The Clergy and the Modern Middle East

Shi'i Political Activism in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon

Mohammad R. Kalantari

• Publisher: I.B. Tauris
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781838605582
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

The Shi'i clergy are amongst the most influential political players in the Middle East. For decades, scholars and observers have tried to understand the balance of power between, Shi'i 'quietism' and 'activism'. The book is based on exclusive interviews with high-profile Shi'i clerics in order to reveal how the Shi'i clerical elite perceives its role and engages in politics today. The book focuses on three ground-breaking events in the modern Middle East: the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the 2003 Iraq War, and the 2006 July war in Lebanon. By examining the nature and evolution of a Shi'i clerical network the book finds that, far from there being strategic differences between 'quitest' and 'activist' clerics, Shi'i mujtahid statesmen matured, from 1979 in Iran to 2003 Iraq, by way of a pragmatism which led to a strong form of transnational and associated whole in Lebanon in 2006. In doing so, the book breaks down the established, and misleading, dichotomisation of the Shi'i clergy into 'quietists' and 'activists' and discovers that the decision of Shi'i clerical elites to become politically active or to stay out of politics are attributable to their ability to adapt to their political environments.

1

Introduction

The clerical authority in Shiʿi Islam has always been intertwined with the politics of the community. For decades, many scholars and observers have been concerned to understand the nature of, and the likely balance of power between, what has been characterized as Shiʿi ‘quietism’ and ‘activism’ in the current politics of the Middle East. This book challenges the notion that a meaningful strategic distinction can be defined between these supposed political factions among the Shiʿi clerical elite. Although some clerics did not explicitly reach for political power, and some abstained themselves from interfering in affairs of the rulers, at no time in the history of the faith, the mainstream clerics have been under this illusion that they should be indifferent from sociopolitical affairs of the community and remain apolitical. The distinction between political acquiescence and being apolitical is one underlying theme throughout this book.

The very root of Shiʿi identity was bolstered when in the eyes of his partisans Ali’s right of caliphate was usurped by Abu Bakr. Mainstream Shiʿi belief entails that the twelve Imams are the just rulers, and as their general deputies, the clerics have appropriated some of their prerogatives and claimed for similar roles, including protecting the principles of Shiʿism and the community of believers. A high-ranking Shiʿi cleric puts it in the context when asked about whether the clerical elite are politically active or quiet, saying,

The Prophet has told us that, ‘all of you are guardians and are responsible for your wards’ . . . so the clergy cannot be apathetic vis-à-vis the Shiʿi community, the Muslim community, and even the whole humanity. With that said, the situation is not always ripe. How come it is not licit for an ill-person to fast, for a cleric who doesn’t perceive an appropriate situation, it is to refrain from political engagement. Quietism, in this sense, does not mean indifference; and if somebody says that clerics are not political, he doesn’t understand Shiʿi clerical authority altogether.¹

Notwithstanding for centuries, observers had generally viewed the Twelver Shiʿis² as ‘moderate’ and, relative to other Muslims, politically quiet.³ As the community was growing, in size and age, it was facing the grievances of the religious leadership vacuum as well as the later emergence of the modernity. This has always been an underlying factor that shapes political postures of the clergy. The need for political engagement became more evident and necessary as the so-called Occultation era of the last Imam prolonged. With the rise of activism on the part of Shiʿi clerics in Iran, however, scholars began to reconsider Shiʿi political doctrines and to search in them for elements they might have previously overlooked in their understanding of the community. It no longer appeared as quietistic relative to the various other Islamic political ideologies. Since then, this previously ‘most moderate’ faith has been characterized as a ‘revolutionary’ and politically ‘active’ ideology.

The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran as well as its broader impact on the Middle East caught observers by surprise. No one expected a revolution in Iran, or at least one led by the religious elites and their followers.⁴ The Revolution consequently triggered a wave of scholarly research and writing on the political tendencies of Shiʿi Islam. It also inspired a reassessment of historical events that had been decisive in the evolution of the political activism of the modern Shiʿi clergy.⁵ For the clerics themselves, the 1979 Revolution was a watershed moment. Their role in politics was redefined dramatically, for then they succeeded in becoming the backbone of the state in the modern time.

From the very early stages of the Islamic Republic, its religious leadership represented itself as leaders of both the Shiʿi and Sunni masses, and called on them to rise up against their usurper unjust rulers. However, as time went by, the new regime in Iran perceived more as a sectarianized state, which primarily prompted the Shiʿi communities of the region, trying to ‘awaken’ in them a religio-political identity.⁶ For great numbers of Shiʿis in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic provided not only a model for activism but also a source of moral and financial support.⁷

An example is Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was formed in 1982 to represent the underprivileged Shiʿis in the Civil War.⁸ The rise of Hezbollah was aided by, and helped to further advance, a decisive shift in Lebanon’s sectarian balance of power in favour of the Shiʿi community. In the mid-1980s it became evident to most scholars and analysts that Shiʿis had passed beyond what, in retrospect, appeared to have been a politically quiet phase and, at least for a large fraction of the community, had been converted to a more activist Islam. Yet, given the pace of change in regional politics at that time, there was still no clear understanding of how this transformation had taken place, and how the actors involved interacted to produce this political activism.

The Iraq War in 2003 was another event which, after Iran’s 1979 revolution, brought about a change in the balance of sectarian power in favour of Shiʿi Muslims. The ascent of the Shiʿi community in post-Saddam Iraq has raised concerns among many regional and international actors, not least among them the Sunni rulers of the region. More than a decade later, what Vali Nasr noted long ago has been confirmed: that the Middle East which would emerge ‘from the crucible of the Iraq war’, though it ‘might not be more democratic’, would ‘definitely be more Shiʿi’.⁹ The overthrow of Saddam’s regime bolstered a Shiʿi political revival in Iraq. For the first time since the foundation of the modern state, the Shiʿa of Iraq was provided with the opportunity to rule. However, this alarmed a group of Sunni leaders in the region. Just a month before the Iraqi National Assembly Election in 2005, King Abdullah of Jordan stated that a ‘Shiʿi Crescent’ was emerging in the Middle East. He warned that

[i]f pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government, a new crescent of dominant Shiʿi movements or governments stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could emerge, alter the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and pose new challenges to U.S. interests and allies.¹⁰

While the notion of a ‘Shiʿi Crescent’ is largely meant to serve as a call for Sunni solidarity and vigilance, it does capture a newly emerged political reality in the contemporary Middle East.¹¹

The establishment of a Shiʿi government in Iraq also mobilized groups of Shiʿi clerics who, for decades, had remained quiet under the rule of the Baʿath Party. This unexpected activism confronted observers with new queries. Attention has focused, in particular, on the political role of the clergy in Qum and Najaf Seminaries following the war in Iraq. Many have tended to view this political activism as the expression of a distinctive type of Shiʿism, and to seek support for this view in the complexities of the relevant doctrines.¹²

Understanding the role played by the Shiʿi clergy in the political transformations that have taken place in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon during the last four decades requires an exploration of the responsibilities they assume for themselves within their community and how they perceive the world around them. Although Shiʿis comprise about 10–15 per cent of the Muslim World, they represent the majority of the population in the Persian Gulf. However, the internal dynamics of the Shiʿi community appears to be an area about which there is much confusion among scholars and policymakers.

The aim of this book, therefore, is to provide greater clarity about the seeming transformation of Shiʿi politics from the perspective of the clerical elite and, in this way, to contribute to a better understanding of the nature and dynamics of Shiʿi clergy political activism. What does ‘political activism’ mean here? There is a saying, and a logical principle often used by Shiʿi clerics in their study circles, that ‘things are known through their opposites’. To understand activism, one may try to discover what does quietism mean? In his oft-cited work, Activism and Quietism in Islam, Michael Cook attests that Islam is a political religion, therefore, ‘activism is given in Islam’ and it is the quietists ‘who have to work to provide themselves with excuses’.¹³ Quietism, in this sense, is a position entailing the refusal to rebel, detachment from political engagement and withdrawal from the society.

Reflecting on early Islam and to underpin why different groups and thinkers rejected rebellion, Robert Gleave comes up with three categories: (1) those who viewed the state as legitimate and had no reservations about engaging with it; (2) those who viewed the state as illegitimate, thus refrained to engage with it; and (3) those who viewed the state as illegitimate but would engage with it for strategic reasons.¹⁴ He calls the third category as ‘pragmatic quietism’ and puts Shiʿis under it. Yet perhaps the very idea of pragmatism acknowledges the active agency of its subject.

Those who do not rebel against the (unjust) state, perhaps because they do not have enough means and power, and get along with it for their strategic prudence, although relatively seem as quiet, but are engaged in a political action – we will read about them in the following chapters. Likes of Ayatollah Khoei in Iraq, who despite being viewed as quiet between 1970 and 1991, in contrast to his colleagues in Iran, was engaged in politics albeit using different methods. In his case, not being overtly active in politics to preserve the Shiʿi community and seminary in Iraq, which were under the siege of Baʿath Party, was the outmost manifestation of political activism. I define political quietism as being apolitical and showing apathy towards the community and the external political threats; all else, throughout this book, is political activism.

In this book, I express a story of Shiʿi clergy and their political engagement in the modern Middle East, as I heard them telling it to me. Without grappling with the narrative of the clergy about its history, it is difficult to reflect accurately on the influence of their involvement in the ongoing affairs. The story of this book is, therefore, a historical one as well. By the same token, the book surveys the history of Shiʿi community and the clergy; yet I do not see it as my task in this book to narrate an exhaustive history of Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, or for that matter the Middle East.

What I hope this book begins to offer is, in general, that the practice of categorizing various actors in the Middle East unde r the clear-cut groups is anything but illuminating; and more specifically, the Shiʿi clerics, like any other actors in the Middle East, no matter if we label them as quietists or activists, are all politically alert. They will engage in the politics of the community to the extent to protect it and their interests.

Shiʿi clerical political activism

The term ‘Shiʿi Activism’ emerged in the lexicon of the Middle East studies, only after the 1979 Revolution in Iran. In the last four decades, many have tended to characterize Shiʿi Islam as comprised of two different political factions: ‘quietist’ and ‘activist’. But this distinction misunderstands both Shiʿi political doctrine and the contemporary political history of the Middle East.

Since the Revolution, some take the idea that there is a fundamental difference between two factions within the clergy; this so-called dichotomies are captured by, for example ‘Quietism-Activism’,¹⁵ ‘Quietism-Revolutionary’,¹⁶ ‘Quietism-Resistance’,¹⁷ ‘Silent-Speaking’¹⁸ or ‘Quietism-Islamism’.¹⁹ This dichotomization of Shiʿi doctrine and practice assumes that ‘Quietism’ is a deliberate withdrawal from direct involvement in politics, and as a mainstream, is rooted in an orthodox belief in Shiʿi Islam.²⁰ The proponents of this idea assume that the main duty of the clergy during the Occultation era is to await the re-emergence of the Imam, to stay quiet politically and to avoid active confrontation with the so-called unjust rulers. They, therefore, see clerics of Najaf seminary, such as Ayatollah Khoei (d. 1992) and Ayatollah Sistani (b. 1930), as advocates of a so-called mainstream Shiʿi quietism; and place, figures such as Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989) at the other extreme of this dichotomy. To that end, Ernesto Braam suggested a third category of clerical elite, the ‘whispering jurisprudent’.²¹ And in a further modification of the Quietism–Activism dichotomy, Hamoudi suggested four distinctive Shiʿi doctrinal categories: Islamism, Quietism, semi-Quietism and Ambiguous Liberalism.²² In his view, Islamist or activist Shiʿi clerics are those who propagate the idea of the Guardianship of the Jurist, Wilayat e Faqih, and believe that the government desired by God involves a state ruled by Shiʿi Jurist on the basis of their interpretations of Sharia. Khomeini and Muhammad Baqir Sadr (d. 1980) are two renowned advocates of this view. Quietist Shiʿi clerics, according to Hamoudi, deliberately avoid interfering in politics and the affairs of the state (he names Khoei as an example for this category). Semi-quietist Shiʿi clerics are those who fall between the Islamists and Quietists, as they prefer to choose a more ambiguous position in terms of their political involvement. These semi-quietists neither seek the establishment of a Shiʿi state nor absent themselves from the political scene (Sistani is an example). Finally, ambiguous liberal Shiʿi clergy, such as Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (d.2010) in Lebanon, believe in a sort of religio-political pluralism that promises a secure coexistence even with non-Muslims ‘with whom there are disagreements’ as part of ‘a Muslim’s cultural and human responsibility’.²³

Yet another group of political commentators have become more interested in studying the clergy political activism since 2003. Although they appreciate that there are different levels of political inclusion for Shiʿi quietists throughout the abode of Islam – from south Pakistan to North Africa, with Iran and Iraq at its very heart – they acknowledge that the ‘context’ is vital in analysing one’s political activism or quietism. Jelle Puelings, for example, advised policymakers to include Shiʿi clergy as one of the main political actors in Middle East as they ‘can and will play a role in the socio-political developments of their community, even if they are known to be quietist’.²⁴ Similarly, many have criticized the normative view of the Najaf Seminary as a politically quiet institution. This view, they argue, led to the belief that the seemingly quiet, or reticent, clerics of Iraq are totally apolitical. Some have argued that the role of Sistani in his second phase of political life since 2003 is a clear indication that clerics, regardless of what political posture they might assume from time to time, should not be ignored as an important factor in the future of the Mid...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Contents
• List of figures
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Shiʿi clerical authority: Structures and functions
• 3 Shiʿi clergy political activism: A modern history
• 4 Iran 1979: The birth of the mujtahid statesmen
• 5 Iraq 2003: The pragmatic Shiʿi mujtahids
• 6 Lebanon 2006: The networked Shiʿi mujtahids
• 7 The power of Shiʿi clergy’s solidarity and the future of the Middle East
• Glossary
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Copyright