world is made manifest.² Through an investigation into ontology, Jonas prepares the ground for his arguments in support of the “imperative of responsibility.”

For Jonas, the impact of contemporary humanity on the natural environment has been unprecedented. Informed by a theoretical understanding of the human being as separate from nature, technological innovation, supported by science, has progressively developed ever new and more powerful forms of technology, extending the reach of human power far beyond human ability to foresee the consequences. For Jonas, the relations between human knowledge, technological power, responsibility, and ethics are both complicated and fundamental. His analysis of the problem we face and his philosophical argument for a new ethics revolves around the complex interrelationship between these related, though often competing, aspects of human action.

What is needed is a new understanding of “the status of mind in the total scheme of Being” (MM, 51). Jonas argues that philosophy must work in harmony with science in order to arrive at a new way of thinking the mind and its relation to nature as Being. To situate his argument, he points out that there is no evidence that there exists any other “dwelling place for life” in the universe. The Earth is unique, so far as we now know. It is on this planet that the fortuitous events occurred that revealed the potentiality hidden in matter and enabled it to become manifest as life; living organisms coming into being through the long process of evolution (MM, 51).

For Jonas, Darwin's theory of evolutionary biology is evidence of two distinctly important truths, truths that directly challenge the assumptions of the physics and philosophy of Descartes. On the one hand, evolution shows that Cartesian dualism, which defines matter as lifeless, cannot adequately explain the phenomenon of the presence of life evolving out of the material stuff of the universe.³ On the other hand, evolution gives proof to the presence of mind or psyche at all levels of living organisms, thus proving the strict separation between mind and matter, the basic premise of Cartesian dualism, wrong (MM, 52). Jonas's phenomenological biology seeks to return spirit to matter and reconnect the human to nature—two fundamental steps that enable him to begin to argue for the “imperative of responsibility.” From a reevaluation of being, seen through the theory of evolution, and from an investigation into the meaning of the human being, Jonas attempts to formulate a comprehensive ethic, one that can respond to the ecological and ethical crisis we face.

2. “The Altered Nature of Human Action”

To begin a discussion of Jonas's work, it is well to ask why we need a new ethics. Can we not address the ecological crisis through an extension of the theories of ethics we already have? Jonas begins The Imperative of Responsibility by discussing the limitations of the ethical systems and theories we have already at hand. The problem is not that deontology, consequentialism, virtue theory, social contract theory, and so on are of no value to us. It is that they aim at relations between people in society and thus lack both the impetus and the scope necessary to confront the very real problems we are facing. Traditional theories of ethics also fail to address accountability for the future of life itself.⁴

One problem, for instance, is how we might justify a normative claim in regard to non-human beings. Jonas does not argue that other living organisms have rights in the way that human beings do. The notion of rights is a political concept related to duties. Animals, trees, the air we breathe—these cannot be understood as belonging to the socio-political community. Instead, we need a new conceptualization of ethics in order to include all living organisms, the ecosystem, and the physical environment in our ethical considerations. Additionally, Jonas argues this new ethics must find a way to justify taking into our regard considerations concerning future others who will occupy this planet after we ourselves are gone. It is apparent that the ethical theories we have today are incapable of bringing these extended considerations into their realm of concern. Traditional ethical theories are based on the interactions of contemporary human beings living together in society—their claims and justifications revolve around that fact. The confused notion of the rights of animals, plants, air, and water is an expression and indication of the limitations of traditional ethical theories when confronted with the crisis we face.

The crisis we face is new, and it introduces the need for new considerations and justifications—it compels a need for a new understanding of ethics. Jonas argues that it is a crisis brought about by the extended reach of our actions—the nature of human action has fundamentally changed, our technology has developed to a point where its consequences far exceed our knowledge of them, and the repercussions of these consequences extend far into the future.⁵ Not only are we depleting the Earth of its resources, but it is also the case that terribly destructive side effects are created as the result of the utilization and alteration of the natural environment.⁶ Simultaneously, we are developing ever more sophisticated technologies to affect and alter the natural world—including the alarming capacity we have to rearrange the very elementary stuff of life, the genetic material that is the result of billions of years of evolutionary development. As Jonas points out, the effects of our technological actions have a tendency to gather repercussions in a cumulative manner—progressively increasing in impact and scope as they build (IR, 7). As a result, experience is of little help to us, and our knowledge diminishes in proportion to the accumulation of technological aftereffects reaching far into the future. In light of this fact, Jonas argues that a new ethic of responsibility must incorporate a notion of caution coupled with the imaginative projection of possibly negative consequences to guide us in our actions. He calls this a “heuristics of fear” (IR, x).

We have arrived at the need for a new ethics because of the unprecedented reach of our technological power. Appropriately, Jonas begins his discussion of the crisis by referring back to an earlier time when the relationship between human and nature was marked by a natural proportionality that mirrored the actual place of the human being in the natural world (IR, 2–4). Human beings built societies and cities, carving out for themselves a niche that fostered their survival. Nature was not threatened by the early societies of humans, and early humans had no significant power over the existence of nature. With the burst of technological development that issued from the scientific revolution, we find the balance has been altered. The human being no longer occupies a niche within the greater ecosystem but threatens to overrun the planet, depleting natural resources and altering the biosphere, imperiling the very existence of life. All of this is well known and well documented. The significance, for Jonas, is the way these changes have created a need for a new understanding of the meaning of the human being in relation to the consequences of human actions. Ethics tells us how to live, yet we are not the same as we once were, and neither is the world in which we live. The need for a new ontology is based on the fact that the scope of human action has changed, and a new understanding of the human is needed to inform an ethics that has relevance in a changed and changing world. In order to ground his new ethic of responsibility, Jonas engages in a phenomenological and existential examination of evolutionary biology, in effect creating a more nuanced and subtle ontological understanding of the human being, one that comprises both the technological human, homo Faber, and the human being in her relation to and dependence on nature.

The human being is, without doubt, characterized by technological capacity. As beings adept at creating and using tools to shape and organize their environment, human beings, of all animals, have worked extensively to affect the environment in which they live. Yet it is only with the modern machine age and the subsequent development of subtle and powerful new technologies that techne has overshadowed other human capacities and purposes. We define ourselves more and more through our technology, and it has become for us the central significance of our being (IR, 9). As we develop new technologies, they begin to shape who we are as well as the way we experience and view the world. In other words, the world for us becomes more and more a created one, and we become further and further removed from the natural one upon which we depend. While this obviously complicates and perhaps aggrandizes the crisis we are facing, it can help us recognize Jonas's claim as a valid one—our purposes, intentions, and their resulting actions have changed significantly, necessitating the development of a new ethical understanding in response to the altered nature of human action.

So far I have been using the words “nature” and “world” more or less interchangeably, but it is apparent that as the result of technological development more and more there is a “world” that is created by the human being—a constructed world that reinforces itself through its reliance on and use of technologies.⁷ “Nature” is no longer the “world,” for as Jonas says, “the natural is swallowed up in the sphere of the artificial, and at the same time the total artifact (the works of man that have become ‘the world’ and as such envelop their makers) generates a ‘nature’ of its own, that is, a necessity with which human freedom has to cope in an entirely new sense” (IR, 10).

Throughout his work Jonas is deeply concerned with the fundamental importance of human freedom as it relates to our capacity to make ethical choices when considering our actions. Greatly expanded technological capacities introduce ethical concerns that previous ethical theories were not required to consider—primary among these is the issue of the effect of technology on the very nature of the human being.⁸ It is essential to take into consideration the danger of technologies that have the potential to radically alter the nature of the human being in regard to her capacity to make free choices. The most significant threat to the unique result of evolution that is the human being is genetic engineering. I mention this only briefly in order that it might serve as an example of the threat that technological development unaccompanied by critical thought and cautious foresight presents.⁹ With the advent of genetic engineering, the human being deliberately steps into the natural process of evolution and begins to manipulate its building blocks for her own purposes, foremost among them “improvements” undertaken to perfect the species. Jonas raises the question as an example of the kind of ethical deliberation for which we are not prepared, or indeed capable of effecting. He asks, “Who will be the image-makers, by what standards, and on the basis of what knowledge?” (IR, 21). For Jonas, the potential we have to alter our own species is a compelling example of how far we have come from ethical questions that can be answered by reference to traditional ethical theories. We lack both experience with the consequences of such actions and knowledge of their potential for harm. Complicating this lack of experience and knowledge is our belief in the possibility of infinite progress toward ever better conditions resulting from the unfettered growth of science and technology.¹⁰ Jonas points out that given that science claims that its knowledge is value free, we also suffer from the lack of an objective standard with which to judge scientific and technological developments. We tend to assume all innovation is progressive and therefore good. All of these conditions hamper our ability to develop an effective ethical critique of new technologies.¹¹ The crisis we are facing, according to Jonas, is the result of our increased power to act, and it is intensified by the lack of knowledge and experience we have concerning the consequences of these actions. We are at a loss to tackle the problem, he says, because we do not possess the norms or standards needed to challenge the beliefs of scientific materialism. We cannot find a guide for actions because, as Jonas puts it, we act within an “ethical vacuum.”

How does Jonas understand the notion of an “ethical vacuum?” He bases his claim on the fact that science has “destroyed the very idea of norm as such” (IR, 22). Through the philosophical development of dualism, nature as extended matter became value-less. With the devaluation of nature and the glorification of science and technology, based as they are on a foundation of value-free facts about things, we have reached an imperiled state, that of “a nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it” (IR, 23). Thus, we are in a state of near emergency, and we find that we do not have the tools to deliver ourselves from it. This is the case Jonas makes. The need for an ethics that can rise to the challenge of the times, one that can address the global reach of our actions and guide us in protecting the future from the potentially dire consequences of our actions today is imperative if the planet is to continue to thrive and if the human being is to retain her capacity to live freely and ethically in harmony with the Earth.

We see around us the growing threat to existence as the repercussions of past decisions begin to come to fruition as the climate changes, effecting natural disasters and food shortages, exacerbated by the depletion of the natural resources we depend on to support our way of life. It does not need to be argued that we must develop some way to approach the problems we face before they overwhelm us—and without an ethics that has thought through the complications constitutive of the looming global environmental crisis to guide us, we stand helpless before those who will seek to control or profit from the chaos that will prevail as emergencies, shortages, and confrontations threatening our lives and livelihoods begin to arise with greater intensity and frequency.

Before turning to Jonas's response to the problems we face, it is useful to consider his critique of scientific materialism and its relation to nature and value in greater detail. Because dualism is the philosophical theory underlying the premises of scientific materialism, I begin with a discussion of the Cartesian view.

3. Materialism and the Problem of Dualism

The philosophical foundation of the scientific materialist view can be traced back to Descartes. In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes arrived at a vision of the natural world that was sharply bifurcated. Duality has been an interest and a problem in philosophy since Parmenides, but with Descartes the problem is delineated in a new and powerful way. Descartes's careful and intricate examination of his own consciousness led him to conclude that mind or soul is fundamentally different and separate from matter or bodily things.¹² This conclusion seems almost cannily designed to facilitate the beginnings of a view of life that lends itself well to the newly emerging sciences. To understand life as composed of dead matter and disembodied mind is to encourage a manipulative attitude toward nature—it is reduced to a thing there for our own use. Hence nature is devalued, and because this view does not envision the human as intricately related to and dependent upon nature, it appeared to these early scientists that nature could be acted upon with impunity.

The most significant result of the Cartesian view of the duality of mind and body is the separation of life from substance. Substance or body, under this conception, is mere extension. Other qualities that we may associate with it are not essential to what it is.¹³ Materialism, the idea that nature is dead matter existing in a world ordered by cause and effect, is the foundation of modern science.¹⁴ Divorcing soul (anima) from matter, making them alien to one another, led to a worldview that facilitated the experimentation and manipulation of nature and this led to the development of increasingly sophisticated technologies. Cartesian dualism gave way to scientific materialism, the view that matter is the only substance and all causes are physical. The troublesome matter of the soul or mind still lingers, however, as consciousness is difficult to explain given that it is neither substantial nor apparently physical, and it is apparent that a certain amount of incoherence results from the materialist view.¹⁵

When persons can look a...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgments
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part One: Origins
• Part Two: Groundwork
• Part Three: Potentialities
• Conclusion: The Ethic of Responsibility and the Problem of the Future
• Notes
• Bibliography