SUNY series, Intersections: Philosophy and Critical Theory

From Kant to Critical Theory

María del Rosario Acosta López, J. Colin McQuillan, María del Rosario Acosta López, J. Colin McQuillan

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781438480282
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Aesthetics in Philosophy

Critique has been a central theme in the German philosophical tradition since the eighteenth century. The main goal of this book is to provide a history of this concept from its Kantian inception to contemporary critical theory. Focusing on both canonical and previously overlooked texts and thinkers, the contributors bring to light alternative conceptions of critique within nineteenth- and twentieth-century German philosophy, which have profound implications for contemporary philosophy. By offering a critical revision of the history of modern European philosophy, this book raises new questions about what it means for philosophy to be "critical" today.

1

The Struggle between Dogmatism and Skepticism in the Prussian Academy

A Precedent for Kantian Critique

CATALINA GONZÁLEZ

1. Introduction

Kant’s notion of critique may have been historically preceded and prepared for by one of the quarrels in which dogmatism and skepticism were central themes: namely, the critique of skepticism in the Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences during the eighteenth century. At the center of the dispute was an “anti-skeptical” treatise, Jean-Pierre de Crousaz’s Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien et moderne. The work was published in French in 1733, later abridged and then translated into German by two important members of the Prussian Academy, Samuel Formey and Albrecht von Haller, respectively. It appeared to the German public in 1751 with the title Prüfung der Secte, die an allem zweifelt. Kant himself recommended this text as a good source for modern skepticism in his Lectures on Logic: “If one wants closer instruction in the scepticismus of modern times, then one can read with great profit the writing that Haller published under the title: Examination of the sect that doubts everything.”1

In this paper, I will examine the introduction to Crousaz’s work, first, to gain a general idea of the confrontation between dogmatic and skeptical philosophers with regard to religious issues in the eighteenth century, and second, to identify some of the skeptical topics that Crousaz uses in his defense of religion. Then I will observe how this text may have contributed to a progressive dissolution of the boundaries between skepticism and dogmatism, leading to Kant’s critical standpoint. In fact, according to John Christian Laursen, the attitude of the Prussian Academy involved not only the defense of religion from skeptical outlooks but also the assimilation of skeptical strategies and arguments, and in doing so, it promoted the emergence of a philosophical middle ground. He argues:

There were good reasons for defending some sort of skepticism at the Berlin Academy. For one thing, enlightened philosophes of the Academy were worried as much by the dogmatists of enthusiasm and superstition as they were about the skeptics. They had to defend a middle way to protect their positions and way of doing philosophy.2

On the basis of Laursen’s suggestion, I argue in this paper that this philosophical middle ground importantly influenced Kant’s critical viewpoint. To develop this claim, I will begin by sketching out Laursen’s account of the role of the Prussian Academy’s anti-skepticism in the popularization of modern skepticism. Then I will outline some of the most important anti-skeptical arguments in Crousaz’s Examen du pyrrhonism ancien et moderne as well as some rhetorical topics that may have informed Kant’s formulation of a “critique” of pure reason, such as the identification of this critique with a “mature” exercise of reason. Finally, I will describe the way in which Crousaz’s views, which I consider to be a form of “skeptical anti-skepticism,” may have helped in the construction of Kant’s critical philosophy.

2. Crousaz and the Prussian Anti-skeptical Academy

In a series of articles published with Richard H. Popkin, Laursen has drawn attention to the influence of the Prussian Anti-skeptical Academy in eighteenth-century German philosophy.3 Originally founded in 1700 by Leibniz under Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg, the Academy was reformed in 1744 by Frederick the Great. It was predominantly francophone between the ’40s and ’90s, given that several of its members, some of them Huguenots in exile, arrived in Germany from France and from Switzerland.4 Prominent among these members are P. L. Maupertius, Formey, Haller, Mérian, Sulzer, and de Castillon. They engaged in the translation and commentary of skeptical treatises, such as Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Cicero’s Academica.5 Their purpose, however, was not to spread the skeptical outlook, but rather to attack it, in order to defend Christian faith from the outbreaks of fideism, deism, and atheism that became notorious in the eighteenth century.

According to Laursen, the arguments used by Prussian anti-skeptics have two important features: (1) they are moral and religious arguments, not directed to showing the unsoundness of the skeptical views but only to revealing their harmful practical consequences;6 and (2) they resort to skeptical topics in order to draw anti-skeptical conclusions.7 In view of the latter, Laursen argues, the Academy’s attitude toward skepticism was rather ambivalent, since, “to the extent that they actually domesticated many a skeptical point into their own canons of argument, they contributed to the process of assimilating skepticism into the modern world view.”8 Thus, the Academy’s anti-skeptical efforts proved rather useful in popularizing the writings of the main modern and ancient skeptics, by making their arguments accessible to a more widespread public, and perhaps also by giving them a mystified aura of irreligiousness and immorality.

According to Laursen, one of the most important sources of inspiration for the Academy was Crousaz’s extensive treatment of modern Pyrrhonism in his Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien et moderne.9 Formey composed an abridged version of this work with the title Le triomphe de l’évidence in 1738, which could not be published immediately for financial reasons.10 Later, he gave the manuscript to Haller, who translated it into German under the title Prüfung der Secte die an allem zweifelt, and this version was published in 1751.11 To underline the anti-skeptical tone of the work, Laursen quotes Haller’s introduction, where the latter argues that “atheistic skeptics will kill their own fathers, skeptical judges will judge according to their own desires, the poor will rob from the rich, the ‘philosophical’ masses will over-throw princes, and ‘philosophical’ princes will rule according to their whims.”12 In the same vein, Jacqueline E. de la Harpe indicates that, in his correspondence with Crousaz, Haller shows that he was pleased to translate the abridged form of the treatise, for “in a century where superstition and atheism have such great progress, I am often afraid of seeing in my days the dreadful period when Providence would take away from us the light of reason, to which we already pay so little attention, in order to plunge us back into the darkness of popery, from which we can only escape by falling into irreligion.”13

In these two testimonies, we can observe how Haller intended his translation to contribute to the defense of Christian orthodoxy and to the refutation of skeptical views that he considered so likely to spread irreligious attitudes.

Now, Crousaz’s treatise intends to refute the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus and Bayle, the most important ancient and modern representatives of Pyrrhonism. The first part gives a general account of Pyrrhonism; the second comprises an abridged translation of some sections of Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Adversus Matematicos, with a criticism of his main arguments; and the third part is a refutation of Bayle’s skepticism in his Dictionary. I will refer to the general introduction of the work, where Crousaz expresses his intentions and explains the causes of the influence of Pyrrhonism in modern times.

At the beginning of his discussion, Crousaz acknowledges that his endeavor may encounter opposition from those who think they do not need such an explanation, for they already know what Phyrrhonism is; or from those that doubt that there could actually be any philosophers that follow such a strange doctrine. Nonetheless, he argues, he will not presuppose what Pyrrhonism means, but rather will begin by explaining it thoroughly, since his objective is not merely to attack some of the skeptic’s views but to undermine their whole system, in order to “establish the certainty of our cognitions on their primary foundations.”14

Having clarified his objective, the author sets the discussion in an imaginary scene. In this scene, he has been transported to a country in the Indies, where he holds a conversation with a curious philosopher, who wants to know about the foundation and development of the sciences in Europe. The author begins his account with ancient Greek philosophy, but moves quickly to modern times, referring to the philosophies of Bacon, Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and others. His imaginary listener responds that such a diversity of philosophical systems must perplex the learned, who most probably want to “secure the truth.” He continues arguing that, given the diversity of doctrines, several disputes must arise, from prejudice, partisanship, or envy, and that to examine every system and distinguish the true from the false in each case would require an excessive amount of time, which would make the situation even more unbearable.15 He concludes his point by asking, “what maturity of judgment is needed to pronounce oneself on the disputes of such illustrious partisans?”16

In the context of this discussion, Crousaz describes the ongoing dispute between dogmatists and skeptics in Europe, claiming that there are, in fact, some who “defend the systems they hold passionately” and others who “think that it is necessary to completely renounce their thinking … and they even go so far as to deny to the human being the power of securing any truth, either general or particular.”17

At this point of the dialogue, the Indian philosopher expresses his astonishment. He claims that he cannot believe there may be philosophers who consider every knowledge uncertain or, if indeed there are, he argues that they could not possibly live and act normally. To this objection, the author answers that the Pyrrhonists are in fact not always hesitant, but they abandon and resume the state of doubt. Then he explains their method, stating that whenever a scientist or a philosopher, for instance, explains the causes of some physical phenomenon, they object to this explanation. If the scientist then states the principles on which the inference rests, the skeptics object to this principle too, and so on. For “their delight in contradicting, embarrassing others and holding paradoxes grows more and more alluring with every objection. … But when the dispute ends, they go back to their natural sentiments, and act and think like the rest of humans.”18 This is the famous apraxia objection that dogmatists from ancient times used to direct to the skeptics.19 It is interesting that Crousaz, undoubtedly knowing the force of this objection, chooses rather not to dwell on it, and argues instead that suspension of judgment is not a constant attitude of the Pyrrhonists. The reason lies in his intention to depict the skeptics as having a morally flawed character. Crousaz ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The Struggle between Dogmatism and Skepticism in the Prussian Academy: A Precedent for Kantian Critique
• 2 Pure Sensibility as a Source of Corruption: Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics in the Inaugural Dissertation and Critique of Pure Reason
• 3 Critique in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: Why This Critique Is Not a Critique of Pure Practical Reason
• 4 On an Aesthetic Dimension of Critique: The Time of the Beautiful in Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters
• 5 Not Yet a System, Not Yet a Science: Reinhold and Fichte on Kant’s Critique
• 6 Schelling’s Philosophical Letters on Doctrine and Critique
• 7 Critique With a Small C: Herder’s Critical Philosophical Practice and Anticritical Polemics
• 8 Irony and the Possibility of Romantic Criticism: Friedrich Schlegel as Poet-Critic
• 9 Alexander von Humboldt: A Critic of Nature
• 10 Critique, Refutation, Appropriation: Strategies of Hegel’s Dialectic
• 11 Abstraction and Critique in Marx: The Case of Debt
• 12 Nietzsche’s Project of Reevaluation: What Kind of Critique?
• 13 Kantian Critique, Its Ethical Purification by Hermann Cohen, and Its Reflective Transformation by Wilhelm Dilthey
• 14 Transcendental Phenomenology as Radical Immanent Critique: Subversions and Matrices of Intelligibility
• 15 From the Metaphysics of Law to the Critique of Violence
• 16 Is There Critique in Critical Theory? The Claim of Happiness on Theory
• 17 Critique as Melancholy Science
• 18 Reality and Resistance: Habermas and Haslanger on Objectivity, Social Critique, and the Possibility of Change
• 19 The Critique of Law and the Law of Critique
• Works Cited
• Contributors
• Index
• Back Cover