War and Aftermath in Vietnam

T. Louise Brown

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000504712
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book, first published in 1991, attempts to combine a broad understanding of the background to the conflict in Vietnamese and world history with detailed material on US military tactics and the failure of pacification. There are chapters on the US presidential administrations of Johnson, Kennedy and Nixon; religion, culture and society in North and South Vietnam, and the nature of the 'People's Revolutionary War'.

1 Vietnam: the background to war

Land, water and rice are the building blocks of Vietnamese society. In what is modern day northern Vietnam, the ancestors of the Vietnamese built a culture upon wet rice cultivation. Archeological evidence indicates that Late Neolithic and Bronze Age cultures were flourishing in the Red River Delta in the third millenium BC (Taylor 1983:4).

Over time, native Vietnamese development came to be greatly influenced by the Chinese. Attracted to Vietnam principally as a source of tropical goods (Taylor 1983:126), China started to meddle tentatively in the region and then, in 111 BC, exercised its power by drawing what is now northern Vietnam within its empire. For the first 150 years Chinese authority was loose and informal and the native leadership was allowed to retain significant powers. This relaxed control, however, changed radically in response to a revolt of the local chiefs.

Anxious to preserve their privileges from usurption by the Chinese, the indigenous leadership rebelled in AD 40 (Buttinger 1969:31). When the unrest was quelled and the Chinese reimposed their authority two years later, the Vietnamese found the new form of Chinese rule to be far harsher and more authoritarian. To forestall any further challenges to its control, the native elite was stripped of power and a new hierarchy was imported from the north. Pre-modern Vietnam had lost its independence and had become a colonized nation under Chinese occupation.

Although the degree of Chinese control varied according to the fortunes of its dynasties, Vietnam remained a satellite of its powerful neighbour for nine more centuries and, in the process, became imbued with many of its social and political values. A new hybrid ruling class developed as Chinese officials intermarried with the local elite (Taylor 1983:48–57) and all aspects of life for this thoroughly sinicized group were infused with pervasive Chinese overtones. Notwithstanding their cultural affinity, the Sino-Vietnamese elite increasingly saw its interests as distinct from those of the Chinese and they eventually emerged as the focus of opposition to colonial rule.

Given that Vietnam was occupied for so long and was effectively a part of south China for almost a millenium, it is surprising that its people did not become Chinese. Yet far from being assimilated like many of their social superiors, the peasantry preserved a distinctly Vietnamese way of life in their tightly knit rural communities. They accomplished this partly because contact with other races living in the region left an imprint upon their culture that made it distinct from that of China, and partly, and crucially, because they did not want to be Chinese (Taylor 1983:229).

Apart from a brief but ruthlessly exploitative period under Ming rule (1407–27), direct Chinese control over Vietnam ended in AD 939, when an alliance between the disgruntled elite and an even more disgruntled peasantry coincided with a downturn in China’s domestic fortunes. However, once independent, the new rulers of tenth-century Vietnam assumed the same form and style of leadership as their erstwhile masters. In practice this meant a centralized, monarchical state working in tandem with a bureaucracy of mandarins. The adoption of this system was motivated by four factors. Firstly, the Vietnamese had few alternative governmental structures from which to choose. Secondly, Chinese methods had proved efficient in controlling the people. Thirdly, it offered a satisfactory means of preserving national independence, and finally the system was necessary to build and maintain the network of dykes which were vital to irrigation and the control of floods (Nguyen Khac Vien 1974:19).

Confucianism was central to the structure and functioning of this independent state. Originally inherited from China, Confucianism continued to provide a sophisticated framework of thought for the higher echelons of Vietnamese society once the controlling hand of the Chinese was removed. In the process, it became a code of behaviour and a prop to the ruling elite. Its doctrine stressed the fundamental importance of filial piety and deference—both designed to solidify and strengthen existing familial, social and political structures. Hence, Confucianism became the ideology of the elite, its teaching a method of indoctrination and its emphasis upon orthodoxy a means of control.

In pre-colonial Vietnam the village commune or xa was the basic administrative unit. In the long-established communities of the north a solid social organization had been fostered by the combined efforts of many people who struggled every year to irrigate their paddy fields and to build dykes and channels in order to save their land and themselves from the sporadic yet violent floods of the Red River. Technically, each village was an autonomous unit but, in reality, its independence was subject to infringements by the mandarinate and the ruling dynastic house.

Egalitarianism and the need to ensure each family an adequate level of subsistence were vitally important principles of life in the rural communities. They were important because they smoothed the functioning of the corporate village in which each family had to cooperate in the irrigation and farming processes. Even so, economic and social stratification existed within the village and appears to have increased over the centuries. From the early 1600s, serious food shortages became a fact of life in the north of Vietnam (Popkin 1979:87). Undoubtedly, this population pressure worked against the corporate ideal as families vied over smaller and smaller pieces of land and, hence, almost inevitably, sought to better their own position and level of subsistence at the expense of that of their neighbours. Overpopulation gave rise to an agrarian crisis and problems of law and order because it ultimately generated a landless poor. These people were cut adrift from, and unable to re-enter the villages because existing inhabitants feared a further subdivision of the community’s rice lands.

Real power in the village was exercised by those who had positions on the village governing body, the Council of Notables. At one time the ranking system in the villages had been based on age (Popkin 1979:110), but in the centuries preceding French colonial penetration, the notables were drawn almost exclusively from the community’s wealthiest families. Only the wealthy could realistically become leading figures. This was because all those who held high office were obliged to make material contributions to the religious and social life of the village. Significant financial outlays were therefore necessary in order to ascend in the political hierarchy. Despite this, many aspired to a position on the Council because the initial sacrifices could be recouped several-fold as political influence granted the notables the right to manipulate land distribution and the taxation system to their own advantage (Murray 1980:413, Popkin 1979:99).

Theoretically all the land belonged to the emperor and his subjects paid him taxes in return for the right of usufruct. Taxes were assessed on the basis of the number of people who appeared on the official village registers and it was the community rather than the individual which was responsible for payment. The compilation of these vital registers was the responsibility of the notables and they had vested interests in keeping it as restricted as possible. Firstly, the amount of tax to be paid was not based upon the real number of people in the village, but upon the number appearing on the register. As the tax bill was divided equally amongst all villagers, with the exception of those granted exemptions by the notables, a small register naturally meant that each individual had to pay less. Secondly, the inclusion of more people on the register would be tantamount to increasing the charmed circle to which the notables belonged. This arose because inclusion on the register granted people official status. It allowed them, for instance, to travel safely outside the village and to call upon a mandarin to adjudicate in disputes. The notables’ right to grant tax exemptions and to decide who was eligible for inclusion in the register consequently gave them great power within the community and facilitated the consolidation of their economic and political position.

Land was the key to political and social status in traditional Vietnam and, inevitably, it was managed by the elite for its own benefit. In the aftermath of the Ming interregnum (1407–27) the new Le emperors strenuously endeavoured to tackle the problem of land ownership which had tended to become concentrated during the occupation. Accordingly, a variation of the Chinese ‘equal field’ system was adopted (Ngo Vinh Long 1973:5–6) and, henceforth, the system made provision for each individual to receive a share of land commensurate with his social rank and equal to that of his peers. Coupled with periodic land redistributions, it mitigated at least some of the socially harmful effects of the long-term accumulation of land in the hands of a few.

In addition to the village land allotted to individual members under the ‘equal field’ system, communal land was a feature of well established Vietnamese settlements and was used for a variety of administrative and internal welfare purposes which protected the poorest. In principle, communal land was distributed to the most needy but, as with all village lands, it came to be allotted on the base of rank and social status, hence ensuring that those least in need received the most fertile land (Popkin 1979:101). The result of this manipulation of village resources and obligations meant that, rather than being a levelling force working for the benefit of an egalitarian xa, the Council of Notables was a self perpetuating elite whose powers and procedures, in effect, preserved and increased social and economic stratification (Popkin 1979:106).

Despite this degree of inequality, a number of historians who were critical of French colonial policy developed a romanticized view of the pre-colonial village. In accordance with a view that saw the xa as a corporate body acting for the common good, the disintegration of Vietnamese society under French rule was interpreted as a new phenomenon produced by the undermining of the traditional village hierarchy (Mus and McAlister 1970, Fitzgerald 1972). Nevertheless, it would be more accurate to see increased rural stratification under colonial rule as an acceleration of an existing process by which egalitarianism was already being subverted by struggles for power at the village level. The French presence acted as a stimulant to an already apparent trend by increasing the opportunities for those seeking to replace egalitarianism with individualism (Popkin 1979:139–40).

Abuse of privilege was common amongst the mandarins who administered the nation for the emperor. Frequently the justice that they dispensed was dictated by the size of the petitioner’s purse, while patronage systems ensured that those well connected to the mandarin consistently strengthened their economic and social positions. This applied, in particular, to those locally influential individuals on the Council of Notables.

Many avenues were open to mandarins who wanted to become wealthy and powerful but their success was conditioned by the degree of restraint which the emperor managed to impose upon them. As a result of the power which tended to accrue to the mandarins, Vietnam’s pre-colonial history is primarily the history of a struggle between the centrifugal forces of powerful individuals and the centralizing forces of the monarchy (Buttinger 1969:42). This struggle centred upon the level of control which regional powers exerted over the peasantry. In many respects, the mandarin’s ability to exploit the local population was an accurate indicator of the monarchy’s general condition. When the influence of the ruling dynasty waned, local powers increased their control vis-à-vis the population and, hence, had the means to make social and economic divisions more acute. This led to the stripping away of communal lands which, in turn, led to popular unrest and to the overthrow of the dynasty and its replacement by one strong enough to prune regional power (Wiegersma 1988:50). By limiting the influence of the mandarinate and attempting, if not always succeeding, in enforcing periodic land redistributions, the emperor reallocated to the poor some of the land appropriated by wealthy individuals. Far from being examples of the social concern of the court, these acts were designed to ensure its self preservation, firstly by quelling peasant unrest and secondly by weakening the power and influence of aspiring individuals whose cumulative strength could threaten the imperial dynasty.

The emperor stood at the apex of the Vietnamese social hierarchy. Although not of divine status, he was the mediator between man and God and all his subjects owed him allegiance. But, despite the idealization of loyalty to the emperor, the weakness of central authority and the inevitable dynastic cycle resulted in long periods of endemic civil strife. Thus, in the sixteenth century, Vietnam was wracked by internecine conflict which culminated in the division of the country, initially for fifty years and then, after an interlude of three decades, for a period of 150 years. During the second period of political division, dating from 1620, each half of Vietnam was headed by a regionally based dynasty which formed a chua or overlordship in a style similar to that of the shoguns of Japan. As a result, while the Trinh family ruled the north and the Nguyen the south of Vietnam, the emperor was reduced to the status of a puppet under the control of the Trinh.

The Nguyen state encouraged an ongoing southward migration of the Vietnamese people. Population pressure in the Vietnamese homeland of the Red River Delta had become so serious by the fifteenth century that a ‘March to the South’ began. It took hundreds of years for this human frontier to move down the length of modern day Vietnam but by the eighteenth century it was gradually spilling out into the vast, untamed Mekong Delta.

The importance of this migration lies in the nature of the new settlements that were established. Unlike their forefathers in the north, the frontier people settling the fertile lands of the south did not build tightly knit communities. Without the restrictions imposed by over-population they created dispersed villages which spread out, linear fashion, along waterways and newly built canals. The more even flow of the Mekong River rendered elaborate flood prevention methods unnecessary and, therefore, the degree of corporate activity within the community was reduced (Cotter 1968:20–1). Consequently, the fewer demands placed upon collective action resulted in a diminution of the ideal of the xa. Individualism became a far more common feature of the south and contrasted with the constantly strived for, if not always achieved, egalitarian ideal of northern and central Vietnam.

The further the frontier people moved from the heartland of Vietnamese culture, the more tenuous a grip it had upon them. They were liberated progressively from the mental parameters set by traditional Vietnamese society and felt free to dispense with some of its restricting dogma. In doing so they produced a phenomenon that has been aptly described as ‘cultural washout’ (Hickey 1964:82). However, although social and attitudinal differences had begun to emerge in the recently settled areas by the mid-nineteenth century, the peasants of both north and south Vietnam still shared aspects of a common culture and together shouldered a growing burden of exploitation.

The Tay Son rebellion (1773–86), or revolution as it is sometimes termed, was a reflection of the Vietnamese people’s dissatisfaction with the established order. A whole host of problems appeared to be besetting Vietnam. Administrative corruption was rife, malnutrition and epidemics were common and the agrarian crisis had worsened. Under these conditions the initial rebellion in 1773 proved to be a catalyst and springboard from which deep peasant discontent erupted throughout both halves of divided Vietnam. First the Nguyen state of the south fell to the rebels and by 1786 the northern-based Trinh had also succumbed, thus uniting all of Vietnam under a Tay Son emperor.

The new leadership embarked on some radical programmes but they proved unable to carry them through to fruition. Divided by their own internal conflicts, the triumph of the Tay Son was to be short-lived and in 1802 they were crushed by Nguyen Anh, one of the remaining scions of the Nguyen family which had ruled southern Vietnam and which had been almost wiped out by the Tay Son.

Nguyen Anh established a dynasty which survived until 1955 and which was to preside over Vietnam’s conquest by a European power. Under the rule of this new imperial house, Vietnam would l...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of abbreviations
• Chronology
• 1 Vietnam: the background to war
• 2 The first Indochina conflict and the United States’ drift to war
• 3 Lyndon B.Johnson and the tragedy of Vietnam
• 4 Negotiations 1964–73
• 5 The war at home
• 6 Politics, economics and religion: a revolution in Vietnamese society
• 7 People’s revolutionary war
• 8 America’s war: the strategy and tactics of the United States’ military in Vietnam
• 9 Pacification and the attempt to build a viable South Vietnamese state
• 10 The war in five capitals—the international context of the Vietnam War
• 11 The end of the war and its aftermath
• Bibliography
• Index