Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain

Jean-Claude Amiard

• Publisher: Wiley-ISTE
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781119855514
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Mechanical Engineering
• Index: Technology & Engineering

Following the acquisition of the atomic bomb by five states, the United Nations began drafting several treaties to limit nuclear proliferation. These efforts failed, as four more states also acquired nuclear weapons. In a similar vein, an attempt to limit atomic weapons - primarily within the two superpowers - was initiated. While the number of weapons has decreased, the new bombs now being manufactured are more powerful and more precise, negating any reduction in numbers. In the field of civil nuclear use, all nuclear facilities (reactors, factories, etc.) have a limited lifespan. Once a plant is permanently shut down, these facilities must be decommissioned and dismantled. These operations are difficult, time-consuming and costly. In addition, decommissioning generates large volumes of radioactive waste of various categories, including long-lived and high-activity waste. Risks to the environment and to health are not negligible during decommissioning. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have produced numerous publications with recommendations. Each state has its own decommissioning strategy (immediate or delayed) and final plan for the site - whether it be returning it to greenfield status or obtaining a nuclear site license with centuries-long monitoring.

1
Nuclear Non-Proliferation

1.1. Introduction

Nuclear weapons pose an immense risk to human beings, as well as to all living beings and to the environment. For this reason, many individuals and organizations have been working to limit the number of states capable of manufacturing this type of weapon.

UN efforts to prevent, or at least limit, nuclear proliferation are significant and ongoing. For example, the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 28, 2004) echoes the terms of the UN Security Council’s statement from January 31, 1992 by stating that “the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security”. However, in this resolution, it is the risks associated with the acquisition of such weapons by “non-state actors” that are specifically targeted. Some analysts consider that this resolution may justify the use of force to combat proliferation [IRS 19b].

Unfortunately, and in spite of its efforts for 35 years, it is obvious that the UN’s policy of nuclear disarmament has been a failure. The traditional vision of security that seems to be shared by the actors involved in the process of arms control and nuclear disarmament limits their capacity and willingness to abolish this type of armament [LAZ 06]. Hence, France and the United States are exerting strong pressure on the French-speaking states and on Japan to not sign the treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

In an interview with the IRIS (Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs), Jean-Marie Collin [COL 18b], expert and spokesman for ICAN FRANCE, an organization awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017, noted that nuclear weapons constitute a permanent and very real danger for the international community; otherwise, no treaty would have been signed at the UN, and the nuclear deterrent would be null and void. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has stressed that no international plan or actor will be able to adequately address the needs of victims in the event of the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons operate on the balance of terror. However, the problem with balance is that the risk of falling is always great. This “balance” is undesirable to an overwhelming majority of the world, because their security is directly at stake [COL 18b].

1.2. The first countries to acquire the atomic bomb

Five states have carried out their first atomic tests: the United States on July 16, 1945, the Soviet Union on August 29, 1949, the United Kingdom on October 3, 1952, France on February 13, 1960 and China on October 16, 1964.

In order to prevent the number of states possessing nuclear weapons from becoming too large, the United Nations has been concerned with nuclear disarmament from the outset, and four UN structures are particularly responsible for this task: the Security Council, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the Office for Disarmament Affairs [GIL 18].

The Security Council has primary responsibility under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is composed of five permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 10 non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. The general organization of the UN is shown in Figure 1.1.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was established in 1952, within the framework of the Security Council, by General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI), to deal with disarmament issues. However, it only met occasionally after 1959. In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament established a new Disarmament Commission as a subsidiary organ of the Assembly, composed of all UN member states of the Organization. It was established as a deliberative body to consider various disarmament issues and monitor the implementation of the relevant decisions and recommendations adopted at the special session. It sits in New York for three weeks each year (usually in early spring). It considers a limited number of agenda items on a three-year cycle and submits an annual report to the General Assembly [GIL 18].

Figure 1.1. The United Nations organization. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/disarmament.zip

The Conference on Disarmament is the only multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament agreements. It is composed of 65 permanent members who hold three sessions a year in Geneva (usually January to March, May to June and August to September). It operates on the basis of consensus to ensure full support for the agreements reached. It has completed negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but has not yet entered into force [GIL 18].

The Office for Disarmament Affairs, established in 1982, works to promote disarmament and non-proliferation and to strengthen disarmament regimes. Part of its work focuses on nuclear weapons [GIL 18] (Figure 1.2).

The first treaty limiting the use of weapons (particularly nuclear weapons), the Antarctic Treaty, signed in Washington, entered into force on June 23, 1961. This treaty stipulates that the Antarctic is an area exclusively reserved for peaceful purposes and prohibits all activities of a military nature, such as military maneuvers and the testing of any kind of weapon.

Figure 1.2. The various UN bodies working on non-proliferation and disarmament. UNODA: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/amiard/disarmament.zip

1.3. The NPT

The International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was developed within the UN by the Eighteen-Power Committee on Disarmament. Concrete negotiations lasted three years, from 1965 to 1968. The text was mainly drawn up by the United States and the Soviet Union. On July 1, 1968, the treaty was opened for signature in Moscow, Washington and London. It entered into force on March 5, 1970 after ratification by the three depositary Powers and 40 other signatory states [AIE 70].

For the treaty itself, the parties had to decide on its extension 25 years after its entry into force. Despite the reluctance of some non-aligned countries (Mexico and Indonesia) and Arab countries (because of Israel’s absence from the treaty), the NPT was extended indefinitely on May 11, 1995 [IRS 19a].

The NPT is now close to universality, with 191 states as members. Only four states have not joined: India, Israel, Pakistan and Southern Sudan. However, in January 2003, North Korea initiated a procedure to withdraw from the treaty [FRA 19b].

1.3.1. The functioning of the Treaty

In the operation of the NPT, states are divided into two categories. The first category consists of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS). These are the five official nuclear powers (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China), which according to Article IX “had manufactured and detonated a nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” and are entitled to possess such weapons. The second category includes all non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), which make up the rest of the NPT membership. For the purpose of control or safeguarding, this last category is divided into two sub-categories depending on whether or not the states have access to nuclear facilities (see section 4.1.1).

For many years, this NPT has not been functioning well. This is mainly due to non-compliance with two clauses. The first clause is the non-implementation of a process to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The second clause is related to the hypocrisy of the five weapon states, who do not respect the spirit and letter of the NPT. Indeed, while no one can deny that the nuclear arsenals of these states, with the exception of China, have indeed decreased since the Cold War, it must also be noted that all of these states have undertaken processes of modernizing nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

This treaty seems to have reached its maximum effectiveness with regard to the two pillars of non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but it seems limited in effectively forcing the NWS to implement the third pillar, that of a real disarmament policy [COL 15].

1.3.2. Revision of the NPT

This treaty is subject to a Review Conference (RevCom) every five years: the next one was due to take place in 2020, interspersed with three so-called Preparatory Conferences (PrepCom). The RevCom is an opportunity to take stock of the progress made in the past and the future of the treaty in a roadmap, which is called the Final Document [COL 15].

1.3.3. Successes of the NPT

The main success of the treaty is South Africa’s renunciation of nuclear weapons. The first, and only South African nuclear research reactor is the SAFARI-1 (South African Fundamental Atomic Research Installation 1), built between 1961 and 1965 on the Pelindaba site. This site also housed a reprocessing plant (Plant Y). The country also had a secret military program for the South African Defence Force, abandoned by the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the African National Congress came to power. The six aerial atomic bombs with a power of 15 to 20 kt, built between 1982 and 1989, and a seventh, which was under construction, were dismantled before 1993 [TOU 13].

Historically, the AEC (Atomic Energy Corporation) had two sites – Valindaba, for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and Pelindaba, for research. The ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) depended on the Ministry of Defense with two sites – Kentron and Naschem. The production of highly enriched uranium by the South African enrichment plant Y in 1994 was 993 kg (enriched on average to 68% in ²³⁵U), of which 515 kg were enriched to 85% in ²³⁵U [ALB 16].

South Africa’s only nuclear test likely occurred in 1979. On the night of September 22, 1979, a double flash was spotted off the Prince Edward Islands by the American satellite Vela 6911. The double flash of light is the signature of an atmospheric atomic explosion. The initial flash burst at the start of the explosion and corresponded to a fireball. Then, the glow was obscured for a fraction of a second by the shock wave, which made the atmosphere opaque. Then, when the cloud dissipated, the second flash appeared. Since South Africa was the only power in the region with the means to enrich uranium, it was immediately suspected, but foreign support, possibly Israeli, was also envisaged [BAT 18].

South Africa’s disarmament program was complicated by its division State into two countries (South Africa and Namibia) [DZI 17].

The program to dismantle South Africa’s nuclear program began with the dismantling of the six nuclear weapon devices and the seventh, which was in production. The highly enriched uranium was returned to the AEC to be kept under secure surveillance. The second stage was the complete decontamination of the Armscor installations (1990–1991) and the return of highly contaminated equipment, such as melting furnaces, to the AEC. Advena/Circle’s facilities were converted into commercial civil or military activities, but with conventional weapons: the destruction and disposal of non-nuclear components, as well as engineering design and manufacturing information provisions. South African nuclear officials in...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Table of Contents
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
• 2 Disarmament of Atomic Weapons
• 3 International Recommendations and National Policies in Decommissioning
• 4 Procedures and Technologies Involved in Decommissioning
• 5 The Dismantling of Military Nuclear Facilities
• 6 The Dismantling of Electronuclear Reactors
• 7 The Decommissioning of Research Reactors and Other Basic Nuclear Facilities
• General Conclusions
• List of Acronyms
• References
• Index
• End User License Agreement