A State in Denial:

British Collaboration with Loyalist Paramilitaries

Margaret Urwin

• Publisher: Mercier Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781781174630
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Human Rights
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This meticulously researched book uses previously secret official documents to explore the tangled web of relationships between the top echelons of the British establishment, incl Cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, police/military officers and intelligence services with loyalist paramilitaries of the UDA & UVF throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Covert British Army units, mass sectarian screening, propaganda 'dirty tricks, ' arming sectarian killers and a point-blank refusal over the worst two decades of the conflict, to outlaw the largest loyalist killer gang in Northern Ireland. It shows how tactics such as curfew and internment were imposed on the nationalist population in Northern Ireland and how London misled the European Commission over internment's one-sided nature. It focuses particularly on the British Government's refusal to proscribe the UDA for two decades – probably the most serious abdication of the rule of law in the entire conflict. Previously classified documents show a clear pattern of official denial, at the highest levels of government, of the extent and impact of the loyalist assassination campaign.

1
From conflict origins to internment and direct rule

‘A series of positive actions by employees of the State actively furthered and facilitated Patrick Finucane’s murder and … in the aftermath of the murder, there was a relentless attempt to defeat the ends of justice.’ The Government accept[s] these findings unequivocally.

Former British Prime Minister David Cameron speaking in the House of Commons on 16 January 2015, accepting the conclusions of Sir Desmond de Silva’s Report of the Patrick Finucane Review¹

The purpose of this book is to explore the tangled web of relationships between British government ministers, senior civil servants and senior police and military officers with loyalist paramilitaries in both the UDA and the UVF. By using the lens of official British and Irish declassified documents from the 1970s and early 1980s, it will also put into context the loyalist intimidation and sectarian assassination campaigns that occurred in Northern Ireland throughout this period.

That the British government would engage in a collusive relationship with loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland is consistent with British counter-insurgency operations in other theatres of conflict since the Second World War.² Having introduced counter-insurgency methods in a number of colonial campaigns – Malaya, Muscat, Oman, Cyprus and Kenya – British Army brigadier Sir Frank Kitson was posted to Northern Ireland in 1970 as commander of 39 Brigade, Belfast.³ He soon set about introducing these methods in his new posting by establishing plain-clothes soldiers in covert units, which evolved into the Military Reaction Force (MRF), and encouraging the use of ‘proxy’ or supporting forces – local friendly forces employed throughout the colonies by the British Army.⁴

Just as the use of ‘Q Patrols’ of Turkish Cypriots was an important feature in the British victory in Cyprus, and tribes hostile to the Kikuyu in Kenya played a major role in the defeat of the Mau-Mau, so the loyalists of Northern Ireland were the natural allies of the British in their war against republicans, especially the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).⁵ In fact, the loyalists of Northern Ireland had a stronger incentive to become involved than any colonial group. They were British citizens and wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, sharing a common identity and mutual self-interest.

While it would be simplistic to make direct comparisons between the colonies and Northern Ireland, the British Army did discuss among themselves precedents established in Cyprus, Aden and Hong Kong.⁶ All army officers who held the top job (general officer commanding) in Northern Ireland during the 1970s had colonial experience. Many of the tactics used in the colonies were employed in Northern Ireland (but on a much smaller scale) as is exemplified in the Falls Curfew of 1970,⁷ internment, in-depth interrogation, Bloody Sunday,⁸ screening of the population,⁹ undercover units and the use of ‘friendly forces’.

The main ‘friendly forces’ were the UVF and the UDA. While a number of less important loyalist organisations were also established in the early 1970s – Vanguard, Red Hand Commando (RHC), Tara, Orange Volunteers (OV) and Down Orange Welfare (DOW) – the focus here will be on the two main organisations. Numerous official documents establish that British government policy was to portray these loyalists as reactive and defensive, but also largely undisciplined and unstructured – only loosely bound by constraints or leadership control (although these documents also reveal that, in reality, the government knew very well that they were both structured and disciplined).¹⁰ The benefit of portraying them in this way was that there would not be organisational accountability for their actions (unlike the disciplined and structured IRA). Once adopted, this policy position continued through the decades, giving cover to the UDA and, to a lesser extent, the UVF, in their murderous sectarian campaigns.

***

An examination of the origins of the modern UVF leads directly to the opening shots of the conflict in Northern Ireland. From at least 1965 unionist unease was growing. Several factors, both political and economic, contributed to mounting unionist disquiet: the reforms of Prime Minister Terence O’Neill and his meetings with Irish Taoiseach Seán Lemass; the economic downturn, resulting in job losses in the shipyard and aircraft industry (both had mainly Protestant/unionist workforces) and the terminal decline of the linen industry; a decision to dedicate the new bridge over the River Lagan to Queen Elizabeth II rather than Edward Carson;¹¹ and constant rumours of a new IRA campaign.¹²

Several factors were stoking unionist fears about IRA intentions. In November 1965, during the election campaign, members of the Stormont Parliament announced that the IRA was planning to disrupt the election. Rumours were also circulating that the anniversary of the IRA’s previous campaign – 12 December 1965 – would provide the impetus for the resumption of an armed campaign. The IRA’s previous ‘Border Campaign’, which ended in 1962, began on 12 December 1956. When these predictions failed to materialise, speculation then began about the potential for IRA violence during the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising in April 1966.

Rev. Ian Paisley was in the vanguard of those fuelling the flames. Although Easter Rising commemorations were to be confined to nationalist areas, Paisley led public objections to the government’s decision to permit the events.¹³ An RUC report on ‘the Paisleyite Movement’ was sent by RUC Inspector General A. H. Kennedy to the Ministry of Home Affairs on 20 June 1966. The inspector general wrote:

While there is always the IRA in the background ready to seize any opportunity to disturb the peace, the fact is that an equal or even greater threat is posed at present by extremist Protestant groups, many of whom are members of loyalist organisations. These are the people whom it may be possible to reach at meetings of the Loyal Orange Order and other similar bodies and it may be that leaders of Protestant churches could also play their part before it is too late.¹⁴

The report advised that Paisley and his followers had decided to form ‘a new extreme Protestant organisation’ which would operate under a number of different names:

1. The Ulster Constitution Defence Committee

2. The Ulster Protestant Volunteer Force

3. The Ulster Volunteer Force

4. The Ulster Defence Corps

5. Ulster Protestant Action¹⁵

The report contained the following information on the UVF:

The Ulster Volunteer Force is regarded as the militant wing of the organisation and operates under great secrecy. Small divisions are known to have been formed in Belfast, Counties Antrim, Armagh and Tyrone. There is little doubt that a good number of personnel in the Ulster Special Constabulary are active members; indeed it is feared that some have been recruited from other branches of the Crown Forces and government departments.¹⁶

Inspector General Kennedy observed that in the event of force being used, the UVF would be entirely dependent on sympathisers in the Ulster Special Constabulary and crown forces.¹⁷

When Prime Minister O’Neill banned the UVF on 28 June 1966, after the killing of three people in sectarian attacks in May and June of that year, he insinuated that there was a connection between the UVF and Rev. Paisley. He referred to a statement made in the Ulster Hall on 16 June, when Paisley purportedly read out resolutions from the UVF that they were ‘solidly behind Paisley’. The prime minister also referred to a statement of thanks that Paisley had extended to the UVF at a march on 17 April.¹⁸

UVF leader Gusty Spence, a former soldier in the Royal Ulster Rifles who was convicted of one of the killings, later claimed that the RUC and Stormont government in 1966 deliberately tried to connect Paisley to the UVF to discredit him. However, he also claimed that some members of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) were ‘key to the UVF’.¹⁹ Although Paisley flatly denied that his Ulster Constitution Defence Committee or his Ulster Protestant Action had any links to the UVF, according to Margaret O’Callaghan and Catherine O’Donnell, loyalist activist Noel Doherty was listed as secretary of both the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee and the Belfast UVF, while William (Billy) Mitchell was said to be a member of both Ulster Protestant Action and the Belfast UVF.²⁰

David Boulton notes that the modern UVF was formed in March 1966 and began a petrol-bombing campaign on Catholic premises in March and April, which accelerated in May.²¹ After Spence and two others were convicted in October 1966 of the three killings, the UVF went quiet until March 1969 when it was responsible for causing explosions at power stations, reservoirs and water pipelines. These explosions were initially blamed on the IRA. Paisley’s newspaper, the Protestant Telegraph, described the four bomb explosions at the electricity substation in Castlereagh, Belfast, as ‘the first act of sabotage by the...

Table of contents

• Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Foreword
• 1 From conflict origins to internment and direct rule
• 2 The first ira ceasefire and the repercussions of its breakdown
• 3 Arming the loyalists
• 4 Ireland v United Kingdom (european commission of human rights)
• 5 Loyalists Torpedo the Northern Ireland power-sharing executive
• 6 The new IRA ceasefire and the loyalist backlash
• 7 Discrimination in ‘Screening’ and the power of propaganda
• 8 Civil War? the ‘official’ arrival of the SAS and ‘ulsterisation’
• 9 UDA murders of high-profile republicans
• Conclusion
• Endnotes
• Bibliography
• About the Author
• About the Publisher