Notes on Guerrilla War

Principles and Practices

Col. Virgil Ney

• Publisher: Arcole Publishing
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781787209121
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book on Guerrilla War, by an American Officer, a student of and an operator in the field of Unconventional Warfare, is most opportune and timely. For the first time, in many instances Principles are identified and explained by historical examples. Colonel Ney holds to the belief that AMERICANS have a tradition of successful GUERRILLA WAR operations from the earliest days of the Nation's history. Rogers, Marion, Boone, Mosby, Morgan, Quantrill, Ferguson, Andrews, Mackenzie, Funston, Pershing, McCoy, Fertig, Volckmann, Blackburn, Parker, Praeger, Calyer, McGee, Cushing, Anderson, Calvert, Ramsey, Straughn, Thorp, McLish, Childress, Lapham, Barnett: these and others have led or countered GUERILLAS. MARX did not invent GUERRILLA WAR, it was a military phenomenon centuries before his birth; but it has been seized and converted into a comfortable vehicle of Cold-War combat by International Communism. To defeat it, we must know what it is and how it works; to wage it we must understand its PRINCIPLES. That is why this book was written!

 

GUERRILLA WAR

 

CHAPTER I

THAT guerrilla war is based upon definite principles, as is conventional war; would seem to be a logical deduction, or observation after consideration or study of its operational patterns. Throughout military history, guerrilla or irregular bands have appeared to harass, delay and often defeat weapon wielders of more professional mold. That the non-military, untrained civilian, armed only with the most basic weapons, can frustrate regular military formations has been proven in innumerable, deadly and bitter struggles between the protagonists of the two types of war.

How guerrilla war commences and continues to function is a puzzle, which has not, as yet, been solved by the conventional and professional soldier. Further, the nature of the current revolution caused in military science by the introduction of nuclear weapons of mass destruction make necessary the dispersion and independent operational patterns of the guerrilla, if military formations are to survive and function. In order for the regular soldier to defeat the guerrilla he must understand how he operates and when required be able to function in counter-guerrilla missions and operations.

Obviously, the Principles of War, as enunciated by von Clausewitz, are applicable to guerrilla war. These Principles of War are: The Objective, Offensive Operations, The Massing of Force, The Economy of Force, Mobility, Surprise, Security, Communications, and Coordination, (part of Communications). Certain of these principles are applicable to guerrilla war in a general way; others, are applied specifically, as the situation develops. An example: Surprise! The others may be applied, or rejected governed by tactical and strategical requirements. Broadly, they must not be overlooked, or neglected. Specifically, they must be replaced operationally by the principles deduced herein,—as those directly applicable to the special field of guerrilla war. However, and this is most important, guerrilla war by its nature calls forth additional principles. These are required specifically and categorically for its successful operation and conduct. It shall be the purpose of the author to show by historical example, the identity, applicability and workings of the Principles of Guerrilla War. These Principles are: The Environment. Community Security, Community Support, Propaganda, Proximity, Deliberate Delay, Personal Security, Part-Time Function, Full-Time Function, Modus Operandi, Organization.

 

The place of guerrilla war in the military art is an assured one. It has become a distinct branch of the art of war. The following quotation will explain its present position in the overall picture of warfare:

To stir up strife behind an enemy’s lines is a stratagem as old as war itself; but in this last war new techniques of wireless transmission and airborne-supply made possible the long-range preparation and support of revolts in occupied territories on a scale unexampled in history. The organization of resistance has thus become a distinct branch of the art of war, of comparable importance as an instrument of national policy to the traditional arms and the new weapons of the atomic age.{6}

Guerrilla warfare principles and practices have become important adjuncts to the conventional wars of the twentieth century. The possibility of the limited war or “brush-fire” war calls for guerrilla tactics and techniques. Historically, when regular warfare collapses, or it cannot be waged successfully by those, whose primary, or professional task it is, non-military and military individuals have combined to resist the enemy.

 

The recognition, gaining and retention of the principles necessary to the successful waging of guerrilla war are major accomplishments to be achieved by intelligent, deliberate actions. The interdependence of the principles of guerrilla war each upon the other, makes each and every one essential to operational success. The possession of one and the lack of others will call for the development of a proper climate for them all, or the guerrilla movement will be doomed to fail. In this matter, the Principle of Propaganda is paramount. Without some form of persuasion, men may not be convinced of the justice of their cause. A guerrilla movement must propagandize and be propagandized in order to make operable certain of these principles and to attract and to retain an effective number of followers. This is well-illustrated by the following quotation:

From their long talks and analyses a simple strategy emerged: to lie low, but at the same time to spread the word that a guerrilla force was being organized and that recruits were wanted; to build slowly but soundly with an efficient communications system so that all units of the expanding force would mesh their movements and gain the greater power given by coordination; to avoid open conflict with the enemy until the guerrilla army was well-organized, disciplined and equipped; to strike only after plans had been made that would, if possible forestall enemy retaliation against innocent bystanders.{7}

Careful study of successful guerrilla movements, especially in the field of organization and operations, will reveal the presence of a majority of the principles herein enunciated. Conversely, those guerrillas who failed, will be found in the main, to have lacked those principles essential to their existence and functioning. By means of information collected, collated and converted into intelligence, it should be possible to deduce whether or not in a given country guerrilla war may be conducted profitably. The determinants in such a case must be of necessity the principles of guerrilla war weighed against political, geographical and ethnical conditions. Does the country under study afford the basic ingredients for their obtainment? If the basics are there—they must be capable of identification and development—from within and without the actual terrain. In guerrilla war—the risk is always calculated!!

 

By their very natures certain of the principles indicated in this work, will be present in varying degrees of strength in any geographical area or political division involving population. Those principles, which seemingly have no identity with a given area—may be induced to appear and to function by means of external stimuli, in the form of dropped liaison officers, weapons and material aids. This is especially true of the Principle of Propaganda which will be shown to be so essential historically, to the securing and maintaining of the other principles. It is for this reason that the author emphasizes the effect of the specific workings of propaganda in guerrilla war.

Counter-guerrilla measures seek to deprive the guerrilla movement of the possession of the principles of guerrilla war and to eliminate it or negate its potential. In order to do this the influence of the principles must be known within the specific guerrilla environment. They must be understood thoroughly by those who would defeat the guerrilla. The possession or non-possession of certain of the principles by a guerrilla movement—will dictate to a considerable extent, the direction and means to be employed in the counterguerrilla operation against it. An example of this situation would be the taking of action to deprive the movement of possession of the Principle of Community Support. How this and other deprivation have been accomplished will be shown in certain of the historical examples.

Professional military personnel and their organizations are manifesting considerable interest in the field of guerrilla war in view of the generally supposed dispersed nature of battle areas in future nuclear war. For this reason professionals and amateurs alike in the military art must be acquainted with the Principles of Guerrilla War. The possibility of the inhibition or frustration by nuclear weapons and “fall-out” of large military formations including air and sea fleets is a present and unpleasant fact of international life. Today’s wars are being won by propaganda, subversion, infiltration and guerrillas. Nuclear weapons are on the shelf, ready for a war that does not come.{8} That this nation may have to wage “broken-backed warfare”{9} by means of guerrilla war—in event of partial destruction of our mobilization and industrial power by receipt of enemy intercontinental missiles is not a remote possibility. The ability to wage guerrilla war against an airborne invader of the United States may mean the difference between nullity or survival. No American can afford to remain ignorant of the principles of guerrilla war in view of the present and continuing explosive situation in international relations. To do so is to invite disaster, destruction and oblivion!

CHAPTER II—GUERRILLA WAR AND MODERN STRATEGY

GUERRILLA warfare is as ageless as war itself. From the times of Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar, the resistance of small bands to regular soldiery has constituted an important form of military conflict. The term “guerrilla warfare” however, passed into the military vocabulary only after the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1807, when Spanish irregular forces played a large role in the defeat of Napoleon.{10} By definition, the word “guerrilla” means a “little war.” By usage, it gradually came to denote the irregular, non-professional civilian-soldier who accepts the challenge of the invading or occupying force either by supporting his country’s professional army or by substituting for it.

Guerrilla warfare, with its hit-and-run tactics, raids, terrorism and sabotage, mocks the formality which is the hallmark of the traditional military profession. That a peasant or worker, armed with nothing but musket or rifle, could pose a serious challenge to well-equipped and highly trained professional troops was, for a long time, scarcely deemed credible by orthodox military tacticians.{11} Yet guerrilla bands have shown their military worth in the history of modern warfare. The Spaniards in 1807 and the Russians in 1812 and 1941 furnished classic examples of the effectiveness of guerrilla activity in support of professional armies.{12} Since the beginning of the Second World War this form of guerrilla action, i.e., a substitute for conventional warfare—has become more prominent. Among the many instances in which guerrilla forces have been used successfully in lieu of regular armies, we may cite the war between Mao’s communists and Chiang’s Nationalists, Tito’s Partisans and the Nazis, and the current struggle in Algeria between the insurgents and the French army.

The main strength of guerrilla warfare is found in its very lack of military formality. Peasants or workers by day, guerrilla fighters by night: this formula tells not the whole story, but a good part of it. It is a conflict which is characterized by armed bands sallying forth to harass the enemy within his own lines and then fading back behind the curtain of the local population. Guerrilla warfare is conducted by civilians who usually have little formal military experience and little patience with the science of tactics by which modern mass armies operate. The abiding impetus which spurs the guerrillas is the intense desire to expel the invader, the occupier or the colonizer. The most powerful assets at his command are native shrewdness, familiarity with local environmental factors, keen understanding of his own people, and—especially in the present era of protracted conflict—the political know-how which enables him to exploit latent conflicts inherent in the international situation. To the highly disciplined mind of the military professional, schooled in classical strategy, who must cope with the guerrilla, the latter’s method of fighting often appears promiscuous, unpredictable and illogical. One of the most distinctive features of the guerrilla strategy is its lack of “logical” procedure which can be anticipated and thwarted by the enemy.

In this age of missiles and nuclear weapons, there is a growing and pernicious assumption that all of the older modes of warfare have been rendered obsolete. One of the most pressing problems confronting the military establishments of the Western allies springs from the West’s relative lack of experience in coping with guerrilla strategy. The great strides made in military technology since 1945 may help to prevent the massing of conventional military forces in future wars.{13} Guerrilla warfare, with its informality, loose formations and unique capabilities for independent action may offer the most workable solution to the dilemma facing the planning staffs of modern armies. The guerrilla of tomorrow will operate independently or in support of widely dispersed, highly mobile, logistically self-sufficient, small-sized military units which can fight the enemy either in co-ordinated or independent ...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• CHAPTER I
• CHAPTER II-GUERRILLA WAR AND MODERN STRATEGY
• CHAPTER III-GUERRILLA WAR, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
• CHAPTER IV-THE ELEMENTS OF PROPAGANDA
• CHAPTER V-THE WORLD WAR II ERA
• CHAPTER VI-THE WORLD WAR II ERA
• CHAPTER VII-THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA
• CHAPTER VIII-COUNTER-GUERRILLA TACTICS
• CHAPTER IX-GUERRILLA WAR UNDER NUCLEAR and CBR CONDITIONS
• CHAPTER X-CONCLUSIONS
• TRAINING BIBLIOGRAPHY
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• GUERRILLA SAFE-CONDUCT SURRENDER PASS LEAFLET
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER