Japan's Secret War

How Japan's Race to Build its Own Atomic Bomb Provided the Groundwork for North Korea's Nuclear Program

Robert K. Wilcox

• Publisher: Permuted Press
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781682618974
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Militär- & Seefahrtsgeschichte

This groundbreaking investigation reveals how a secret atomic weapons program in WWII Japan led to today's North Korean security crisis. Japan's Secret War explores one of the least-known, yet highly significant episodes of World War II: Japan's frantic race to develop its own atomic bomb. Journalist and historian Robert Wilcox then shows how Japan's efforts evolved into North Korea's nuclear program and the looming threat it presents to mankind. After decades of research into national intelligence archives in the US and abroad, Wilcox presents a detailed account of Japan's version of the Manhattan Project. He traces its development from inception to the possible detonation of a nuclear device in 1945. Wilcox weaves a fascinating portrait of the secret industrial complex where Japan's atomic research culminated. And it is there that North Korea, following the Japanese defeat, salvaged what remained and fashioned its own nuclear program. " Japan's Secret War is still spellbinding. It is intriguing and disturbing, and Robert Wilcoxdeserves high praise for his meticulous research." —Historynet.com

PART 1

SECRETS

WASHINGTON, DC, 1979

One of the more important developments in recent World War II history has been the opening of previously classified intelligence files. The so-called “Magic documents” are an example.

Magic was a triumph of code breaking. Because of the operation, the United States was able to listen in on many of Japan’s secret communications throughout the war. We knew many moves the Japanese were going to make. We were often able to learn the objectives and positions of Japanese military units, such as their combat fleets and submarines. Such information was the crucial factor enabling us to win the Battle of Midway, the turning point in the Pacific war. The pre-Midway intelligence helped us pinpoint their attack fleet in the open ocean and thus surprise it. After Midway, the Japanese went on the defensive and never regained the naval advantage.

The British, too, had a Magic. It was called Ultra, as in “Ultrasecret.” With it, the British were able to listen in on Germany’s secret conversations. Partly as a result of Ultra, the British received information about when and where the Germans were going to bomb England. They also knew where German submarines were located and severely damaged and disrupted the German effort with the decoded information. Ultra, along with radar, deserves a large share of the credit for the British victory in the Battle of Britain, which many consider a major turning point in World War II.

Only a few people knew of Magic and Ultra during the war: the code breakers, very few top-level government officials, and the two heads of state. In America the intercepts, as they were called, were deciphered, arranged into summaries, and condensed into a single daily document, which itself was locked in a case and deposited on the president’s desk. Generally, it was seen by less than half a dozen cabinet members and FDR. If it contained information that had to be discussed with others, that information was said to have been obtained from an “unimpeachable” source. No one would question it.

I went to Washington with the hope that the Magic documents would hold the key to the story. John Taylor, a researcher at the modern-military branch of the National Archives, was assigned to help me. I was lucky. Taylor was knowledgeable and enthusiastic. His office, on the top floors of the archives, retained some of the atmosphere that must have been present when the code breakers themselves were doing their work: ceilings were low; security measures were in effect; archivists hurried about, dispensing the knowledge that made them experts in their particular fields.

It turned out Taylor had worked with the writer of the Science article, Deborah Shapely, and therefore knew something of the Japanese A-bomb work. In fact, even before I asked him, he went to his desk and returned with a United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS, pronounced “us-bus”) report on the subject. It was from a special Manhattan Project mission that had gone in with the first occupation troops to investigate Japan’s A-bomb program’s progress. But the report was only a summary, a few pages with overall findings. Briefly, it said nothing about the Japanese A-bomb project. And Taylor didn’t know of any references to the subject in the Magic documents.

That did not mean there were none. Some 10,000 pages of the Magic documents were now in the archives, he advised, with more to come. They were not indexed or catalogued. It would take a long time, but I could go through what I wanted. There was no telling what I would find, because the few people who had looked at them before had been interested in other things.

In addition, he said, there were at least five other sets of documents that might contain pertinent information, each one of them more voluminous than the Magic files. These included the massive Office of Strategic Services (OSS) files. The OSS had been our espionage organization during World War II (it was the forerunner of the CIA). They included the entire USSBS files, a voluminous number of supporting documents making up the study, which had been conducted immediately after World War II. USSBS and OSS records were housed on entire floors of the huge National Archives building.

Furthermore, said Taylor, another entire building was filled with the records of the US occupation of Japan. They had been indexed only by broad categories, unlike the detailed indexing of the OSS and USSBS files. The building was in Suitland, Maryland, near the District of Columbia. One could go there and look at boxes packed with official papers that were just as they were when they had been hastily shipped home from Japan after the occupation. It would be like finding a needle in a haystack. But the possibility of success was perhaps more real there than anywhere else. The Suitland files, which consisted of acres and acres of boxes with thousands of papers in each, were untouched.

I told Taylor of a new A-bomb lead I learned of in the September 11, 1978, Miami Herald. It was one of the first to come out of the newly declassified Magic documents. “Spaniards Ran Spy Ring For Japan in US,” the headline said. The article had been written by a Washington Post reporter who visited the archives only a few days after the documents had arrived.8 It described a ring of spies code-named TO, pronounced “toe,” the Japanese word for “door.”

The TO spies were mostly Spanish nationals and diplomats. Spain was unofficially allied with the Axis. They had relayed information through the Spanish embassy in Washington to Madrid, and from there it had been sent to Tokyo and Berlin. Messages had included information about convoys, troop movements, American strategy, and weapons development. The convoy information had resulted in the sinking of Allied ships. TO had been such a thorn in America’s side, according to the documents, that we tried to kill its chief in Madrid.

Was this how the Japanese had found out about our A-bomb program—if indeed they had?

Taylor brought me the first Magic volumes. They were called “diplomatic summaries”—capsules of intercepted messages between Tokyo and various embassies. I started going through them. At first I didn’t seem to be getting anywhere. The pages contained a hodgepodge of information grouped under general headings: “military,” “economic,” and “psychological and subversive.” The only order was chronological.

At the top of each summary was its date. Then, after one of the four headings, there would be something like: “Berlin, Japanese Ambassador [Baron Hiroshi] Oshima has sent Tokyo a report entitled ‘America’s Defense Measures’ which includes the following….” The report would be summarized and Oshima’s comments printed verbatim, perhaps with a note from the summarizer explaining what the ambassador meant in view of other deciphered intercepts.

I could imagine these summary writers working late into the night, waiting anxiously for the decodings, then sitting down to analyze them. Their reports were well written, first-rate jobs of condensation and clarity. It was easy to see why famous novelists like Britain’s Graham Greene and Ian Fleming had worked in intelligence. One had to have rare talents, including a mind that could see through the clutter.

Once in a while I’d come upon an isolated reference that made me think I was close to hitting pay dirt. For instance, I came across a summary that said, “A German communication quotes an article in a Japanese newspaper to the effect that a cyclotron equal in size to the one in the United States, which is the world’s largest…will be completed in the shops of Ishikawajima Dockyards by the end of the year.”

So we knew they were working on an atom smasher. I looked for more. But there was nothing. And there was no clue to US reaction.

The cyclotron reference was in a July 19, 1942, summary. Another one, a few months later, said, “According to a military officer [presumably American but not otherwise identified], a bomb has been developed in a chemical laboratory, which, upon bursting, produces a temperature of 1,000 degrees over a wide area.”

Was this our planned A-bomb?

And so it went. I’d note anything that might at some later date bear on my search. Periodically encountering pass...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• INTRODUCTION
• ORIGINAL PREFACE (1985)
• ORIGINAL INTRODUCTION (1985)
• PART 1: SECRETS
• 1
• 2
• 3
• 4
• 5
• PART 2: WAR
• 6
• 7
• 8
• 9
• 10
• 11
• PART 3: CHALLENGE
• 12
• 13
• 14
• 15
• 16
• 17
• 18
• 19
• 20
• 21
• Part 4: DESPERATION
• 22
• 23
• 24
• 25
• 26
• 27
• 28
• 29
• PART 5: HIDDEN
• 30
• 31
• 32
• 33
• POSTSCRIPT 2018
• 34
• 35
• 36
• 37
• 38
• SOURCES
• EARLY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• LATEST ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• END NOTES