A basic description
Thinking is mental activity, but it is not just any mental activity. Or rather, thinking and mental activity are not synonymous. For example, basic visual perception, memory consolidation, and coordination of sensory motor activity are all very sophisticated mental activities, but these kinds of behaviours are not usually considered to be thinking. Thinking is a very specific subset of mental activity that involves working with mental representations, planning and executing behaviours, and the coordination of cognitive resources. For example, solving an algebra problem, analyzing the themes in a film, discussing the prospects for your favourite sports team, or making a split-second decision about which route to take when a road is closed are all examples of thinking. Some of these are examples of fast thinking (intuitive judgements) and others are examples of slower thinking (reasoning and analyzing). We'll discuss these two kinds of thinking later in this chapter. Daydreaming, fantasy, depressive thoughts, and anxious ruminations are also examples of thinking, but are less focussed and sometimes less productive. In this book I will deal primarily with thinking as a cognitive phenomenon and spend less time considering the contents of unstructured thought or the clinical ramifications of thoughts that are difficult to control.
Different kinds of thinking
Thinking can be divided up in many ways, including divisions based on content, effort, the desired outcome, underlying cognitive processes, and function. These kinds of divisions are intuitive but also allow researchers to study thinking at different levels. For example, we must make a distinction between the kind of thought that one engages in when solving an introductory physics problem and the kind of thought that one engages in when catching a fly ball in baseball. For readers not immediately familiar with fly balls, this is a ball that is hit with a high arc, which can easily exceed 30 metres (100 feet). Catching one is fairly easy with practice and involves being able to predict exactly where the ball will land, and placing oneself in that location (McBeath et al., 1995). Solving a physics problem and catching a fly ball both require attention. Solving a physics problem and catching a fly ball both have a measurable outcome (passing the exam or catching the ball). And both are essentially physics problems. But solving an introductory physics problem requires sustained attention, the recall and generation of learned facts, the conscious application of those facts, and the ability to engage in some kind of explicit monitoring of the behaviour. This is a conscious and effortful process, even if the solver in question has some experience with physics problems. Catching a fly ball, on the other hand, is a process that often defies verbal description. It is intuitive and does not seem to rely on the recall of facts, but rather on the replay of hand-eye coordination routines. The physics calculations needed to predict where the ball will land are complicated and require information that the person catching the ball will not have, such as the exit velocity when the ball was struck and the launch angle.
Catching a fly ball and solving a basic physics problem are both examples of complex thinking, and yet they differ in terms of what psychological processes are active during the execution. A thorough understanding of the psychology of thinking requires being able to differentiate between these two kinds of thought processes, the cognitive processes that underlie them, and to be able to have an adequate theoretical description of thinking that encompasses both kinds of thinking.
Consider another example: the thinking processes behind a game of chess. Playing chess requires the coordination of several cognitive processes and behaviours. One must have sufficient knowledge of the rules, a good recall for the rules, and be able to apply them. Playing chess, and especially playing chess effectively, also involves recall for common chess positions and recall of previously played games of chess (Chase & Simon, 1973; De Groot, 1965). Playing chess effectively also involves thinking ahead, thinking about what your opponent might do, and developing a strategy for how to react based on what you think the other player will do. This second set of behaviours involves what is known as a theory of mind, which means being able to consider the contents of another person's thoughts.
Playing chess can be contrasted with playing a visually oriented video game. Many games, especially the simple, physics puzzle games found on mobile platforms, such as the âAngry Birdsâ-type games, place much less emphasis on rule acquisition and retrieval of rules for memory, and place a greater premium on procedurally learned motor responses. As with the previous example (catching fly balls versus solving physics problems), the first behaviour is a conscious and effortful process whereas the second behaviour is an intuitive and procedural process that defies verbal description. Interestingly, both rely on some degree of retrieved memories. In the chapter on expertise in this text, we will discuss at length the degree to which expert chess players rely on the rapid retrieval of previously learned patterns. This may share some overlap with the kind of rapid retrieval of the previously learned motor responses involved in many visually oriented video games. So although these two kinds of thinking are quite different in many ways, and solve different problems, there are shared underlying mechanisms â in this case, the retrieval of prior instances from memory.
We could go one with many other examples, dissecting them to consider what principles of thought and cognition are involved. Writing a paper for a course requires reading and retaining new ideas, considering more than one idea simultaneously, being able to examine the parallels and analogies among ideas, and also being able to make use of basic linguistic process to communicate the idea. Learning to play a short piece on the piano involves the mapping of written notes to motor action, the focus of attention on the sound of the piece, the coordination of several different motor behaviours. Diagnosing patients involves attending to symptoms, comparing the similarity of the observed symptoms to memory representations of previously seen patients. Looking over many of these examples, we start to recognize commonalities: focussing attention, making judgements about similarity, considering several ideas simultaneously. These common attributes will eventually become the objects of study for understanding the psychology of thinking.
