From Radical Marxism to Knowledge Socialism

An Educational Philosophy and Theory Reader, Volume XI

Michael A. Peters, Liz Jackson, Michael A. Peters, Liz Jackson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000486896
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education Theory & Practice

This volume examines the place of Marxist theory in the history of the journal Educational Philosophy and Theory, primarily through the selection and exploration of typical and significant articles exploring Marxist-related themes in the journal over time. The title, From Radical Marxism to Knowledge Socialism, reflects this historical approach. In the 1960s and 1970s, Marxism was considered to be a radical, extreme 'political' theory, while western liberalism and a free-market economy were largely taken for granted as natural phenomena, in western philosophy of education and in the journal. More recently, educational theorists have begun to explore trends related to the neoliberal age. Paradoxically, such trends include the move toward knowledge socialism, which decenters the normative presuppositions of knowledge capitalism as the latest iteration of western liberalism.

The volume begins with an introductory chapter that examines the history of Marxism in western philosophy and philosophy of education. The rest of the book features works selected from the journal that further illustrate the evolution of Marxist theoretical perspectives in the field over time. This collection thus gives a sense of the range and extent of Marxist-inspired thinking in educational philosophy and theory.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of educational philosophy and theory and others who are interested in exploring in depth the evolution of key themes in this field over time, including liberalism, ideology, Marxism, neoliberalism, knowledge construction, capitalist and socialist schooling, and other aspects of economic analysis in education.

1Ideology and schooling

Peter Stevens

University of Sydney

DOI: 10.4324/9781003216421-2

In this paper I want to elaborate a part of the theory of historical materialism to an extent that will enable us to see the prospect of developing scientific concepts to replace certain loose but valuable insights made by radical critics of schooling. At the same time I hope to provide some indication of what we might be able to do as philosophers and theorists of education by way of theory development, rather than by way of conceptual analysis. Within the space restrictions of a short article, much is covered schematically and suggestively, and much of the more abstract detailed workings of the theory of ideology underlying the ideas presented is omitted.¹ The result is rather more a programmatic sketch than a finished picture.

The theoretical work presented here adopts broadly the problematic of Marx as interpreted by Althusser. For Althusser the social formation is a structural totality of various ‘levels,’ or instances, each being the site of a determinate practice having the structure of a mode of production. Different practices are distinguished by the specificity of their raw materials, instruments and type of labour, and their products. Althusser distinguishes four instances, the economic, the political, the ideological and the theoretical, which form an articulated structure-in-dominance: articulated in that the various levels have effects on each other, e.g., the products of one practice may form part of the means of production of another; structured in dominance because at any given time one of the instances (which one is determined by the economic instance) has a more fundamental influence on the totality than do the others.

I. Ideology and Neology

Introduction

Althusser uses the term ‘ideology’ in two quite different senses in his writings, but both he, and his supporters and critics have failed to demarcate this double usage carefully, frequently to the point of not recognising it. The subsequent conflation of the two senses has led to significant theoretical errors and is rife with political dangers.² First, Althusser distinguishes ideological practice, as a specific form. of social practice, having as its object “men’s consciousness” or their ‘lived relations,’ from theoretical practice. (FM, 166–7).^* Second, he distinguishes within theoretical practice between ideological theoretical practice and scientific theoretical practice, which are distinguished by their respective modes of theoretical production (RC 43). Thus the two senses can be put briefly:

1. Ideology as an instance of the social formation (the ideological).
2. Ideology as opposed to science.

In the first sense ‘ideology’ refers to an instance comparable to and theoretically on a par with the political, etc., while in the second sense it locates a distinct form within quite another instance, the theoretical.

In Althusser’s writings ‘ideology’ in the first sense carries with it none of the pejorative flavour that it has in the Marxist usage generally, in which the ideas of being mystificatory and functioning in the interests of the ruling class are important elements. This pejorative character is however apparent in Althusser’s second sense, viz., ideology as opposed to science. Ideological and scientific knowledges alike are systems of concepts, theses, etc., resulting from theoretical practice. However, ideology “is distinguished from a science not by its falsity... but by the fact that the practico-social predominates in it over the theoretical, over knowledge” (FM 251), i.e., in ideological theoretical practice the function of constituting knowledge is subordinated to the function of serving practical interests. This is achieved by way of the problems which ideological theoretical practice sets itself; these are “merely the theoretical expressions of the conditions which allow a solution already produced outside the process of knowledge because imposed by extra-theoretical instances and exigencies (by religious, ethical, political or other ‘interests’) to recognise itself in an artificial problem manufactured to serve it both as a theoretical mirror and as a practical justification.” (RC 52). An illustration of this can be taken from Marx’s analysis in Capital of Classical Political Economy as an ideology. The practical economic interest of the capitalist class demanded that theoretical practice issue in the solution that existing labourers’ wages constituted full recompense for labour performed. The problem ‘manufactured’ to issue in this solution is, “What is the value of labour?” But this ‘problem’ is simply a theoretical mirror of the required answer within the labour theory of value. The answer supplied is that the value of labour is equal to the labour-time required to produce it, to the value of the means of subsistence necessary to sustain the labourer; i.e., equal to mere subsistence wages, as required. However the problem is, in fact, an artificial one, having no proper meaning with the labour theory of value. (It is analogous to asking, “What is the value in money terms of one dollar?”) It does however serve to obliterate the distinction and quantitative difference between the value of the commodity purchased by the capitalist, viz., labour power (which is, indeed, equal in value to subsistence wages), and the value produced by that labour power when put into action. It thereby obscures the surplus produced by the labourers above the value of their labour power and the expropriation of this surplus value by the capitalist.

* Louis Althusser’s various books are cited in the text in accordance with the following abbreviations:

FM: For Marx, Penguin, Hannondsworth, 1969.

RC: Reading Capital, New Left Books, London, 1970.

J.P: Lenin and Philosophy, New Left Books, London, 1971.

I shall continue to use the term ‘ideology’ for this second sense, while introducing the term ‘neology’ for the first sense. The neological instance (as I shall now call it) will be the main concern of this paper. The account given here is essentially derived from work by Althusser,³ but is based on an attempt ·to correct and extend that work.⁴ The neological instance like the other instances, is the site of a definite practice with its own specific raw materials, products and means of production. Neological practice “also transforms its object: men’s ‘consciousness’.” (FM 167).⁵ The product of this transformation is a new ‘consciousness.’

Marx early identified this ‘consciousness’ with “man’s ideas, views and conceptions” which change “with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life.”⁶ The classic condensation of this is the famous phrase of the 1859 Preface: “[men’s] social being determines their consciousness.” What is this ‘consciousness,’ and what is this social being?

An Introductory Account of the Neological Instance

The condition of continued human existence is production (of food, of shelter, etc.). The condition of continued production is reproduction of the means of production (of tools, of materials) and of producers. Though production and reproduction must occur, there is not just one way (mode) in which they must occur. Nonetheless, at any given time and place there is a specific mode of production and reproduction which predominates. As a result people live in specific ways, which are substantially determined by this mode of production: they work at particular sorts of tasks, their work is organised in specific ways, there is a determinate form in which they acquire the means of their own subsistence, and they relate to one another in certain ways rather than others. For example, consider a serf in feudal times, whose work is strip farming of specific crops, mostly organised on the basis of the family as the productive unit, working part of his time on land held by himself, part on land held by the local ruler and taking as his means of subsistence only the crops produced on his own land. He relates to the ruler and his agents in definite subservient ways, obeying their orders, addressing them in certain forms; he relates to the local leaders of religion in different but equally specific ways; to his fellow serfs he is an equal, and to his wife and children he is a ruler, and both of these result in quite specific forms of behaviour towards these others. The totality of all these concrete and material practices and rituals, both formal (e.g., baptism ceremonies for babies) and informal (such as doffing his hat and standing with bowed head when speaking to the ruler’s steward), constitute a specific material form of life.

But humans not only have this material form of life, they also represent their lives to themselves in conceptual forms, in images and words. These immediate forms of thinking the material experiences of life also constitute part of the form of life that a person lives. Thus, for example, a man may live materially a certain dominant relationship with a woman, making decisions for her and keeping her financially dependent, and at the same time, i.e., as part of the same overall form of relating, represent the woman to himself as, say a “kitten,” or a “lamb,” or a “chick,” and the relationship as one of “protecting the little woman.” The material form and the conceptual representation are clearly interrelated.

For any given individual the totality of the material form of their life, together with its related immediate conceptual representations lies within what we shall call the neological matrix of that individual. This neological matrix can for analytical purposes be regarded as an ensemble of particular neologies, each of which is a socially constructed set of practices, rituals and behaviours interrelated with one another and with certain concepts and images. A neology is a coherent whole and distinguishable from other neologies, though it may be linked to, and influenced by those other neologies. Examples are the neologies of religion, of morality, of schooling, of the family, each of which exhibits certain organising principles which structure the rituals and concepts, etc., and provide practical norms guiding behaviour.

No individual carries out all aspects of all rituals of a particular neology at any given stage (e.g., one is a pupil at one stage and a teacher at another) or perhaps ever (e.g., one may live according to the family neology without ever having children; by having parents, and by witnessing and interacting with others and their children). However, when a certain range of a person’s material acts and conceptual representations are governed by the organising principles of a neology we will regard that person as living in that neology. The ensemble of neologies within which an individual lives constitutes that individual’s neological matrix.

It is this neological matrix which constitutes that ‘social being’ of an individual which ‘determines consciousness,’ in the sense that a person’s awareness of self, his or her attitudes, etc., are the accompanying results of living in specific neologies. And it is not only consciousness that is involved, since much of the effect of living in these neologies is profoundly unconscious, emerging in consciousness only as apparently natural emotions, etc.

We need then to adopt a broader conception of ‘consciousness’ than the Marx of the Manifesto, one that recognises the unconscious structures as well as the conscious expressions, and for this reason we will employ quotation marks in our use of ‘consciousness.’ It may be worth emphasising that this ‘consciousness’ is not without its effects on neology, as when subjective discontent leads to a change of life-style, i.e., to an alteration of a person’s neological matrix. itself having consequences for that person’s ‘consciousness.’

The development and maintenance of a certain ·consciousness’ in the above sense is important for the maintenance and reproduction of any existing mode of production. If people’s ‘consciousness’ is adapted to and supportive of the existing mode of production, then changes in that mode will be so much the harder to make. So the maintenance of people in a certain range of neological matrices is an important factor in stabilising a given mode of production. Thus it may be very important for this end that certain neologies are encouraged and supported (even institutionalised and enforced) and others discouraged and opposed. Equally it is important that each new generation is moulded into the (pre-existing) neological matrix with which they are at birth surrounded. What these neologies are will be specific to the mode of production considered; however, in relatively stable situations, the prevailing neologies are such as to adapt people to their conditions of existence under that mode, in particular to the existing relations of production.

There are many ways in which these ends may be achieved. Economic factors may dictate certain forms of life rather than others (e.g., near-subsistence farming), but within the remaining scope, political power may determine support for or sanctions against some possible forms (resulting in serfdom, say, rather than small-holding free peasantry) and theoretical grounds for adopting certain forms may be propagated to exert their influence on ‘consciousness’ (e.g., presenting the division into ‘stations of life’ as ordained by God). Also important is the self-reproducing momentum of existing neologies: the family tends to raise people who are fitted for and desire family life.

Up to now no distinction has been made between class societies and classless ones as far as the role of neology is concerned. It should be clear that living in neology (i.e., abstracting from any particular neologies in which people live) is inevitable in all societies and that neology is an essential feature of any society. In a class society the maintenance of neological institutions and informal neologies which produce an appropriately submissive ‘consciousness’ in the dominated classes is of great importance to the dominating classes, and they make use of their political power (control of the state and its instrumentalities and economic resources) and their control of the communications media, etc., to support these institutions and to develop and propagate theoretical views which endorse and justify the existing neologies. (Theories which have built into them this class interest-serving role are ideologies). The state’s repressive instrumentalities (the police, the army, etc.) remain in reserve to deal forcibly with situations where ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Foreword
• Notes on contributor
• List of figures
• Introduction: Western Marxism in Educational Philosophy and Theory
• 1 Ideology and schooling
• 2 Marxism and education: will the doctrine bear the weight?
• 3 Education and cultural disadvantage
• 4 Illich and anarchism
• 5 Knowledge and ideology in the Marxist philosophy of education
• 6 Liberal education and social change
• 7 The continuing conflicts between capitalism and democracy: ramifications for schooling-education
• 8 Luce Irigaray: women becoming subjects for a divine economy
• 9 The nature and limits of critical theory in education
• 10 Class dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’
• 11 A brief commentary on the Hegelian-Marxist origins of Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’
• 12 Hope, political imagination, and agency in Marxism and beyond: explicating the transformative worldview and ethico-ontoepistemology
• 13 Knowledge socialism: the rise of peer production – collegiality, collaboration, and collective intelligence
• Index