A New Struggle for Independence in Modern Latin America

Pablo A. Baisotti, Pablo A. Baisotti

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000458862
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia dell'America Latina e dei Caraibi

This volume explores several notable themes related to foreign affairs in Latin America and the reconfiguration of the power of the different states in the region. It offers insightful historical perspectives for understanding national, regional and global issues from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day, from analysis of the traditional "hegemony" of the United States over Latin America through its military, and political influence due to the presence of the European Union, Russia, and China. These views cannot be reduced to a simplistic vision of the dominant and subordinate; rather, they attempt to seek lines of continuity by highlighting traditional interpretations of new scenarios such as regional trading and security blocs. The volume refuses to impose a traditional and uncritical linear historical narrative onto the reader but instead proposes an alternative interpretation of the past and its relation to the present. Finally, the growing importance of international mechanisms in enabling the success of certain Latin American regimes is also highlighted, in particular the influence of regional diffusion through international organizations or other networks.

1 The United Kingdom, the United States and China as Competitors for Hegemony in Argentina, 1860–2020

Carlos Escudé

DOI: 10.4324/9781003042686-2

If either wealth or poverty are come by honesty, there is no shame.

(Confucius)

Introduction

To anyone with knowledge of Argentine history, it is patently clear that the replacement, in 1945, of the U.K. by the U.S. as the hegemon in the Southern Cone region of the Americas had ruinous consequences for Argentina, for the simple reason that (albeit in an asymmetrical way) the Argentine and British economies complemented each other, but there was practically nothing that the U.S. needed from Argentina. This has not changed.

Notwithstanding, with the recent decline of the U.S. and the rise of China, new prospects have emerged, because the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has an economy that is complementary to that of Argentina.

In this context, if Argentina is to reverse its descent and make good use of this new opportunity, it is urgent to learn from the lessons of the past. This chapter is divided into three major sections: 1860–1942, 1942–1955 and 2003–2020. It is largely based on original research undertaken by the author.

Section I – The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1860–1942

The Economic Dimension of the Anglo-Argentine Connection

According to one of the great economic historians of Argentina, the late Cuban-American Carlos Díaz-Alejandro:

From 1860 to 1930 Argentina grew at a rate that has few parallels in economic history, perhaps comparable only to the performance during the same period of other countries of recent settlement. The expansion was most remarkable until the outburst of World War I; the fifty years before 1914 witnessed in Argentina one of the highest growth rates in the world for such a prolonged period of time […] During 1900–1930, Pampean real wages seemed higher than in some European cities. A comparison of hourly wages in 1911–14 between Buenos Aires and Paris and Marseille for seven different categories showed the Buenos Aires wage rates higher than those in Marseille in all categories (by about 80%), and higher than most corresponding Parisian wage rates (on average by about 25%). A 1921 report of the British Department of Overseas Trade stated that Argentine wages before World War I were higher than in European countries […].

(Díaz-Alejandro 1970, 1, 41, 43, 44)

This expansion was basically the product of the complementary character of the Argentine and British economies. This complementarity produced both trade and capital investments to an extent that was undreamed of before in Argentina. The flow of capital and trade was concomitant with the flow of immigrants and with expansion in production. By 1890, £174.8 million were invested by Britain in Argentina. By 1909, this sum had grown to £291 million, of which 166.4 were in railways, a basic service for the transportation of Argentine goods to the port. By 1913, this sum had grown further to £357.7 million. The evolution of British capital in Argentina can be followed in Table 1.1 (Martínez and Lewandowski 1915, 358; Ferns 1950).

To put the U.S. into the picture, it should suffice to say that until the mid-1920s, both French and German investments amounted to more than the U.S. total. During the 1930s, U.S. investments occupied the second place, but very far behind the U.K. and not too far ahead of France (Phelps 1938, 105). In 1939, almost 40% of British investments in Latin America were in Argentina. A comparative perspective of the situation in 1942 is portrayed in Table 1.2. Thus, although the U.S. had an interest in Argentina, it was far from attaining the level of capital penetration of the Argentine economy that the U.K. had achieved.

Table 1.1 British Capital in Argentina, 1913–1943 (in Millions of Pounds)

1913	£357.7	1929	£432.7	1937	£441.5
1918	£379.5	1930	£435.1	1938	£442.3
1923	£396.1	1931	£429.7	1939	£428.5
1924	£395.0	1932	£427.8	1940	£417.3
1925	£400.8	1933	£436.7	1941	£395.6
1926	£408.2	1934	£453.1	1942	£397.3
1927	£411.9	1935	£446.2	1943	£384.1
1928	£420.4	1936	£442.1

Source: Escudé (1981, 58).

Table 1.2 Foreign Investment in Argentina in 1942 (US$ millions)

	Total	% of total	Total foreign direct investments	Direct investments in railways
Britain	1,360.0	60.09	1,138.5	891.3
U.S.	442.3	19.55	263.2	7.7
Belgium	252.3	11.15	245.0	–
France	120.3	5.31	119.8	100.1
Italy	19.8	0.87	19.3	–
Germany	8.9	0.39	8.9

Source: Escudé (1981, 58).

The case for Argentine imports was somewhat different. Britain and Germany occupied the first and second places until World War I. In 1916, the U.S. displaced Britain, and this situation prevailed until 1922. The U.S. took the lead again in 1925, but was displaced in 1931. Britain had the lead from that year until 1939, with the situation again disrupted by World War II. Apparently, while free trade prevailed, the U.S. could compete well for the Argentine import market. The Depression was favorable to Britain, while the wars were devastating to her share of the Argentine market. With regard to Argentine exports, however, the situation was again reverted. The U.S. was very far from being able – or wanting – to dispute British predominance as a consumer of Argentine exports. During the pre-World War I and inter-war years, Germany was second to Britain; indeed, the Netherlands and Belgium were during several years a more important market for Argentina than the U.S. Not even during the war did the U.S. displace the U.K. (Anuario Estadístico [Statistical Yearbook] 1944 and 1947, 39–61; Ministerio de Asuntos Técnicos [Ministry of Technical Affairs] 1948–1952; Chamber of Commerce 1951, 83). Moreover, until the end of World War II, Argentina was, overall, a highly privileged actor within the economic structure of the British Empire. Table 1.3 illustrates the number of non-Empire countries receiving U.K. exports of greater value than those received by Argentina.

Table 1.3 Number of Non-Empire Countries Receiving U.K. Exports of Greater Value Than Argentina, 1912–1952

1912	3	1923	5	1933	3	1943	2
1913	3	1924	3	1934	3	1944	5
1914	3	1925	3	1935	3	1945	6
1915	5	1926	2	1936	3	1946	7
1916	5	1927	2	1937	3	1947	1
1917	6	1928	2	1938	2	1948	2
1918	4	1929	3	1939	1	1949	2
1919	9	1930	3	1940	1	1950	10
1920	6	1931	3	1941	2	1951	12
1921	2	1932	4	1942	1	1952	13
1922	7

Source: Escudé (1981, 65).

Table 1.4 Countries from Which the U.K. Bought More Than from Argentina, Including the Empire But Excluding the U.S., 1912–1952

1912	3	1923	1	1933	2	1943	2
1913	3	1924	0	1934	3	1944	1
1914	3	1925	3	1935	2	1945	4
1915	0	1926	1	1936	3	1946	4
1916	2	1927	0	1937	2	1947	1
1917	3	1928	0	1938	3	1948	2
1918	2	1929	0	1939	2	1949	3
1919	3	1930	1	1940	4	1950	6
1920	0	1931	1	1941	3	1951	12
1921	0	1932	2	1942	3	1952	18
1922	1

Source: Escudé (1981, 65).

Furthermore, as shown in Table 1.4, this was, even more, the case with regard to the importance of Argentina as a source of supplies for the U.K. Indeed, during 7 of the 17 years spanning 1915 and 1932, it was the prime source of U.K. imports, including Empire countries but excluding the U.S. Neither Canada, Australia, nor New Zealand was in such a privileged position; only India could match this record. Furthermore, from 1920 to 1932, Argentina was – the U.S. excluded – the primary source of U.K. imports, despite the fact that often in those years, it bought more from the U.S. than from Britain, which was not the case for the Empire countries.

Indicators of Resulting Social Development

This flourishing Anglo-Argentine connection came together with social and cultural development, contradicting the tenets of teoría de la dependencia [dependency theory]. Towards 1947, life expectancy in Argentina was higher than those in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. It was at a similar level as the U.K., being slightly higher in Argentina for the male population, and slightly lower for the female population (Keyfitz and Fleiger 1968; United Nations yearbooks).

Illiteracy rates were lower than that in Southern Europe and higher than that in Northern Europe, but incomparably higher than that in other Latin American countries, Argentina’s being 13.06 vis-á-vis Brazil’s 50.6 (UNESCO 1954, 1977).

Towards 1950, the number of third-level students per 100.000 inhabitants was well below the U.S., New Zealand, the Netherlands and Canada, but well above England and Wales, West Germany, East Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Austria (UNESCO 1968).

In the same year, it had 900 inhabitants per physician, a lower ranking than Austria, Switzerland, the U.S. and New Zealand, but on parity with Canada, above Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Australia, and well above Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan, France and Scotland (UN Statistical Yearbook 1952).

Moreover, as measured by the Gini index, towards 1960 Argentina had a more equitable distribution of income than Holland, Finland and France, and a far more equitable distribution than Brazil, Chile, Mexico and South Africa, while Australia, Canada, the U.K., Spain, Uruguay and the U.S. had better, less concentrated distributions (Jain 1975).

Finally, regarding yearly book production, towards 1950 it ranked below the USSR, the U.K., West Germany, Japan, France, the U.S. and Italy, but above Hungary, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Norway and Canada (...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Foreword
• Introduction to Latin American International Relations
• 1 The United Kingdom, the United States and China as Competitors for Hegemony in Argentina, 1860–2020
• 2 Russian Foreign Policy towards Argentina: More Than a Hundred Years of History
• 3 The Comintern, Soviet Diplomacy, and Latin America (1919–1941)
• 4 Brazil and Argentina in the Context of the Two World Wars: Latin American Regional Geopolitics and the Paradox of Insertion through Isolation (1914–1945)
• 5 Latin American Diplomacy: The Years around the Bretton Woods Conference, 1944
• 6 Latin America and the Great Cold War Strategy
• 7 “Fuera el imperialismo yanqui de América Latina. Viva la Revolución Cubana”: Uruguayan Anti-Imperialist Students and Eisenhower’s Visit in 1960
• 8 Between Love and Hate: Latin America versus Spain
• 9 A Century of Conflicts between Cuba and the United States
• 10 “Dreams of Revolution”: The Regional Impact of the Bolivarian Wave
• 11 Border Politics in UNASUR: Lessons from the Triple Andean Frontier
• 12 The Dilemmas of the South American Integration Project
• 13 Latin America versus the U.S. Trump Administration: Crisis and Subordination (2017–2021)
• Contributors
• Index