Ecstasy, Catastrophe

Heidegger from Being and Time to the Black Notebooks

David Farrell Krell

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781438458274
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Phénoménologie en philosophie

In Ecstasy, Catastrophe, David Farrell Krell provides insight into two areas of Heidegger's thought: his analysis of ecstatic temporality in Being and Time (1927) and his "political" remarks in the recently published Black Notebooks (1931–1941). The first part of Krell's book focuses on Heidegger's interpretation of time, which Krell takes to be one of Heidegger's greatest philosophical achievements. In addition to providing detailed commentary on ecstatic temporality, Krell considers Derrida's analysis of ekstasis in his first seminar on Heidegger, taught in Paris in 1964–1965. Krell also relates ecstatic temporality to the work of other philosophers, including Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Schelling, Hölderlin, and Merleau-Ponty; he then analyzes Dasein as infant and child, relating ecstatic temporality to the "mirror stage" theory of Jacques Lacan. The second part of the book turns to Heidegger's Black Notebooks, which have received a great deal of critical attention in the press and in philosophical circles. Notorious for their pejorative references to Jews and Jewish culture, the Notebooks exhibit a level of polemic throughout that Krell takes to be catastrophic in and for Heidegger's thought. Heidegger's legacy therefore seems to be split between the best and the worst of thinking—somewhere between ecstasy and catastrophe. Based on the 2014 Brauer Lectures in German Studies at Brown University, the book communicates the fruits of Krell's many years of work on Heidegger in an engaging and accessible style.

Part One

Ecstatic Temporality in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927)

1

The Ecstases of Time

“Ecstatic temporality,” or the “ecstatic interpretation” of “original,” “primordial” temporality, is one of the major achievements of the second division of Heidegger’s 1927 Sein und Zeit, Being and Time. When does Heidegger first come up with the idea of the “ecstatic”? What does he mean by it? Do we know where in the history of philosophy Heidegger may have found this idea? And was that idea ever applied to time in the way he applies it? If the ecstatic analysis of temporality is as remarkable as I believe it is, and if it alters in a fundamental way our idea of human existence in time, why does Heidegger soon drop it after the publication of Being and Time? And even if he drops it, does that mean we have to? These will be my questions not only today but throughout the series of the four Brauer Lectures.

Let me begin with section 65, and not with section 64. Section 64, on “Care and Selfhood,” seems to me highly problematic: its appeal to a self, an αὐτός or ipse, and especially to the independence and autonomy of that self, even to some sort of permanence of the self—all of these suggested by his emphatic and repeated use of the hyphenated word Selbt-ständigkeit—seems to me to be as problematic as all the other terms he urges his readers to avoid, namely, spirit, soul, body, person, personality, and subject. Indeed, the problematic notion of a standing self, problematic if only because it does not seem to be submitted to that Destruktion or “dismantling” of ontological notions on which Heidegger otherwise insists, accompanies Heidegger after Being and Time as well. In the 1930s, for example, he counts on such selfhood for the grandiose “decision” toward which he feels his times are compelling him.

No, let me begin with section 65, “Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care.” Three preliminary questions obtrude, however, before we begin to read section 65, which is where Heidegger first introduces his interpretation of “ecstatic” temporality. We have already heard these questions. First, when does Heidegger first come up with this idea of ecstatic temporality? Second, do we know where in the history of philosophy Heidegger may have found this idea of ecstasy, which he was able to apply to time? Third, if the ecstatic analysis, along with the analysis of being toward death, or toward “the end” of our mortal existence, is the great achievement of Division Two of Sein und Zeit, why does Heidegger soon drop it?

When does he first come up with the idea? Apparently, quite late in the writing of Sein und Zeit. During the summer semester of 1925 Heidegger teaches a lecture course titled Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time, now published as volume 20 of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe. Surprisingly, the words and the idea of ecstatic temporality do not appear there. Time itself is understood to be “the guideline” of his inquiry “into the being of beings” (20:8), and yet, remarkably, there is not a hint of the ecstases. It is not as though the theme of time were new to Heidegger, either in 1925 or 1927. Indeed, his venia legendi lecture in July 1915 is on “The Concept of Time in the Discipline of History.” Heidegger, we remember, serving as Husserl’s assistant, had as his special assignment the phenomenology of the historical sciences. We could hardly expect the word Ekstase to appear in the venia legendi lecture, but what does appear there, presumably for the first time, is the notion of time proper, “authentic” time, as it were, die eigentliche Zeit. In his preliminary discussion of time as the measure of motion and acceleration in modern physics from Galileo through relativity theory, Heidegger comments on what it means to declare a particular instant of time the starting point of a measurement: “We make an incision into the timescale, so to speak, thereby destroying time proper [die eigentliche Zeit] in its flow, and we cause it to cease. The flux freezes, becomes a plane surface [Fläche], and only as a plane surface is it measurable. Time becomes a homogeneous place-order, a scale, a parameter” (FS 366). Time for an historian, by contrast, is a matter of qualitative determinations, as Dilthey and Bergson have already insisted, qualitative in terms of (1) our assessing the authenticity of the historian’s sources, (2) elaborating the context of the period under discussion, and (3) estimating in some nonarithmetic way the distance of our own world from the world under discussion. Periods and distances in the historical sciences do not succumb to measurement. Heidegger is particularly attuned to the problem of the historian’s selection of themes for discussion and even his or her decisions about what counts as evidence; for these matters are shaped by his or her own history, indeed in ways that are seldom evident. By 1915 Heidegger is sensitive to issues of hermeneutics, although that word too does not yet appear.

Heidegger’s focus on questions of time and history is clearly visible in every course he teaches and in every text he writes between 1915 and 1927. It is to Being and Time that we must now turn, and yet I find it impossible to finish discussing the venia legendi lecture before mentioning the final example Heidegger offers to show how the historian reckons with, but does not measure, time and time periods. Heidegger cites the twelve weeks that it took the Prussian general August von Mackensen to reach the Russian-Polish Festungsviereck, a recent event in World War I. Those twelve weeks assume their proper importance, Heidegger says, only insofar as they reflect “the vast and powerful thrust of our allied troops [die ungeheure Stoßkraft unserer verbündeten Truppen],” the assuredness with which the “operational target” was chosen, and the “resistance” of the Russian army (FS 374). Such military examples will not be missing from Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche two decades later, to say nothing yet of other texts from the late 1930s and early 1940s. They show how difficult it is for a philosopher as well as a historian to avoid those intrusions by contemporary events into one’s selection of themes and examples. Indeed, in Being and Time Heidegger will take pains to show how existential-ontological analysis, in the pursuit of its aims, has to purge itself of the news of the day, as of “everydayness” or “dailiness” altogether. These military examples also show how impossible it is for Heidegger to purge himself of his deutsch-nationales Denken and the militancy that clings to it. The very “principle” of historical conceptuality, Heidegger concedes at the end of his venia legendi lecture, lies in the “value relation,” Wertbeziehung, that permeates historical institutions such as the Church and the historians themselves. To repeat, these “value-relations,” are seldom visible to the historian—or philosopher—him- or herself.

I realize that I may be getting sidetracked by this, but I cannot drop the matter before mentioning that, at least according to some reports I have seen, Walter Benjamin hated Heidegger’s venia legendi lecture, which he may have heard—the two of them were students of Heinrich Rickert’s in Freiburg during the years 1912 to 1913—and which in any case Benjamin would surely have read. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile to compare in detail Heidegger’s views in that lecture with Benjamin’s Kunstkritik essay and the “critical-epistemological preface” to his Trauerspiel book, both of which appear to conform with Heidegger’s main theses; it would be most instructive to compare that lecture with the late “On the Concept of History,” which, with its stringent critique of historicism, opens a gap between Benjamin’s mature conception and Heidegger’s early conception of historical time. Yet even here, for instance, in Benjamin’s criticism of our belief in progress and the “homogeneous” notion of time that underlies such a belief, we hear echoes of Heidegger’s most strongly held views. In the Schwarze Hefte (96:183) we hear Heidegger say, “Expelled to the farthest remove from the truth of the historic are the historians,” and Benjamin would be hard put to disagree, even though his sense of the “historic” would differ sharply from Heidegger’s. But enough.1

Our second question was: Where in the history of philosophy might Heidegger have found, if only quite late in his writing of Sein und Zeit, the idea of ecstatic temporality? Not in Husserl, surely. And even though Heidegger does find Bergson’s Données immédiates de la conscience compelling reading, which does not mean to say that he always interprets it well or fairly, “ecstasy” is not there, even if something of Bergsonian élan is already present, and élan, as Schwingung and Schwung, will be important for Heidegger’s later thinking of time. Could it have been in Kierkegaard, then, or in the literature of mysticism? Perhaps. But there ecstasy would have to do with some sort of intervention of “eternity” into time, or at least with the temporary suspension of the temporal. Franz von Baader (1765–1841), in “On the Concept of Ekstasis as Metastasis,” defines ecstasy as the temporary suspension of the interlacing of body, soul, and spirit, in anticipation of their complete separation in death.2 Whereas von Baader is an important source for Schelling, however, he is not such for Heidegger. Could it have been Schelling himself who gives Heidegger the word and the idea of ecstasis, inasmuch as Schelling uses the word ἔκστασις during his years in Erlangen? Let me take a moment to examine this possibility in detail.

Heidegger mentions “ecstatic temporality” briefly in the notes for his lecture course on Schelling during the Summer Semester of 1936. Among the three principal terms at the outset of Schelling’s 1809 treatise on human freedom—Wesen, Grund, Existenz—the last means not the being on hand of a thing, or a thing’s existentia as opposed to its essentia, but precisely what Heidegger calls Ex-sistenz, “that which steps out of itself,” das aus sich Heraus-tretende (SA 129). What undergoes this stepping out? Heidegger replies, das im Heraus-treten sich Offenbarende, everything that “in stepping out reveals itself,” or “enters into the open” (ibid.), and that of course means beings as a whole, not merely Dasein. By 1936, both “existence” and “ecstasis” have less to do with the unfolding of human temporality than with “the truth of beyng” as such and in general.

Yet temporality is also discussed in terms of Schelling’s discussion of God’s “becoming” (SA 135–36). Such divine coming to be cannot be measured in terms of Kantian “succession,” das Nacheinander, inasmuch as a certain “simultaneity,” or Gleich-Zeitigkeit, prevails in the divine. Heidegger adds, “The original temporal simultaneity [Gleich-Zeitigkeit: ‘at or in the same time’] consists in this, that having-been and being-futural, and equally originally [gleichursprünglich] being-present, assert themselves as the plenitude of essence [Wesensfülle], coining themselves within one another” (SA 136). This odd phrase, “coining themselves within one another” tries to translate selbst ineinander schlagen. This last word means to strike or to imprint, hence, “to coin.” It is a word Heidegger will use decades later in his interpretation of Geschlecht in the poetry of Georg Trakl. If I am right, it is not a word Heidegger uses in his account of ecstatic temporality in Sein und Zeit. Here in the Schelling course the stroke, imprint, or coinage (der Schlag) has to do with “appropriate temporality,” or “temporality proper,” which Heidegger identifies with the Augenblick. Thus, according to Heidegger, Schelling does not think of eternity as the nunc stans, “the standing now.” Rather, he thinks of it in terms of a living, moving, processual eternity in which each temporal ecstasy is “struck” or “coined” in all the others. Heidegger later in the course identifies “the moment” in which future, having-been, and present collide, or mutually imprint one another (zusammenschlagen), as the moment of decision, Entscheidung. In it the human being achieves its freedom, indeed as a form of “resolute openedness,” Entschlossenheit (SA 186–87).

In a later seminar on Schelling’s treatise, taught during the summer semester of 1941, Heidegger takes some distance on Schelling’s claim that the divine, in its ostensibly full and perfect freedom, “overcomes” time. Beyng, argues Heidegger, can never be independent of time: “Being is ‘dependent’ on ecstatic time; this is an essential characteristic of the ‘truth’ of being; but this ‘truth’ belongs to the essential unfolding [Wesung] of beyng itself” (SA 208). It is somewhat surprising to see the term ecstatic temporality still being used, yet an entire section of Heidegger’s notes in 1941 bears the title, “Temporality as Ecstatic Temporalizing” (SA 228–29). Here Heidegger calls time “a preliminary name for the region in which the truth of being is projected”; he adds, “ ‘time’ is the ecstatic between (time-space), not the in-which of beings, but the clearing of being itself” (SA 229).

When one turns from Heidegger’s own notes to Schelling’s texts, one notes initially that the word Ekstase is absent from the Treatise on Human Freedom. Nor does the word appear in the 1811, 1813, and 1815 versions of The Ages of the World, as edited by Heidegger’s colleague Manfred Schröter. Yet Schelling does use the word in an important way during his Erlangen lectures of 1820–21, and we will take a moment a bit later in the chapter to examine that use. But could Heidegger have found the term ecstasis anywhere in Schelling during the period in which he is writing Being and Time? That seems highly unlikely. He knew of Schelling’s 1809 treatise, and he may already have read Die Weltalter, to which he refers, albeit rarely, in the 1936 lecture course. Yet the Erlangen lectures were edited only much later (1969, 2002, and 2012–14 are important years for the new and more complete editions of the Weltalter-Fragmente and the Erlangen lectures), so that, to repeat, it is highly unlikely that Heidegger would have seen these materials.

Surely, w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Key to Works Cited
• Introduction
• Part One: Ecstatic Temporality in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927)
• Part Two: On the Black Notebooks (1931–1941)
• Conclusion
• Index
• Back Cover