The Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Britain

Norman Ridley

• Publisher: Air World
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781399010399
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War II
• Index: History

The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a ‘war of attrition’, it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role on both sides. In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command’s operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe’s Intelligence chief, Major Josef ‘Beppo’ Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command’s capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Göring’s decision-making at all stages of the conflict. Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other’s war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a ‘force multiplier’, by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a ‘force diluter’, thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe. The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny.

Chapter 1

Luftwaffe Intelligence

To set up an intelligence organisation for the largest air force in the world, appoint its commanding officer in the rank of Major (Oberst) and then deny it the facilities to do the job was sheer folly. The outcome was inevitable.1

One of the first things to be said about Luftwaffe Intelligence is that OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe), the German Air Force High Command, had so little time for it that its headquarters’ General Staff in Berlin did not include one single intelligence agency of their own when it was created.2 Germany had been denied an air force under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, so when the OKL was formed in 1936 it had no traditions or precedents upon which to build. It created itself according to the ambition and requirements of the age, which envisioned a mobile and flexible component of national defence in which intelligence would be collected, analysed and its lessons applied within flexible, localised areas of operations and not through rigid centralised channels. This placed the Luftwaffe uneasily within a German Intelligence system ‘consisting of numerous uncoordinated and often competing mechanisms’, overseen by ‘jealous ministers, arrogant party officials and proud warlords’ scrambling to ‘bring their titbits’ to their masters.3

During peacetime, the Luftwaffe relied heavily on the OKW (Armed Forces High Command) Counterintelligence Office (Abwehr) headed up by Konteradmiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris, but began to exercise more independence once war threatened.4 It is worth noting also that the Luftwaffe was the most highly politicised of the three armed services and some in the Abwehr, most conspicuously Canaris himself and the chief of the Central Branch, Colonel Hans Oster, were becoming seriously disaffected with Nazi ideology.5 Canaris had been brought out of semi-retirement to fill the post and ‘lacked both the moral courage to challenge the Nazis … and the skills to run an effective secret service.’6 Cooperation between the intelligence services was unlikely to survive the separation.

The first intelligence organization that had any connection to the Luftwaffe was the Forschungsamt (Research Bureau), one of ten independent and frequently feuding intelligence agencies within the German armed forces. The Forschungsamt had been set up by Göring in 1933, ostensibly as part of the, then secret, German Air Force, but which was, in reality, a bureau used almost exclusively to serve him personally and his political associates.7 The Forschungsamt had initially operated from Göring’s personal residence with its twenty operatives tapping telephone wires, but later moved into the Schiller Colonades at Schillerstrasse. It grew to establish offices in most major German cities.8 Other intelligence agencies struggled to protect themselves from Nazi domination with the assistance of the anti-Nazi Foreign Minister, Konstantin von Neurath, but he could do little more than fight a rearguard action until his death in 1938 opened up the floodgates to a political tsunami.9 Many of the more ambitious and more strident operatives, although by no means the most effective, were attracted to those agencies that promised greater advancement, the Luftwaffe being the first option. The nature of German Intelligence agencies within an increasingly authoritarian regime during the immediate pre-war years inevitably ensured that they spent as much time spying on each other as they did on the enemy.

When the role of centralised intelligence gained a modicum of recognition as the political situation in Europe became more unstable, OKL bowed to the inevitable and established a range of intelligence sections, but its response was grudging and half-hearted. On 1 January 1938, weeks after the Reich Air Ministry had been reorganised, an intelligence organisation, the 5th Abteilung (5th Branch Foreign Powers Section D5, Operations Staff/Ic) of the Luftwaffe General Staff, was formed, under the command of Oberst Josef ‘Beppo’ Schmid, to acquire information about foreign air forces and identify strategic targets in the event of war. Schmid had been plucked out of the Operations Division on the recommendation of the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Hans Jeschonnek, and this promotion also saw him attached to Göring’s personal General Staff, giving him prestige and influence far above his rank. The intensely ambitious Schmid, considered ‘more cunning than intelligent’, was born in Bavaria in 1901 and had been a member of the National Socialist Party in Germany since November 1923, when he had taken part in Hitler’s abortive Beer Hall Putsch in Munich.10 Thus, Schmid had established a crucial relationship with Hitler who commemorated the event annually and had presented a special award to all those who had participated in it. While Hitler served a prison term for his actions, Schmid went on to become an infantry private in the German Army. General Hermann Plocher called him ‘a colourful and sometimes controversial character’.11 He consolidated his personal position by shrewd manipulation of his political connections to Göring, but notwithstanding his many years of service to the Nazi Party, he still essentially lacked the seniority that would allow him to give his department any real status or authority.

His early involvement with the Nazi Party meant that Schmid was well known to Hitler and had also enjoyed a close association with Göring over the years. It is a clear example of the way the Luftwaffe operated at staff level that Schmid, with no experience of, or expertise in, intelligence, had been assigned his position without proper scrutiny of his suitability. His General Staff officers were similarly unqualified, for the most part, for the roles they were asked to play. Few were trained in analysis and evaluation techniques which meant that reports lacked rigour and coordination, sometimes resulting in contradictory assessments of the same intelligence. This inevitably tended to reinforce the jaundiced view of the High Command when considering intelligence from any source other than those over which they had direct control. Schmid found himself, more often than not, in little more than a propaganda role feeding upbeat stories to the German media. The higher echelons of Luftwaffe command, aware both of his political connections and penchant for intrigue, were wary of him but were, nevertheless, unimpressed by his abilities. On the other hand, for Schmid, it was considered neither proper nor advisable for a mere Oberst to offer up any opinion that disturbed the confidence of a totalitarian policy-making hierarchy. He very quickly understood the lie of the land and was careful not to make himself unpopular on any level.

Schmid’s main attributes were a penchant for bribery, a persuasive tongue and his proverbial conviviality – he was a heavy drinker; he created about himself a circle of officers who lacked intelligence skills but were completely under his control. Given the attitude of OKW to intelligence per se, there was little incentive for him to excel professionally in a role that encouraged him to focus more on political correctness than operational efficiency. Indeed, Göring valued him for his ‘good company’ which, in the pre-war years at least, was more than enough to keep him in place. While it is not wise to rely too much on the opinions of protagonists after the event, especially ones on the losing side, it is worth noting that the decorated Luftwaffe fighter pilot, Adolph Galland, later called Schmid ‘a complete wash-out’, and Milch said he had ‘trimmed his sails to the wind.’12 When considering Schmid’s qualities it is important to note that, whatever assessment is made of his performance in intelligence, he served throughout the war with increasing rank, thanks to Göring, ending up as a generalleutnant in control of the 1st Jagdkorps, then Luftflotte 3 and finally in command of all units charged with Defence of the Reich in 1945. Having said that, there is no record of any historian claiming that he served with distinction in any of these roles.

The Luftwaffe had suffered from an accelerated development which outstripped its organisational capabilities and, through Göring’s leadership, was too much wedded to political dogma to have ever had the chance of becoming a balanced and properly organised service. For instance, there were no adequate facilities for scientific aeronautic research. Neither was there sufficient attention given to providing logistical support units which would later prove to be a crucial failing in the Battle of Britain, when the shortage of replacement fighters weakened the Jagdgeschwader in September and October. Intelligence was also neglected alongside these auxiliary elements, all of which somehow were considered to be un-military and rather a bit too highbrow for Nazi ideology.

Many of the 5th Abteilung personnel had been drawn from the Foreign Air Forces Branch of the General Staff and consisted of civilians and reserve officers who, in their previous roles, had been used to following a strategy which did little more than exaggerate the strength of foreign air forces in order to justify German armament production. The section was tasked with ‘evaluation of intelligence on foreign states, their military-political appreciation, especially on all questions in connection with the area of air war command’ and ‘target study’.13 Schmid, for all his personality shortcomings, however, was a clever man and realised that the impending war required something more in the way of intelligence appraisals than had hitherto been the case. He adjusted his departmental priorities to focus more on acquiring intelligence about potential enemy targets. Technical Staff Officers were given extended leave in order to travel to foreign countries to become acquainted with the political and economic environment there.14 This practice had been an intrinsic part of German intelligence-gathering since the 1920s, when Reichswehr officers had travelled extensively in the United States. There was a general shake-up of staff which saw younger and more suitably qualified officers brought in, but qualified men were few and far between and until a sufficient number could be recruited the department still relied on the knowledge and experience of its older reservist personnel who, for the most part, were unsuitable from both a physical and intellectual perspective. It was often the case, also, that the efficiency of intelligence gathering was undermined by Göring and Milch insisting on having their friends or personal favourites appointed to desirable positions such as attachés serving with diplomatic missions.15 The attaché service was particularly inept at intelligence gathering as a result, especially given that reports from embassies were thoroughly vetted and amended as required in order to conform to political imperatives.16 The whole attachés service was undermined by its never having ‘trained men specifically for the job’, and selected personnel on the basis of ‘good character, military knowledge, social skills and handsome appearance’.17

The Press Group, part of the 5th Abteilung, was responsible for monitoring both local and foreign news media. Foreign newspapers could have been used much more effectively as a source of potential target intelligence, but again a shortage of foreign language personnel restricted its performance. One major source of intelligence was a column written by a French Major Longeront for the right-wing L’Intransigeant newspaper, in which he reported on personnel transfers, promotions and movement of air squadrons.18 German media was scoured for indiscretions and censorship became widespread to restrict reporting and exposure of its own sensitive material.19

The main departments of Schmid’s new organisation were set up as a second echelon at their Wildpark-Werder headquarters near Potsdam, and other departments at Kurfürst, in Berlin. Schmid, and his immediate staff, however, lived and worked in the Sonderzug ‘Robinson’ command train mobile headquarters of the Luftwaffe General Staff. Daily conferences were held at Kurfürst and chaired by Jeschonnek or his deputy, where the minutes of the previous day’s Führer conference were discussed and all necessary orders issued to field commanders.20

There was clearly a general systemic mindset throughout the German armed forces which viewed intelligence departments as low priority. They were usually underfunded, lacked authority and were ‘not a strong suit in the German military tradition’.21 With each intelligence department vainly seeking recognition only to be rebuffed, each tended to become suspicious and jealous of the others generating debilitating inter-departmental rivalries. Schmid had an advantage over other, more competent, rivals because of his Nazi credentials and closeness to Göring, which gave him unparalleled access to the highest levels of command. In an atmosphere where personal advancement in this field often tended to depend upon operatives varnishing the truth according to what might be acceptable, Schmid excelled. He was a fine example of an ex-Army Nazi-party hack who had great personal ambition, but lacked any experience of intelligence gathering or its analysis. His department was actually quite small and incapable of wide-ranging research and monitoring, but Göring, who seemed not to rely too much on Schmid’s opinions anyway, was often willing to take him at his word, which usually avoided uncomfortable details. The 5th Abteilung, under-resourced and lacking rigorous practices, acquired the habit of relying on whatever information it could surreptitiously glean from rival departments, from perusal of foreign press coverage and generally outdated pre-war publications. As a result, despite Schmid’s personal relationship with Göring, his staff were seen as low-grade personnel who did not fit into the normal military structure and whose advice was generally treated with disdain by their operational superiors. Nevertheless, Schmid had moderate success in acquiring intelligence sufficient to inform his early reports which were considered wide-ranging but lacked depth owing to staff shortages. Göring at that time called Schmid’s work ‘exemplary’ in reference to its photoreconnaissance component.22 Possibly Schmid’s most important contribution to the Luftwaffe war effort against Britain was his dossier consisting of detailed lists of potential targets, many with aerial photographs supplied by the Strategic Reconnaissance Group, headed by Oberst Theodor Rowehl. These files were copied and distributed to all bomber geschwader of Luftflotten 2 and 3.23

Intelligence within the Luftwaffe was judged more on how it supported the ambitions of the Luftwaffe leadership, especially Göring, rather than on its intrinsic value. Throughout the whole Battle of Britain, Schmid never failed to provide his commander with precisely the information he required to justify and explain away one setback after another and confidently predict an imminent turnaround of fortunes. His attitude may well have been permanently coloured by the way in which a report had been received during 1939, pointing out that unless Germany increased her air strength, the combined air resources of France and Great Britain would outstrip those of Germany by the beginning of 1940. This report had the powerful backing of the then Luftflotte 5 Commander, General Erhard Milch, but when Göring read it he summoned his Chief of the General Staff, General Hans Jeschonnek, and Schmid to a severe dressing-down for their defeatist analysis and ordered the report to be destroyed.

During 1939, the German High Command had expanded...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preamble
• Introduction
• Chapter 1. Luftwaffe Intelligence
• Chapter 2. Reichsmarschall Hermann Wilhelm Göring
• Chapter 3. German Radar
• Chapter 4. RAF Intelligence
• Chapter 5. Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere Dowding
• Chapter 6. British Radar
• Chapter 7. The Dowding System
• Chapter 8. Testing the Dowding System to Destruction
• Chapter 9. The Tizard Committee
• Chapter 10. Enigma
• Chapter 11. Polish Codebreakers
• Appendix A. The Oslo Report
• Appendix B. British Intelligence on Luftwaffe Aircraft
• Appendix C. How the Enigma Machine Works
• Appendix D. Giulio Douhet
• Sources
• Notes