Capital Development

Mandate Era Amman and the Construction of the Hashemite State (1921–1946)

Harrison B. Guthorn

• Publisher: Gingko
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781909942516
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The history of the city of Amman under the British mandate government of Transjordan. Amman, the capital of Jordan, contends with a crisis of identity rooted in how it grew to become a symbol for the Anglo-Hashemite government first, and a city second. As a representation of the new centralized authority, Amman became the seat of the Mandatory government that orchestrated the development of Transjordan, the British mandate established in 1921.Despite its diminutive size, the city grew to house all the components necessary for a thriving and cohesive state by the end of the British mandate in 1946. However, in spite of its modernizing and regulatory ambitions, the Transjordan government did not control all facets of life in the region. Instead, the story of Transjordan is one of tensions between the state and the realities of the region, and these limitations forced the government to scale down its aspirations. This book presents the history of Amman's development under the rule of the British mandate from 1921–46 and illustrates how the growth of the Anglo-Hashemite state imbued the city with physical, political, and symbolic significance.

1

More of the Same: Ottoman Continuity and the Early Years of the Mandate

Transjordania is a new country – a mere fleck of desert and trouble on the world map. It is so new that few persons more than 500 miles from its borders know where or what the kingdom is. The Versailles pastry-makers, like many cooks, had some dough left over after the world molds were filled, and this was one of the odd cookies.¹

Junius Wood in National Geographic

So asserted Junius B. Wood in 1923. However, while it is true that Transjordan was a new state, it did not emerge from nothing. Pre-existing Ottoman institutions and traditions helped to shape Amman and the mandate. The reforms of the late Ottoman era reshaped the territory that would become Transjordan as well as its relationship to centralised government control. The 1858 Land Code and the 1864 Provincial Reform Law instilled a discrete Ottoman presence in Transjordan, which led to the further development of the territory, especially the towns of Salt and Amman. Indeed, it was the imposition of stronger Ottoman governance over Transjordan that made it strategically important during World War I. After the war, the brief rules of, first, Emir Faisal, and then the national governments, did not amount to any substantive changes in the territory. In 1921, Emir ʿAbdullah’s arrival was into a territory operating in the shadow of Ottoman collapse.

The earliest phases of the mandate functioned more or less as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire and its governing apparatuses, albeit under a new name and a new monarchy. Through 1924, the government tried to return to the same levels of administration and control that had existed in Ottoman times. Prior to 1924, Emir ʿAbdullah and Chief British Representative (CBR) Philby operated with minimal imperial oversight.² The mandatory government only needed to protect larger British imperial regional interests; the shape and function of specific aspects of the mandate’s government were largely irrelevant. This early lack of interest led to the creation of numerous ‘Potemkin ministries’; ministries and purported government oversight that existed in name only.³ The competing interests of Emir ʿAbdullah, his foreigner ministers, and Chief British Representative Philby made for a turbulent three-year period where little fundamental change occurred.

Following the arrival of Colonel Henry Cox as the Chief British Resident in 1924, the situation began to change. The British imperial government started to pay far closer attention to Transjordan’s finances and development. The Transjordanian state slowly began to move away from Ottoman institutions in an effort to increase the degree of control the central government exerted over the region. Gradually, the previously hollow ministries of the government transformed into actual governing entities with legitimate agendas and missions. The slow growth of the Transjordan state required the balancing of a myriad of local, regional, and imperial interests by both the mandatory government in Amman and the imperial government in London. The British Resident and a select few British advisers were the agents through which these conflicting interests were directed and contained. After 1924, British colonial oversight of Transjordan began in earnest.

Ottoman Transjordan

The British were not the first imperial power to try to impose order over the lands that became the Mandate of Transjordan. In order to understand the infrastructural and institutional developments that occurred during the mandate, it is critical to appreciate the reforms carried out by the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the infrastructural and institutional structures of the mandate built upon these reforms; they did not begin from scratch. Prior to the nineteenth century, few reforms affected the administration and development of Ottoman Levantine cities.⁴ In general, these provincial cities were more or less left to their own devices and only loosely tied administratively to the Ottoman state. There was little, if any, form of direct control from Istanbul over the Levant. While some administrative offices did exist, such as wali (governor), mushir (commander in chief of local army units), daftardar (revenue administrator), and qadi (senior judge), these offices did not form a single centralised institution. There was little regulation of social, economic and political affairs. Interaction amongst social groups was largely determined ‘by religion, family, district, profession or guild and their respective leaders’.⁵

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government endeavoured to increase its control over its imperial hinterlands, including Transjordan.⁶ Institutions of the state, which were the fount of its authority in previous centuries, like the janissary corps and land regime taxation (malikane) system, were unwieldy and ineffectual in the new century. Handicapped by these old structures, the Ottoman state strove to reassert centralised control through a series of reforms known as the tanzimat. These administrative reforms were meant to propel the Ottoman state into the modern era. On the Transjordanian frontier, the two reforms with the most direct impact were the 1858 Land Code and the 1864 Provincial Reform Law.

The 1858 Land Code modified tax codes to give landed titles to individuals to facilitate the taxation of every parcel of productive land throughout the empire. This shift away from the inefficient tax-farm system (malikane) was to create a direct relationship between land ownership and taxation. The acceptance of taxation, in turn, enriched Ottoman coffers and expedited the acknowledgement of centralised government oversight originating from Istanbul. The Land Code was fully implemented in ʿAjlun by 1887, and then extended south into Balqa. Likewise, Ottoman use of incentives and coercion led to increased tax receipts in Salt by the 1890s, whereas their application further south in Karak and Maʿan was far less successful.⁷

While the Land Code altered tax receipts, what changed the character of local administration drastically in 1864 was the Regulation of Provinces (Vilayet Nizamnamesi), which established provincial capitals. The Vilayet Law created a standard municipality model, based on the system in Istanbul.⁸ Its implementation in 1864 divided the Ottoman Empire into provinces (wilaya), regions (sanjaq), cities (medina) and quarters (mahalla).⁹ While the broader administrative units were important, the unit with the most direct impact in the lands that became Transjordan was the juridical district (kaza). This unit brought together a district governor, a treasurer and a judge, along with their affiliated clerks and armed forces.¹⁰ It would be the kaza and its officers that brought the Ottoman state in direct contact with the local populace as the basic unit of administration.

The Ottoman reforms of the late nineteenth century did not only apply to broad administrative statues; this period was also marked by a series of urban regulations and new infrastructural programmes. From 1848–1882 there were six major urban planning regulations: the 1848 Building Regulation (Ebniye Nizamnamesi); the 1858 Regulation on Streets (Sokaklara dair Nizamname); the 1863 Street and Building Regulation (Turuk ve Ebniye Nizamnamesi); the 1875 Regulation on Construction Methods in Istanbul (Istanbul ve Belde-i Selasede Yapılack Ebniyenin Suret-i İnşaiyesine dair Nizamname); the 1877 Istanbul Municipal Law (Dersaadet Belediye Kanunu); and the 1882 Building Law (Ebniye Kanunu). These combined reforms divided and transformed Istanbul through mandated modernisation reforms, so that by 1900, Istanbul was a dual city with westernised Galata and Pera on one side, and traditional Istanbul on the other side of the Golden Horn. Many of these regulations focused on regimenting building construction, building height, and a correlation of scale between building height and street width. New parameters, dimensions and statutes enforced regularity and standardisation in urban redevelopment projects. These new regulations were meant to aid communication efficiency, as well as travel speed and trade. The focus on speed, communication and centralisation also led to the advent of a number of large transportation and communication projects throughout the empire, such as the Syrian, Baghdadi, and Hijaz railways, the Damascus-Beirut road, and the Medina telegraph line.¹¹

The 1869 Regulation on Roads and Streets (Turuk ve Meabir Nizamnamesi) furthered this push towards provincial reform by creating three categories of roads throughout the empire: imperial roads that led to Istanbul; secondary and tertiary roads that linked provincial centres; and roads leading to smaller towns and villages. In time, the Transjordan Mandate would use these same laws, with Amman replacing Istanbul as the central destination. The shift towards Amman during the mandate increased its regional standing as the locus of power while simultaneously diminishing the relevance of other urban centres. In this way, the infrastructural reforms of the mandate period were very much in keeping with late Ottoman centralising efforts.¹² The goals of the Ottomans’ new road construction programme – increasing trade, profitability, and communication speed – were hampered by the empire’s dire financial situation – the Ottoman Empire went bankrupt in 1876. As a result, foreign concessions funded many roads and railways throughout the empire – e.g., the Beirut-Damascus road opened in 1863 by Edmond de Perthuis. Despite such limitations, the Ottoman Empire boasted over 900 kilometres of roads by the early twentieth century.¹³

Perhaps the most important infrastructural project of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was the Hijaz railway. At the onset, the Ottoman government planned the Hijaz railway as a purely domestic project. The hope was that the empire could handle planning, financing and constructing the railway without any external assistance. This proved to be impossible and a large proportion of the materials and technical expertise came from outside of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴ There was no real economic motivation for the rail line, and the Hijaz Railway was justified as a means to reinforce the Islamic credentials of the Ottoman Empire by aiding pilgrims on hajj. It was also hoped that the railway would strengthen Ottoman control over southern Syria and the Hijaz. The line reached Medina in 1908 but never made it to Mecca.¹⁵

Despite the flurry of reforms in the nineteenth century, the land falling into the territory of Transjordan did not come under Ottoman control immediately. It took multiple attempts to bring Transjordan under direct Ottoman rule. First in 1844, then 1851, and 1852, the latter of which saw the establishment of the Ottoman district administration (liwa) of ʿAjlun, joining Karak, Salt and ʿAjlun under a single administrative unit. However, this liwa existed only on paper. Finally, in 1867, the Governor of Damascus Mehmet Rashid Pasha’s military campaign brought northern Transjordan under permanent Ottoman rule. The northern provinces of ʿAjlun and Balqa fell under Ottoman sway in 1867, while southern Karak, and to a lesser degree Maʿan, remained outside Ottoman control until 1893. The new regional governate (mutasarrifiyya) of Balqa linked Salt and Nablus, with Muhammad Saʿid Agha appointed its first regional governor.¹⁶ The provincial seat for the mutasarrifiyya was the town of Salt.

At that time, Salt was the only permanent year-round settlement found in the Balqa region, and so was the logical regional base of power. Salt was built on the steep slopes of a hill, protected by a castle, with valleys on either side. Its topography protected and insulated it from raids and sustained attacks. It had extensive markets, mosques and churches in different quarters.¹⁷ The most important trade centre in Transjordan operated with Nablus as its primary trading partner before being officially linked in the Ottoman mutasarrifiyya. The Committee for State Construction began erecting in Salt the official buildings of Ottoman administration, including the governor’s residence and a government...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Figures
• List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. More of the Same: Ottoman Continuity and the Early Years of the Mandate
• 2. Controlling Infrastructure: Fleshing Out Potemkin Ministries
• 3. Extraordinary Finance: City Infrastructure in the Midst of Imperial Funds, Private Capital and Local Actors
• 4. A Battle for Autonomy in the First Legislative Council of Transjordan
• 5. Elite Manipulation in the Legislative Council: Amman as a Paradox
• 6. A Flâneur on the Streets of Amman
• 7. The Development of Amman’s Urban Fabric
• 8. Political Proving Ground: Performative Power and Anti-Zionist Demonstrations in Faisal Square
• Conclusion
• Appendix I: Legislative Councils of Transjordan (1929–1946)
• Appendix II: Amman Residential Architecture Matrix
• Bibliography
• Index