Art and Its Significance

An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory, Third Edition

Stephen David Ross, Stephen David Ross

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 1994
• ISBN:
  9781438417875
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Storia e teoria della filosofia

This anthology has been significantly expanded for this edition to include a wider range of contemporary issues. The most important addition is a new section on multicultural theory, including important and controversial selections ranging from discussions of art in other cultures to discussions of the appropriation of nonWestern art in Western cultures. The material from Kant's Critique of Judgment has been expanded to include his writing on aesthetical ideas and the sublime. The selections from Derrida have been updated and considerably expanded for this edition, primarily from The Truth in Painting. One of Derrida's most interesting provocations has also been added, his letter to Peter Eisenman on architecture. In addition, the section on feminist theory now includes a chapter from Irigaray's Speculum of the Other Woman. The anthology includes the most important writings on the theory of art in the Western tradition, including selections from Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche; the most important philosophical writings of the last hundred years on the theory of art, including selections from Collingwood, Langer, Goodman, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty; contemporary Continental writings on art and interpretation, including selections from Gadamer, Ricoeur, Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault; also writings on the psychology of art by Freud and Jung, from the Frankfurt School by Benjamin, Adorno, and Marcuse, in feminist theory, multiculturalism, and postmodernism. The anthology also includes twentieth-century writings by artists including discussions of futurism, suprematism, and conceptual art. Stephen David Ross is Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature, State University of New York at Binghamton.

I
Historical Background

PLATO

WHITEHEAD CLAIMS, in one of his most memorable remarks, that the history of philosophy is but a series of footnotes to Plato. Overstated as this claim may be, it forcefully expresses the influence of Plato’s writings upon the history of Western philosophy. What Plato has to say about art is no less important, and it is both colored and augmented by the fact that Plato was a supreme artist himself: his dialogues are incomparable dramatic achievements, and he used a great many literary devices, the most prominent of which is Platonic irony, a form unique in the history of writing in affirming and negating truth at many different levels simultaneously.

The dramatic form of Plato’s dialogues, the complexity introduced by the fact that Socrates, who wrote nothing himself, was both Plato’s teacher and his dramatic protagonist, makes it impossible to tell what position is Plato’s own. There are critics who believe, indeed, that Plato had no authoritative position, and that exploration of the process of inquiry, of philosophical dialectic, was Plato’s supreme achievement.

In connection with art, Plato presents a great number of different views, several of which are represented here. Among them, we can discern many of the central issues that involve the importance of art in the context of human life. The Republic, perhaps Plato’s most influential work, addresses the nature of justice. Responding to the question of why a person should be just, Socrates sets himself the task of describing an ideal state. The passages from Books II and III present his view of the kinds of stories and music that should be made available to children who are being educated to defend the state and from whose ranks the philosopher king will be chosen. The entire discussion presupposes the view of art as techn

, the employment of the best means to produce desirable ends.

Socrates’ answer to the question of justice is that justice is an ideal order, in the state and in the individual soul, governed by reason. This emphasis on reason is the basis for making the philosopher ruler of the state. The question for art is what role it can have relative to an ideal governed by reason. It is a question of the truthful possibilities of art and of the corruption in the soul produced by works of art that are not grounded in reason.

There is a far more profound argument in the Republic, in Book X, where Socrates criticizes art for being a “mere” imitation where what we desire is knowledge of reality. In contemporary terms, this is the question of why we should waste our time with art when we could spend it pursuing knowledge of the world.

These do not complete Plato’s views on art, for in other places he shows a far greater sympathy for the possibilities realizable through art. Ion is frequently read as supporting the view that poetry is not based on knowledge and provides no understanding. Yet it may also be read as suggesting that the understanding Ion lacks is techn

, while he possesses truth through divine inspiration, something that far exceeds any human understanding. For as Socrates says, speaking of the Muse that inspires poets as a magnet attracts iron rings, “the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses.” Such themes of what surpasses techn

continue in Symposium and Phaedrus, where er

s and madness cross between heaven and earth, and Plato presents Socrates as drawing a magnificent and eloquent parallel between love of beauty and love of the Forms. These different views may not exhaust all the different philosophical positions taken on art, but given our concern with the nature of reality and with understanding that reality they come close to covering the question of the importance of art.

PLATO
Republic, Books II, III, X^*

BOOK II

[Steph. 376] He who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly.

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.

Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.

Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

Certainly not.

Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.

By all means.

And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional sort?—and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul.

True.

Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?

By all means.

And when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?

I do.

And literature may be either true or false?

Yes.

[377] And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?

I do not understand your meaning, he said.

You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

Very true.

That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.

Quite right, he said.

You know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken.

Quite true.

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown up?

We cannot.

Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

Very likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.

But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes—as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a likeness to the original.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies, in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus [378] retaliated on him. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.

Why, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.

Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling among themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children; and when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a similar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer—these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the takes which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

There you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models to be found and of what tales are you speaking—how shall we answer him?

[379] I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be observed by them, but to make the tales is not their business.

Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Something of this kind, I replied:—God is always to be represented as he truly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the representation is given.

Right.

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?

Certainly.

And no good thing is hurtful?

No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not.

And that which hurts not does no evil?

No.

And can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?

Impossible.

And the good is advantageous?

Yes.

And therefore the cause of well-being?

Yes.

It follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only?

Assuredly.

Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.

That appears to me to be most true, he said.

Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots,

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two

Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,

Him wild hunger drives o’er the beauteous earth.

And again—

Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was really the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus that

[380] God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe—the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur—or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking; he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery—the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in verse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered commonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.

I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.

Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform—that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.

That will do, he said.

And what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another—sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

I cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.

Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?

Most certainly.

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any similar causes.

Of course.

[381] And will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any external influence?

True.

And the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite things—furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are least altered by time and circumstances.

Very true.

Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least liable to suffer change from without?

True.

But surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?

Of course they are.

Then he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?

He cannot.

But may he not change and transform himself?

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and more unsightly?

If he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or beauty.

Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to make himself worse?

Impossible.

Then it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains absolutely and for ever in his own form.

That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.

Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that

The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and down cities in all sorts of forms,

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in tragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms

For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;

—let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of these myths—telling how certain gods, as they say, ‘Go about by night in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;’ but let them take heed lest they make cowards of their childr...