Seaforth World Naval Review

2022

Conrad Waters

• Publisher: Seaforth Publishing
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781399018968
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

For more than a decade, this annual volume has provided an authoritative summary of all that has happened to the world's navies and their ships in the previous twelve months. It combines regional surveys with major articles on important new warships, and looks at wider issues of significance to navies such as aviation and weaponry. The contributors come from around the globe and as well as providing a balanced picture of naval developments, they interpret their significance and explain their context. As well as its regular regional reviews, the 2022 volume focuses on three fleets: the Sri Lankan Navy, the Spanish Navy, and the Royal Navy. There are in-depth articles on the Argentinian Bouchard Class OPVs, the RussianProject 20380 Stereguschchiy Class corvettes, and the Royal Navy's Batch 2 'River' Class OPVs. The technological section looks at optronic systems and offboard mine countermeasures, and there is the regular review of what is happening in naval aviation, which includes coverage of the US Marine/Navy MV-22 tiltrotor. Now firmly established as the only annual naval overview of its type in the world, The Seaforth World Naval Review is essential reading for the professional and enthusiast alike. It takes the reader to the heart of contemporary maritime affairs. "…this is a marvelous asset for those wishing to keep up to date with naval matters. Very highly recommended."- Warship World

1OVERVIEW

Author: Conrad Waters

INTRODUCTION

‘Divide and rule, a sound motto. Unite and lead, a better one’, wrote the German polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), considered by many to be that nation’s greatest writer of the period. His words have resonance in the current day as the United States’ new Biden administration attempts to make a clean break with the ‘America First’ nationalism of the Trump era. In contrast, its own security strategy places renewed emphasis on collaboration with like-minded democracies to secure the country’s interests. This new approach was evidenced in the United States’ new Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released on 3 March 2021.1 Opening with the statement, ‘… one thing is certain: we will only succeed in advancing American interests and upholding our universal values by working in common cause with our closest allies and partners …’ the document emphasises collective action with friendly nations to protect the rulesbased international order that is seemingly under siege from authoritarian powers.

The Portuguese MEKO 200 frigate Corte-Real pictured operating with Danish and Swedish warships in the course of the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise. The new American Biden administration is attempting to rebuild alliances with NATO and other friendly nations to counter growing rivalry with Russia and China. (Marius Vågenes Villanger / Norwegian Armed Forces)

Whilst the mood music at the top may have changed, it will likely take considerable time and effort for the United States to regain the trust of traditional allies. Confidence in American reliability has been shaken by the transactional approach to relationships that typified the Trump years, perhaps best illustrated by the often publicly voiced criticism of the ‘obsolete’ NATO alliance on grounds of inadequate burden-sharing. One early bump along the road to recovery was President Biden’s decision to set 11 September 2021 as a firm date to withdraw all American forces from Afghanistan. This step was seemingly taken without full consultation with the NATO and other allied nations who have assisted military operations in the country over the past two decades and has drawn criticism from many quarters.

In truth, the withdrawal from Afghanistan is yet further evidence of a reshaping of US strategic priorities to counter the threats arising from China – ‘the only competitor capable of combining its power … to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system’ – and a disruptive Russia. Lipservice continues to be paid to the other dangers to American security previously identified; viz. the challenges posed by North Korea, Iran and international terrorism. However, the trend towards placing China and Russia at the heart of American security concerns is confirmed. A Global Posture Review mandated by the current administration will emphasise this reality, bolstering the United States’ presence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe at the expense of other regions. This shift is likely to increase the importance of ‘high end’ naval capabilities relative to the largely land-based counter-insurgency forces that fought the long war against terror.

Two main questions need to be answered in assessing whether the United States’ strategic shift is likely to be successful. One is the extent to which America’s allies are willing to join with it in challenging China’s emerging power. An example of this uncertainty was provided in the long-awaited conclusions to the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review of foreign policy, defence, security and international development, finally published on 16 March 2021.2 Whilst this singled out Russia as ‘the most acute threat’ to British interests, the stance taken towards China’s emerging power was more nuanced. This essentially reflected the inherent conflict that exists between China’s important role as a global trading partner and investor and its less beneficial desire to use its economic might to challenge democratic ‘Western’ values. The United Kingdom is seemingly willing to include a flagwaving transit of the South China Sea on the Queen Elizabeth carrier strike group’s maiden deployment, also tweaking Russia’s tail off the Crimea in the course of the deployment. However, it remains to be seen how firm and widespread the resolve to prioritise intangible principles over hard economic interests will prove to be.

The other question is whether the ‘Western’ nations will be willing to shoulder the expense of the increased military burden that responding to a new age of great-power competition will inevitably demand. The Biden presidency’s own stance in this regard is less than straightforward, as a desire to fund social and economic programmes means that defence is being accorded a lower priority than under the previous administration. The President’s FY2022 Defense Budget Request announced on 28 May 2021 – which is essentially flat in real terms – was notable in cutting back on previously planned naval shipbuilding programmes that are a key aspect of countering growing Chinese naval power. Nevertheless, many other allied countries are increasing defence spending, the financial damage of the COVID-19 pandemic notwithstanding. Alongside investment in new capabilities such as cyber, unmanned and even space capabilities, much of the additional spending is being directed towards making good gaps in naval capacity.

DEFENCE BUDGETS AND PLANS

The shift towards expanding defence budgets in spite of the impact of the current pandemic is demonstrated by the latest annual assessment provided by the independent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Published in April 2021 and updating spending data up to 2020, this saw expenditure rise from 2.2 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP or global economic output year-on-year. This is broadly equivalent to the percentage figure seen ten years previously and confirmed a recent reversal in a trend that had previously seen the so-called ‘world military burden’ steadily shrink for much of the decade. The main underlying driver of this higher military burden was the reduction in output resulting from severe global economic downturn caused by the pandemic. However, defence spending did actually rise by some 2.6 percent in real terms. Whilst commentators are divided as to whether stretched government finances will allow this uplift in spending to be sustained over the medium term, plans that have already been announced for 2021–2022 suggest defence expenditure will continue to grow in the immediate future.

Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) – https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database contains data on countries over the period 1949-2020.

Notes:

1. US$ totals for 2020 and 2019 are based on then current (i.e. non-inflation adjusted) prices and exchange rates for the years in question. Exchange rate movements, in particular, can therefore result in significant movements in the US$ figures and explain apparent discrepancies in the table. SIPRI also adjust previous-year calculations when more accurate data becomes available – this has resulted in several significant differences from the 2019 total figures contained in last year’s Seaforth World Naval Review. Notably, spending for the United Kingdom was revised c. 10 percent upwards due to the inclusion of certain spending on pensions and other items, as well as taking into account income generated by the MoD that was then recirculated into military spending.

2. The ‘real’ change figure is based on constant (2019-based) US$ figures.

3. Figures in brackets are SIPRI estimates.

Table 1.1 lists the main defence spending nations as of 2020. All in all, the data showed little in the way of material change in the distribution of budgets compared with 2019. Notably, there was no alteration to the constituents of the list of the top ten spending countries which – in total – accounted for an unchanged three-quarters of overall global military expenditure. Perhaps unsurprisingly, eight of these ten can also be considered as major naval powers. Other countries with significant fleets – namely Italy, Australia, Canada and Brazil – all ranked between 11 and 15 in the major spending league.

The United States continued to have by far the largest military budget in the world, albeit a final 4.4 percent uplift from the Trump years still left spending down by around 10 percent from a decade ago. The United Kingdom – now ranked in fifth place following a material upward revision to how SIPRI calculates British defence spending – remained the only other country to see a real-terms decline in spending over this period, albeit the trend is now being reversed.3 As previously, it was countries within the broader Asian region that demonstrated the most sustained rise in military expenditure. China, South Korea and India – as well as Australia outside the top ten – have all seen spending grow by a third or more since 2011. Moreover, China and India are both firmly ensconced as the second and third highest spenders, a status reinforced by the fact that their budgets tend to buy far more in local currency than those of their counterparts in the ‘West’.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy Type 054A frigate Anyang leads the Type 052C destroyer Jinan and the newer Type 052D variant Kunming in exercises in the East China Sea on 23 April 2021. China is building warships at a pace that rival navies are struggling to match. (China Military Online)

FLEET REVIEWS

An assessment of Table 1.2 summarising the yearon- year development of major fleet strengths provides an insight into some of the practical realities that might be influencing the Biden administration’s focus on rebuilding the United States’ alliances. The data shows that the US Navy remains the world’s most powerful and balanced fleet. However, its main rival – China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) – is continuously closing the gap. Indeed, despite the relatively generous funding the US Navy benefitted from during the Trump administration, fleet numbers actually fell in a number of important warship categories during the last year.4 By contrast, major additions to the PLAN over the same period included – amongst other vessels – three major amphibious warships, seven destroyers and around fifteen littoral corvettes. Simply put, the United States is struggling to match the phenomenal rate of naval shipbuilding being achieved by its Asian counterpart that shows little signs of slowing.

Notes

1 Numbers are based on official sources, where available, supplemented by news reports, published intelligence data and other ‘open sources’ as appropriate. Given significant variations in available data, numbers should be regarded as indicative, particularly with respect to Russia, China and minor warship categories (which are sometimes rounded). There is also a degree of subjectivity with respect to warship classifications given varying national classifications and this can also lead to inconsistency.

2 FAC numbers relate to ships fitted with or for surface-to-surface missiles.

Clearly, numbers are not the whole story. The United States Navy continues to enjoy significant – albeit diminishing – qualitative advantages in a number of areas. Combined with new operational concepts such as distributed maritime operations and manned-unmanned teaming, this may be enough to maintain an overall advantage in the years ahead.5 However, given that America’s relative economic and, hence, military and naval power, is likely to continue to decline, the need to place increasing reliance on allied navies to maintain a margin of supremacy is evident. This strategy is not only subject to the political uncertainties already referenced above; it will also need a level of collaboration between the US Navy and friendly fleets not seen since the height of the Cold War to work effectively. On a practical level, therefore, it seems likely that efforts to improve inter-operability and, indeed, integration with friendly navies will be given renewed emphasis in the year...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Section 1: Overview
• Section 2: World Fleet Reviews
• Section 3: Significant Ships
• Section 4: Technological Reviews
• Contributors