SUNY series in Ancient Greek Philosophy

Steven Skultety

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781438476599
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

Do only modern thinkers like Machiavelli and Hobbes accept that conflict plays a significant role in the origin and maintenance of political community? In this book, Steven Skultety argues that Aristotle not only took conflict to be an inevitable aspect of political life, but further recognized ways in which conflict promotes the common good. While many scholars treat Aristotelian conflict as an absence of substantive communal ideals, Skultety argues that Aristotle articulated a view of politics that theorizes profoundly different kinds of conflict. Aristotle comprehended the subtle factors that can lead otherwise peaceful citizens to contemplate outright civil war, grasped the unique conditions that create hopelessly implacable partisans, and systematized tactics rulers could use to control regrettable, but still manageable, levels of civic distrust. Moreover, Aristotle conceived of debate, enduring disagreement, social rivalries, and competitions for leadership as an indispensable part of how human beings live well together in successful political life. By exploring the ways in which citizens can be at odds with one another, Conflict in Aristotle's Political Philosophy presents a dimension of ancient Greek thought that is startlingly relevant to contemporary concerns about social divisions, constitutional crises, and the range of acceptable conflict in healthy democracies.

PART I

CONFLICT IN IMPERFECT CITIES

Prelude

A great deal of the conflict we meet with in life is regrettable. When we hear that “conflict has erupted” in a given country, or that “conflict has broken out” in a given city, we usually imagine human beings violently attacking each other, and we often wonder whether those involved are treating each other viciously. We picture riots and then appallingly brutal crackdowns, shootings, and indiscriminate retaliations, and we may even worry that some group is attempting to wipe out opponents in systematic fashion. We fear the onset of communal breakdown with participants who have dropped any pretension of following ethical norms.

Yet even when the conflict that grabs our attention is not atrocious, we still believe that something regrettable is taking place for all those who have joined the fight. Take, for example, the case of justified war. Though the participants may be doing their best to follow basic codes of conduct, and though they may be fighting for some reasonable purpose or cause, it is still the case that fighting in war is not the best way for these human beings to spend their time. Most would agree with Aristotle’s assessment that “war [polemon] must be chosen for the sake of peace, work for the sake of leisure, necessary and useful things for the sake of noble ones” (Pol. VII.14 1333a35–36). Virtuous people may need to fight in war, but war is not their highest end—the end they would choose for its own sake. On the contrary, it is noble pursuits found in peace and leisure that serve as the ultimate goal of a life well lived.

This book is not a study of war—an examination of the scope, nature, and causes of violent conflict among cities—but rather an assessment of how Aristotle understands conflict among the inhabitants within one and the same political community. However, here in part I, we will see that Aristotle believes that much of the conflict that takes place within cities does indeed resemble war in several key respects.

First, Aristotle develops an extraordinarily sophisticated theory of stasis that is meant to explain how and why cities suffer the total communal breakdown of civil war (chapter 1). This type of conflict involves an attempt by factionalizers to change the constitution by force or fraud, and it is usually precipitated by inhabitants suffering from some sort of vice. There are times when even virtuous people may need to engage in stasis to correct a flawed city. But while this may occasionally be the best option for excellent agents living within deeply imperfect regimes, the internal war of stasis, like the violence of external war, is still regrettable for all those involved. No one would attribute such conflict to the best sort of political environment.

Aristotle’s account of stasis also offers a theoretical framework for appreciating the danger posed by the antagonism between rich and poor (chapter 2). These two groups are not identified simply by their unequal economic statuses, but by a suite of psychological defects that leads them to engage in endlessly divisive partisanship—a type of conflict that exacerbates and intensifies the causal factors that push cities toward outright civil war.

Finally, in addition to the partisanship between these specific two groups, there is another, general type of simmering conflict that Aristotle imputes to flawed cities. Before reaching the dire stage of all-out civil war, the factors that cause stasis in the long term can, in the short term, inspire inhabitants to distrust the constitution governing their city (chapter 3). Such distrust takes many forms, and in each case is a function of the different inhabitants’ characters as well as the structure and identity of the ruling class. This is why we find Aristotle offering so many different techniques for managing mistrust; just as the unfortunate problems faced by average communities are complex, so too are Aristotle’s recommendations for how rulers might respond to them.

Chapter 1

Stasis as Civil War

To understand how Aristotle conceptualizes conflict, it is important first to clarify how he uses the word most often associated with conflict in ancient Greece: “stasis.” This word was used by many in the ancient world to cover a broad swath of conflicts we find in shared political life: “[A]ll levels of intensity were embraced by the splendid Greek portmanteau-word stasis.”1 Without any clear conceptual boundaries, the word could apply to civil war, sedition, fighting, tension, troubles, disagreements, and, generally, any of the ways human beings could be at odds with one another in the city.

The main goal of this chapter, however, is to establish that Aristotle does not use the term in such a sweeping way, and to argue that he uses it with great precision. For Aristotle, stasis is catastrophic conflict that involves a radical alteration of the polis. Stasis is nothing less than civil war.

More than philological accuracy is at stake in interpreting Aristotle’s use of this word. First, appreciating how Aristotle delimits the meaning of stasis brings into sharp focus the ways in which he adopts a self-consciously anti-Platonic approach to issues of civil war. Unlike Plato and other ancient thinkers who think of stasis as civic conflict per se, and who take it to be explained by the root cause of uncontrolled appetite, Aristotle thinks of stasis as a distinct sort of political event that can be caused in many different and distinct ways. Distancing himself from the Platonic theory, Aristotle endorses a view far closer to what we find in some of the multifaceted accounts offered by ancient historians.

Second, once we realize that Aristotle defines stasis with precision, we can better appreciate the scope of his advice to politicians to do everything they can to prevent stasis in their cities. Rather than being a clarion call to end all conflict, and thus a call for perfect coordination and holistic harmony, this is advice for addressing the causes of civil war. His counsel to suppress such a calamity should not be interpreted as a recommendation to quash all types of conflict whatsoever.

I. What Is Stasis?

The text of the Politics is littered with talk of stasis, diastasis, and those who stasiazousi, but it is only in Pol. V.1–4 that Aristotle attempts to explain what, exactly, he means by these terms. At the most general level, stasis is a prominent type of constitutional change [metabolē],2 distinguished from other types of change caused by such things as electioneering (V.3 1303a14), carelessness (a16), or unnoticed, gradual alteration (a1). But when it comes to offering a positive account of what stasis is, Aristotle describes it as being a kind of action, identified by a certain sort of means being used for attaining a certain sort of end. Specifically, stasis is that species of political change in which participants use the instruments of force or deceit (V.4 1304b8) to change the form of the constitution (V.1 1301b6–10) or, though they leave the form unchanged, try to get the constitution “in their own hands”; to alter the “degree” of the constitution; or to change a specific part of the constitution (b10–26).3

Notice that, described thus, stasis does not exist in the way that a chair exists or a specific living substance exists; rather, it designates a type of social action altering the civic constitution.4 Thus, when we read that a city is filled with stasis, Politics V.2 suggests that Aristotle would have us ask such questions as: Who are the people acting in this way? Have these actors decided to use force, or are they using fraud as their means? Do they wish to accomplish some goal that will leave the constitution of the city intact, or are they planning to alter the city’s form? In other words, because stasis exists as social action, understanding it not only involves noticing changes in patterns of external political behavior, but also requires grasping the psychology of the agents engaged in such action. Documenting the beliefs and desires that cause people to change a constitution, therefore, is not a coincidental investigation, but a crucial component of understanding stasis itself.

While even a cursory reading makes it clear that these sorts of action-oriented causes are of most interest to Aristotle in Pol. V.1–4, it is no small task to make sense of his rather convoluted account. The broad outline, thankfully, is not too difficult to comprehend since he explicitly declares that the archai or aitiai5 of stasis are “three in number” (for the sake of readable translations, I will use the generic “faction” and its cognates to translate “stasis” and its cognates):

[1] how those who factionalize hold themselves and [2] for the sake of which things, and [3], third, what are the origins [archai] of political disturbances and factions among people. (V.2 1302a20–22)

We can see clearly enough that Aristotle would have us draw some sort of three-fold division among the causes of stasis; but getting clear about what, exactly, Aristotle means by each of these three is more difficult. My own interpretation of how Aristotle comprehends stasis and these causes rests on three main claims.

First, Aristotle thinks that there is a surprising degree of psychological similarity among all those who engage in faction.

Second, Aristotle is drawing a temporal distinction among these causes: he offers [1] the first and [2] second causes as a psychological portrait of those who actively engage in faction, and introduces [3] the third cause to identify factors that, at an earlier time, helped to create factionalizing mindsets.

Third, among the elements in a factionalizing psychology, Aristotle draws a distinction between the general motive of factionalizers, on the one hand, and the specific opportunities agents attempt to exploit when they decide to initiate faction. The [2] second cause depicts the decision that initiates or “triggers” active factionalizing, while [1] the first cause describes a general wish.

I.1. A Universal Profile of Factionalizers

Aristotle describes [1] the first cause of stasis as “how those who factionalize hold themselves [pōs te echontes stasiazousi].” I take it that he conjugates the verb and participle in the present tense because he takes himself to be depicting people who are performing a certain kind of action that is in progress. All of his descriptions of the first cause of stasis represent it this way. For example, when he spells out the details of the first cause, he again uses verbs and participles in the present tense:

For faction is everywhere [pantachou] due to inequality, when unequals do not receive proportionately unequal things (for example, a permanent kingship is unequal if it exists among equals). For people generally [holōs] engage in faction pursuing equality [to ison zētountes stasiazousi]. (Pol. V.1 1301b26–29)6

In the next chapter, Aristotle elaborates:

One must establish what, most of all, is generally the cause [aitian katholou] of people being in some way disposed to change—a cause which we already hit upon in earlier discussion. For those who desire equality factionalize [isotētos ephiemenoi stasiazousi] if they believe [nomizōsin] that they are getting less, even though they are the equals of those who are getting more; whereas those who desire inequality and superiority do so when they believe [hupolambanōsin] that, though they are unequal, they are not getting more but the same or less. (Sometimes these desires are just, sometimes unjust.) (V.2 1302a22–29)

Once again, this description reveals something about people who are already factionalizing.

What, exactly, is it that is revealed? Aristotle’s expanded account here in Pol. V.2 portrays the first cause as this: not getting as much as one believes one deserves, coupled with a desire to rectify this perceived injustice. On this reading, Aristotle uses verbs of thinking and believing to emphasize that factionalizers may, or may not, have a correct, or even partially correct, conception of justice. When Aristotle here claims that “Sometimes these desires are just, sometimes unjust,” he signals to readers that his foregoing discussion was focusing upon the factionalizers’ subjective perception of justice, regardless of whether that perception is correct or not. In this way, Aristotle is able to identify a cause of faction that we might find in perfectly virtuous people, partially just oligarchs, partially just democrats, and even unjust tyrants (or extreme oligarchs and democrats acting tyrannically). For example, in a city where all inhabitants are similarly virtuous, but one person holds a permanent kingship, faction may start because the virtuous believe they are getting less power than they deserve. However, in a (genuine) aristocracy where a few virtuous people rule, this same belief might lead the poor to factionalize. And again, in a democratic city where everyone is treated as arithmetically equal, the virtuous may factionalize if they think they are not getting the superior appointments they believe they deserve. And yet this same desire for superior treatment might cause the rich to factionalize in a city where virtue is used as the standard for merit, and even cause the richest person of all to factionalize for despotic power. In all these cases, we have people motivated by a desire for equality, in either its arithmetic or proportional form.

It is by picking out a feature that might be shared by both virtuous and vicious agents alike that Aristotle can offer a universal account of this cause of stasis. That Aristotle hopes to identify such a universal is suggested by his claims that faction is everywhere [pantachou] explained by this first cause, that this cause is universal [katholou], and that it holds generally [holōs]. Of course, in the realm of human affairs, we would not expect any generalization to hold without exception, and we must also remember that Aristotle thinks there are types of constitutional change ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part I: Conflict in Imperfect Cities
• Part II: Conflict among Perfect Citizens
• Part III: Aristotelian Conflict and Modern Political Thought
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index Locorum
• General Index
• Back Cover