Indonesia's Failure in Papua

The Role of Elites in Designing, Implementing and Undermining Special Autonomy

Emir Chairullah

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000518399
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Chairullah investigates how the political, social, and economic interests of national and local elites were negotiated in the formulation and early stages of Special Autonomy in Papua Province, Indonesia.

The Papuan case lends support to the current conception of elite theory, which considers the influence of actors and dynamics beyond power elites in the decision-making process. The failure of the policy implementation as a conflict reduction strategy in the Papuan case can be attributed to the dynamics of elite configurations during the negotiation and early implementation stages. Chairullah presents two significant new findings for research on Papuan Special Autonomy. Firstly, that secret negotiations were held between Papuan and national elites during Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency, and these were crucial in reducing separatist sentiment in Papua. Secondly, that the United States, through Freeport McMoRan, strongly influenced the Special Autonomy negotiation process. The actions of national elites in Jakarta led to widespread disappointment about the policy at all levels in Papua and the subsequent escalation of separatist sentiment based on Papuan ethnic identity.

An important book for scholars of Indonesian politics and society, and especially those with a particular interest in the Papuan conflict.

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781003199908-1

Background

This book examines the negotiations between national and Papuan elites in the formulation and early implementation of Special Autonomy in Papua. Following an economic and political crisis in 1997 that triggered the fall of President Soeharto and the beginning of the Reformasi era, Indonesia underwent a political transformation from authoritarian rule to a democratic system of government. The political transition resulted in the establishment of electoral democracy, greater devolution of fiscal and political autonomy to the regions, and enhanced government transparency. The process of decentralisation in Indonesia that ensued as a consequence of democratisation has facilitated the rise of civil society, and the end of military and police domination in civilian government structures (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003a). Due to democratisation’s huge impact on central-regional relations in this country, many scholars such as Booth (2014) and Bennet (2010) acknowledge this reform as a big bang and one of the most ambitious decentralisation programs in the world. To that extend that idea and examine the consequences of decentralisation as described above, this book reveals how political, social, and economic interests of Papuan and Jakartan elites were negotiated in the formulation and the early stage implementation of Special Autonomy. This book is grounded in elite theory, which contends that decision-making processes, including negotiations, are mostly shaped by the role of elites in society.

In Indonesia, the legislation underpinning decentralisation policies has existed since the formation of an independent state in 1945. However, the comprehensive implementation of decentralisation only began in 1999, a year after the demise of Soeharto’s 32-year authoritarian regime. In the Reformasi era, for example, the Indonesian Government passed Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy, which later was revised in Law No. 32/2004. In accordance with this revised law, the central government transferred authority to local governments for the decision-making and administration of various public functions within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia [NKRI]). In the case of Indonesia, a federal model was unlikely to be implemented due to its association with the Dutch colonial government’s transitional arrangements on Indonesia’s independence (Bertrand, 2004).¹

Decentralisation policies, which have been applied to all provinces across Indonesia in various forms since independence, are variously characterised by power devolution, deconcentration, and co-administration (Diprose & Ukiwo, 2008; Harriss, Stokke, & Törnquist, 2005; Ranis & Stewart, 1994). The four provinces of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Aceh, and Papua were granted Special Autonomy status distinct from Indonesia’s other 30 provinces. Granting a type of autonomy that differs from one region to another within one country is a fairly common practice in many countries, and is commonly referred to as asymmetrical decentralisation or asymmetrical intergovernmental arrangements (Wehner, 2000; Zuber, 2011). Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, and Stanton (2002) and (Bakke, 2015) contend that asymmetrical decentralisation combines the principles of power sharing and self-determination in an attempt to reduce internal conflict between the central government and regional minority groups seeking greater autonomy. Offering autonomy and self-government to areas inhabited by minorities with unique socio-cultural factors and histories is a conflict management strategy often pursued in order to limit the potential for conflict while ensuring the state’s sovereignty (Brancati, 2006; Gurr, 2000; Walter, 2009).

Aside from the distinct historical circumstances of the special regions of Jakarta and Yogyakarta,² Special Autonomy status for Aceh and Papua provinces was seen as a solution to the separatist conflict that had been an issue in both regions for decades. Mirroring Canada, Spain, and the Soviet Union’s approach to separatist conflict (Weller & Wolff, 2005), the Indonesian Government chose to pursue a policy of Special Autonomy in Aceh and Papua to reduce conflict and bring an end to hostility with the parties wanting to secede from the Indonesian state (McGibbon, 2004; Solossa, 2005). Currently, calls for separatism in Aceh Province after the implementation of Special Autonomy and post-tsunami recovery have begun to subside (Miller, 2009). Special Autonomy seems to have had positive effects in Aceh that cannot be claimed for Papua, where separatist sentiment continues unabated.

Research problem and research question

As I mentioned in the previous section, the purpose of this book is to show the negotiations between national and local elites in the decision-making process and early implementation of Papua’s Special Autonomy. This book derives from my understanding of why the Special Autonomy policy has not yet overcome separatist sentiment in Papua. The relatively recent process of granting special autonomous status in order to secure Papuan integration has been inseparable from the political challenge of how to retain Papua within the unitary state of Indonesia and the history of this province since May 1963. Papua is distinct from the rest of Indonesia because the Dutch as former colonists had not released their control over this province.³ The Dutch even planned to give independence to the Papuans in 1970, and this promise later became a reason for the pro-Independence Papuans asking for secession. However, in August 1962, the New York Agreement mandated that the Netherlands transfer power over this province to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), which then transferred the province to Indonesia in May 1963. The 1962 New York Agreement also stipulated that the Indonesian Government must give the Papuans the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice, known as Pepera (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat) in 1969.

Despite the fact that the 1969 Pepera or the Act of Free Choice result has been recognised internationally by UN Resolution No. 2504/1969 and conforms with the doctrine of uti possidetis juris (Ratner, 1996), the integration of Papua Province (formerly known as Irian Jaya) into Indonesia remains problematic in the relationship between Jakarta and Papua.⁴ Many people in Papua still refused to acknowledge Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over Papua because the Act of Free Choice was not legitimate: Jakarta had authorised only some Papuans to vote. These Papuan groups also recognised that Pepera had been carried out through intimidation, military violence, and immoral conduct, contravening humanitarian principles and further casting its legitimacy into doubt (King, 2004; Pigay, 2001; Scott & Tebay, 2005; Shabecoff, 1969). The Papuan separatist groups that opposed the central government and later called for independence were collectively identified as the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka [OPM]), led by figures such as Seth Jafeth Roemkorem, Nicolaas Jouwe, Jacob Henrik Prai, and Kelly Kwalik, among others (R. Harvey, 2009; Republika, 2015). In response to continued calls for Papuan independence, the Indonesian Government during the Soeharto regime adopted a security approach as its primary strategy to deal with opposition, declaring Irian Jaya a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer [DOM]) from 1982 to 1998 (Budiardjo & Liong, 1988; Pigay, 2001).⁵ Under Soeharto, the Papuan people and local government bureaucracies were fully controlled by the central government.

Following the fall of the Soeharto authoritarian regime in 1998, a repressive and centralised approach to governing Papua gave way to attempts by the central government to foster dialogue efforts with the Papuan elites. Aspirations of the Papuans began to be heard and accommodated by implementing some policies that were aimed at reducing separatist sentiment. However, Habibie’s dialogue idea seems to have achieved very little. Further, there was no follow-up to Habibie’s initiative because his government feared a strengthening of secessionist demands from the Papuan elites. In response to continued resistance to the Indonesian Government, and to curb the Papuan people’s demand for independence, the central government introduced the Special Autonomy policy in relation to Papua in the context of sweeping regulatory and legislative changes in Indonesia at the time. The policy can be defined as a political status recognised and arranged for the Papuans to legislate and implement some authorities that only apply in Papua. The legislation was mandated by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) through Resolution MPR-RI/No. IV/MPR/1999. Habibie’s successor, President Abdurrahman Wahid, continued with the move towards recognising local autonomy, changing Papua Province’s name from Irian Jaya to Papua in 2000.

The demand to implement Special Autonomy in Papua to resolve its prolonged separatist conflict was inspired by the provision of Special Autonomy status for Aceh, which was legalised under Law No. 44/1999 on the Special Status of the Aceh Province of Aceh and revised by Law No. 18/2001 on Special Autonomy for Aceh. Although the Papuans initially did not respond to this policy offer with enthusiasm, in 2000, Papua Governor JP Solossa, along with local academics, took the initiative of drafting the Special Autonomy policy (McGibbon, 2004; Solossa, 2005; Sumule, 2003b). The Indonesian Government, under the Presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri, eventually granted Special Autonomy to Papua through the enactment of Law No. 21/2001 after two years of negotiations. There was a glimmer of hope among the Papuan elites that this policy would improve the quality of their people’s lives. For many elites in Papua and in the central government, the Special Autonomy Law was considered a means of resolving separatist conflict in the region (Demianus, 2013; Singh, 2012). The Special Autonomy legislation divided authority between the central government and the provincial governments in Papua, recognised and respected the basic rights of Papuans, granted local people the right to determine opportunities to develop regions for their welfare, and guaranteed the division of authority at the local government level. Besides these points, the central government provided additional Special Autonomy funds on a regular basis as part of the annual budget. Compared to the New Order regime, in which local government was controlled by the central government (Booth, 2014; Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997), with the Special Autonomy Law, the Papuans would have relatively more control over their own affairs, including special stipulations that:

• the provincial governor and deputy are of Papuan ethnicity
• the various regional symbols such as the name of the province, the flag, coat of arms, and cultural anthem are formalised
• the Papuan People Consultative Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua [MRP]) or an institution planned to represent adat (local culture) interests, Papuan People Representative Council, or Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua [DPRP]), and local political parties, are set up.

However, a reduction in separatist sentiment, which was the main purpose of implementing the Special Autonomy policy, has been more difficult to achieve. Some studies show that although local government in the province is led by indigenous people who have been elected by the Papuans, the implementation of Special Autonomy often marginalises, discriminates against, and even oppresses indigenous Papuans (Anderson, 2015; Fernandes, 2006; Numberi, 2012). These characteristics lead to a situation in which the pro-separatist groups and many people in Papua have been trying to rebuild the Papuans’ spirit with the view to secede from Indonesia, although some of these groups had initially accepted the Special Autonomy policy (Suara Papua, 2013; Yoman, 2013). These pro-separatist groups argue that some major areas stipulated in the law, such as allowing local people to use various regional symbols and the MRP establishment, were either annulled or watered down into insignificance. Therefore, these movements conclude that Special Autonomy has failed because it seems that this policy only benefited the local elites and bureaucratic officials in Papua (Komnas TPNPB, 2015). Demands for Papuan independence have become more widespread, with demonstrations and even including the raising of the Papuan Morning Star flag, during the annual commemoration of the OPM’s founding on 1 December in many parts of Papua (Okezone, 2016; The Jakarta Post, 2015).

The events in the aftermath of Special Autonomy enactment in Papua suggest that local leadership was not a guarantee of realising the principal objective of Special Autonomy, which was to reduce separatist conflict. The continuing dissatisfaction with Special Autonomy in Papua, and claims that it has only benefited local political elites, prompted this investigation into the early negotiation of Special Autonomy policy in Papua. The dissatisfaction also raises questions about the effectiveness of Special Autonomy in reducing separatism, and ultimately, its effectiveness as a conflict management strategy. In particular, ongoing conflict suggests that it is important to ask how negotiations occurred and what sorts of compromises were made. These matters have not been addressed in the literature. This book therefore examines the forces informing – and processes for negotiating – Special Autonomy between Papuan and Jakartan elites. This book examines the conditions under which negotiations took place, the kinds of compromises that were made by central and local Papuan elites in the formulation of the Special Autonomy policy, and whether these helped to address core issues in Papua. The research seeks to ascertain whether the outcome of negotiations contributed to continuing conflict in Papua. Surprisingly, given the importance of these events for the Papuan people, they remain under-studied in the literature, and this research addresses this gap.

This book contributes to our understanding of the formulation of autonomy policy in newly democratic countries, in this case, Indonesia, drawn from the account of elites directly involved in the negotiations and early implementation. The contribution of this book mainly lies in the production of new findings. My new findings about the elite negotiation process have shed light on the rationale behind the decision of Papuan elites to accept the Special Autonomy policy that was offered by the central government in reducing secession demand in Papua. By drawing on elite theory and its current debates, this book reveals the dynamics between elites, both at ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Glossary
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Literature review and theoretical framework
• 3. The trajectory of political decentralisation in Indonesia
• 4. Elite negotiation in the formulation of Special Autonomy in Papua
• 5. Freeport factor in the Papua Special Autonomy negotiation
• 6. Unimplemented Special Autonomy
• 7. Renegotiation of Special Autonomy
• 8. Summary and conclusion
• Appendix
• References
• Index