The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek

F. A. Hayek, Jeremy Shearmur

• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• Year: 2022
• ISBN:
  9780226782003
• Topic: Betriebswirtschaft
• Subtopic: Business allgemein

A new edition of F. A. Hayek's three-part opus Law, Legislation, and Liberty, collated in a single volume
In this critical entry in the University of Chicago's Collected Works of F. A. Hayek series, political philosopher Jeremy Shearmur collates Hayek's three-part study of law and liberty and places Hayek's writings in careful historical context. Incisive and unrestrained, Law, Legislation, and Liberty is Hayek at his late-life best, making it essential reading for understanding the philosopher's politics and worldview. These three volumes constitute a scaling up of the framework offered in Hayek's famed The Road to Serfdom. Volume 1, Rules and Order, espouses the virtues of classical liberalism; Volume 2, The Mirage of Social Justice, examines the societal forces that undermine liberalism and, with it, liberalism's capacity to induce "spontaneous order"; and Volume 3, The Political Order of a Free People, proposes alternatives and interventions against emerging anti-liberal movements, including a rule of law that resides in stasis with personal freedom. Shearmur's treatment of this challenging work—including an immersive new introduction, a conversion of Hayek's copious endnotes to footnotes, corrections to Hayek's references and quotations, and the provision of translations to material that Hayek cited only in languages other than English—lends it new importance and accessibility. Rendered anew for the next generations of scholars, this revision of Hayek's Law, Legislation, and Liberty is sure to become the standard.

Volume 1

Rules and Order

Intelligent beings may have laws of their own making; but they also have some which they never made.

—Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des lois, I1

Introduction

There seems to be only one solution to the problem: that the élite of mankind acquire a consciousness of the limitation of the human mind, at once simple and profound enough, humble and sublime enough, so that Western civilisation will resign itself to its inevitable disadvantages.

—G. Ferrero1

When Montesquieu and the framers of the American Constitution articulated the conception of a limiting constitution2 that had grown up in England, they set a pattern which liberal constitutionalism has followed ever since. Their chief aim was to provide institutional safeguards of individual freedom; and the device in which they placed their faith was the separation of powers. In the form in which we know this division of power between the legislature, the judiciary and the administration, it has not achieved what it was meant to achieve. Governments everywhere have obtained by constitutional means powers which those men had meant to deny them. The first attempt to secure individual liberty by constitutions has evidently failed.

Constitutionalism means limited government.3 But the interpretation given to the traditional formulae of constitutionalism has made it possible to reconcile these with a conception of democracy according to which this is a form of government where the will of the majority on any particular matter is unlimited.4 As a result it has already been seriously suggested that constitutions are an antiquated survival which have no place in the modern conception of government.5 And, indeed, what function is served by a constitution which makes omnipotent government possible? Is its function to be merely that governments work smoothly and efficiently, whatever their aims?

In these circumstances it seems important to ask what those founders of liberal constitutionalism would do today if, pursuing the aims they did, they could command all the experience we have gained in the meantime. There is much we ought to have learned from the history of the last two hundred years that those men with all their wisdom could not have known. To me their aims seem to be as valid as ever. But as their means have proved inadequate, new institutional invention is needed.

In another book I have attempted to restate, and hope to have in some measure succeeded in clarifying, the traditional doctrine of liberal constitutionalism.6 But it was only after I had completed that work that I came to see clearly why those ideals had failed to retain the support of the idealists to whom all the great political movements are due, and to understand what are the governing beliefs of our time which have proved irreconcilable with them. It seems to me now that the reasons for this development were chiefly: the loss of the belief in a justice independent of personal interest; a consequent use of legislation to authorize coercion, not merely to prevent unjust action but to achieve particular results for specific persons or groups; and the fusion in the same representative assemblies of the task of articulating the rules of just conduct with that of directing government.

What led me to write another book on the same general theme as the earlier one was the recognition that the preservation of a society of free men depends on three fundamental insights which have never been adequately expounded and to which the three main parts of this book are devoted. The first of these is that a self-generating or spontaneous order and an organization are distinct, and that their distinctiveness is related to the two different kinds of rules or laws which prevail in them. The second is that what today is generally regarded as ‘social’ or distributive justice has meaning only within the second of these kinds of order, the organization; but that it is meaningless in, and wholly incompatible with, that spontaneous order which Adam Smith called ‘the Great Society’, and Sir Karl Popper called ‘the Open Society’.7 The third is that the predominant model of liberal democratic institutions, in which the same representative body lays down the rules of just conduct and directs government, necessarily leads to a gradual transformation of the spontaneous order of a free society into a totalitarian system conducted in the service of some coalition of organized interests.

This development, as I hope to show, is not a necessary consequence of democracy, but an effect only of that particular form of unlimited government with which democracy has come to be identified. If I am right, it would indeed seem that the particular form of representative government which now prevails in the Western world, and which many feel they must defend because they mistakenly regard it as the only possible form of democracy, has an inherent tendency to lead away from the ideals it was intended to serve. It can hardly be denied that, since this type of democracy has come to be accepted, we have been moving away from that ideal of individual liberty of which it had been regarded as the surest safeguard, and are now drifting towards a system which nobody wanted.

Signs are not wanting, however, that unlimited democracy is riding for a fall and that it will go down, not with a bang, but with a whimper. It is already becoming clear that many of the expectations that have been raised can be met only by taking the powers of decision out of the hands of democratic assemblies and entrusting them to the established coalitions of organized interests and their hired experts. Indeed, we are already told that the function of representative bodies has become to ‘mobilize consent’,8 that is, not to express but to manipulate the opinion of those whom they represent. Sooner or later the people will discover that not only are they at the mercy of new vested interests, but that the political machinery of para-government, which has grown up as a necessary consequence of the provision-state, is producing an impasse by preventing society from making those adaptations which in a changing world are required to maintain an existing standard of living, let alone to achieve a rising one. It will probably be some time before people will admit that the institutions they have created have led them into such an impasse. But it is probably not too early to begin thinking about a way out. And the conviction that this will demand some drastic revision of beliefs now generally accepted is what makes me venture here on some institutional invention.

If I had known when I published The Constitution of Liberty that I should proceed to the task attempted in the present work, I should have reserved that title for it. I then used the term ‘constitution’ in the wide sense in which we use it also to describe the state of fitness of a person. It is only in the present book that I address myself to the question of what constitutional arrangements, in the legal sense, might be most conducive to the preservation of individual freedom. Except for a bare hint which few readers will have noticed,9 I confined myself in the earlier book to stating the principles which the existing types of government would have to follow if they wished to preserve freedom. Increasing awareness that the prevailing institutions make this impossible has led me to concentrate more and more on what at first seemed merely an attractive but impracticable idea, until the utopia lost its strangeness and came to appear to me as the only solution of the problem in which the founders of liberal constitutionalism failed.

Yet to this problem of constitutional design I turn only in volume 3 of this work. To make a suggestion for a radical departure from established tradition at all plausible required a critical re-examination not only of current beliefs but of the real meaning of some fundamental conceptions to which we still pay lip-service. In fact, I soon discovered that to carry out what I had undertaken would require little less than doing for the twentieth century what Montesquieu had done for the eighteenth. The reader will believe me when I say that in the course of the work I more than once despaired of my ability to come even near the aim I had set myself. I am not speaking here of the fact that Montesquieu was also a great literary genius whom no mere scholar can hope to emulate. I refer rather to the purely intellectual difficulty which is a result of the circumstance that, while for Montesquieu the field which such an undertaking must cover had not yet split into numerous specialisms, it has since become impossible for any man to master even the most important relevant works. Yet, although the problem of an appropriate social order is today studied from the different angles of economics, jurisprudence, political science, sociology and ethics, the problem is one which can be approached successfully only as a whole. This means that whoever undertakes such a task today cannot claim professional competence in all the fields with which he has to deal, or be acquainted with the specialized literature available on all the questions that arise.

Nowhere is the baneful effect of the division into specialisms more evident than in the two oldest of these disciplines, economics and law. Those eighteenth-century thinkers to whom we owe the basic conceptions of liberal constitutionalism, David Hume and Adam Smith, no less than Montesquieu, were still concerned with what some of them called the ‘science of legislation’,10 or with principles of policy in the widest sense of this term. One of the main themes of this book will be that the rules of just conduct which the lawyer studies serve a kind of order of the character of which the lawyer is largely ignorant; and that this order is studied chiefly by the economist who in turn is similarly ignorant of the character of the rules of conduct on which the order that he studies rests.

The most serious effect of the splitting up among several specialisms of what was once a common field of inquiry, however, is that it has left a no-man’s-land, a vague subject sometimes called ‘social philosophy’. Some of the chief disputes within those special disciplines turn, in fact, on differences about questions which are not peculiar to, and are therefore also not systematically examined by, any one of them, and which are for this reason regarded as ‘philosophical’. This serves often as an excuse for taking tacitly a position which is supposed either not to require or not to be capable of rational justification. Yet these crucial issues on which not only factual interpretations but also political positions wholly depend, are questions which can and must be answered on the basis of fact and logic. They are ‘philosophical’ only in the sense that certain widely but erroneously held beliefs are due to the influence of a philosophical tradition which postulates a false answer to questions capable of a definite scientific treatment.

In the first chapter of this book I attempt to show that certain widely held scientific as well as political views are dependent on a particular conception of the formation of social institutions, which I shall call ‘constructivist rationalism’ – a conception which assumes that all social institutions are, and ought to be, the product of deliberate design. This intellectual tradition can be shown to be false both in its factual and in its normative conclusions, because the existing institutions are not all the product of design, neither would it be possible to make the social order wholly dependent on design without at the same time greatly restricting the utilization of available knowledge. That erroneous view is closely connected with the equally false conception of the human mind as an entity standing outside the cosmos of nature and society, rather than being itself the product of the same process of evolution to which the institutions of society are due.

I have indeed been led to the conviction that not only some of the scientific but also the most important political (or ‘ideological’) differences of our time rest ultimately on certain basic philosophical differences between two schools of thought, of which one can be shown to be mistaken. They are both commonly referred to as rationalism, but I shall have to distinguish between them as the evolutionary (or, as Sir Karl Popper calls it, ‘critical’) rationalism on the one hand, and the erroneous constructivist (Popper’s ‘naive’) rationalism on the other.11 If the constructivist rationalism can be shown to be based on factually false assumptions, a whole family of schools of scientific as well as political thought will also be proved erroneous.

In the theoretical fields it is particularly legal positivism and the connected belief in the necessity of an unlimited ‘sovereign’ power which stand or fall with this error. The same is true of utilitarianism, at least in its particularistic or ‘act’ variety;12 also, I am afraid that a not inconsiderable part of what is called ‘sociology’ is a direct child of constructivism when it presents its aims as ‘to create the future of mankind’13 or, as one writer put it, claims ‘that socialism is the logical and inevitable outcome of sociology’.14 All the totalitarian doctrines, of which socialism is merely the noblest and most influential, indeed belong here. They are false, not because of the values on which they are based, but because of a misconception of the forces which have made the Great Society and civilization possible. The demonstration that the differences between socialists and non-socialists ultimately rest on purely intellectual issues capable of a scientific resolution and not on different judgements of value appears to me one of the most important outcomes of the train of thought pursued in this book.

It appears to me also that the same factual error has long appeared to make insoluble the most crucial problem of political organization, namely how to limit the ‘popular will’ without placing another ‘will’ above it. As soon as we recognize that the basic order of the Great Society cannot rest entirely on design, and therefore also cannot15 aim at particular foreseeable results, we see that the requirement, as legitimation of all authority, of a commitment to general principles approved by general opinion, may well place effective restrictions on the particular will of all authority, including that of the majority of the moment.

On these issues which will be my main concern, thought seems to have made little advance since David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and in several respects it will be at the point at which they left off that our analysis will have to resume. It was they who came nearer than anybody has done since to a clear recognition of the status of values as independent and guiding conditions of all rational construction. What I am ultimately concerned with here, although I can deal only with a small aspect of it, is that destruction of values by scientific error which has increasingly come to seem to me the great tragedy of our time – a tragedy, because the values which scientific error tends to dethrone are the indispensable foundation of all our civilization, including the very scientific efforts which have turned against them. The tendency of constructivism to represent those values which it cannot explain as determined by arbitrary human decisions, or acts of will, or mere emotions, rather than as the necessary conditions of facts which are taken for granted by its expounders, has done much to shake the foundations of civilization, and of science itself, which also rests on a system of values which cannot be scientifically proved.

One

Reason and Evolution

. . . to relate by whom, and in what connection, the true law of the formation of free States was recognised, and how that discovery, closely akin to those which, under the names of development, evolution, and continuity, have given a new and deeper method to other sciences, solved the ancient problem between stability and change, and determined the authority of tradition on the progress of thought....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Editorial Preface
• Editor’s Introduction
• LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY
• VOLUME 1   Rules and Order
• VOLUME 2   The Mirage of Social Justice
• VOLUME 3   The Political Order of a Free People
• Author Index
• Subject Index
• Footnotes