Eternity Now

Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liady and Temporality

Wojciech Tworek

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781438475561
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Jewish Theology

The Habad movement, formed in eighteenth-century Belarus, has developed into one of the most influential streams of Hasidic Judaism. Drawing on both mystical sermons and legal writings of its founder, Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liady (1745–1812), Eternity Now provides the first account of the historiosophical dimensions of early Habad doctrine. Challenging the commonly held view that Shneur Zalman was primarily concerned with supratemporal transcendence, Wojciech Tworek reveals the importance of time and history in his teachings. Tworek argues that the worldly dimensions of Shneur Zalman's thought were largely responsible for the rapid growth of Habad at the turn of the nineteenth century and fostered its transformation from an elitist circle into a mass movement. Tworek's readings of Hebrew and Yiddish sources demonstrate the implications of these ideas not only for male scholars but also for non-scholars, Jewish women, and even non-Jews. Philosophical and kabbalistic thought joined together to form a model of religious experience attractive to a broad audience, laying an ideological foundation for the missionary messianism that was to become a hallmark of Habad in the twentieth century.

1

TOWARD A DEFINITION OF TIME

Setting the Stage

Our discussion of time in Shneur Zalman’s teachings begins with two basic and seemingly straightforward questions: what is time and what kind of conceptual tools may be used to investigate it?

It may seem paradoxical to discuss Shneur Zalman’s teachings on time from a philosophical perspective, since he had a complicated attitude toward philosophy. Yet his teachings did not emerge in a vacuum, nor did his concept of time. He was familiar with medieval Jewish philosophy and its attempts to grasp reality in all its manifestations, including the temporal one. As a thinker influenced by kabbalistic writings and by the founding figures of Hasidism, Shneur Zalman had at his disposal other, nonphilosophical conceptual frameworks and, like many of his predecessors, he considered philosophical tools inadequate for understanding reality.1 First, he had a generally negative view of philosophy as a non-Jewish wisdom of demonic provenance that pollutes the three intellectual attributes of the divine soul in every Jew: Wisdom, Understanding, and Knowledge.2 He discouraged Jews from studying philosophy, and only permitted outstanding scholars to do so for a living.3 Second, he believed that non-Jewish philosophy simply did not deliver on its promises: no matter how hard they try, philosophers fail to express the most important issue, which Shneur Zalman considers to be at the core of Jewish faith: the unity of God. Paradoxically, although this concept lies beyond the grasp of even the brightest philosophers, it can be comprehended by those whom Shneur Zalman describes as the simplest Jews, for “even women, the youth and the children have faith in the one God.”4 It is a truth every Jewish child receives once old enough to develop “a bit of knowledge.”5

While it is true that Shneur Zalman softens his criticism with regard to Jewish philosophy, he nevertheless maintains his reservations concerning its attempts to comprehend God intellectually.6 Thus, in Hilkhot talmud Torah, his compendium of laws concerning Torah study, the prohibition on inquiring into the books of non-Jewish philosophers is followed by a warning against reading Jewish books containing non-Jewish philosophical ideas. Shneur Zalman even states explicitly that those who study books of this kind commit such a grave offence that they lose their share in the world-to-come! While medieval rabbis may have had good reasons to deal with philosophy, the same certainly does not apply to the average Jew.7

Shneur Zalman even suggests that the greatest of Jewish philosophers, Maimonides, had a somewhat limited understanding of the divine. Drawing on kabbalah, he explains that there are four worlds arranged in a fixed hierarchy ranging from the closest to God to the furthest from God: Emanation (atsilut), Creation (beri’ah), Formation (yetsirah), and Making (‘asiyah). Each comprises ten sefirot, which in Habad teachings are Hokhmah (Wisdom), Binah (Understanding), Da’at (Knowledge), Hesed (Mercy), Gevurah (Power), Tif’eret (Beauty), Netsah (Lasting Endurance), Hod (Majesty), Yesod (Foundation), and Malkhut (Kingdom).8 In Shneur Zalman’s theosophy, Keter (Crown) is not included in the ten sefirot but plays the role of intermediary between the sefirotic world and its transcendent source above.9 When evaluating the relevance of Maimonides’s philosophy, he balances his preference for kabbalah over philosophy, on the one hand, and his respect for the great medieval thinker and halakhist, on the other. He concedes that Maimonides’s philosophy is indeed valid, but only with regard to the reality below the three upper sefirot of the World of Emanation. Anything above that, he maintains, is attainable only to the masters of kabbalah.10 Moreover, as Yosef Stamler has noted, Shneur Zalman’s ambivalence regarding Jewish philosophy finds expression in the sources he selects to quote. While Maimonides does indeed feature in his teachings, Shneur Zalman rarely refers to his philosophical ideas and work, and when he mentions Maimonides in Tanya, he often finds it necessary to adduce additional support from the kabbalists for the ideas put forward.11

Given Shneur Zalman’s doubts concerning philosophy, it may be surprising that his teachings on time are so strongly influenced by medieval philosophical discourse. He might not point his readers directly to his sources, but his language betrays the fact that he did precisely what he advised against: allowing philosophical ideas to influence his worldview. The conceptual framework of his temporal discourse is informed first and foremost by the Aristotelian concept of time as a “number” or a “measure of movement” that was embraced by the medieval Jewish philosophers.12 This Aristotelian underpinning is particularly conspicuous when he describes time as “an aspect of number and division [behinat mispar ve-hithalkut],”13 a definition that in turn establishes the opposition between temporality and God who, “blessed be he, is above time […], for he is the simple one [ehad pashut] with no division at all, heaven forfend, but rather everything is united [in Him].”14

The polarity of God and time follows the dichotomy between the simple and the compound, as well as the philosophical assumption that the infinite and immeasurable is superior to the finite and measurable. The latter assumption not only concerns the gap between God and time, but also the general difference between the infinite God and the finite creation. It is true, argues Shneur Zalman in Tanya, that when we compare the numbers of one and one million, we may be impressed by the disparity between them and the magnitude of the latter. This, however, cannot be compared to the relation between any set of numbers and the infinity, as the latter cannot be expressed in numerical figures. There is an ontological gap between the divine Light of Infinity (Or Ein Sof) and the contracted illumination that brings about the lower worlds. This gap results from a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference: the finite cannot be compared to the infinite, and regardless of its size, it is always considered “as nothing” when seen from the perspective of the infinite.15

Even though in this particular case Shneur Zalman does not refer explicitly to time, the fact that it is an aspect of number makes the connection evident. This understanding of time as number/finitude allows him to reaffirm the view expressed by some Jewish philosophers and kabbalists16 that time belongs to the realm of creation, and is separate from God, who is defined as Infinity (Ein Sof),17 which precedes creation. According to Shneur Zalman, God’s infinity and supratemporality are hinted at in God’s ineffable name.

He [God], may he be blessed, is verily in the nature of Ein Sof. He was, he is and he will be [hayah, hoveh, ve-yihyeh]18 verily with no change, as in the statement [in the daily morning service]: “It was you who existed before the world was created, it is you now that the world has been created,” etc.19

Shneur Zalman goes to great lengths to emphasize that the act of creation does not limit or influence God in any way. Since he is indifferent to temporal change, even as dramatic an event as the creation of the world does not represent a turning point in the history of the divine. In other words, God precedes creation in an ontological sense and not just in a temporal sense. This principle would later be formulated explicitly by Menachem Mendel Schneersohn, the Tsemah Tsedek.

He [God], blessed be he, is not dependent on time at all. That being the case we say [about Him] the Ancient One [kadmon], but not [in the sense of] temporal precedence [kedimah zemanit], heaven forfend, which would mean that he preceded the world in time. […] Rather the precedence, which we ascribe to Him, means that he preceded everything, including the aspect of time. […] He, blessed be he, was alone prior to the existence of world, and when he created the world, he created time, too.20

What his successor spells out, Shneur Zalman signals by employing an expression from the daily morning service, which describes God as the “king exalted alone since the beginning of time […] extolled from days of old [ha-mitnase mi-yemot ‘olam].” According to his explanation, God is exalted and extolled not “from” (or “since”) but rather above and beyond yemot ‘olam, which Shneur Zalman understands literally as the “days of the world,” namely, worldly days, symbolizing temporality. The liturgical verse therefore reaffirms God’s supratemporal character and the status of time as a product of creation.

The view of time as a product of creation helps Shneur Zalman find illuminating solutions to some earlier debates with regard to the timing of creation. The Sages entertained the idea that the creation could have occurred, at least theoretically, at any other point in time, whether earlier or later than it actually did. This presumption occurs in the midrash, where Rabbi Tanhuma declares: “The world was created at the proper time. The world was not ready to be created prior to then.”21 While Rabbi Tanhuma’s statement merely alludes to the possibility of an earlier or a later creation, the Talmudic argument between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua concerning whether the world was created in the month of Tishri or Nissan clearly assumes the prior existence not only of time, but also of the Jewish calendar.22 Shneur Zalman, however, dismisses the whole problem of the proper time of the creation by referring to the kabbalistic conception of creation as a heuristic model, amended according to the teachings of his Hasidic teacher, Dov Ber the Maggid of Mezrich. According to Hayim Vital’s ‘Ets hayim, the sequential emanation of the sefirot must have taken place before the actual event of the creation.23 The duration of the process must, therefore, have determined the timing of the subsequent creation. Shneur Zalman, however, points out that this answer is not satisfactory, for one could further ask why the process of emanation began at that particular point in time rather than earlier or later. In order to resolve this difficulty, he refers to the teachings of Dov Ber,24 who explains that time itself was created ex nihilo (yesh me-‘ayin) and could not therefore have predated the creation or in any way conditioned it. For that reason, the very problem that ‘Ets hayim tackled appears to be merely the result of a misconception of the nature of time and the limits of the temporal discourse.

Not only does Shneur Zalman argue that time did not exist before the creation of the world, and therefore that the temporal categories of “earlier” and “later” simply do not apply to that context, he also states unequivocally that time was created from the divine nothingness.25 Like generations of Jewish philosophers before him, he adopts a conception of time as a unit of measurement and thus as something that out of necessity entails finitude and multiplicity, and uses it as an underpinning for his exposition of the kabbalistic understanding of time as a product of the creation of the infinite God, who acts through his infinite light.

Between an Eternal God and a Temporal World

The dichotomy of the infinite God versus temporal creation does not clarify the nature of relations between them. At first glance, the chasm seems unbridgeable. In Shneur Za...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• A Note on the Presentation of Source Materials
• Introduction
• 1. Toward a Definition of Time
• 2. History: From Creation to the End of Time
• 3. The End of Days
• 4. Time and Religious Praxis
• 5. Time’s Gender Twist
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Back Cover