War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Vol. I

David Lloyd George

• Publisher: Arcole Publishing
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781787209329
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War I
• Index: History

"Mr. Lloyd George's War Memoirs constitute a record of unfading historic interest….No one who wishes to be well informed about the Great War should fail to study them."—Rt. Hon. Winston S. ChurchillA personal account of World War I events, as told from the perspective of David Lloyd George, former Chancellor of the Exchequer (1908-1915), Minister of Munitions (1915-1916), Secretary of State of War (1916) and, towards war end, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1916-1922).

 

PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE{1}

MOST of the leading actors in the Great War, both Statesmen and Warriors, have committed to writing the story of the part they played in it. With one or two exceptions they have written their narrative themselves, although the composition of books has been to them as new a venture as it is now to me. With the exception of M. Briand, who never put pen to paper, all the dominant personalities of the War have told their tale of what they did and why they did it; amongst rulers, the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, M. Poincaré, President Wilson (through Mr. Baker); amongst statesmen, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Asquith, Lord Grey, Mr. Churchill, Colonel House, Prince Max of Baden, Von Bülow; amongst the warriors, Foch, Joffre, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Hofmann, Cadorna, French, Haig (with the aid of another pen), Henry Wilson, Robertson, Pershing, and a host of others. My library shelves groan under the burden of war autobiographies. No wonder I hesitated for years to follow the example set me by those who figured so prominently on the stage where I also occupied a not inconspicuous position. I had almost decided to bequeath the undertaking to those with whom I should leave my papers, when two incidents occurred which influenced me to take up my pencil and relate my own story in my own words.

The first was an illness which released me from the irksome and peculiarly thankless duty of leadership in a political party unhappily poisoned and paralysed by internal dissension amongst its better known members. The other was a visit paid me during my convalescence by an old comrade of the Great War. He entreated me to take advantage of my seclusion from active political warfare to give my account of the events of the War. He reminded me that amongst statesmen I was the only one who went right through it from the declaration of War to the signing of Peace. He urged that the real history of the War might not—and probably would not—be written for another generation, but that the books written today by the men—generals and politicians—who had a share either in the fighting or in the direction would constitute the principal material upon which the historian would draw for his facts and impressions. All these books gave the point of view of the individual writer, biased naturally either by limitation of his opportunities or by a controverted theory of events, or, too frequently, by the exigencies of a personal apologia. It was pointed out to me that I was the only person in authority who was in Mr. Britling’s position. I “saw it through” from the outbreak of the quarrel to the settlement of the terms. There are multitudes who were better acquainted with certain aspects of the War; there arc, or were, a few who for a limited period were in a better position to view the struggle as a whole; but there is no one (and I often recall the fact with horror) who was as intimately acquainted as myself with the war direction during the whole of its rending and tearing course through the vitals of mankind.

To tell the story at all is like repeating what was seen in a night-mare, and I shrank for years from writing my record of the horrifying details. It is not pleasant to remember how men and women devoted energy, intelligence, and zeal for four-and-a-half years to the work of destruction and pain. But it must be told if such a calamity is to be averted in the future. It is better that the real facts should be given. I do not pretend to know them all, but some of them I know better than my contemporaries. These I am doing my best to relate accurately in the following pages. I make my own contribution, not as one who claims to be an experienced author, but as a witness giving evidence on what he remembers of these tremendous transactions.

I have written of men and events as I saw and thought of them. That may involve criticism where others might praise and commendation where others might attach blame. Where I have indulged in any stricture, I have taken the utmost pains to test the accuracy of my recollection by reference to contemporary documents. I have also consulted men who took an active part in episodes I record. But the pathways and boundaries of memory are so obliterated and confused by time, that the most reliable witness often strays, unless the road is marked out with the “writing that remains.” Luckily, I have in my possession—thanks to careful secretaries—a vast number of memoranda, minutes and letters concerning the War and Peace, all written at the time.

The only value which these volumes may possess for the future historian of war will depend upon the memories being genuine and upon the extent to which they are fortified by documentary or other contemporary evidence. These documents I have chosen and quoted or used with a full sense of the responsibility resting on every public servant not to reveal or publish anything which may injure the interests of his country. In the exercise of this discretion I owe much to the scrutiny of one of the most efficient and distinguished public servants of his generation—Sir Maurice Hankey. I owe thanks also to a great many kind friends who have assisted me by supplementing and stimulating my memory with their own as to occurrences where I enjoyed their valued co-operation.

The tale is one which does not always give me any pleasure to tell; quite the reverse. There is much of it which I wrote with intense reluctance. For I found it necessary in the interests of a truthful record to relate facts which constitute a severe criticism on the action of men whose memory is honoured by their fellow countrymen for many sterling qualities which they possessed in a remarkable degree. My disinclination for revealing to the public unpleasant truths which reflect on distinguished public servants is naturally enhanced by the fact that some of them are no longer present to defend themselves. For that reason I felt disposed to pass on to others the duty of writing the true history of the occurrences recorded in these volumes. But as all these Great War figures had in their lifetime, either themselves or through the agency of authorised substitutes, already given their version of affairs, in which they did not spare those of whom they disapproved—including myself—I felt I was justified in publishing information at my disposal which corrected wrong impressions. Moreover, I took the view that if you accept the responsibility of writing history, you cannot do so honestly without allocating blame as well as praise, where either is due to the men who take a leading part in the events which make that history. And the right and duty of criticism or approval for their contribution does not cease with their death. Warriors are in that respect in the same category as politicians. Apart from that general consideration, there are at least two imperative reasons why the facts should be told now and not later. It has been sagely remarked by Macaulay that the knowledge of past events “is valuable only as it leads us to form just calculations with respect to the future.” The atmosphere of the world—East and West—is charged with the international suspicions, rivalries, ambitions and fears that have always hitherto ended in war. Nations are arming for war. Every nation throughout the world—almost without exception—is increasing its armaments. Every effort to arrest this menacing expansion of the mechanism of wholesale slaughter has failed. Nations with already enormous armaments are increasing and improving them. Formidable nations that were disarmed, are rearming. Governments are making preparations for war in defiance of treaties they signed, and they are doing so with an urgent anxiety that can only be explained by a general apprehension that war is impending. There is no confidence in any quarter that peace can be long preserved. In these circumstances it is essential first of all that nations should know, before they declare war, to what they are committing themselves. All nations alike enter into a war with an equal confidence in ultimate victory for their banners. Defeat is always a surprise to the vanquished. Elements they had not realised, defects in their own equipment, resources or qualities, or superiority in those of their foes, which they never suspected, mistakes attributable to inferior leadership which threw away good chances—and finally that play of chance and fate, which no genius can forecast or control, all make the issue of a war as doubtful as that of a serious disease. A good physician may pull through a man with a weak constitution—a poor or second-rate doctor may ruin the chances of a patient with the soundest natural physique. A good cause counts in any struggle, but it is by no means decisive in a particular conflict between right and wrong.

I remember forming one of a delegation of British Ministers (which included Mr. Asquith, Lord Kitchener, Mr. Balfour, Sir Edward Grey) which attended an important conference at Paris in 1915. When we left for London, M. Combe (“le petit père Combe”) came to the station on behalf of the French Government to see us off. He was a small and vivacious octogenarian whose optimism had not been in the least dimmed by years or by the maledictions of the devout, whom he had offended by his attacks on the Church. As soon as he entered the saloon carriage where we were seated, he started to deliver an oration on the subject of the War and its prospects—all full of hope and confidence. He ended with a peroration about “Justice, Liberté, le Droit et la Victoire.” Mr. Balfour regarded the whole performance with ill-concealed disdain and turning to me said: “He must have strangely misread history if he thinks that ‘Justice, Liberté et Droit’ are synonymous with ‘Victoire.’”

There is a melancholy justification for this cynicism in the events of the past. Victory may not always go to the big battalions, neither does it invariably incline to the righteous, for it is a historical truism that a just cause often contends in vain against the superior might or efficiency of its opponents or the weakness or greater stupidity of its adherents. Those who entrust the destiny of their country to war therefore incur unforeseeable risks which may be fatal to them and the land they love. No other arbitrament is so costly in its procedure as well as so uncertain in its event. Let those who doubt this read carefully what happened in the Great War and see how reckless and unintelligent handling brought us almost to the rim of catastrophe, and how we were saved largely by the incredible folly of our foes. But you cannot always rely on your opponents making greater mistakes than your own.

The next lesson is one we must not overlook in a world of armed nations—that if mankind should unhappily fail to abolish war from the category of its visitations, then, if we are involved in another, we must take earnest heed that we do not fall into the errors that cost us so dearly last time. That is also my excuse for giving an account, so detailed as to be weighted with dreariness, of the great improvisations which were set up to organise the resources of the nations for war. A study of these is essential to anyone who wishes to learn how a country can be organised to the best advantage either in War or in Peace.

But, whether in exposition, approbation or condemnation, I must emphasise the importance of this precept—that these lessons cannot be learnt unless they are truthfully taught. If out of respect for honoured memories or cherished delusions, the truth be suppressed and defects hidden under a varnish of glorification, then we shall learn nothing, and if there be a next time we may not then escape disaster as we did in the last calamity—by a shuddering breadth.

I regret more than words can express the necessity for telling the bare facts of our bloodstained stagger to victory. But I had to tell them or leave unchallenged the supremacy of misleading and therefore dangerous illusions.

Unfortunately, censure attracts more attention than laudation. I have criticised a few—very few—statesmen and generals. That attracts controversy, and controversy involves a publicity which casts the larger and more important part of the narrative into the shade. If in these pages I have resorted to criticism, I have also recalled with pleasure the great services of many. Bonar Law, Balfour, Churchill, Cecil, Geddes, Maclay, Reading, Smuts, Borden, Hughes, Milner, Northcliffe, Fisher, Ernie, Lee of Fareham, are amongst a multitude of statesmen and administrators to whom praise is due and has been accorded without stint. I have dwelt on the successes of Generals like Plumer, Allenby, Maude, Monash and Cowans, whose triumphs lit up the dismal narrative of military ineptitude displayed by a few others. There were great figures whose shortcomings added to our difficulties. In their case I have also called attention to the exceptional qualities they possessed. And as to the myriads of officers and men whose incredible valour and endurance saved their country from the consequences of every blunder perpetrated, whether by politicians, generals or admirals, if I have failed in bestowing on them the full measure of praise they merit, it is from lack of adequate power to express the emotion to which I am moved by a renewed contemplation of their heroism.

D. LLOYD GEORGE

Bron-y-de, Churt.

1933-34.

LIST OF PLATES

The Rt. Hon David Lloyd George, O.M., M.P.

The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, M.P., in the robes of Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1914

(1) The Earl of Oxford and Asquith; (2) Viscount Grey of Fallodon, K.G.; (3) Lord Cunliffe; (4) Count Paul Wolff-Metternich

M. Albert Thomas (French Minister of Munitions), Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre in earnest conversation wi...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• FOREWORD TO NEW EDITION
• PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE
• LIST OF PLATES
• CHAPTER 1-THE BREWING OF THE STORM
• CHAPTER II-THE CRASH
• CHAPTER III-SIR EDWARD GREY
• CHAPTER IV-THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
• CHAPTER V-THE FIGHT FOR MUNITIONS
• CHAPTER VI-THE FIGHT FOR MUNITIONS-continued
• CHAPTER VII-THE POLITICS OF THE WAR
• CHAPTER VIII-THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN MAY, 1915
• CHAPTER IX-THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS: ESTABLISHMENT AND LABOUR PROBLEMS
• CHAPTER X-THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR
• CHAPTER XI-THE WAR COUNCIL AND THE BALKANS
• CHAPTER XII-ALLIED PROCRASTINATION
• CHAPTER XIII-THE RUSSIAN COLLAPSE
• CHAPTER XIV-WHY WERE THE RUSSIAN ARMIES ILL EQUIPPED?
• CHAPTER XV-WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED HAD THE ALLIES POOLED THEIR RESOURCES
• CHAPTER XVI-THE FUTILE ALLIED OFFENSIVES ON THE WESTERN FRONT
• CHAPTER XVII-THE SERBIAN TRAGEDY
• CHAPTER XVIII-THE BALKANS AND THE SOMME
• CHAPTER XIX-MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS: PRACTICAL ACHIEVEMENTS
• CHAPTER XX-ALLIED RELATIONS WITH AMERICA
• CHAPTER XXI-PRESIDENT WILSON’S PEACE MOVES
• CHAPTER XXII-THE IRISH REBELLION
• CHAPTER XXIII-THE COMING OF CONSCRIPTION
• CHAPTER XXIV-DISINTEGRATION OF THE LIBERAL PARTY
• CHAPTER XXV-LORD KITCHENER: A CHARACTER STUDY
• CHAPTER XXVI-AT THE MINISTRY FOR WAR
• CHAPTER XXVII-SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON
• CHAPTER XXVII-TRANSPORT
• CHAPTER XXIX-THE MESOPOTAMIA MUDDLE
• CHAPTER XXX-THE KNOCK-OUT BLOW
• CHAPTER XXXI-THE LANSDOWNE PEACE MOVE
• CHAPTER XXXII-THE MILITARY POSITION AT THE END OF THE 1916 CAMPAIGN
• CHAPTER XXXI-THE FOOD POSITION
• CHAPTER XXXIV-A CABINET OF INDECISION
• CHAPTER XXXV-THE CRISIS: DECEMBER 1916
• CHAPTER XXXVI-SOME PERSONAL SKETCHES
• CHAPTER XXXVII-1914-1916: A RETROSPECT
• CHAPTER XXXVIII-FIRST TASKS AS PRIME MINISTER
• CHAPTER XXXIX-THE GERMAN AND WILSON PEACE NOTES OF DECEMBER, 1916
• CHAPTER XL-THE PERIL OF THE SUBMARINES
• CHAPTER XLI-THE ARMING OF MERCHANT VESSELS
• CHAPTER XLII-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF SHIPPING
• CHAPTER XLIII-SHIPPING PROBLEMS
• CHAPTER XLIV-CONTROLLING THE FOOD PRODUCTION
• CHAPTER XLV-A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL SERVICE
• CHAPTER XLVI-MILITARY OUTLOOK FOR 1917
• CHAPTER XLVII-THE ROME CONFERENCE
• CHAPTER XLVIII-PSYCHOLOGY AND STRATEGY
• CHAPTER XLIX-JOFFRE
• CHAPTER L-THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE
• CHAPTER LI-SEQUEL TO NIVELLE OFFENSIVE
• CHAPTER LII-THE PETROGRAD CONFERENCE
• CHAPTER LIII-THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
• CHAPTER LIV-AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR
• CHAPTER LV-THE IMPERIAL WAR CABINET AND CONFERENCE
• APPENDIX A-PRIME MINISTER’S STATEMENT TO THE IMPERIAL WAR CABINET, ON THE MILITARY AND NAVAL POSITION (20TH MARCH, 1917).
• APPENDIX B-AGENDA FOR THE FORTHCOMING SPECIAL WAR CABINET MEETINGS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DOMINIONS AND INDIA
• APPENDIX C-SUMMARY OF SIR EYRE CROWE’S MEMORANDUM
• APPENDIX D-SUMMARY OF REPORT OF LORD MILNER’S COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DESIDERATA IN TERMS OF PEACE
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER