The Normandy Campaign

An Analysis

Major David S. Wilson

• Publisher: Arcole Publishing
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781789121926
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Since the 50th anniversary of World War Two (1994), there has been an increased interest in the Normandy campaign. The Normandy campaign was a watershed event for the US Army and left a great influence. General William E. Depuy, the first commander of the Army's Cold War Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC), was an infantry battalion operations officer in the 90th Inf. Division which had the very mission of encircling German forces in Normandy. Further, General Depuy was the author of the 1976 Field Manual FM 100-5 Operations and its concept of the "active defense." Many would later compare US VII Corps' Operation COBRA in Normandy to US VII Corps in Operation DESERT STORM and to the 1982 FM 100-5 Operations manual doctrine of "AirLand Battle" (ALB).While General Depuy did not have direct influence in developing "AirLand Battle, " he did have an indirect influence in selecting the tenets of "AirLand Battle: " agility, depth, initiative and synchronization. If one studies the Normandy campaign, they will see the German defenders executing an "active defense" with units defending in depth (Caen) and counterattacking Allied advances. Also, displayed by the Germans was the agility of their staffs and troops to quickly move "Kampfgroups" (combat teams) around the battlefield and small unit leaders taking the initiative in executing their "active defense." Many have referred to Normandy as a logistical feat. I prefer to focus beyond the beachhead. By using ratios and attrition of combat power, I will attempt to provide a quantitative analysis of the Normandy campaign. Normandy covered the full spectrum of war: the defense and the offense. It is through studying the Normandy campaign we can extract valuable lessons learned relevant to the art of operational-level warfare.

 

CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION

Since the fiftieth anniversary of World War Two (1994), there has been an increased interest in the Normandy Campaign. Further, in the 1980’s there were numerous books written on the campaign, mainly for the purpose of challenging biographies of Allied generals written during the 1950’s and 1960’s. Adding further interest to Normandy has been the renewed interest in conventional warfighting starting in the mid-1970s following America’s military defeat in Vietnam and the Israeli experience in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Overall, there are several good books written on Normandy, and it is not my intention to reiterate them.

 

It is my goal to fill a professional void created by those books. These books are written from an academic point of view and not from the view of a military staff officer. Further, in the 1970’s came the development of the concept of “Combat Multipliers” by Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy. By using computer models, Dupuy was able to study World War II. What is most profound is not that his ratio’s predicted an Allied victory, but he found that leadership, morale and fire support (air and artillery) modified the combat power of units.

 

At the same time in the 1970s, the US Army was publishing its new doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (FM 100-5), focusing on the “active defense.” This revised manual used the ratio’s that Dupuy had discussed. However, these ratio’s were removed from the 1982 version of FM 100-5 (“Airland Battle”) as being too attrition oriented. Even though Dupuy criticized the Army’s combat ratio’s, the US Army’s Command & General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth student staff manual ST 100-9 (dated 1994) still retained ratio’s in wargaming and includes Dupuy’s very own movement rates.

 

Also, part of ST 100-9 is the importance of wargaming. Today, wargaming, called battle simulations, is an important part of military staff training. It is no coincidence that during the opening shots of the Normandy campaign, the German VII Army staff was busy conducting a wargame of an Allied invasion.

 

The Normandy campaign was a watershed event for the US Army and left a great influence.{1} General William E. Depuy, the first commander of the newly created US Army Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the author who wrote the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations, fought in Normandy as a battalion operations officer of the ill-fated 90th Infantry Division. While the tenets of Airland Battle doctrine would not be published until the 1982, FM 100-5, Operations manual, General Depuy had an institutional influence on the selection of those tenets: Agility, Depth, Initiative and Synchronization. If one studies the Normandy campaign, they will see the German defenders executing an active defense with units defending in depth (Caen) and counterattacking penetrations. Also, displayed by the Germans was the agility of their staffs and troops to quickly move “Kampfgroups” (combat teams) around the battlefield and small unit leaders taking the initiative in executing their active defense.

 

Today, a campaign like Normandy, thirty Allied division against twenty German divisions across a hundred kilometer front would be waged by four modern divisions against two modern divisions. Instead of a two month campaign with an average rate of advance of two kilometers, Normandy today would be over in two weeks with an average advance rate of ten kilometers a day. Instead of 400,000 battle casualties and 4,500 tank losses on both sides, such a modern battle would entail no more than 12,000 casualties and 1,500 tank losses.

 

The mechanization of warfare has increased operational tempos, shortened decisions cycles and increased movement, lethality and dispersion, but according to Trevor N. Dupuy, attrition rates have remained the same. In 1944, a US infantry division covered a four kilometer front which today is covered by an infantry battalion.

 

Many have referred to Normandy as a logistical feat. I prefer to focus beyond the beachhead. By using ratio’s and attrition of combat power, I will attempt to provide a quantitative analysis of the Normandy campaign. This campaign is still relative today. A massive air campaign followed by a US VII Corps attack, secured by 1st Infantry Division and exploited by 3rd Armored Division to destroy an elite armored unit culminating with an unsuccessful encirclement describes America’s last major conventional war (Operation DESERT STORM 1991) just as much as it did seventy years ago Operation COBRA (1944). It is through studying the Normandy campaign we can extract valuable lessons learned relative to the art of operational-level warfare.

CHAPTER TWO-D-DAY, JUNE 6, 1944

On 6 June 1944, the western Allies landed on Normandy.{2} The beaches were code name (west to east): Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword. German forces near the beaches consisted of four divisions: 91st Division, 352nd Division, 711th Division and 716th Division. Further inland was the 21st Panzer Division. On Utah beach, the US 4th Infantry Division of the US VII Corps landed with the US 82nd Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division landing behind the beach. The purpose of the airborne drop was to secure the base of the Cotentin peninsula behind Utah beach. The US dropped 13,000 paratroops with 822 C-47s. At Utah, the 4th Infantry encountered the 919th Regiment of the German 709th Division which provided little opposition and eventually surrendered. Further in land were the 1058th Regiment and the 6th Parachute Regiment. It was these two regiments which encountered the US paratroops. Also, in the area and available for commitment was the 91st Division and elements of the 914th Regiment and 1057th Regiment.

At Utah, the 4th Infantry Division lost only 200 casualties against two German regiments.

The 101st Airborne Division lost 2,000 casualties, and the 82nd Airborne lost only 500 casualties.

On D-Day, a total of 23,000 soldiers landed on Utah beach. For the inland battle, the Germans had the equivalent of twenty-seven battalions versus eighteen airborne battalions. Fortunately, three of the German battalions were “Ost” battalions composed Russian volunteers. East of Utah was a suspected gun battery at Pointe du Hoc. It was here that the US 2nd Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment attacked elements of the 914th Regiment. Eventually the rangers scaled the cliffs and got to the top, but only after suffering 225 casualties.

East of Pointe du Hoc was Omaha beach which was covered by a large cliff which overlooked the entire landing site. At Omaha, the US V Corps landed four regiments of the veteran 1st Infantry Division and the 29th Infantry Division versus the 916th Regiment of the 352nd Division and the 915th Regiment of the same division which was further inland. The 915th was intended to be a reserve for the German 84th Corps. While landing, the lead regiments of the 16th and 116th Infantry Regiments suffered heavy casualties. Of the 4,000 infantry that landed, 2,000 became casualties. Further, the assigned armor support, the US 743rd Tank Battalion, lost twenty-one of fifty-one M4 Sherman tanks. Another tank battalion was wiped out completely. Also, two field artillery battalions lost all of their howitzers due to German fire. By night fall, US V Corps had advanced in land two kilometers.{3} To land 55,000 soldiers on D-Day, the First US Army lost 4,600 casualties. For Allied planners this was a price they were willing to pay to get a foot hold on Fortress Europe.

East of Omaha was Gold beach, north of Bayeux. It was here that elements of the British XXX Corps landed. The units were the British 50th Infantry Division, the 47th Royal Marine Regiment and the 8th Armor Brigade. German forces consisted of the 726th Regiment and elements of the reserve 915th Regiment. Further east of Gold beach was Juno beach. This was to be the Canadian beachhead. Here the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division landed along with the Canadian 2nd Armored Brigade against the German 736th Regiment. Of approximately 6,000 infantrymen who landed at Juno, the Canadians lost 1,000 casualties.

The last beachhead to the east was Sword which shouldered on the month of the Orne River. Here the British 3rd Infantry Division and the 27th Armored Brigade landed against elements of the German 736th Regiment of the 711th Division. South of Sword beach, the British 6th Airborne Division landed encountering elements of the German 716th Division.

Between fighting the 6th Airborne and the British 3rd Infantry Division, the 716th lost five of its six battalions in heavy fighting, a total of 3,000 German casualties. Total British casualties for Gold and S...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
• CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER TWO-D-DAY, JUNE 6, 1944
• CHAPTER THREE-OPERATION EPSOM
• CHAPTER FOUR-FIRST US ARMY
• CHAPTER SIX-OPERATION COBRA
• CHAPTER SEVEN-MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK, 7 AUGUST 1944
• CHAPTER EIGHT-BRITISH 2nd ARMY
• CHAPTER NINE-CLOSING THE FALAISE GAP, AUGUST 1944
• CHAPTER TEN-CONCLUSION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY