1
INTRODUCTION
We live in surprising times. There are many who have yet to come to terms with Brexit, the election of Trump as US President, the crisis of confidence in the European Union, or the popularity of extreme right-wing groups in Europe. Yet there are many who support these changes. In Poland, a large part of the population is watching in horror as the ruling party displays its determination to turn the democratic order on its head: they are demolishing the independence of the courts, shredding free media, and limiting the capacity of creating independent organizations (as of the time of writing, the European Commission is in the process of Article 7 proceedings; in other words, in the midst of a procedure outlined in the Treaty on European Union designed to determine whether there is a risk in an EU Member State that European values may be at risk of serious breach â in this case, the rule of law is at stake). How passionately they are warping the educational system, violating civil rights, and stripping minorities of their rights â how they are pushing Poland to the margins of Europe. Howls of protest are raised against the thoughtless chopping down of the BiaĆowieska Forest1 (in direct contradiction to the warnings of scientists and the opinion of the European Commission) and the unjustified slaughter of wild boar (the recently liberalized laws on hunting). Many are also unable to believe their eyes at the sight of neo-fascist marches of âtrue Polesâ through the streets of Polish cities, and they are shocked at the smiles on the faces of those in government, proud of âsuch a beautiful sightâ (to quote statements made by then Interior Minister BĆaszczak regarding the 11 November 2017 Independence Day celebrations). All of this was, until recently, unthinkable. However, there are a large number of people who consider these events appropriate and desirable, and certainly not threatening. Commentators and researchers are making tremendous efforts to understand these changes, falling back on traditional distinctions: normal people (the sovereign) versus the elite, the countryside versus the city, religion versus no religion, left versus right. And while these constructs remain important in descriptions of the complexity of social life, it would nevertheless seem that they have lost their explanatory power in relation to what we are witnessing today. They also fail to help us predict what awaits in both the near and more distant future.
As it turns out, divisions in society â deeper than ever before â are demarcated according to entirely different criteria, which generally include trust (in politics, politicians, and institutions), attitudes towards refugees/immigrants, and attachment to strict cultural norms. Studies demonstrate that, in a way, these dimensions polarize social groups across traditional divides. The perception of politicians and politics as unworthy of our trust is characteristic of people with both right-wing and left-wing views (Ivarsflaten, 2008; TNS OBOP, 2010; Edelman Trust Barometer, 2017; Siedlecka, 2017), and the persistence of sceptical, suspicious attitudes towards politicians has in many countries led to rejection of the political status quo, delegitimization of governing parties, and support for populist and radical parties (see BĂ©langer & Aarts, 2006; Bergh, 2004; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Marczewski, 2017). Negative attitudes towards refugees/migrants are present among both people of right-wing and left-wing views, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, men and women, and people living in both rural and urban areas (e.g., Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015; Pattyn, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Onraet, 2012; CBOS, 2015). It is the anti-immigrant attitudes of people in many countries that have contributed to significant support for populist politicians and parties, and not only in Europe (e.g., Allen, 2017; Jetten et al., 2015; BieĆkowski & Ćwiderska, 2017). In Poland, fear of immigrants, successfully magnified in the run up to the 2015 elections, is considered one of the more important factors in political change (Puhl, 2015; Migalski, 2017). In addition, the dimension of cultural âtightnessâ, defined as an attachment to harsh social norms accompanied by low tolerance for any deviations from them2 (Gelfand, Nishi, & Raver, 2006), is not only applicable to conservative societies. It also turned out that this dimension predicted whether one would vote for Trump 44 times more accurately than other dimensions, including authoritarianism, which was previously the strongest predictor of radical choices (Gelfand et al., 2016).
For years, psychology has also pointed to one other dimension whose significance comes to the fore particularly in uncertain times. This is the fundamental dimension of our mind: closed/open-mindedness, described in detail by Milton Rokeach in 1960, elaborated by Andrzej Malewski (1961), and in contemporary times analyzed by Ari W. Kruglanski and a large group of researchers affiliated with him (see the November 2016 interview with Kruglanski in The New York Times). This dimension distinguishes people open to information and new ideas, prepared to change their views, from people who are rigidly attached to their convictions and resistant to the unknown. Closed-mindedness thus implies a tendency to maintain in oneâs mind a single perspective along with the conviction of its unquestionable correctness, which leads to the rejection of other perspectives. Closed-mindedness leads people to believe they are in possession of an absolute truth, which is why they uncritically trample on the convictions of others as fundamentally false and bad. Objective facts, rational arguments, evidence â none of it has any meaning. They go unnoticed, they are rejected, or they are manipulated to reinforce the initially held convictions. This is why, apart from its other effects, closed-mindedness leads to harmful judgements about reality, the retention of a black-and-white vision of the world, falsification of reality, and unfair judgements of other people. It is a source of stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, and in consequence the refusal of the right to live for many people and social groups. Closed-mindedness is a threat to tolerance and open democracy (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979; Gibson-Graham, 2006; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Vogt, 1997).
Closed-minded people are not only resistant to facts, but they are also motivated to keep their mind closed. They must feed it with fears (suspicions, doubts, worries), and in consequence they gain even more certainty as to their infallibility. It is precisely the belief that âI know betterâ that gives closed-minded people the right â in their mind â to break the law and place themselves above it, to issue judgements, to decide alone (or in their own group) about what is right and what is wrong, to punish those who dare disagree with their verdicts. Does this not sound familiar?
Open-mindedness, in turn, implies the capacity to retain diverse perspectives in oneâs mind, to accept their diversity and their critical overview. This also involves continually doubting in the correctness of oneâs own views, and by the same token a constant readiness to re-examine them. In consequence, it becomes possible to change oneâs beliefs and judgements about other people whenever new and more credible information is revealed. This all leads to thinking divorced from stereotypes, in which prejudice is minimized. It leads to tolerance towards others, that is to say respect for othersâ feelings, perspectives, preferences, beliefs, and actions, even when they are in stark contrast to oneâs own. Difficult for us to imagine in todayâs world, isnât it?
Open-mindedness is a psychological resource that facilitates the development of individuals, societies, and cultures. Progress is rather easy to measure in science, but more difficult within the domain of morality (see Lambie, 2014). In science, progress has been represented by the work of Galileo, Kepler, Newton, etc. Progress within the sphere of morality â the ending of slavery, recognition of torture as impermissible, sharing with the needs, recognition of genocide as an evil. The history of humanity is not a history of progress â Nazism came to life in a nation of poets and humanists; slavery was instituted in French colonies by Napoleon in 1802; and politicians sanctioned torture in Guantanamo Bay in 2002. Progress does not simply happen â we are pushed to it by leaders whose objective is a more fair, open, and tolerant society. Simply put, a better society. Has this idea today become so devalued?
For years, it was considered that closed-mindedness was a consequence of low intelligence, poor education, and difficulties with comprehension and logical thinking (e.g., Rokeach, 1948; Zagona & Zurcher, 1965; Rychlicka & NÄcka, 1990). Today we know that poorer mental capacity indeed does create more fertile ground for closed-mindedness, but it is not fully determinative (Steininger & Colsher, 1979; Van Hiel & Crowson, 2017; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010). Some of the problems of the contemporary world are the work of decisions by intelligent and creative leaders who nevertheless are distinguished by their closed-mindedness (see Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski, 2003; Fullbrook, 2004; Harvey, 2006).
For decades, the dimension of closed-mindedness was linked with a specific worldview â right-wing, conservative, religious (Altemeyer, 1996). Today, we demonstrate with studies what Rokeach and other theoreticians suggested in their analyses long ago: that these ideologies favour closed-mindedness but are not entirely explanatory of it. People of both conservative and liberal beliefs can be closed to other ideas, particularly those which do not suit their worldview; they can selectively seek information that is aligned with their convictions; they can also be entirely certain that they are entirely correct. Closed-mindedness is present among people who are both religious and non-religious; among those who believe in supernatural phenomena and those who mock such beliefs; among those who defend the rights of animals and those who give not a whit for animals; among advocates of veganism and those who eagerly consume meat. And so on, and so on.
We know a great deal about this dimension, but far more about closed-mindedness than open-mindedness (see Kruglanski, 2004; Kossowska, 2005). Several decades of systematic research have given us a good understanding of the social consequences of closed-mindedness. We have also grasped its sources and the mechanism that leads to it. We know that some people are more predisposed to closed-mindedness, but we all react with closed-mindedness in situations of uncertainty. We also know that despite the socially negative consequences of closed-mindedness (the most important of which is intolerance), it also has adaptive and regulatory functions for individuals and groups. Thus, it is better for us to understand the processes associated with closed-mindedness but also the conditions in which we remain open despite our opposite tendencies. In this book, we intend to focus on previously unexplored effects of closed-mindedness.
The title of this book includes the word âtoleranceâ. We use this notion in its purely psychological sense, defining tolerance as openness towards âdifferentâ, âthe otherâ, âdistinct from usâ. This is, of course, not the only way of framing the subject (see, e.g., Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017), which we address in the final parts of the book. The framing we propose looks at tolerance through the lens of processes underlying stereotypes, prejudices, and discrimination towards representatives of various groups. We thus turn our attention to both factors responsible for forming a positive perception of others, and those which, despite the persistence of negative attitudes towards various groups, do not allow for aggression towards them. In our opinion, both of these aspects of open-mindedness are important, as they determine the quality of interpersonal relationships; these, in turn, impact both human and social welfare. In Poland today, we observe with trepidation how easily and without fear of sanction one may exhibit views, attitudes, and behaviours that stigmatize individuals who come from other cultures, profess other values, and believe in other deities. There is an urgent need for a better understanding of the source of such ostracism. It is our conviction that while psychology has been involved in explaining these phenomena for some time (see recently published works: BrzeziĆski, 2017; Kofta & Bilewicz, 2011; Drogosz, Bilewicz, & Kofta, 2012; Drogosz, 2018), viewing them through the lens of processes linked with closed- and open-mindedness will provide us with new data. It also facilitates the formulation of recommendations applicable in social practice that can provide a chance to halt or even reverse these negative social trends.
In this volume we report on the results of work by research teams from the Centre for Social Cognitive Studies (www.cscs.edu.pl), operating at the Jagiellonian University Institute of Psychology. In our work, we have concentrated primarily on describing the (neuro)cognitive, affective, and motivational mechanisms underlying closed-mindedness, and on demonstrating its functional aspect. The most interesting and important results of our work, however, concern the boundary conditions in which individuals characterized by closed-mindedness (predisposed to closed-mindedness) react with openness: to information, to viewpoints, to other people. This is proof to us that openness is possible, even in situations conducive to closed-mindedness. This research is presented in detail in this volume. We are confident that they form a basis to develop approaches for counteracting closed-mindedness. There is nothing more important than promoting open-mindedness in times of confusion and chaos.
This book is written from a psychological perspective. The reader will not find in it any sociological or political analyses. By the same token, it does not pretend to explain the entire complexity of the contemporary world, but it does show what contemporary psychology can contribute to enhancing our understanding of it. And it can contribute quite a bit. We focus on the individual, because we believe it is necessary to understand the individualâs reactions in order to grasp how to bring change to our surroundings. But the key to understanding reactions is understanding the circumstances that make people closed-minded and susceptible to populist nonsense. People do not live and function in a vacuum. There exists a widespread conviction that in the modern world, the success of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism is the product of globalization, the greed of transnational corporations, the failure of neoliberal politics that has led to drastic social inequality, and the loss of a feeling of security. To this list, we often add the threat of terrorism and associated fear for oneâs own health and safety. This also goes with the exceptional rate of technological progress. These are quite distinct phenomena, but there is one common denominator: they are all sources of uncertainty. Each of these situations leads people to feel, irrespective of the reality that surrounds them, that the world has ceased to be predictable and comprehensible. It is thus difficult to effectively plan oneâs own future and that of oneâs kin. It is difficult to make smart choices. An effective manner of coping with oneâs own fears, as it turns out, is to accept radical ideologies, which supply simple explanations, point to those responsible, channel rage and frustration. By the same token, they restore a feeling of control, faith that the world is orderly and makes sense, and give a reason to exist. They also give false hope for a better tomorrow. Importantly, however â it is not the experience of real threats, but the manner in which they appear that forms emotional reactions, attitudes, quests, and choices. It is perception, not the real situation we are in fact in, that delivers the fuel needed for developing the way we think about the world, ourselves, and others. It shapes social tolerance or is responsible for its absence.
This book would not have been possible without the engagement of people who spent five years studying the issue. A tangible product of this involvement has come in the form of eight successfully defended PhD theses devoted to various aspects of open-mindedness and closed-mindedness. Ewa Szumowska explored the link between closed-mindedness and multitasking; Piotr Dragon and Joanna GrzymaĆa-MoszczyĆska examined the association between closed-mindedness and the tendency to employ stereotypes in shaping prejudices towards âothersâ; Gabriela Czarnek described the psychophysiological mechanisms of closed-mindedness; Agnieszka Strojny and PaweĆ Strojny focused on the role of cognitive resources in promoting open-mindedness; Klara Rydzewska indicated the adaptive functions of closed-mindedness in the cognitive function of older persons; Krzysztof Hanusz examined the same issue in the context of the effect of exposure to computer games. Aneta Czernatowicz-Kukuczka and Sindhuja Sankaran, occupying post-doctoral positions, analyzed the role of stress and feeling of control in shaping closed-mindedness; Paulina Szwed, as research assistant, tested assumptions concern...