The differences in the approaches to CIMIC presented by various entities result from their distinct perspectives on the role and position of the armed forces during international interventions. They have a crucial influence on the accepted level of amalgamation of civilian and military actors and the catalogue of military tasks. In this section, I will present an overview of CIMIC conceptualisations developed by two IOs: the United Nations and the European Union, as well as the approach of Civil Affairs developed by the USA. The example of the US Civil Affairs was selected, as it helps to explain why the US soldiers are not included in this study â even though the United States is a member of NATO, they do not subscribe to NATO CIMIC and instead pursue their own, slightly different approach to civil-military cooperation. To underscore the similarities and differences in the approaches, I will trace the genesis of policies that enhance and regulate civil-military relations and the various tasks that they include in civil-military cooperation.
1.1. The United Nations and civil-military cooperation
When the UN has set to revise its approach towards peacekeeping operations, following the experiences of the 1990s, one of its conclusions referred to the importance of civil-military interaction. In 1996, after the dissolution of the UN operation in Bosnia, Carl Bildt, the UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, shared a reflection on the future engagement of the UN:
Whatever we call these operations, peace enforcement or peacekeeping, they will require a civilian component and a civilian-military interface. Thatâs been a case in all those operations in the past and most certainly in Bosnia, and it will be one of the key lessons learned for the future.
(Phillips 1998)
The ensuing Brahimi report stressed that one of the conditions necessary to create a post-conflict environment that would allow for the withdrawal of the forces is to render peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners (Brahimi 2000, ix). Within this framework, peacekeepersâ task is to secure the area and create conditions in which peacebuilders can support political, social, and economic changes: âwhile the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepersâ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuildersâ workâ (Brahimi 2000, chap. B para. 28). Based on this assumption, the UN has developed a two-pronged approach to civil-military cooperation in which one concept presents a military and the second a humanitarian point of view (UN DPKO 2002; UN DPKO and UN DFS 2010).
The first concept, UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN CIMIC), is based on a similar premise to NATO CIMIC, as it is a military function supporting the interaction between military, police, and civilian components of UN missions (UN DPKO and UN DFS 2010). It is best defined through identifying its functions as
first, to support management of the operational and tactical interaction between military and civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operation; and second, to support creating an enabling environment for the implementation of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area.
(UN DPKO and UN DFS 2010, chap. D para. 11)
This definition reveals the main difference between NATOâs and UNâs approaches. Contrary to NATOâs understanding, the aim of UN CIMIC is to serve as a multiplier to civilian efforts, rather than to âwin hearts and mindsâ for the support of a military commander. UN CIMIC is conducted by military staff at operational and tactical levels (UN DPKO and UN DFS 2010, paras. 18â21).
The second concept, the Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UNCMCoord), reflects the humanitarian orientation of UNâs approach and therefore visibly differs from NATO CIMIC. It is a humanitarian staff function, with an aim to provide an interface between humanitarian and military actors (de Coning and Holshek 2012, 16). It is defined as âthe system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectivesâ (UN DPKO 2002). Unlike NATO CIMIC, UN-CMCoord focuses on supporting humanitarian efforts and subordinates the military engagement to civilian needs, priorities, and guidance (Flavin and Aoi 2017, 56). It is tasked with ensuring security for humanitarian workers and operations and assisting humanitarian organ-isations in gaining access to all areas, by providing engineering support, escorts, security patrols, or transport (UN OCHA 2012). UN-CMCoord is conducted by civilian officers deployed to peacekeeping operations where the forces are engaged in relief activities or if their military activities are likely to have humanitarian consequences (de Coning and Holshek 2012, 20).
The UNâs two-pronged approach to civil-military interaction reflects a particular disposition and complexity of the organisation. While NATOâs involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction relies mainly on military tools, the UNâs activities often comprise the engagement of military forces, humanitarian and development agencies, and police. Hence, while NATO CIMIC focuses primarily on supporting the military mission, the UN has arranged its UN CIMIC and UN-CMCoord doctrines around the activities of civilian entities, treating the military as a multiplier of civilian efforts.
1.2. The European Union and civil-military cooperation
In comparison to the UN, and even NATO, the EUâs engagement in military interventions is quite new. Its first deployments took place in 2003, though the EU has started working on the most relevant doctrines before that time. Its doctrine on civil-military cooperation (EU CIMIC) was first drafted in 2002 (European Union Military Committee 2002). Its assumptions were to a large extent based on the solutions proposed by NATO, as the two organisations have already had initiated the process of increasing interoperability between their military capabilities through the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements (see NATO 2016). The EU CIMIC is therefore a military function defined as
the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.
(European Union Military Committee 2002, para. 20; Council of the European Union and EU Military Staff 2008)
It refers to cooperation with the specific aim of connecting and making use of military capabilities in the theatre for the coordination and cooperation with IOs, NGOs, and GOs (Gross 2008, 17â18). In this respect, the core functions of EU CIMIC are similar to those defined by NATO and include civil-military liaison, support to the civil environment, and support to the military force (European Union Military Committee 2002, chap. H; Council of the European Union and EU Military Staff 2008).
Contrary to NATO, and similarly to the UN, the EU did not rest with one concept of civil-military cooperation. In 2003, the European Union established a second concept called Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) regulating the intra-European relations at the political and strategic level (Council of the European Union 2003; see also Khol 2006). CMCO âaddresses the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and the subsequent implementation of EUâs response to the crisisâ (Council of the European Union 2003, para. 1). This concept was established based on a realisation that European/Common Security and Defence Policy missions vary greatly with regard to their mandates, length, and types of instruments and therefore require a particular culture of coordination which would enhance coherence (Council of the European Union 2003). As observed by Knutsen, this culture of cooperation in the EU âshould start with staff-staff contacts and visits aiming to achieve routine and systematic liaison and better working level contacts between respective military/police/other civilian planning teamsâ (Knutsen 2008, para. 27). It should also be implemented in all possible EU-led operations involving more than one EU instrument. Consequently, CMCO was designed primarily to ensure internal EU coordination in crisis management, but it is also seen as a prerequisite for cooperation with external actors (Council of the European Union 2003). Thus, as a result of CMCO, EU crisis management operations should be âconsidered as a unified effort consisting of civilian and military missions, which exchange information and analyses on developed distributive networksâ (Council of the European Union 2006, 3).
The EU CIMIC and CMCO concepts are embedded in the European Unionâs policy discourse, finding its way into the 2003 European Security Strategy, the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal, or the 2010 Internal Security Strategy for the EU (Council of the European Union 2004; European Council 2003, 2010). The development of EUâs CIMIC/CMCO, and in broader terms of CSDP, slowed down since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008; however, the dedication to these concepts was mirrored in the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Unionâs Foreign and Security Policy, which declared the need for âcloser connections between civilian and military structures and missions, bearing in mind that these may be deployed in the same theatreâ (European External Action Service 2016, 47â48). The two concepts developed by the European Union are the reflection of the organisationâs position and internal complexity. As the member states of the EU are largely corresponding with NATOâs, some of the EUâs solutions towards the civil-military conundrum were shaped in the same manner as Allianceâs doctrines. Hence, the indication of the dominant position of the military interests in EU CIMIC and its strong orientation to mission primacy and support to the military force. At the same time, the number and diversity of stakeholders participating in EU missions and operations propelled the establishment of the second concept fostering coordination among the various EU-related actors.