People commit mistakes. Sometimes those mistakes seem so numerous, while some decisions in the realms of foreign policy and security are so difficult to comprehend, that one could doubt rationality of states or/and people altogether.
If leaders, groups of advisors, institutions or states in general act rationally â in any substantial meaning of the word â then there is much room for theoretical explanations. If, on the contrary, international relations are piling up of errors, accidental or emotionally driven decisions, theory would only be left with descriptive and normative functions, telling a lot about a parallel universe of possible adequate decisions, but being unable to explain whatâs happening in real international politics.
But not only rationality is the key. Explanation requires scientific methods; while science has for a long time been a tough business in dealing with international relations. Here is why.
Studying international relations: nuances of methodology and levels of analysis
Defining what we really know about international politics is challenging. This is not quite the kind knowledge we get about moving stars, falling apples or chemical reactions. It is often not about general fundamental laws, but rather about regularities, correlations and probabilities. Moreover, what we know about international politics may become irrelevant over time.
Arms races lead to wars. Thatâs an example of how a hypothesis about international relations may look like. Examining such hypothesis is mostly what IR as a science is about. But how does one know whether itâs true or false?
To test a hypothesis, one needs working scientific method. The most reliable method of science is experiment. Holding one would be the best option. Picking two states without an arms race between them, then introducing it ceteris paribus, and observing a war or an absence of it would be a nice way to go. However, âceteris paribusâ is impossible in international politics: there is no way to manipulate various parameters and quietly observe. Arms races can certainly be absent or present in relations between states at different periods of time, but a host of other variables are constantly changing as well; and these variables are out of control of a scientist. Because experiments are significantly limited in IR, it is becoming difficult to verify hypothesis and theories altogether. Notions like, âstates try to keep the balance of power among themâ are becoming fiercely debated, while establishment of causal links gets much more complicated. One could speculate about shifts in balance of power as a cause of, say, the Peloponnesian War, but it is almost impossible to strictly prove the point. As a result, theories are getting less explanatory and more normative or descriptive.
But there is also some good news. If it is impossible to change a certain variable while holding others constant, one could turn to history. It is not only a fascinating subject in university curriculum of many future IR specialists but also a source of quasi-experimental data. Facts from the past emulate experiments and with certain reservations may be used for testing hypotheses. The fundamental reservation is that historical events are unique, even when they look similar. Causes of the Trojan War may resemble in some way those of the Thirty Yearsâ War, but differences are numerous and important. Causes of all wars may be speculated about in one way or the other, while it is important to hold in mind unreliability of historical generalizations as well as impossibility to prove any hypothesis with no matter how many examples.
Overreliance on history may also lead to facts becoming hostages of theories. Plato once noted that we canât know about particular before knowing about universal. Here is a trick for an IR researcher. Following Platoâs logic, theories are often constructed before collecting data and shape the way facts are observed and interpreted. They install filters and biases and may even substitute facts in a research. Not surprisingly, instead of being verified by facts, hypotheses are often tested by referring to other hypotheses or theories. Thatâs not how a good research should look like, but thatâs why theories of international relations tend to get normative, and multiple paradigms coexist.
IR as a science
- Lacks experimental research
- Encompasses different competing approaches as to what should be studied
- What is known about international politics impacts the way it goes
- Studies complex and undetermined processes
- Has several major paradigms at the same time
- Demonstrates methodological plurality
A menu of choice in paradigms is accompanied by a great variety of methods applied in IR research. Theoretical and methodological plurality may seem a disadvantage and a sign of academic chaos. In order to turn it into an advantage, there is a need for some systematization. Levels of analysis may help with that.
If asked about causes of a war or some other international event, students often tend to list as many probable contributing factors as possible instead of concentrating on defining a decisive one. Mentioning as many causes as possible may help more fully describe a war; however naming a key reason is a way to building a theory which would help explain many wars. Reasons of any specific war are truly numerous, and there is no opportunity to hold an experiment â so one starts by pointing as many as possible. World War I may have started because of colonial collisions among major powers, or a security dilemma in Europe, or, quite possibly, because of Kaiser Wilhelmâs propensity to risky decisions for whatever reasons. How about Franz Josephâs deteriorating health and the way it impacted moves of Austria-Hungary before the war erupted? By carefully examining Wilhelmâs biography and Franz Josephâs medical card it is surely possible to find some explanations of events in the summer of 1914. In the same way, one could hardly deny the role of Hitler or Stalin in dramatic events of the 20th century. Critical moments in history multiply the impact personal decisions are making upon world politics. Figures of Caesar, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, Bismarck, Churchill and alike are gaining additional attention. It would be not easy to explain events with their participation without referring to their personal attributes.
However, that would certainly not be enough for anything going deeper than TV series about or mass media coverage of international affairs. People are not free in their decisions, even when it comes to Genghis Khan, as to explain international politics by referring to biographies and medical cards. They are constrained by a quite narrow range of possible alternatives, shaped by more stable and abstract factors. One set of them is often referred to as national interests. From such a perspective, it is becoming clear the World War I broke out not as a result of free decisions by emperors and kings, but because of incompatibility of interests of participating states. That incompatibility existed on a depersonalized level and was connected to colonial, economic, military or political clashes. A war has become a way of resolving these conflicts and would have happened regardless names and characters of those who declared it in the end. Such an approach is much more deterministic and has lots to do with Karl Marxâs notion that man make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, rather under circumstances existing already (Marx, 1994). Monarchs and presidents take decisions about war and peace, but are always constrained by circumstances. Accordingly, understanding international politics is impossible without examining national interests and other variables at a level of state.
But even that wonât be enough. States should follow, or at least take into account, signals sent by international system. The latter is a specific way of arranging relations among states and other agents, defined by a structure, i.e., by how power is distributed and concentrated. Same states would act differently when power is distributed or concentrated in different ways. Structure constraints choices for states just the way national interests constrain personal preferences of monarchs and presidents. Even the most powerful states take structural effects into account. From such a perspective, World War I would be seen not only as a result of personal choices or even inconsistencies of national interests but as a final destination of evolution of international structure after establishment of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. In other words, there were structural causes of that conflict.
The trick for many students is that events in international politics are brought about by numerous causes at different levels. Three of them are especially relevant: personal, state and system. Others, like dyadic or regional, may also be addressed if necessary. The point is that to deal with multiplicity of factors one would need many theories at different levels.
Levels of analysis help keep research focused. They bring together medical cards, biographies, national interests, group thinking, balance of power and a host of other factors to arrange them in a systemic way.
Along with a diversity of many contributing factors there is also another important methodological issue. To which extent are decisions taken in international politics rational?
Irrational people and rational decisions they take. Models of decision-making in foreign policy
Most of us, fortunately or not, are not acting rationally most of the time. That makes life fascinating and full of surprises, but is also affecting the realm of international politics.
From a certain perspective, international relations may look as a sequence of decisions taken by rational agents. There are procedures of decision-making, lots of analytics involved and states appear to be more rational than people, for instance because they do not shift their priorities so often.
On the other hand, after all, decisions are taken by humans. After dealing with international politics long enough, one would finally face a question: to what extent is a research of international politics about studying behavior of people?
âNone or minimalâ would be a suggestion from a realist in a mid-20th century. International politics from that perspective is about relations among states, determined mostly by the balances or imbalances of power. Wars brake out and alliances are established as responses to shifts in the balance. Concepts like âpowerâ, âsecurityâ, or ânational interestsâ are designed to set frameworks of perception and reduce human factor to the minimum.
Realism is not alone. Most of theoretical physics is not about trajectories of specific atoms. In the same manner, most of theories of international relations are not focusing on behavior of people. Even when physics studies many separate particles, it relies on some generalized parameters, e.g., temperature, volume or density. A realist in a mid-20th century was following the same path, referring to security, power or national interests. Most of alternative approaches also do the same by studying interdependence, cooperation, international society and a lot more. But just the way non-determinism and randomness of many processes have become evident in physics, eventual impact of individual preferences on decision-making in international politics also manifested itself. A need to develop a theory which would not neglect individual choices but incorporate them into scientific research resulted in engaging of a concept and a theory of rational choice into international studies. The whole approach which puts rationality in the center while explaining international politics, behaviorism, got its name because of a focus on behavior. Studying behavior of people who take foreign policy decisions requires not only historical generalizations, political economy or security studies. It also involves psychology and some knowledge about strategic interactions.
Most international relations theories hold the assumption of rationality. People are believed to act rationally, at least when facing some specific choices over important issues, and that belief is extended to actions and choices of states and other actors on international arena. But the concept of rationality is not trivial, while rationality in choices of people is not evident even in specific choices over important issues. Moreover, most of the time, as it has been noted, people are not acting rationally. It may even be the case that people are mostly surprisingly irrational, especially judging by the way some students plan their in-class activities during the semester. More clarity about what rationality is would be helpful.
Rational behavior implies ability to recognize oneâs goals and pick the most effective ways of reaching them. That, in turn...