British Infantry In The Falklands Conflict: Lessons Of The Light Infantry In 1982

Major Andrew M. Pullan

• Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781782896616
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This study investigates the Falklands Conflict from the perspective of the light infantry to determine the key lessons that they learned during the ground campaign. These lessons are then applied to the British Army, specifically the infantry, at the turn of the century to determine if they are still relevant.
The Falklands Conflict represents the last experience that the British infantry has of fighting in the light role in conventional warfighting. This thesis postulates that there were some critical failings in the infantry performance in the Falklands, mainly due to a lack of training because of a lack of time spent in the light infantry role.
This study analyzes the ground campaign from the landings at San Carlos to the final battles around Port Stanley. From this study six broad lessons were identified, three of which are unique to this thesis and concern the use of ad hoc formations, the light infantry load, and the impact of the Regimental System on infantry performance in the Falklands Conflict. The study then concludes by discussing the relevance of all the identified lessons to the infantry at the turn of the century. The conclusion of this study finds that many of the factors that led to the problems experienced by the infantry in 1982 and hence to their lessons from the ground campaign are as relevant today as they were in the Falklands Conflict.

CHAPTER 1 — THESIS OVERVIEW

On 2 April 1982 Argentinean forces invaded the Falkland Islands. Three days after the invasion, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible left the United Kingdom to head what was to be the largest task force in recent history. On 25 April the task force repossessed South Georgia. On the night of 20/21 May the first major landing on the Falkland Islands was made at San Carlos Water. In the actions that followed there were inevitable setbacks and casualties. Nevertheless, just over three weeks after the landing the Argentinean forces surrendered. It was by any standards a brilliant campaign, marked by exceptional logistics planning and improvisation, and carried through with outstanding skill and fortitude.{1} — Ministry of Defense, The Falklands War: The Lessons

Keep your hands off the Regiments, you iconoclastic civilians who meddle and muddle in Army matters; you are not soldiers and you do not understand them.{2} — Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier’s Life

Problem

The 1982 Falklands Conflict descended upon Britain out of a seemingly “clear blue diplomatic sky,” catching the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom off guard. Despite this, within three days a Royal Navy task force was steaming south prepared to dispute the Argentinean invasion, by force if necessary. Mobilized in direct support of this operation were thirty thousand servicemen and women and 108 ships. Included in this package were two light infantry brigades: 5 Infantry Brigade (5 Inf Bde) and 3 Commando Brigade (3 Cdo Bde). In total, these two brigades comprised of five Army infantry battalions and three Royal Marine commandos (defined later). Of concern to this thesis are the lessons learned by the Army’s five infantry battalions, and the continued relevance of these lessons to the British Army at the turn of the century.

A brief survey of history tells us that, for the British Army, being caught unprepared is nothing new, nor has such a pattern of events changed in the intervening years since the Falklands Conflict. The most recent example of this being Kosovo in 1999, with the imminent deployment of eight thousand soldiers to the borders of Serbia increasing the proportion of soldiers on operations to 27 percent of the recruited strength of the Army.{3} This figure takes no account of those preparing to deploy or those who have just returned from operations. It is fair to conclude from this that the British Army is over committed. Furthermore, all the operations are, currently, peace support tasks, all of which are a distraction to the preparation of the Army for its perceived primary role—high intensity warfighting.

However, the root cause of the Army’s plight is not the commitment level to operations, which is the Army’s raison d’etre, but the heavy-handed cut backs in the size of the Army following the end of the Cold War. The rush to cash in on an apparent peace dividend has left the Army under resourced and under strength. This, despite all the warning signs that the demise of the Soviet Union would leave a power vacuum into which chaos would, and did, step.

Symptomatic of the changes in the British Army is the infantry. By the end of 1998 the British Army had reduced by one third, with infantry battalions being cut in number from fifty-eight to forty. The key planning assumption driving restructuring was that a major war or operation requiring a substantial national commitment would be recognized with months if not years in which to react. Consequently, not only has the Army reduced in size but readiness times and training levels have also been cut. The infantry, as all regular units, now operate on a method of graduated readiness. That is, a small proportion of infantry battalions are at a high state of readiness (between two and five days’ notice to move), a higher proportion are at a medium state of readiness (ten to twenty days) and the majority are at the lower state of readiness (thirty days). Those infantry units at thirty days’ notice to move are resourced to conduct little (if any) collective training with the other arms and services. The infantry, therefore, cannot afford to squander its limited training opportunities. However, with such a high proportion of the Army deployed on peace support operations one wonders if the policy of graduated readiness remains a viable method of preparing an army for warfighting or whether it simply serves as an impediment to unit preparation. Unfortunately, answering this specific question lies outside of the scope of this thesis.

Purpose and Scope of the Study

The Falklands Conflict represents the last time that the British infantry, specifically the light infantry, fought in pitched battle. The purpose of this study is to re-evaluate the lessons of the Falklands Conflict and consider their continued relevance to the British Infantry. The scope of this study is the three week ground campaign in which six battles were fought. It is from the approach to and conduct of these battles that the main lessons for the British Infantry will be sought. As such, the primary question for this thesis is: Are the lessons of the infantry from the Falklands Conflict relevant to the British Infantry at the turn of the twentieth century? There are two subordinate questions that support this primary question: (1) “What lessons did the British infantry learn from the Falklands Conflict?” and (2) “Are these lessons still relevant?” A study of the Falklands Conflict, a limited-war conducted by light infantry, may help determine, in part, those factors that are essential to infantry success on the battlefield.

This thesis will not comment upon the immediate political events surrounding the conflict nor make judgments as to the moral rights and wrongs of the British and Argentinean position in the Falklands. When determining the lessons of the conflict, that is answering the first subordinate question, the focus will be on the lessons as regards the light infantry. However, on a broader scale all these lessons are applicable to all the infantry of the British Army. For the purposes of this thesis the following aspects of the ground campaign are not considered in any detail: the initial defense of the islands, Special Boat Service (SBS) operations, Special Air Service (SAS) operations, or the recapturing of South Georgia.

The Infantry

The first brigade to deploy to the Falklands was 3 Cdo Brigade, which comprised of 40, 42 and 45 Commando (Cdo), 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA), and 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment (3 PARA), under the command of Brigadier Julian Thompson. Five Inf Bde arrived in the Falklands some nine days after 3 Cdo Bde. This Brigade comprised of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards (Scots Guards), 1st Battalion Welsh Guards (Welsh Guards), and 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles (7 GR), under the command of Brigadier Tony Wilson. With the arrival of 5 Inf Bde in the area of operations, a divisional headquarters was established under the command of Major General Jeremy Moore.

The three Royal Marine commandos committed to the Falklands Conflict were similar in size, organization, and basic equipment to their infantry counterpart in the Army. However, being part of the Royal Navy, they were, and are, outside of the everyday running of the British infantry and are resourced to select and train their soldiers for missions that are outside of the standard infantry requirement. Because of this they are not a major consideration in this thesis. In the author’s opinion, the battalions of the Parachute Regiment and the commando units of the Royal Marine’s represent the elite light infantry of the Armed Forces. Without the commitment of these units at the early stages of the Falklands Conflict it is doubtful if the ground campaign would have been such a remarkable success.

The infantry from the Army that deployed to the Falklands operated in the light role, although of the infantry that deployed only the parachute battalions and Gurkhas were dedicated light infantry. The two Guards battalions, akin with the rest of the infantry, arms plot between various roles, including armored infantry, mechanized infantry and light infantry. The role of light infantry has many guises, including airmobile infantry, public duties (which includes ceremonial guard duty at Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle, and providing the guard for state occasions), overseas garrisons, resident infantry in Northern Ireland, and so on. The process of arms plotting is the moving of units from bases and between roles every two to six years. As an example, over a period of twenty years a battalion can expect to be based in about eight different locations (overseas and in the United Kingdom) and have been in eight different roles. During this time a battalion will be called upon to do several six month operational tours to Bosnia, Northern Ireland, or wherever there is a requirement. The exception to the arms plotting process is the parachute role, which is only conducted by the three battalions of the Parachute Regiment (there are currently two in role parachute battalions). The out of role parachute battalion is normally serving two years in Northern Ireland.

Despite their different roles, the organization of the five Army battalions was broadly similar. Each battalion had five companies, three in the rifle role (although both parachute battalions had one of these companys double tasked as a patrol company), one headquarters company (responsible for administration and logistics) and one support weapons company. All support weapons companies had an 81 millimeter mortar (81mm mortar) platoon and a Milan anti-tank platoon, the carriage of whose ammunition proved a major test of improvisation and toughness during the conflict.

Each of the rifle companies had three platoons, each platoon having three sections of eight men (as a general rule). Sections were themselves divided into two four-man fire teams. In command of each section, ideally, was a corporal with a lance-corporal as the second in command. In command of each platoon, ideally, was an officer (lieutenant or second lieutenant) with a sergeant as the platoon second in command. Majors commanded the rifle companies and were served by a small headquarters, usually consisting of a captain (second in command), a sergeant major, a color sergeant (responsible for administration), a couple of signalers and a couple of storemen. More men could be added to the company headquarters as required, although at the expense of the rifle platoons or another company in the battalion.

Platoons were armed with (approximately) twelve 66 millimeter light antitank weapons (66mm LAW), one 84 millimeter medium antitank weapon (Carl Gustav), and a 2-inch mortar to provide local illumination and smoke. Each section had one general-purpose machine gun (GPMG), with the remainder of the section armed with the 7.62 mm self-loading rifle (SLR). The GPMG was also used in the sustained fire role, which resulted in a major logistics and portability burden for the infantry. Most soldiers carried one or two high explosive (HE) or phosphorous grenades. Radio communications went down to fire team level using a new radio system that had been distributed to the battalions just before deployment.

The other arms and services supported the infantry that fought in the Falklands, to some degree or other, in what is termed combined arms operations. This term is defined as “the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms, such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation, to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm was used against the enemy in sequence.”{4} As the Falklands proved, combined arms operations are important to the success of the infantry battle. However, its successful application requires intensive training, preferably on a frequent basis, in order to avoid skill fade.

Thesis Outline

This thesis will be divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Falklands Conflict to help place the lessons later described in some form of context. Included in this chapter is a brief description of the islands’ terrain and climate, an annotated chronology and a short description of the ground campaign.

The infantry lessons of the conflict are identified in chapters 3 and 4, thereby answering the first subordinate question. Chapter 3 focuses upon those lessons that can be identified from official sources and the writings of those who participated in the conflict. Chapter 4 will describe those lessons identified by an analysis of all the available information on the conflict. As such, the lessons described in chapter 3 reflect the perceived wisdom of the lessons learned from the conflict, and the lessons in chapter 4 are lessons unique to this thesis.

Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, considers the lessons from the preceding chapters and describes the root causes of the identified infantry lessons. The relevance of these lessons to the British Army at the turn of the twentieth century is then discussed, thereby answering the second subordinate question and the primary question.

CHAPTER 2 — THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: THEIR HISTORY AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE 1982 CONFLICT

The most detestable place I was ever at in my life ....one wild heath wherever you turn your eye.{5} — Lieutenant Thomas Coleman, War in the Falklands

The 1982 Falklands Conflict was fought over the issue of the sovereignty of the Falklands Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands. Together, these three island groups form the Falkland Islands Dependencies (fig. 1). What follows is a description of the islands, an overview of the history of the Falklands, an annotated chronology of events, and a brief description of the land campaign.

Figure 1. The Falklands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands

The Islands

The Falkland Islands lie some eight thousand miles from Britain and three hundred miles from the east coast of Argentina and are the only major island group in the South Atlantic. They consist (as shown in fig. 2) of two main islands, East and West Falkland, and more than one hundred smaller ones, which in total cover 4,700 square miles in area (approximately two-thirds the size of Wales). Falkland Sound, a narrow strip of water, separates East an...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• CHAPTER 1 - THESIS OVERVIEW
• CHAPTER 2 - THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: THEIR HISTORY AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE 1982 CONFLICT
• CHAPTER 3 - TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND MEN
• CHAPTER 4 - AD HOC FORMATIONS, LIGHT INFANTRY LOADS, AND THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM
• CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE
• APPENDIX A - PARTICIPANTS AND CASUALTIES IN THE MAJOR LAND BATTLES
• APPENDIX B - BRITISH ARMY: GROUND FORCES ORDER OF BATTLE
• APPENDIX C - BRITISH ARMY’S TRIAL FITNESS TESTS AS AT MARCH 1999
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
• BIBLIOGRAPHY