Peace and Security in Indo-Pacific Asia

IR Perspectives in Context

Sorpong Peou

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000462609
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Peace and Security in Indo-Pacific Asia is for the informed, the interested, and the engaged. Sorpong Peou brings together the skills of the pedagogue with the knowledge of the scholar.

-Dr. David Dewitt, University Professor Emeritus, Senior Scholar, York University, Toronto, Canada.

Peou's excellent book provides both the lay reader and the specialist with six important theoretical frameworks which should provide the basis for better appreciation of what a security community in Indo-Pacific Asia means in our world today. There are very few scholars who understand the region like Peou.

-Dr. W. Andy Knight, Professor of Political Science, the University of Alberta, Canada.

Sorpong Peou's extraordinary breadth of knowledge, of both International Relations theory and the key trends in Indo-Pacific Asia, shines through in this authoritative analysis.

-Dr. Richard Stubbs, Professor of Political Science, McMaster University, Canada.

A pedagogical approach of the textbook that is appreciated is how the author respectfully engages with the theories of IR and is not pushing an agenda of denouncing some theories and trying to persuade the reader of others. We live in such polarizing times that it is truly refreshing to read scholarly work that avoids sensationalistic attacks on theories that have been debated for decades. Each theory in this manuscript is explored on its own terms, and the reader is encouraged to figure out where they stand on these enduring debates in the context of Indo-Pacific security. The approach will lead to compelling classroom discussions of the theories and the politics of the region.

This book is a must-read for any student or observer of security trends in the region.

-Dr. Mark Williams, Chair and Professor of Political Studies, Vancouver Island University, B.C., Canada.

Part I Realist tradition

1 Classical and neoclassical realist perspectives

DOI: 10.4324/9781003132646-1

This chapter reviews classical and neoclassical realist perspectives on war, peace, and security in Indo-Pacific Asia. By and large, these theoretical perspectives paint a grim picture of major states struggling for control and domination; thus, regional peace and security are fragile or temporary. They share with other realist perspectives some general propositions. Firstly, nation-states are the principal actors in international politics. Secondly, national survival remains states’ ultimate policy objective. Thirdly, self-help is the logic that applies to all states. Classical realism still has some influence on security thinking in Indo-Pacific Asia, but neoclassical realism seems to have more influence since the 1990s. What makes classical and neoclassical realism distinct from other realist perspectives is that human nature plays a central part in their analyses, although neoclassical realism departs from classical realism by placing less emphasis on human nature as an explanatory variable. According to neoclassical realists, states are led by their leaders whose perceptions and abilities to mobilize domestic support for policy action vary. Moreover, their analyses give attention to the dynamics of domestic politics and political elites’ perceptions. In general, they regard unipolar systems or hegemony as more prone to international and regional stability and security than multipolar ones. Neoclassical realists tend to stress inititially the rise of Japan and recently China, as well as the decline of the United States, but disagreement continues among scholars on the question of American decline. American neoclassical realists tend to view regional peace and security as dependent on American supremacy over the region. This argument has stimulated debates and raised questions about the future of peace and stability in Indo-Pacific Asia.

Classical and neoclassical realism in a nutshell

Classical realism has been influenced by Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War (1972) and Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), a public figure much like Henry Kissinger of the United States or Tony Lake of the Florentine Republic. E. H. Carr (1939: 63) characterizes Machiavelli as “the first important political realist,” who revolted against utopianism. Machiavelli’s greatest works include The Prince (1513) and The Art of War (1521). Neoclassical realism, however, draws more insights from Thucydides’ work.

Machiavelli’s enduring influence on realism is based on the belief in the selfishness of human nature. The interstate system is anarchical, but anarchy as a variable explaining princes’ warlike behavior is less important than human nature. As noted by Alan Ryan, “the staying power of The Prince comes from its sweeping statements about human nature…” (Ryan 2012: 364). Most men cannot be trusted because of their ingratitude, fickleness, fear of danger, and covetousness (Patrick 2014). To keep their states safe and secure, princes must thus be like “lions” and “foxes.. In his view, “it is much safer to be feared than to be loved,” if one cannot command both love and fear at the same time. In spite of all the dangers, men seek war in order to augment their glory and honor by also putting the interests of their states before those of individuals. Princes must reject the renaissance belief that they would remain helpless toys in Fortuna’s hands and must do all they could (“the ends justify the means”) to make themselves as strong and powerful as possible by not joining forces with others more powerful because doing so would only bring ruin on themselves. They must, therefore, expand and conquer by being skilled in the art of warfare, prepared to use deception, ruthless, and capable of commanding generals with unlimited authority as in the Roman tradition. Machiavelli drew lessons from ancient Rome: he “wanted Rome’s battalions and legions and cohorts” (Boesche 2003: 37) that once gained power and glory and thus preferred imperialisms to balances of power and believed that republics with permanent and professional armies were best for imperial expansion. A military thinker who laid the foundations for a permanent and professional army, he thought that the goal of the professional army is to ensure a complete defeat of the enemy in wars that should be “short and sharp” rather than long or protracted (Gilbert 1986: 24).

A more recent classical realist thinker was Hans Morgenthau (1985) whose line of theoretical thinking appears to be quite similar to that of Machiavelli in terms of emphasis on human nature. Moral codes may influence individuals but do not make states moral agents. There are no universal moral standards on which states can agree. State leaders are driven by an innate desire to dominate others. Unlike Machiavelli, the state (not the prince) remains the primary actor in international politics. The state remains the referent point for security, and the sources of threat are of a political and military nature rooted in human nature, which “has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover [the law of politics]” (Ibid: 4). States continuously prepare for and engage in organized violence or war. Permanent peace is impossible to achieve without a world state, but world government cannot exist without a world community, which “is unattainable under the moral, social, and political conditions prevailing in the world of our times” (Ibid: 361). A sense of world community can still develop but only if national decision-makers work to “ameliorate world tensions through a return to a wise diplomacy” (Speer 1968).

But until the nation-state disappears and gives way to a world state, the political struggle for power among states to ensure their national survival rests on the logic of self-help that requires that they arm themselves and/or join military alliances with other states that face the same enemy. International stability based on balance-of-power politics alone, however, remains precarious. The systems “are essentially unstable” (Morgenthau 1985: 89). When a state becomes powerful and pursues imperialist policies, other states either yield or seek to balance it “or war decides the issue.” Effective balance-of-power systems are multipolar. Multipolarity (multiple centers of power) invites caution from state leaders: numerous poles create a higher degree of uncertainty, making it more difficult for active players to take decisive action.

Neoclassical realism can be traced back to the work of Greek war historian Thucydides. Colin Gray makes the following observation about the historian: “It is not at all obvious that eighty years of careful scholarship in the 20th century, from the aftermath of the First World War to the present day, have produced guidance on the causes of war noticeably superior to that offered by Thucydides” (Gray 1999: 162). Robert Gilpin (1981: 227–228) makes this point: “In honesty, one must inquire whether or not 20th century students of international relations know anything that Thucydides and his 5th-century [BC] compatriots did not know about the behavior of states.”

Contemporary neoclassical realists do not ignore the importance of human nature, nor do they argue that ideas do not matter. Gilpin (2001: 17), for instance, argues that non-material factors also matter. For neoclassical realists, however, non-material factors do not explain everything. Moreover, human nature still matters. Gray (1999: 175), who argues that “Clausewitz [still] rules” and that “the future is the past,” writes: “I fight, therefore I am human.” From his perspective, “we humans are so gripped by some of the less attractive features of our nature as to be obliged to function according to a notion of prudence that has to include a willingness to fight” (Ibid: 181).

Overall, however, neoclassical realists have become less concerned with human nature as the main source of ambition and aggression than classical realists but more attuned to the impact of relative material power, domestic politics, and state leaders’ perceptions. Relative power is central to neorealist thinking. Thucydides provides one of the most enduring realist statements on power as the key variable in the study of war: “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides 1972: 402). The real cause of the Peloponnesian War (431–415 BC), Thucydides writes, was “the growth of the power of Athens and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” The growth of their power led the Athenian leaders to see their city-state as superior to other city-states in Greece and to seek hegemony as the way to guarantee its security, and this logic also applied to Sparta, which was compelled to fight back for its survival. Relative power matters to neoclassical/neomercantile realists a great deal, especially those who think not only about land and population sizes and military power but also about national wealth and international economic competition based on the idea of developing and commercializing new technologies, manufacturing products, and exporting them (Krasner 1983: 320–321).

The concept of revisionism is also central to neoclassical realist thinking. As their economic and military power grows, states are expected to become expansionist. Nazli Choucri and Robert North (1975: 1) put it forcefully: “a growing state tends to expand its activities and interests outward – colliding with the spheres of influence of other states – and finds itself embroiled in international conflicts, crises and wars…. The more a state grows, and thus the greater its capabilities, the more likely it is to follow such a tendency.” Robert Gilpin’s political law of “uneven growth” of national power leads to a similar conclusion: as the power of a state increases that state will be tempted to try “to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of interests” (Gilpin 1981: 94–95). Fareed Zakaria (1998: 19) makes a similar argument: “increased resources give rise to greater ambitions.” Rising states seek to build large armies, entangle themselves in politics beyond their borders, and seek international influence. Revisionist states lust for empire and seek to expand power by being on the bandwagon, coveting far more than what they possess, taking great risks, or pursuing reckless expansion (Schweller 1995: 278–281). Rising or emerging powers “seek to change, and in some cases to overthrow, the status quo and to establish new arrangements that more accurately reflect their own conception of their place in the world” Friedberg (1996b: 13). The Cold War ended in the early 1990s, but newly rising states will not be forever content with the international status quo (Mead 2014). In general, neoclassical realists remain skeptical about peaceful power transitions, primarily because of the fast-growing challenger’s revisionism or the hegemonic power’s preventive actions against revisionist states.

Neoclassical realists/neomercantilists add two key intervening variables to classical realism: domestic politics and state leaders’ perceptions. States are not treated as the “black boxes” that other realists assume they are. “Statesmen, not states,” argues Zakaria (1998: 42), “are the primary actors in international affairs.” State leaders seek to protect or promote their national interests by mobilizing domestic support for their initiatives (Christenson 1996: 11). But they cannot behave aggressively if constrained by domestic burdens like welfare costs (Wohlforth 1999: 40). In short, neoclassical realism “places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign policy behavior” (Walt 2002b: 211). Also, according to neoclassical realism, perceptions of relative power also matter. States behave according to leaders’ perceived realities of objective power. The distribution of power can also be miscalculated or misperceived (Wohlforth (1995). Zakaria also takes perception into account: “statesmen will expand the nation’s political interests abroad when they perceive a relative increase in state power, not national power” (Zakaria 1998: 35, 38, and 42). In short, political leaders do not operate in the same way under the same objective conditions.

Neoclassical realists advocate hegemony or unipolarity. Hegemonic stability theory is relevant. International regime formation depends on a hegemon both willing and able to enforce rules. Regimes weaken when their hegemons decline (Gilpin 1987: 345). Wohlforth (1999: 9) also regards unipolarity as durable and peaceful, especially “when one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced” or when the preponderant power remains undisputed. Schweller (1995: 281) also argues that the international system remains stable when the pro-status quo states (likened to “the kings of the jungle”) “are far more powerful than revisionist states.” The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the world’s sole superpower thus led neoclassical realists to claim that the unipolar world is likely to bring world peace. By implication, a region dominated by one power is likely to remain stable and peaceful.

Classical/neoclassical realist perspectives on Indo-Pacific Asia

Indo-Pacific Asia has in recent decades attracted the attention of neoclassical realists. Some Asian strategists are regarded as Machiavelli’s children. Richard Samuels (2003), for example, examines Japanese policy elites who were eager to work toward placing their state among the great powers. They were ambitious to the extent that they sought to establish parity with the rest of the world by striving to eliminate the “unequal treaties” imposed upon them by the West, by thriving to become a “first-class” nation, and by being determined to “catch up” and surpass the West (Samuels 2003: 12).

But long before Machiavelli and Morgenthau, Sun Tzu (545–470 BC) and Kautilya (317–293 BC) had already given their advice to state leaders and military strategists. The key advisor to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya, Kautilya has been compared to Machiavelli by Western historians. His mandala theory (theory of omnipotence) on war and diplomacy is found in Arthashastra (“the science of worldly gains”), which reveals his wish to see his king become a world conqueror, his distrust of moral pleas when faced with a superior force, his approval of secret agents willing to kill enemy leaders and sow discord among them, his view of women as a weapon of war, and his belief in the spread of disinformation and the use of religion and superstition to demoralize enemy troops and to bolster the morale of his own (Boeshe 2003).

Kautilya’s offered six foreign policy options to the king whom he regarded as a role model who would want to be conqueror (Vijigishu): war, marching, peace, neutrality, alliance, and double policy (Karad 2015: 328–330). A king wages war against another when he is more powerful than the latter. He marches against his enemy when he is in a position of strength. He makes peace when he is in relative decline compared to another king but meanwhile prepares for war and waits for his enemy to weaken before launching an attack on the latter from the position of strength. He remains neutral when both sides are equal in terms of strength or when neither can defeat the other. He builds a politico-military alliance with his enemy’s enemy. This checkerboard pattern in Kautilya’s thinking is based on this geopolitical reasoning: “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” He made the observation that states on the Indian subcontinent understood this option when they allied with others far away in order to protect themselves against those near them. Double policy means seeking the help of another king who is as strong as the enemy while attacking the latter. There are two elements in his strategic thinking: self-preservation in times of weakness and expansion in times of strength. Kautilya’s strategy is similar to Machiavelli’s imperialism and that of Thucydides with emphasis on the importance of relative power among states.

But much better known than Kautilya among strategists and security scholars is Sun Tzu who was a military general and produced his influential work, The Art of War, which describes the seven states in the “Warring States” period (475–221 BC), perhaps the bloodiest era in Chinese history. He attacked moral reasoning and advised leaders, faced with armed and dangerous neighbors, to take action that would help them to survive in an era where warfare became an instrument of power politics (McGreal 1996: 30–33). His strategic thinking placed strong emphasis on human nature, material power, and cost-benefit calculations. For him, “war is a natural aspect of the political and social environment of man…an expected, if unwelcome, mark of human behavior” (McGreal 1996: 32). Somewhat like what Hans Morgenthau said, Sun Tzu reasoned that human beings disregard morality. Human nature must be controlled by force. When asked if he could turn two platoons of concubines into troops, he demonstrated a simple logic of power. He divided them into different units, commanded by the king’s two favorites. When the “troops” chuckled instead of doing as commanded, he ordered the two “officers” beheaded on the spot. The next most senior concubines were put in their places, and the “troops” flawlessly obeyed his commands.

Sun Tzu’s political tactics include his advice to state leaders that they should assess their power as accurately as possible (Sun 1988). Power can be defined in material terms. When it came to preparing future battles, military leaders were prohibited from using superstitious rituals of prediction. They also had to be prudent by not trusting the intentions of other state leaders and had to pay attention to their material capabilities (especially military ones, such as the strength of the opponent and the number o...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• Foreword
• Introduction: Peace and security in Indo-Pacific Asia
• Part I: Realist tradition
• Part II: Liberal tradition
• Part III: Pacifist tradition
• Part IV: Culturalist and critical theory traditions
• Part V: Feminist tradition
• Part VI: Transnationalist tradition
• Conclusions: Toward a new Indo-Pacific Asian order
• Bibliography
• Index