FOR FAR TOO MANY PEOPLE, Christians and non-Christians alike, the doctrine of election is regarded with suspicion, doubt, and often not a little trepidation. As Karl Barth put it, for much of its history the idea of election has existed in an interpretive and receptive âtwilightâ that has transformed what should by rights be a joyful summation of the gospel into an odious and inscrutable dogma.1 Likewise, Barthâs Swiss colleague, Emil Brunner, noted that, in considering this doctrine, we enter âthe danger-zone, in which our faith might be injured and our theology distracted into heresy.â2 There are, perhaps, two overriding reasons why this has been the case. On the one hand, the doctrine often seems to presume at its head a God of arbitrary caprice. Indeed, the doctrineâs general opprobrium is in large measure because it appears to be guided by neither rhyme nor reason but directed only by the mysterious will of a hidden God. For Theodore Beza, for example, the doctrine is founded not on the self-revelation of the triune God but on a God behind that revelation, âwhose ways are past finding out.â3 On the other hand, it also suffersâor is thought to sufferâfrom that age-old doctrinal malady, âinnovation.â Christians by and large have tended to be a conservative community, for which change and development is frequently associated with liberalizing heterodoxy. Stability and constancy act as proxy guarantors of dogmatic normativity, and any doctrine that seems to appear out of nowhere, as it were, is consequently in for a rough time.
Strangely, this is precisely the fate that has befallen the doctrine of election. While Augustine, Gottschalk, and Aquinas all spoke in differing ways about predestination between the fifth and thirteenth centuries, it was not until the sixteenth-century Reformation, particularly but not only through the influence of John Calvin, that the idea of election emerged with full force as an ingredient in Western theology. Nevertheless, while there is no doubt that Protestantism, most noticeably within the Reformed wing, has emphasized the doctrine of election to a degree not seen in either patristic or medieval writings, it is not thereby the case that this idea can or should be apprehended only lightly, as if it were a Protestant novelty.
On the contrary, the roots of this doctrine lie deep within the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. If the exegesis of those Scriptures has obscured rather than clarified the intent of the idea, that should not detract from the doctrineâs essential grounding in the Bible nor cause us to think of it only in the light of the last five hundred years. No genuine appreciation of the doctrine of election (and how indeed it is the sum of the gospel) is possible if we begin only, say, with Calvin and work forward. In this first chapter, then, we will explore just how ancientâand therefore un-innovative!âthe idea of election is by considering a set of biblical texts (but by no means all) that foreground election as the most basic action by which Godâs relationship with his people is expressed.
A SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE
All doctrines are, or should be, grounded in the churchâs Scriptures. That is an uncontestable axiom (at least rhetorically) across all Christian traditions.4 But what this means in practice is a more complex matter that differs in its enactment from doctrine to doctrine. The nineteenth-century historical theologian George Fisher rightly insisted on the centrality of Scripture as âthe objective rule of Christian faith.â5 Yet his successors were equally correct to remind us that the appeal to Scripture âhas operated in different ways.â Occasionally, the Bible is the âoriginating sourceâ of a certain idea; more usually, it has been the provider of âconfirmatory evidence for a conviction already reached.â Of course, we are also now much more ready to accept that the Scriptures, as partially products of human endeavor, were written in contexts that themselves need careful cultural exegesis. Nonetheless, such interpretive complexities notwithstanding, doctrinal appeal to Scripture must still be made.6
However, an understanding of what it means for a doctrine to be âscripturalâ still evades us. For example, the doctrine of the resurrection is scriptural in a way that the doctrine of the Trinity is not. That is, while there may be any number of ways of interpreting what the resurrection of Christ was and means, that the New Testament attests it is not in any doubt. The doctrine of Godâs triunity, however, is scripturally opaque. Although Dan Migliore contends that there is a âpervasive trinitarian patternâ to the witness of both Old and New Testaments, it remains the case that the doctrine of the Trinity itself must be extrapolated from the biblical witness rather than being found there in any self-evident sense.7 What, indeed, were the earliest conciliar debates aboutâat Nicaea and then again at Chalcedonâif not heated controversies over the correct extrapolation of trinitarian theology from the pages of Scripture? As Dietrich Ritschl has so eloquently put it, the notion that âregulative statements [of doctrine] are present in the biblical writingsâ is true only approximately and with severe qualification. Notwithstanding the obvious and necessary truth that Christian doctrine is grounded in, and based on, the testimony of Scripture, âscriptural doctrineâ per se, if we mean by that a set of directly applicable formulations of normative theology, is largely a fiction.8
So how are we to approach and understand this strange doctrine of election and affirm its âscripturalityâ? It goes without saying that election is in the Scriptures, much as the resurrection is and the Trinity is not. Godâs decision âto chooseâ (×Ö¸Öź×֡רâbahĚŁar) Jacob/Israel, the divine âknowingâ (×Ö¸×֡עâyadaâ ) of his people that suggestively connotes so much more than cognition, Jesusâ âcallingâ of his disciples (κι὜ Îľá˝Î¸á˝şĎ áźÎşÎŹÎťÎľĎξν Îąá˝ĎÎżĎĎâMk 1:20)âeach verbal metaphor depicts a God who initiates and then activates a will to have a relationship with others who are outside his own Godhead. Thus, and given that this whole book is predicated on the affirmation of Godâs free decision to be with us and for us, it seems right that we consider the relevant Scriptures not so much as mere texts to investigate but rather as Godâs conversation with us. Katherine Sonderegger articulates this beautifully when she says that the âdearness of Scriptureâ is that we are drawn by it into the presence of God, our eternal Teacher. No matter how strange and even alien some parts of the Bible are to usâand this not least in connection with the doctrine of electionâto hear the words of Scripture is, says Sonderegger, to enter into the âpenumbra of a welcome Light,â to âtouch and love a token of the One who irresistibly calls us.â9 In affirming the doctrine of election as scriptural, we mean here that in the Bibleâs various expressions of this idea, we encounter over and again this freedom of Godâs call. As we shall see, even in its shadow side, the confession that God chooses to call and beckon us into conversation and encounterâsome first, then others; not all at the same time, but eventually some; always for the sake and on behalf of allâis the scriptural attestation of what it means to be elect. In other words, the Scriptures themselves are our conversation with God about his greater freedom to enter into conversation with us, which we rightly denote by the idea of election.
But we must also mean more than this. Conversations have a tendency to be heard discriminately, with us hearing only what we wish to hear. No matter how conversational our approach to the Scriptures isâand conversational it must indeed be if we know that in and through them we encounter not simply textual fragments and ideas but, on the contrary, Godâs attestation of his own selfâthe Scriptures must be for us not simply a dialogical sparring partner but the very foundation and testing ground of what we claim. Only if this doctrine of election, as we wish to propose it here, can legitimately be understood as a faithful representation âof what God has already said of himself, and continues to say,â will it stand up to scrutiny.10 Scripture thus becomes the starting point of all that we say and then the touchstone by which our and othersâ expressions of this doctrine are judged. With this in mind, we ought now to turn our attention to a selection of key passages in both Testaments.
GENESIS 12:1-9
Now the LORD said to Abram, âGo from your country and your kindred and your fatherâs house to the land that I will show you. I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name great, so that you will be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and the one who curses you I will curse; and in you all the families of the earth shall be blessed.â So Abram went, as the LORD had told him; and Lot went with him. Abram was seventy-five years old when he departed from Haran. Abram took his wife Sarai and his brotherâs son Lot, and all the possessions that they had gathered, and the persons whom they had acquired in Haran; and they set forth to go to the land of Canaan. When they had come to the land of Canaan, Abram passed through the land to the place at Shechem, to the oak of Moreh. At that time the Canaanites were in the land. Then the LORD appeared to Abram, and said, âTo your offspring I will give this land.â So he built there an altar to the LORD, who had appeared to him. From there he moved on to the hill country on the east of Bethel, and pitched his tent, with Bethel on the west and Ai on the east; and there he built an altar to the LORD and invoked the name of the LORD. And Abram journeyed on by stages toward the Negeb. (Gen 12:1-9)
The story of Abramâs call, while perhaps not the most fantastical story in the Hebrew Bible, is nevertheless one of the most baffling. The creation of a universe ex nihilo may strike a somewhat more discordant note in an age so devoted to science and technology as ours. In principle, however, it is not especially problematic if you have already accepted the premise of a sovereignly powerful God. Similarly unproblematic are, on the acceptance of this premise, the sundry healing miracles (e.g., of the widowâs son in 1 Kings 17:17-24 and of Namaan in 2 Kings 5:1-19), the stopping of the sun (Josh 10:13), and the various other manifestations of Godâs action in the natural world. This particular story, though, cannot be explained merely by reference to Godâs presupposed almightiness, for the issue at hand is not power, but choice. As James Kugel puts it, the ancient and indeed only reasonable response to the call of Abram is âbewildermentâ! What precisely had Abram done to deserve Godâs promise that âhe would become the ancestor of a great and mighty nation . . . [and would be granted] so many good things that his very name would turn into a blessingâ? The only right and possible answer is nothing.11
Walter Brueggemann presses this idea further in linking Abramâs undeservedness with that small but vital biographical detail at the end of the preceding chapter: âNow Sarai was barren; she had no childâ (Gen 11:30). Such barrenness, says Brueggemann, âis the way of human history. It is an effective metaphor . . . [because] there is no human power to invent a future. But barrenness is not only the condition of hopeless humanity. The marvel of biblical faith is that barrenness is the arena of Godâs life-giving action.â12
In other words, insofar as this passage is the first substantive introduction to Abramâthe preceding verses in Genesis 11:26-31 being more about his father, Terahâits details provide no basis for extrapolating any merit on his part by which his divine call could have been justified. Indeed, it is exactly the deficit of merit, of which Saraiâs infertility is a sign, that is the point. Godâs call is unexplained, precisely because it is unmerited, and rests only on Godâs free decision. True, a later passage in Joshua has been exegeted by Jewish, Christian, and Islamic scholars to prove Abramâs monotheism, in an effort to cite that as the reason for his being singled out.13 But Kugel reminds us that there is
not a single verse in the book of Genesis [that] actually says that Abraham believed in the existence of only one God . . . There is nary a hint, even in the Bibleâs much later depiction of him, that Abrahamâs beliefs differed in kind from those of the people he encountered.14
What we see in this story, then, is a confounding example of Godâs freedom to choose one thing and not anotherâor in this case, one person and not anotherânot only for no good reason but seemingly for no reason at all.
Choice, ho...