Rebels in government

Is Sinn Féin ready for power?

Agnès Maillot

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781526154552
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Irish History
• Index: History

The February 2020 general election in the Republic of Ireland sent shockwaves through the country's political system. Sinn Féin, ahead of all other parties in terms of first preference votes, secured its place as a potential coalition partner, a role it has been playing in Northern Ireland since the start of the century. This result not only disrupted the two-party system, it also questioned a narrative that had cast Sinn Féin as an outlier in the political mainstream. However, the prospect of this all-Ireland, radical left and former Provisional IRA associate being in government raises many questions: what does the success of this all-Ireland party say about the prospect of reunification? Can a party over which the shadow of paramilitaries still lingers be fully trusted? And are the radical changes that the party advocates in areas such as housing, public health and taxation a compelling alternative? These are the questions that this book sets out to address.

1

The United Ireland party

We’re Irish republicans. We’re passionate about Irish unity, it’s what we get up in the morning to try and achieve. (Pearse Doherty, YouTube, 05/07/20)

In 2018, when asked what the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) fundamentally meant, Gerry Adams gave a puzzling assessment: in his view, it ‘doesn’t pretend to be a settlement. It is an agreement on a journey, without agreement on the destination’ (Adams, YouTube, 10/04/18). For anyone with any knowledge about Sinn Féin, however, this destination was very clear: the unification of Ireland, which is what has driven, and justified, the party’s existence. This makes Sinn Féin a unique political organisation within Ireland, one that has a vision to which it has held steadfastly, one that can look beyond the ordinary mandate and present a utopian project. Furthermore, no other party is fully organised on both sides of the island, with the exception of small, fringe organisations that had not, as of the early 2020s, made any significant breakthrough into the Irish political scene. Sinn Féin is determined to provide a roadmap for the long-term future of the island. Reshaping the economy, remodelling society, and redressing inequalities, are all intertwined in the process that the party and its followers embarked upon a century ago and that, in spite of many setbacks and divisions, is still seen as the top priority.

Irish unity: a fundamental ideal, a fluctuating strategy

Dublin-based journalist Arthur Griffith would probably fail to recognise the current party as the latest incarnation of the movement known as Sinn Féin, which he founded in 1905. The main ingredient it has retained is also one of its most symbolic, and radical, strategies: abstentionism, which is still in place for Westminster elections, and in practice means that no elected Members of Parliament will take their seats in the House of Commons. The historical ties have thus not been entirely severed, as the logic that applied to this tactic in the early twentieth century is still considered valid today: that of refusing to recognise the authority of the UK, then the British Empire, over Ireland. Of course, historical and political conditions changed considerably throughout the twentieth century. Sinn Féin adapted its demands to the context in which it was operating, shifting its focus from the quest for self-determination until 1921, to the removal of the oath of allegiance¹ until the early 1930s, and then to the reunification of the island. Throughout this journey, it has retained its appetite for radicalism, rooted in the vision of a unified and independent Irish nation.

Territory has played an important role in the traditional framing of the Irish nation, being the central rationale for the claim to independence. Insularity further justified the belief that Ireland as a whole constituted a natural, self-contained unit. Indeed, one of the 1918 electoral manifestos for independence read: ‘Look at the map! God had made Ireland Separate!’ (Sinn Féin, n.d.). The unity of the territory has thus been at the heart of Sinn Féin’s preoccupations. However, while this core principle has always been seen as non-negotiable, the party has shown it can be flexible when it comes to the strategies needed to achieve the goal. Gerry Kelly, long-term member of the Sinn Féin Ard Comhairle (Party Executive) and Member of the Local Assembly (MLA) explained: ‘Irish republicans are highly respected around the world – especially in conflict zones – because of our versatility and ability to strategise and adapt to changing circumstances while keeping focused on our primary objective of uniting Ireland’ (AP, 11/11/12). This adaptability was already visible when the Sinn Féin delegates accepted to sign the 1921 Treaty, which set in motion the process of autonomy for both sides of the island and therefore cemented partition. While this was seen by the anti-Treaty faction as a betrayal of the spirit and raison d’être of the party, it also showed a capacity to generate leaders who are willing, when at a crossroads, to override principles. The fact that those leaders were ultimately forced out of the party and created their own movements was Sinn Féin’s major Achilles’ heel, as it has shown a propensity for splits which can, momentarily at least, weaken the organisation. Thus, when Éamon De Valera, who was closely identified with the fight against the 1921 Treaty, decided in 1926 to lead his supporters into the Dáil – in spite of the strong opposition within Republican circles to the oath of allegiance that elected representatives had to swear to the British monarch – the only honourable, or pragmatic, course of action was for him to leave the party and form a new one, Fianna Fáil. Those who held on to the identity of Sinn Féin claimed the higher political moral ground, feeling that they were the true heirs of republicanism as embodied by the 1916 Proclamation. But they were also fighting a rear-guard battle which crippled their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Despite its resilience, the party gradually sank into a state of quasi oblivion after De Valera’s departure and that of a sizeable number of Sinn Féin delegates. Not even the most radical republicans were able to support the moribund party, which became estranged from all other kindred organisations such as Saor Eire,² Republican Congress³ and even the IRA.⁴ So while it might have seemed paramount to uphold principles, rigidity was what alienated Sinn Féin from its natural allies and drove it to a state of utter isolation and vulnerability.

The quest for a reunification of Ireland started in the mid-1920s, when the Border Commission finalised the partition of the island and copper-fastened a situation that had existed since the Treaty. Pro-Treaty IRA leader Michael Collins’ vision of a secession that would ultimately prove unworkable (Rankin, 2006, 9) was buried with the confirmation of the boundaries that separated the six north-eastern counties from the rest of the island. Northern Ireland became a ‘statelet’, an autonomous province within the UK. More importantly, this new reality was seen as permanent by the Unionists who had sought to secede from the rest of the island and to remain within the British Empire. On the other hand, most parties in the newly established Free State concentrated on achieving economic and political stability and reinforcing the new institutions’ sovereignty. The agenda of reunification, if embedded in their political core identity, was not a priority, nor was it acted upon (Coakley, 2017). With the 1937 constitution, the State, now Éire, reaffirmed its commitment to reunification, but was content with making this an aspiration rather than a priority, further binding the traditional narrative with ‘the nation of Ireland being defined in terms of the island of Ireland’ (Hayward, 2004, 23). For the decades to come, the national question would remain ‘unfinished business’ (Meagher, 2016).

While it could be argued that, until the early 1930s, Sinn Féin was more preoccupied in seeing the oath of allegiance removed than the reunification of the island, the border gradually became a more salient issue for Republicans, who were committed to using all means necessary to obtain its abolition. In the early 1930s, Sinn Féin put forward a vision of reunification strongly grounded in a ‘Christian’ ethos, which was more equated with Catholicism than with Protestantism. At the end of the same decade, the IRA embarked on an ill-fated military campaign in Ireland, or Plan S (for Sabotage), which sought the departure of the British from Northern Ireland. However, little time was spent in analysing the reasons why this border existed in the first place or the resistance that unification would encounter. Instead, the British State was ascribed the entire responsibility for artificially designing those borders, with little, if any, consideration paid to the Unionists and to their fears, which were not openly acknowledged. Politically speaking, Unionism was seen as a by-product of British imperialism, which would lose its main rationale once the link with the rest of the UK was severed.

What revitalised the party in the late 1940s–early 1950s was its capacity to articulate an agenda centred, far more than in previous years, on the reunification of the island. Sinn Féin threw its weight behind the IRA’s Border Campaign (1956–1962), nominating candidates to by-elections, which succeeded in putting its name on the Irish political map, as four of its candidates were elected to the Dáil in 1957. The new leadership thus managed to veer the party from the status of onlooker and guardian of principles to proponent of reunification, with a discourse increasingly anchored on Northern Ireland. It developed a vision as to the rationale and the running of a United Ireland, but didn’t ignite ‘national sentiment in a way that would transform the status quo’ (Ferriter, 2019, 62). Ultimately, the failure of the armed campaign led to a radical change of direction, one that would eventually drive Sinn Féin to its most traumatic split since the foundation of Fianna Fáil. The 1969–1970 division between Provisionals and Officials, both within Sinn Féin and the IRA, left two factions that confronted each other not so much on the principle of reunification, but on the best strategy to achieve it. Indeed, the then leadership had begun to elaborate a more socialist, Marxist view of how the new Ireland that it strived to bring about would operate. In its view, this would be an Ireland of workers and farmers. Although similar proposals had already been developed in the 1930s, these had not been endorsed by Sinn Féin and the Second Dáil,⁵ who found them too radical, too left-wing. But with the start of the civil rights movement, which was seeking the introduction of reforms within the Northern Irish State, Sinn Féin adapted its strategy to prioritise the unity of the working class within Northern Ireland, as in its analysis this would pave the way for a United Ireland. Therefore, what common ground might have existed between the Protestant and Catholic working classes was to be further explored and built upon. However, whether this would have been enough to overcome the fundamental division that separated the two communities is more open to question. Provisional Sinn Féin was quite clear that this would not be the case, as it considered a unification of the working classes impossible while the Northern State was in existence. They thus prioritised achieving the unity of the island over the unity of the proletariat.

The 1969–1970 split saw the emergence of a highly principled organisation, which believed in the tactics of revolutionary warfare, opposing those who sought an alliance of the working classes in order to overthrow the Unionist regime and undermine the British stronghold on Northern Ireland. Ultimately, it is the rejection of the very idea of reform that sustained the Provisionals’ struggle throughout the conflict and that coloured their strategies in terms of how to reach their ultimate goal: a United Ireland.

Within a year of having been founded, Provisional Sinn Féin had developed a roadmap, Éire Nua, which was the closest the party came to a political programme. First published in 1971, it was the brainchild of the thinkers of the Provisional Movement, such as Ruairí and Seán Ó Brádaigh or Dáithí Ó Conaill. Somewhere in between the 1916 Declaration of ‘the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland’ and a Marxist analysis, it advocated for public control of the means of production, the Nationalisation of banks and key industries as well as the ban on foreigners acquiring land in the country. Éire Nua had a two-pronged objective: to convince Unionism of the benefits of reunification, and to promote a vision that was grounded on what were deemed to be concrete and feasible proposals, within the overall objective of achieving a 32-county socialist republic. The socialism of the proposition stood for a mix of ideals: those of 1916, still seen as defining the ultimate vision of the future of Ireland; a genuine belief that workers should be prioritised in the process; and some more concrete proposals such as cooperatives and further worker involvement in the economy. More prominent in the documents was the attention paid to the Unionist/Protestant population, as it acknowledged their opposition in principle to a United Ireland. Based on the key organisational principle of federalism, Éire Nua was meant to address this opposition as well as to allay fears. It divided Ireland into its four historical provinces, so as to ensure that each local/regional community had an equal say. Ulster was to become once again a nine-county province, which presented the double advantage of breaking away from the partition as originally designed, in Sinn Féin’s eyes, by Britain and Unionists, and restoring some demographic balance between Catholics and Protestants within the North. This was meant to dispel the Protestants’ anxiety of being immersed into a Catholic Ireland: while they would not retain the straightforward majority that they held within a six-county Northern Ireland, they would still remain numerically strong and therefore in a position to defend their interests. Paraphrasing Lord Craigavon’s famous 1934 speech where he spoke of a ‘Protestant parliament and a Protestant people’,⁶ Éire Nua put forward the idea of an ‘Ulster Parliament for the Ulster people’ and developed specific proposals outlining the rationale for the setting up of such parliaments (Sinn Féin, 1971).

The Provisionals’ proposals were elaborated in a context that was not conducive to a discussion on the merits of a United Ireland. The Northern Ireland parliament, Stormont, had been suspended by the British government in March 1972, which took over the administration of the region through Direct Rule from Westminster. The British authorities then organised a Northern Ireland Sovereignty referendum, held on 8 March 1973, asking the electorate whether they wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK or to be joined with the Republic of Ireland outside the UK. Sinn Féin reacted with contempt, seeing this consultation as a stratagem from the British to artificially boost their legitimacy in the region. Republicans claimed, as they had always done, that the only valid poll ever to be held was the general election of 1918, as it included the whole of Ireland. Sinn Féin therefore called upon its supporters to boycott the process, and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) followed suit on the basis that it was an ‘irresponsible decision’ by the British government as the party feared it would lead to an escalation of violence as a highly predictable outcome. Consequently, the results were not very telling, with 98.90% of the votes cast favouring retaining the union, while 41.34% of the electorate had followed the Nationalist/republican parties’ call for a boycott and stayed away from the polling stations. In real terms, 57% of the electorate had chosen to remain within the UK (BBC, 09/03/73).

The issue of reunification remained at the top of Sinn Féin’s agenda throughout the 1970s, with the publication of a number of pamphlets that complemented the federal project. However, with the advent of a new leadership and a radical change in strategies, Éire Nua fell out of favour. Whether it was ever held in any esteem by the younger generation of Northern Republicans who would eventually take over the leadership of Sinn Féin in the early 1980s is questionable, as the swift change of policy that followed the election of the new leadership would tend to demonstrate. In 1982, the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis deleted all references to the federal project from the party’s constitution, as it was now seen as being counterproductive, a ‘sop to Unionism’. Interestingly, Éire Nua had aroused the interest of some in Loyalist circles, and a tentative dialogue had taken place in the 1970s. But both mainstream Unionism and Nationalism failed to engage with the proposals, and Republicans went back to the drawing board on the issue of reunification. However, as the 1980–1981 hunger strikes had demonstrated, it would be next to impossible to achieve meaningful progress by force of arms only. Politics became a buzzword, and shorter-term objectives were set. With the adoption of the ‘Armalite and ballot box’ strategy⁷ in 1981, which led Sinn Féin to play a more active role in the political arena, it was essential to put forward policy programmes that not only dealt with a hypothetical future, but that tackled concrete day-to-day issues. For the first time since the early 1920s, Sinn Féin was actually putting together a proper political programme. A United Ireland was still the core demand, but it was assorted with many other shorter-term objectives.

Sinn Féin soon reaped the benefits of its newly found electoral enthusiasm, securing an average of 10% of the vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly (1982), Westminster (1983) and European (1984) elections. But its performance in the Republic was still insignificant, and reunification was dependent on the party’s ability to secure support on both sides of the border. This led Sinn Féin ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The United Ireland party
• 2 The legacy of the Troubles
• 3 The radical, left-wing party
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index