Swinging The Sledgehammer: The Combat Effectiveness Of German Heavy Tank Battalions In World War II

Major Christopher W. Wilbeck

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781782897538
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This thesis is a historical analysis of the combat effectiveness of the German schwere Panzer-Abteilung or Heavy Tank Battalions during World War II. During the course of World War II, the German Army developed heavy tank battalions to fulfill the concept of breaking through enemy defenses so faster, lighter mechanized forces could exploit the rupture. These heavy tank battalions had several different tables of organization, but were always centered around either the Tiger or the Tiger II tank. They fought in virtually every theater of Europe against every enemy of Germany. Ultimately, the German military created eleven Army and three Waffen-SS heavy tank battalions. Of the Army battalions, the German command fielded ten as independent battalions, which were allocated to Army Groups as needed. The German Army assigned the last heavy tank battalion as an organic unit of the elite Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland. The Waffen-SS allocated all of their battalions to a different Waffen-SS Corps.
Because these units were not fielded until late in 1942, they did not participate in Germany's major offensive operations that dominated the early part of World War II. Germany's strategic situation after mid-1943 forced their military onto the defensive. Consequently, there are very few instances when heavy tank battalions attacked as a breakthrough force. During the latter part of the war, they were used in many different ways to provide defensive assistance along very wide frontages. This study assesses the German heavy tank battalions as generally effective, primarily because of the high kill ratio they achieved. However, based upon observations from a wide variety of examples, this study also outlines several areas where changes may have increased their effectiveness.

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

The only instrument of armored warfare which German commanders regarded as qualitatively different from the rest was the Mark VI Tiger, which was not allotted to divisions but organized in independent battalions, kept under central control, and committed to crucial offensive and counter-offensive missions.{1} — John Keegan, The Second World War

The German Tiger and Tiger II tanks were legends in their own time. They were arguably the most feared weapon developed by the Germans. The men who commanded these tanks accomplished extraordinary feats. This thesis analyzes the combat effectiveness of the German schwere Panzer-Abteilung (s.Pz-Abt.), or heavy tank battalions. This thesis shows that although they were rarely used in the role for which they were originally conceived, that of breaking through prepared enemy defenses, these units were effective in the offense and defense in destroying enemy tanks. However, results varied between different battalions and leaders could have increased the heavy tank battalion’s effectiveness with better doctrine and employment. The analysis includes the performance of doctrinal and assigned missions from both the Western and Eastern Fronts, and it considers doctrine, force structure, equipment, leadership, and personnel.

Although there is a great wealth of information available on many aspects of the heavy tank battalions, no literature exists to answer whether these units were viable forces that achieved the doctrinal mission for which they were conceived. Also, no scholar has looked into whether they were able to accomplish the missions assigned to them while the German Army was on the defensive; counterattacking, reinforcing other units in the defense, or as a mobile reserve. This thesis fills that void by studying unit histories and engagements from all perspectives while looking at the different organizations developed, types of equipment, and missions of the heavy tank battalions.

Background

After World War I, the armies of the world wrestled with the lessons learned during that war. They tried to come up with solutions for overcoming the linear, stalemated war of World War I. The objective was to go beyond positional, attrition warfare and return to a war of maneuver. In order to do this, a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses had to be attained. Many military theorists tried to conceive a doctrine to rupture and exploit the enemy defensive line. Great Britain, Germany, and Russia all published material in their professional military journals that put forth the idea of attacking in waves of tanks. In these theories, the lead wave consisted of the “heavy” tanks and the follow-on waves were lighter, faster tanks that exploited the breach. Although the German Army planned for heavy tanks and development of the Durchbruchswagen (breakthrough tank) began in 1937, no heavy tanks were fielded before World War II began.{2}

The German Army ultimately developed their own concept of mobile warfare that was very successful during the first part of World War II in encircling enemy forces. Their success in Poland, France, and during the first year in Russia precluded the necessity of having to “break-through” a continuous line of fortified defensive positions; thus they did not suffer from the lack of heavy tanks in their armored forces. However, the German Army’s encounter with the Soviet T-34 Medium and the KV-1 heavy tanks during their advances near the end of 1941 reinvigorated the development of their dormant heavy tank program.

The German Army created the first two heavy tank companies on 16 February 1942 and assigned them to the first heavy tank battalion that was created on 10 May 1942{3}. These heavy tank battalions were not assigned to the organization of Panzer Divisions, rather, they were used as Heeres-Truppen (army level units). The Army High Command (OKH) allocated these units to army groups who would be free to subordinate them further to armies, corps, or even to divisions for employment. Before the war was over, the army fielded eleven and the Waffen-Schutzstaffel or (armed SS) fielded three heavy tank battalions.

These organizations had several different Tables of Organization but were always centered around either the Tiger or the Tiger II (also known as the King Tiger or Royal Tiger) tank.{4} They were in continual service from 16 September 1942, when they saw their first action against the Russians near Leningrad, until the end of the war.{5} During this time, they fought in virtually every region of the European theater against Russians, Americans, and British forces.

Historical Literature

There are many books available that discuss the primary piece of equipment of the heavy tank battalions, the Tiger and Tiger II tanks. There is also a vast amount of literature about the individuals who attained incredibly high kill totals while commanding these tanks. Very little, however, is written about the actual units in which these tanks and individuals operated. The biggest shortcoming is works on the effectiveness of the heavy tank battalions. At best, there are several books covering the combat histories of heavy tank battalions using combat reports of these units. These books do not attempt to analyze any of these combat actions and do not include conclusions on their role in combat.

Although there are weaknesses in the literature of heavy tank battalions, there are some works that provide useful insights. Two of these accounts are from Heinz Guderian. Guderian played a very important role in the development of armored doctrine before World War II as a leading theorist and as the Chef der Schnellen Truppen (Chief of fast troops) and during the latter half of the war as Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen (Inspector General of armored forces). Any exploration of Germany’s doctrinal development and use of armored forces is deficient without including Heinz Guderian’s two books. His first book, Actung-Panzer! The Development of Armoured Forces, their Tactics and Operational Potential provides a background on doctrine prior to World War II. His second book, Panzer Leader, was written after the war and provides information concerning changes in the doctrine and employment during World War II. Because Achtung-Panzer! was written prior to the development and fielding of any heavy tank battalions, it contains no specific analysis of these units, but it does provide the foundation for defining the doctrinal role envisioned for heavy tank battalions. Panzer Leader contains several reflections on the correct employment of heavy tank battalions, but its insights focus on the initial fielding of the heavy tank battalions prior to the battle of Kursk.

In terms of combat histories of the heavy tank battalions, Wolfgang Schneider’s Tigers in Combat I and Tigers in Combat II are good sources of information obtained from personal interviews, unit histories, and battle reports. The first book covers the ten army heavy tank battalions and the second book covers the Waffen-SS battalions and the heavy tank battalion of Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland, as well as other units that included a heavy tank company. These books provide a brief overview of each unit that includes equipment, organization, camouflage and markings. The primary source of combat history comes in the form of a sentence or paragraph of what the unit’s actions were on a particular date, similar to a daily logbook or diary. The type and amount of information given varies from unit to unit and from time period to time period. Although providing a great deal of information, Schneider’s books do not include an analysis of heavy tank battalion combat actions. The daily log entries, however, do contain information on the changes in the battalion’s combat power and the operational status of its Tigers. His books provide a table for each unit, detailing the date and cause of each Tiger lost. It also contains information on the number of enemy tanks and equipment destroyed during stated time periods so that an evaluation of tank kills and losses can be ascertained through the unit’s log.

Two unit specific heavy tank battalion combat histories in English provide combat details, but little analysis. They are The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 and The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508, and they recount the respective unit histories from the officers and soldiers that served in these units. Included in these are personal accounts of these units in combat. Together these units were involved in important battles at Kursk, Normandy, Italy, and in the attempt to relieve the encircled German forces in Cherkassy. These books provide in-depth, personal accounts of heavy tank battalions in combat. As a compilation of logs, diaries, and personal accounts, these books are very valuable sources to gain insight into the combat actions of the heavy tank battalions but they do not attempt to analyze the effectiveness of the units. Some of the diary entries are from the battalion and company commanders and include losses and enemy destroyed on a daily basis along with a narrative account of the action. These expand and clarify the simple entries in Schneider’s Tigers in Combat I and Tigers in Combat II and provide personal insight into the units’ actions during combat.

Many books discussing the technical aspects of the Tiger and Tiger II are available. The single most important author on Tiger tanks in general is Thomas L. Jentz. His books Germany’s Tiger Tanks, D.W. to Tiger I and Germany’s Tiger Tanks, VK45.02 to Tiger II provide a great deal of information from primary sources on the design, production, and modifications of the Tiger and Tiger II. In all of Jentz’s works, his standard for inclusion in one of his books is that it must be obtained from original records from World War II.

Jentz has also written a two volume work on armored forces titled Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Force. This book is valuable because it draws on many other sources and participants in the development of the heavy tank battalions. It is especially helpful in tying together the doctrinal changes in the German army with the technical development of the heavy tank and the Tiger program. This book contains heavy tank battalion combat reports that provide recommendations to improve the doctrine, organization, or equipment associated with these units.

By far, the single most valuable work on this subject is yet another book by Jentz. His book, Germany’s Tiger Tanks, Tiger I & II: Combat Tactics, concentrates on the tactical application of Tigers and uses original accounts in the form of after action reports. As he states in his introduction, “these original after action reports are very valuable in obtaining a true picture of applied tactics. As written, they would have had to meet the tough test of peer acceptance.’{6} Because they were written shortly after the events occurred, they also have the advantage of being recorded before memories became clouded by time. Most of the German reports appear to have been written with the motive of initiating improvements to the Tigers or changing tactics. As useful as this book is in researching the heavy tank battalions, it still only provides a limited foundation to evaluate the unit’s performance and does not attempt to analyze combat effectiveness in a comprehensive manner. Finally, as the title of the book suggests, the primary focus is on the employment of units below battalion level, although there is some good information on battalion tactics.

Looking at the heavy tanks from the opponent’s view, David Fletcher’s Tiger! The Tiger Tank: A British View provides excellent insight into the British perspective of the Tiger tank as a technical piece of equipment. However, it offers little detail into thoughts of British commander’s during World War II regarding the heavy tank battalions, their doctrine and effectiveness.

Overcoming Biases

A thorough study of various battles and engagements from Allied unit histories and published historical accounts reveals strong biases within the Allied forces. Among the Allied armies, units continually reported that Tiger tanks were in their sector or that they had destroyed Tiger tanks. For example, a casual reading of Allied accounts during the battle of the Bulge would indicate that at least half of the German tanks employed there were Tigers. Actually, no more than 136 Tigers were involved, with the vast majority of German tanks in the battle being Panther and Panzer IVs.{7} The Soviets also have to be treated with the same skepticism in some instances. For example, Soviet propaganda claimed that 700 Tigers were destroyed during the battle of Kursk. This number is five times more than the actual number engaged in the fighting.{8}

In order to obtain the most accurate picture possible, this thesis uses many different sources. Tank kills reported by the heavy tank battalions against the British and US were verified in specific engagements from a variety of records, including unit histories, after action reports, diaries and other personal accounts. Soviet tank losses were often omitted in their unit histories and in personal accounts, making an accurate count much more difficult to obtain. Several western sources provide some analysis of Soviet tank losses in several battles and were used to confirm German claims.

A source of confusion in reporting tank losses and kills is the definition of what constitutes destruction of a tank. Tanks of World War II, especially the Tiger, were robust and resilient and could be repaired and put back into action if they were recovered and brought back to a maintenance unit. One side may have claimed the destruction of an enemy tank, but in reality, that tank was repaired and returned to service.

The German heavy tank battalions submitted regular reports on Tigers destroyed and also on the number operational. An unserviceable tank required the unit to make a report, giving the chassis number, a survey of the damage and an estimate of the time needed for the repairs.{9} A second report was made at a higher level, indicating the number of tanks in working order for the unit, and the number of tanks under repair.{10} In all cases, clarity and accuracy were required. This makes obtaining an accurate accounting of th...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• ACKNOWLEDGMENT
• TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS
• CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER 2 - HEAVY TANK BATTALION OVERVIEW
• CHAPTER 3 - BIRTH OF HEAVY TANK BATTALIONS TO OPERATION CITADEL
• CHAPTER 4 - AFTER OPERATION CITADEL TO THE END OF THE WAR
• CHAPTER 5 - ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
• BIBLIOGRAPHY