Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare

Mao Tse-Tung, General Samuel B. Griffith

• Publisher: Hauraki Publishing
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781786250926
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Russian History
• Index: History

The Classic text on Communist Guerrilla warfare includes an excellent introduction by Brigadier General Samuel Griffith USMC who was also the translator."In 1937 Mao...wrote a succinct pamphlet that has become one of the most influential documents of our time....the first systematic analysis of guerilla warfare...The widespread applicability of Mao's doctrine stems from his realization of the fundamental disparity between the agrarian, peasant-based society of China and that of pre-revolutionary Russia, or any urban society....he had to employ tactics and appeals appropriate to the peasant."

YU CHI CHAN — (Guerrilla Warfare)

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

In July, 1941, the undeclared war between China and Japan will enter its fifth year. One of the most significant features of the struggle has been the organization of the Chinese people for unlimited guerrilla warfare. The development of this warfare has followed the pattern laid out by Mao Tse-tung and his collaborators in the pamphlet Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare), which was published in 1937 and has been widely distributed in “Free China” at 10 cents a copy.

Mao Tse-tung, a member of the Chinese Communist Party and formerly political commissar of the Fourth Red Army, is no novice in the art of war. Actual battle experience with both regular and guerrilla troops has qualified him as an expert.

The influence of the ancient military philosopher Sun Tzu on Mao’s military thought will be apparent to those who have read The Book of War. Sun Tzu wrote that speed, surprise, and deception were the primary essentials of the attack and his succinct advice, “Sheng Tung, Chi Hsi” (“Uproar [in the] East, Strike [in the] West”), is no less valid today than it was when he wrote it 2,400 years ago. The tactics of Sun Tzu are in large measure the tactics of China’s guerrillas today.

Mao says that unlimited guerrilla warfare, with vast time and space factors, established a new military process. This seems a true statement since there are no other historical examples of guerrilla hostilities as thoroughly organized from the military, political, and economic point of view as those in China. We in the Marine Corps have as yet encountered nothing but relatively primitive and strictly limited guerrilla war. Thus, what Mao has written of this new type of guerrilla war may be of interest to us.

I have tried to present the author’s ideas accurately, but as the Chinese language is not a particularly suitable medium for the expression of technical thought, the translation of some of the modern idioms not yet to be found in available dictionaries is probably arguable. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of retranslated quotations. I have taken the liberty to delete from the translation matter that was purely repetitious.

Samuel B. Griffith Captain, USMC

Quantico, Virginia 1940

A FURTHER NOTE

The preceding note was written twenty-one years ago, but I see no need to amplify it.

Yu Chi Chan (1937) is frequently confused with one of Mao’s later (1938) essays entitled K’ang Jih Yu Chi Chan Cheng Ti Chan Lueh Wen T’i (Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War), which was issued in an English version in 1952 by the People’s Publishing House, Peking. There are some similarities in these two works.

I had hoped to locate a copy of Yu Chi Chan in the Chinese to check my translation but have been unable to do so. Some improvement is always possible in any rendering from the Chinese. I have not been able to identify with standard English titles all the works cited by Mao.

Mao wrote Yu Chi Chan during China’s struggle against Japan; consequently there are, naturally, numerous references to the strategy to be used against the Japanese. These in no way invalidate Mao’s fundamental thesis. For instance, when Mao writes, “The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese,” he might have added, “and from hope of ultimate victory over the forces of Chiang Kai-shek.” However, he did not do so, because at that time both sides were attempting to preserve the illusion of a “united front.” “Our basic policy,” he said, “is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front.” This was, of course, not the basic policy of the Chinese Communist Party then, or at any other time. Its basic policy was to seize state power; the type of revolutionary guerrilla war described by Mao was the basic weapon in the protracted and ultimately successful process of doing so.

Samuel B. Griffith Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.)

Mount Vernon, Maine July, 1961

1 — WHAT IS GUERRILLA WARFARE?

IN A WAR OF REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in a war waged for the emancipation of a people who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must coordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.

These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and Revolution, said: “A people’s insurrection and a people’s revolution are not only natural but inevitable.” We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare, we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.

Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is die resistance of a semi-colonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:

1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy’s national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.

There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only those who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch’i Shan, “The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one.” Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.

What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counterrevolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people’s guerrilla war, who say: “Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla operations.” There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerrilla action, mistakenly say: “Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people” (Jen Ch’i Shan). Then there are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch’ing, for one). The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may consist of regular army units intact.

And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.

All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well educated in revolutionary technique, self-confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counterpropaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders will gradually overcome the lack of discipline, which at first prevails; they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.

Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say: “This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds and bandits” (Jen Ch’i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerrilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency. “This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism,” said Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare.{4}

What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people.

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerrilla warfare based on the principles we have mentioned and carried on over a vast extent of territory in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counterrevolutionary character. As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerrilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution; those of the Reds in China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla war that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interests of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower, and all have been in accord with die laws of historical development. They have existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.

The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those that will be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.

If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that “the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people.” Such a conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.

Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely “class” type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much broader than is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said: “When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners” (Civil War in Russia).{5} The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different class groups. This necessitates the use of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla war are, however, similar in that they...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• INTRODUCTION
• YU CHI CHAN - (Guerrilla Warfare)
• APPENDIX