PART ONE
WHAT IS A âPHILOSOPHY-CINEMA?â
I wasnât stupid enough to want to create a philosophy of cinema.
âGilles Deleuze, âThe Brain Is the Screenâ
1
Sartre and Deleuze via Bergson
Sartre Anticipates Deleuze:
The Cinema, a âBergsonian Artâ
âTogether we would like to be the Humpty-Dumpty of philosophy, or its Laurel and Hardy. A philosophy-cinema.â Thus writes Deleuze, referring to himself and to FĂ©lix Guattari, in his âNote to the Italian Edition of The Logic of Sense,â published in 1974. This sentence seems to echo the passage by which, six years earlier, he had finished the Preface to Difference and Repetition: âThe time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been done for so long: âAh! The old style âŠâ The search for a new means of philosophical expression was begun by Nietzsche and must be pursued today in relation to the renewal of certain other arts, such as the theatre or the cinema.â In short, Deleuze found that the novelty of cinema implied a renewal of the philosophical questions concerning not only our relationships to ourselves, to the others, to the things, and to the world, but alsoâand inevitablyâconcerning philosophy itself: that is, concerning its expressive style and, hence, the very style of its own thinking. Indeed, the question of the âphilosophy-cinemaâ does not belong to a single thinker. Rather, it involves a whole epoch, as the Preface to Difference and Repetition suggested. In this sense, it is a question regarding thinking itself. As suchâthat is to say, precisely as it concerns a whole epochâit is not surprising to see it emerge, every now and then, all through that epoch. Actually, also Jean-Paul Sartre, in a posthumously published writing, seems to have come across this questionâwith the imprudence of his (then) twenties. Apparently, such writing dates back to his last khĂągne trimester (1924) or to his first year at the Ăcole Normale SupĂ©rieure (1924â25); in any case, well before his first approach to phenomenology, which was to occur about ten years later. The writingâs title is âApologie pour le cinĂ©ma. DĂ©fense et illustration dâun Art international [Apology for the Cinema. Defense and Illustration of an International Art].â
The starting point Sartre chose for this writing is what his former philosophy teacher and one of the timeâs most influential âmasters of thinkingâânamely, Emile-Auguste Chartier, better known as Alainâmaintained in one of his own 1923 Propos sur lâesthĂ©tique (Thoughts on Aesthetics), significantly titled âLâimmobile [Immobility].â
This is how Alain started: âArt expresses human power through immobility. There is no better sign of a soulâs strength than immobility, since the thinking is recognizable in it.â He concluded by affirming that âthe art of the screen provides an a contrario evidenceâ of this artistic research of immobility, âwithout even looking for it; for the perpetual movement is the very law of films, not only because speech is lacking completelyâand it becomes clear that to be mute from birth does not mean to keep silentâbut most of all because the actor feels obliged to be restless, as if to pay homage to the mechanical invention.â
In short, this is roughly the syllogism proposed by Alain: if all art is a âsearch of immobility in movement,â and ifâas we just readââthe perpetual movement is the very law of films,â then âthe art of the screenâ is not an actual art.
The young Sartre highlights that he traces in Alainâs question âthe elements [of a problem] that is far more important than the sterile discussions of someone like Winckelmann: does [beauty consist] in immobility or rather in change?â Indeed, for Sartre, the most important problem is raised by the passage in which we heard Alain affirm that thinking is recognizable in immobility. In reconsidering this question, Sartre gives it a significant twist. Alainâs thesis suggested that thinking is, by its very essence, recognizable in immobility. In Sartreâs opinion, such a thesis expresses the attachment (the word he uses is, precisely, attached [attachĂ©]) of the human mind âto what is motionless, and not only in aesthetics.â Sartre hence explains that â[i]t is [easier to understand] the immutable. In particular, it is easier to love what does not change, and one tries to blind oneâs self to this point: âYou have not changed. You still look the same.â â It is not hard to trace, in this sentence, some underlying Bergsonian echoesâwhich will later be confirmedâconcerning the interpretation of our practical life.
Sartre hence seems to suggest that Platonism understood as the thinking of Being meant as endurance consists precisely in this effort to blind oneâs self. Still, âa new philosophy has dethroned that of the immutable Ideas,â he claims. However, he only names it a few lines farther. âAt the moment, there is no reality outside change. Will aesthetics not benefit from this?â Such a question allows Sartre to introduce his reflection on the cinema, forâas he will explain furtherâthe cinema âinaugurates mobility in aesthetics.â
It looks as if we could synthesize things as follows: for Sartre, the cinemaâby inaugurating mobility in aestheticsâhas helped to unveil the fact that the supposed acknowledgment of thinkingâs essence in what is motionless was but an attachment to what is âeasier.â Hence, the cinema questions philosophy itself, for it âdethronesâ Platonism and literally gets us thinking anew. Or rather, what shall be thought anew imposes onto philosophy, no less inevitably, the responsibility to think of itself as a âphilosophy-cinema,â we might say echoing Deleuze.
Yet, there is more. To Alainâs dismissive judgment apropos of the cinemaâs mutism, Sartre responds as follows: âWe are closer to non-speaking actors, who do in fact sing, and their song (I mean, that of the violins) signifies much better whatever they may say [âŠ] does better than just teaching us what Mary Pickford thinks, since it makes us think as she does.â
On this basis, he hence recurs âto some Bergsonian passages,â in which one can notice the repeated reference to the melody as an example of composed and yet undecomposable movement. Indeed, it is through these passages by the grand philosopher that the young student aims at âmaking understand that a film, with its sound accompaniment, is a consciousness like ours.â In other wordsâas in the case of a melodyâit is âan indivisible flow.â Besides, in the previous lines, Sartre had already declared that, since it âinaugurates mobility in aesthetics,â âthe cinema provides the formula of a Bergsonian art.â Thus, he unveiled the identity of the ânew philosophyâ to which he was referring, and, by such means, he claimed something that, surprisingly enough, would anticipate in one single shot the double action by which, in 1983, Deleuze would begin, in his turn, the Movement-Image.
Indeed, the first chapter of this book by Deleuze appeared to be in accordance with the substance of the Sartrean judgment. At the same time, it implicitly reminded us that Bergson himself would have never allowed such a judgment, for it was he who, in Creative Evolution (1907), matched the âtypical example of false movementâ precisely with the cinema, which had then been born only a dozen years earlier and, still according to Bergson, claimed to reconstruct movement itself as a sum of âimmobile sections and abstract time.â
The problem is raised, first of all, by the fact that in a movie, as we know, at each second comes a succession of a certain number of photogramsâbetween sixteen and eighteen at the time of silent pictures, later twenty-four. Such photograms are spaced by as many instants of black, which remain unperceived by the spectator. In fact, each of these motionless photograms is separated from the others by such an exiguous temporal gap that the ensemble we perceive creates an impression of continuity.
Sartre seems to refer precisely to this question when, in his âApologie pour le cinĂ©ma,â he writes: âYou may even consider it [the film] as a roll of motionless negatives; this is no more a film than the water from the tank is the water from the source, or a consciousness divided by associationism is the actual consciousness.â Convinced that one may say about the film what Bergson claimed apropos of the melodyâand suggesting a little further that their respective indivisibility is one and the same with the rhythm that characterizes bothâthe young Sartre peremptorily stresses that â[t]he essence of the film is in mobility and in duration.â
About sixty years later, it is Deleuze who will proceed in a similar direction, by recurring precisely to Bergson so as to criticize the judgment on cinema, which Bergson himself had expressed in Creative Evolution: âCinema does not give us an image to which movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-image.â Deleuze also makes clear that this is the movement-image Bergson himself had discoveredâin the first chapter of Matter and Memoryâas he overcame the opposition between â[m]ovement, as physical reality in the external world, and the image, as psychic reality in consciousness.â
Sartre Quits Bergsonianism and Film Theory
However, the parallel between the young Sartreâs path and that of Deleuzeâs book comes to an end here, for they will move on in opposite directions. Starting from 1933, Sartre will discover Husserlâs phenomenology, which he findsâwith respect to his desire to move âtoward concretenessââmore satisfactory than Bergsonâs thinking. Of course, such concreteness includes that of images. As for Deleuze, he will describe Bergsonâs and Husserlâs paths as two antagonist replies to the same historical need âto overcome this duality of image and movement, of consciousness and thing.â As is well known, he will then take sides in favor of Bergsonâs reply against Husserlâs. Hence, if the editors of the young Sartreâs âBergsonianâ text considered it as a âpre-phenomenologicalâ writing, Deleuze rather qualifies the position Sartre assumed after the encounter with phenomenology in ter...