The Condition of the Working Class in Turkey

Labour under Neoliberal Authoritarianism

Çaatay Edgücan Şahin, Mehmet Erman Erol, Çaatay Edgücan Şahin, Mehmet Erman Erol

• Publisher: Pluto Press
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780745343136
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Labour & Industrial Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Decades of neoliberal authoritarianism have propelled Turkey into crisis. Regime change, economic disaster and Erdogan's ambition to impose 'one-man rule' have shaken the foundations of Turkish political life, but what does this mean for workers?

Moving beyond the headlines and personalities, this book uncovers the real condition of the working class in modern Turkey. Combining field research and in-depth interviews, it offers cutting-edge analyses of workplace struggles, trade unionism, the AKP's relationship with neoliberalism, migration, gender, agrarian change and precarity, as well as the Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on workers.

Bringing together Turkish activists and scholars, this book is an inside look at the dynamics and contradictions of working-class resistance against Turkey's neoliberal authoritarian regime; from worker self-management to organised labour and rural struggles.

PART I

Restructuring

Neoliberal Restructuring of Labour and the State: From Military Dictatorship to the AKP Era

1

Not-So-Strange Bedfellows: Neoliberalism and the AKP in Turkey

Mehmet Erman Erol

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The neoliberal transformation of Turkey began with the military coup in 1980 and has continued uninterrupted since then. It was uninterrupted in the sense that it reflected the broader policy preferences of state managers; however, it also faced frequent and significant impediments and instabilities. Following a major economic crisis in 2001, political Islamist AKP has been the agent of neoliberalism in Turkey. Enjoying ‘strong’ majority governments since 2002, the AKP played a significant role in restructuring of the state and economy; and achieved the implementation of unaccomplished parts of neo-liberal reforms such as massive privatisations, flexibilising the labour market, restructuring of social security and the health system, and imposition of market imperatives in general. This process, however, was not without problems and, especially with the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2008, the AKP’s neoliberal path became crisis-ridden; marked by various domestic and external crises and ever-growing Islamist and authoritarian practices.

This chapter locates the rise of political Islam in general, and the AKP in particular, within the neoliberal transformation of Turkey since the 1980s. The chapter starts with making sense of the meaning of neoliberal state and economy, both theoretically and historically. Then Turkey’s encounter and experience with neoliberalism in the 1980s is dealt with. Following this, the crisis-ridden 1990s is discussed in terms of financial and political turmoils; ending up with the major 2001 crisis, and the 2002 elections which the AKP won by a landslide. The AKP era is periodised as 2002–07 (the first term, the so-called ‘golden age’) and post-2007 (crises and intensified authoritarianism). The overall argument of the chapter is that neoliberalism is most significantly a (political) project that aimed to curb the power of labour; and Turkey’s transition to neoliberalism reflects this ambition. AKP governments, in that sense, represent a direct continuity as far as management of labour power is considered. However, the chapter takes the AKP’s peculiarities and contradictions into account as well, in the context of unprecedented authoritarianism and Islamist politics.

1.2 MAKING SENSE OF NEOLIBERALISM: FREE ECONOMY AND STRONG (AUTHORITARIAN) STATE

It would not be an overstatement to argue that the global political economy has been governed within the parameters of a neoliberal framework in the last four decades. Despite legitimacy problems arising from the 2008 global financial crisis,¹ neoliberalism survived and ‘in some respects strenghten[ed] as a response to that crisis’ (Kiely, 2017: 725). This chapter conceives neoliberalism as a form of political economy or a particular organisation of capitalism (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005: 3) that entails a ‘free economy’ and a ‘strong state’ simultaneously (see Gamble, 1994; Bonefeld, 2017a). The reason why this couplet came to the fore should be understood in the context of politicised social relations (i.e. intensified class struggle) and the crisis of Keynesian/developmentalist political economy in the 1970s in both the Global North and the Global South.

As Bonefeld (2017b: 754) explains, ‘during the 1970s, neoliberal interpretation of the then crisis of capitalist accumulation focused either explicitly or implicitly on the crisis of state authority’. Hence, to achieve the aims of the neoliberal paradigm, i.e. removing barriers to capitalist accumulation and curbing the power of labour for a ‘free economy’, restoring state authority via the ‘strong state’ was of vital importance. The crisis of the 1970s manifested itself in the form of escalating inflation, rising real wages, slowing of the pace of global capitalist accumulation, and difficulty of financing the ever growing government budget deficits (Clarke, 2005: 58). However, the crisis, by the neoliberals, was conceived of as not a crisis of ‘economy’ per se; it was in fact the crisis of ‘political’ economy. It was argued that at the heart of the crisis were the ‘economic consequences of democracy’ and a ‘weak state’ (crisis of ‘governability’) that was surrendered to the special interests (i.e. trade unions) and mass democratic demands for welfare, full employment and employment protection (Bonefeld, 2017b). In such a situation, social relations were politicised, as well as economic management. Strong trade unions, excess of (social) democracy, accompanied by a ‘weak state’ were seen to be the main reasons of the crisis and also the main impediments to achieving free economy.

Hence, as Andrew Gamble (1994: 40) points out, the strong state was needed ‘firstly to unwind the coils of social democracy and welfarism that had fastened around the free economy; secondly to police the market order; thirdly to make the economy more productive; and fourthly to uphold social and political authority’. For the state to be strong enough to materalise such objectives, neoliberal thinkers such as Hayek and Friedman believed that the economy should have been freed from political interference, and the economic relations should have been depoliticised such that the market could self-regulate (Macartney, 2013). As David Harvey describes, ‘neo-liberal theorists are … profoundly suspicious of democracy’ (2005: 66). Thus, the ‘democratic overload’ on the state should have been removed via depoliticisation (i.e. insulating key institutions such as the central bank from democratic pressures). Hence the argument over the ‘separation of politics and economics’, or the attempts to separate the ‘economy and state into distinct forms of social organisation’ (Bonefeld, 2017b).

As such, active public economic policy and strong trade unions were to be avoided as their intervention would create perverse (i.e. inflationary) consequences (Macartney, 2013). In that sense, by constantly attempting to insulate policy-making processes from the trade unions and other democratic pressures, it could be well argued that neoliberalism is an authoritarian form of governance. As Bruff (2014) notes, authoritarianism is not solely the exercise of brute coercive force: it ‘can also be observed in the reconfiguring of state and institutional power in an attempt to insulate certain policies and institutional practices from social and political dissent’. This does not mean that ‘coercion’ or ‘use of force’ would not be practised. It ‘is justified when it is employed to defeat and contain those interests, organisations and individuals that threaten the survival of the free economy, either by flouting its rules or resisting the outcomes that flow from market exchanges’ (Gamble, 1994: 39).

Neoliberalism is commonly associated with ‘globalisation’, such that the term ‘neoliberal globalisation’ is frequently used. Indeed, the globalisation of economic and financial relations give the capitalist states a very strong justification for implementing the neoliberal policies. Faced with the competition to attract capital to their territories or to be competitive in the world market, states particularly targeted labour markets and attempted to make them flexible and competitive (Harvey, 2005). Also, this process led to the transformation of the ‘welfare state’ into a ‘workfare’ state. In the neoliberal globalisation era, therefore, the result of such a shift has been curbing and dismantling various social expenditures in the context of greater fiscal discipline and austerity (Rogers, 2014: 66).

These developments, i.e. less visible involvement of the state in some areas, privatisation, dissolution of the welfare state, increased significance of global markets, led some accounts in International Political Economy (IPE) to argue that the state lost its autonomy and surrendered to market forces. However, this view is too simplistic. As Bonefeld outlines, ‘the depoliticization of the economy, the curtailment of trade union power, the transformation of the welfare state into a workfare state, and the liberalization of the economy, creating, maintaining and sustaining free economy, are all a matter of a practice of government’ (2017b: 755, my emphasis). Furthermore, this means these processes are reflections of a political project; and amount to a ‘strong, authoritarian state’. This is the essence of neoliberalism.

Without doubt, there would be variations in neoliberal policies ‘from place to place as well as over time’ (Harvey, 2005: 70). However, wherever implemented, neoliberalism essentially focused on the ‘question of labour’ for a free economy and ‘restoration of (capitalist) class power’ (Harvey, 2005: 70), and establishing a ‘strong state’ to sustain this free economy and the domination of capital over labour. Turkey’s experience with neoliberalism since the 1980s reflects these tendencies well.

1.3 TURKEY’S EXPERIENCE WITH NEOLIBERALISM UNTIL THE AKP PERIOD

1.3.1 Military Dictatorship and ANAP Governments: 1980–91

Against the background of the crisis-ridden political economy of Turkey between the 1977 and 1980 period, which was marked by the crisis of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), intensified class struggle and political instability, the Turkish Army staged a coup on 12 September 1980. It is important to note hereby the explicit and implicit calls and pressures of the Turkish bourgeoisie for authoritarian solutions before the coup. The military junta’s first concern was ‘restoring law and order, and state authority’. This entailed the ‘strong state as a guarantor of economic individualism’ (Aydin, 2005: 54) as well as the ‘free economy’ of neoliberalism, instead of the collective demands of organised labour. Hence, state-economy and/or state-society relations needed to be restructured through a new legal, political and economic framework, which was in sharp contrast to the pre-1980 economic and politico-legal structure.

The military dictatorship, which lasted until 1983, had certain political and economic objectives. Economically, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB)-backed 24 January 1980 stabilisation programme² would be implemented immediately, as Turkish capitalism was suffering from foreign currency constraints, external debt, balance of payment problems, high inflation and a shortage of crucial commodities. The stability programme consisted of a devaluation of Turkish lira, removal of price controls, trade liberalisation, removal of restrictions on imports and encouragement of exports (Duman, 2014: 81). Although there was no direct reference to labour-related issues, the aim was to change the way Turkey integrated with the world market, from ISI to an export-oriented strategy based on competitiveness, which would necessitate the disciplining of labour and dramatic wage reductions (Duman, 2014: 81).

In order to achieve the objectives of this anti-labour neoliberal economic orientation, the military aimed ‘to put an end to class-based politics’ (Yalman, 2009). Under the military dictatorship, all trade union activity was banned. The labour front was completely excluded from any policy-making process. This amounted to an authoritarian trade union policy and an authoritarian neoliberal restructuring of the state. In this context, the 1982 Constitution was quite functional. In line with its general anti-democratic character, the Constitution ‘institutionalized measures intended to de-politicize, de-mobilize, de-radicalize, and de-unionize society’ (Marois, 2012: 102). The right to strike was curtailed and could only take place under carefully defined circumstances. Hence, the military regime ‘ensured through the authoritarian 1982 constitution that the working class would not challenge capital in the foreseeable future’ (Aydın, 2005: 53). In the following year, the new labour legislation furthered restrictions on unionisation and labour movement (see Chapter 13).

As far as authoritarian neoliberal restructuring of the state and policy-making is concerned, there has been a shift within the branches of the state. Following the new constitution, the executive power was strengthened at the expense of legislature, and power had been centralised within the executive (Öniş and Webb, 1992). The right-wing ANAP governments between 1983 and 1991 continued these authoritarian political and economic orientations of the military dictatorship. However, it lost power in the 1991 elections. Nevertheless, this defeat ‘did not mean … the demise of the pro-structural adjustment or the pro-liberalisation coalition. The long period of ANAP rule helped consolidate reforms to such a degree that all the principal parties agreed on a broadly similar economic program’ (Öniş and Webb, 1992: 48), namely neoliberalism. There would be significant economic and political instabilities in the 1990s, however, which would make it ‘a lost decade’.

1.3.2 Crisis-Ridden Neoliberalism: The Long 1990s and the 2001 Crisis

Although the neoliberal economic policies brought some stability mainly thanks to the disciplined labour power and massive external support through the ‘credibility’ of the regime, this process brought its own contradictions. Indeed, from 1987 onwards, the labour movement and unions revitalised, partly due to the limited transition to ‘democracy’, and challenged the anti-labour stance of the ANAP government. Hence, towards the end of the decade, distributional pressures made themselves felt again, growth was declined, and other economic indicators worsened (see Chapter 2).

Under these conditions, the main macroeconomic policy response of the ANAP government was complete deregulation of financial markets and capital account liberalisation in 1989 (Aydın, 2005). The expectation was to attract short-term capital inflows to restore economic growth and finance the deficits. However, this move made the Turkish political economy once again crisis-prone led by a financial and speculative capital accumulation regime, which marked the 1990s. In this context, the increasing fiscal and current account deficits, the shaky nature of the political environment, and the deterioration of external and internal debt stocks ended up with a massive capital outflow in April 1994 (Aydın, 2005). The 5 April 1994 IMF-backed orthodox stabilisation measures attempted to impose discipline on the economy, but remained limited against the background of labour unrest and political legitimacy issues, as well as favourable w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I: Restructuring
• Part II: Containment
• Part III: Resistance
• Notes
• Contributors
• Index