Chapter 1
Answering the Question: What Is Fanaticism?
For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours.
âThomas Hobbes (1985 [1651]: 105)
Passion, Michael Walzer (2004) claims, âis a hidden issue at the heartâ of many of todayâs most pressing political problems (110). Excessive passion in the political arena can impel a turn to irrationalism and engender an unbending conviction in the exclusive truth of oneâs own belief. Often, this can further mean a refusal to compromise or admit any doubt and, all too often, the pursuit of violent means to realize oneâs political aspirations. To put it too bluntlyâfanaticism. But, as Walzer is quick to point out, a politics totally devoid of passion is also undesirable. Like Max Weber before him, Walzer argues that politics, in its best expression, comprises âconviction energized by passion and passion restrained by convictionâ (120), an unstable combination redolent of what Weber (2004) famously called an âethics of convictionâ and an âethics of responsibilityâ (83).1
Historians of political thought have long wrestled with this central problem of passion in politics, engaging with changing concepts and attendant terminology to understand and grapple with this central problem of social existence.2 John Passmore (2003) notes that, during the Enlightenment, when the forces of reason were arrayed in battle against those of passion, âtwo words entered the English language at almost the same timeâ to describe this struggle: enthusiasm and fanaticism (211). As we will see in this work, these two different termsâand the closely related concepts they are meant to denoteâhave undergone a long process of evolution as they have been used to understand certain types of social engagement, beginning with their earliest invocation in the ancient world, followed by their transformation into religious concepts, and, by the time of the Enlightenment, their ultimate refashioning as primarily political concepts.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines âfanaticismâ as âthe condition of being, or supposing oneself to be, possessed,â or, âthe tendency to indulge in wild and extravagant notions, esp. in religious matters; excessive enthusiasm, frenzy; an instance, a particular form of this,â as well as, âin a weaker sense: Eagerness or enthusiasm in any pursuit.â While the dictionary notes the first instance of the word (or a variant) in English as dating from 1652, Dominique Colas (1997) notes a usage more than a full century earlier in a 1525 version of the celebrated story of Robin Hood (14). Emerging in vernacular languages around the turn of the seventeenth century, âenthusiasmâ is defined similarly by the Oxford English Dictionary, which offers a few related definitions, all variations on âpossession by a god, supernatural inspiration, prophetic or poetic frenzy; an occasion or manifestation of these.â
More recent attempts to define fanaticism focus on particular attributes of this concept. For example, H. J. Perkinson (2002) claims that the key attribute of fanaticism is a âflight from fallibility.â Such a rejection of fallibility, Perkinson argues, leads one to become âfanatical,â as well as âdogmatic,â âobscurantist,â and âauthoritarianâ (172). The psychologist Stanley Milgram (1977) reduced fanaticism to mere extremism, writing, âA fanatic is someone who goes to extremes in beliefs, feelings, and actionsâ (58). The philosopher A. P. Martinich (2000) identifies an obsession with transcendence as the crux of fanaticism, writing, âA fanatic is a person who purports to place all (or virtually all) value in things of some transcendent realm. This entails that either no or only derivative value is attached to this worldâ (419). Passmore (2003) extends these analyses, arguing that âhard-core fanaticismâ has three major attributes: âsome objective of such consequences that all other ends must be subordinated to it even when this entails acting in ways which would normally be regarded as immoral,â as well as a belief that âit is possible to know by having access to some peculiarly authoritative source of knowledge what this objective is and why such means are possible,â and the further belief that âthose who have this knowledge are entitled to suppress those who raise any questions about it, who oppose in a way its realization or, more generally, who do not show in their behaviour that they wholeheartedly accept itâ (221).
While these attempts at definition are no doubt helpful, they only tell us so much. Indeed, as many political philosophers and intellectual historians have pointed out, the central concepts of political life are difficult, if not impossible, to neatly define. As Nietzsche (1996) argues, such concepts exist âcompletely beyond definitionâ; they âno longer possess[] a single meaning, but a whole synthesis of âmeaningsââ (60). The influential German intellectual historian Reinhart Koselleck (2016) arrives at a similar view regarding such âfoundational conceptsâ (Grundbegriffe), writing, âConcepts are thus concentrations of many semantic contentsâ (46). Accordingly, while the meaning of the words we use to denote certain concepts may be more or less clear, the concepts themselves can only ever be âinterpreted.â This is no less the case with a concept like fanaticism.
Combining insights from the field of âconcept historyâ (Begriffsgeschichte), as well as related approaches including the Cambridge School of intellectual history, and the more recent methodological innovations of the philosopher Berys Gaut (2000, 2005), this work demonstrates the complexity and myriad transformations of the concept of fanaticism. Therefore, instead of proffering one simple and neat definition of fanaticism, I will provide a âcluster accountâ of the concept of fanaticism.3 Accordingly, after studying the history of the concept of fanaticism, especially its more modern political manifestation through analyses of the thought of Immanuel Kant, Edmund Burke, and Fyodor Dostoevsky, I will posit ten primary attributes of the concept of fanaticism that, in various permutations, hang together and create what we can recognize as fanaticism in its fullest sense. These core attributes are messianism, an inappropriate relationship to reason, an embrace of abstraction, a desire for novelty, the pursuit of perfection, an opposition to limits, an embrace of violence, absolute certitude, excessive passion, and an attractiveness to intellectuals.
While throughout its history fanaticism has almost always held a normatively negative connotation, it has long existed alongside its more normatively ambiguous (or even normatively positive) twin, enthusiasm. Accordingly, to hope to understand the concept of fanaticism, its twin concept, enthusiasm, must also be explored. The history of these two concepts can be likened to two concurrent lines, sometimes intersecting and converging, where the terms enthusiasm and fanaticism could be understood as synonyms, and sometimes diverging, where the terms no longer denote quite the same referent. I will show that these lexical transformations reflect deeper changes within the concept of fanaticism, changes that correspond to the way the phenomenon of fanaticism has changed throughout the course of human history. Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, the concept of fanaticism has existed in three relatively stable forms throughout its history. Referring in ancient times to a particular type of cultic practice, the concept was later understood primarily to denote a deviant type of religious belief and habitus with the rise of Christianity until the Enlightenment. Finally, around the time of the French Revolution, fanaticism became refashioned as a political concept, now referring to a type of political belief and behavior that, in many ways, replicated in political terms what its earlier religious mode denoted.
Further complicating our efforts to uncover the history of this complicated concept is the fact that fanaticism, and its cousin enthusiasm, have both most often been understoodâand usedâin a pejorative context. Cartographers of these elusive concepts are no strangers to this complication. As the psychologists and analysts of fanaticism AndrĂ© Haynal, Miklos Molnar, and GĂ©rard de PuymĂšge (1983) note, âThe concept of fanaticism enables us not only to place a value judgement on those who oppose our ideals, but also to condemn out of hand their mode of behavior, without delving deeper, simply by saying: âThey are fanaticsââ (4). Indeed, the appellation âfanaticâ has often been used as a political smear to banish and condemn political views and actors with whom one disagrees. In the American context, to take one example, this rhetorical maneuver was commonplace in nineteenth-century debates over slavery and abolition. John C. Calhoun, for example, a longtime South Carolina politician who rose to the station of vice president under John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson, often denounced abolitionists as fanatics in his efforts to defend slavery. In one of his most famous speeches to Congress âOn the Reception of Abolition Petitionsâ in 1837, Calhoun (1992) defended slavery as âa positive good,â denouncing those who opposed it as âfanaticsâ (474â475). While some in the broad American abolitionist movement may indeed have been fanaticsâJohn Brown comes to mindâmost did not possess the unique combination of attributes needed to merit this label. As we will see, fanaticism, properly understood, means more than just devotion to a causeâmore, indeed, than even extreme devotion to a cause. Rather, a fanatic assumes a unique way of being in the world, one that brings with it a host of characteristics that go beyond mere political engagement or even political extremism. Fanaticism, to truly merit the description, must possess some combination of messianism, an inappropriate relationship to reason, an embrace of abstraction, a desire for novelty, the pursuit of perfection, an opposition to limits, an embrace of violence, absolute certitude, excessive passion, as well as some intellectual pretension. While it is not necessary to possess every last one of the foregoing qualitiesâand certainly not each in equal measureâthis analysis aims to show that the complex concept of fanaticism emerges from various and varying combinations of these noxious ingredients. Despite this complexity, however, Calhoun aims the pejorative fanatic at any opponent of slavery, adopting an indiscriminate and political usage of the term to describe anyone who sought to âraise the negroes to a social and political equality with the whitesâ (475). Yet, even though the terms fanatic and enthusiast can indeed be used as a political or religious cudgel, this does not mean that these terms cannot also be used to refer to real existing concepts which can be identified, studied, and tracked over time. By paying close attention to context, a careful historian will be able to disentangle the concept of fanaticism from political, social, and religious machinations, when the latter apply. The often-fraught nature of such value-laden concepts makes the job of the historian more difficult, to be sure, but not impossible. She must simply acknowledge this added complexity when seeking out the thread of fanaticism running through history and approach her task with even more humility than the treatment of other, less contentious concepts might require.
While understood as synonymous for much of their history, as âfanaticismâ came to be understood as a political vice by the eighteenth century, many thinkers looked to âenthusiasmâ as they sought to salvage a more emotional or affective form of political engagement that avoided the excesses of fanaticism. Enthusiasm presented itself as a third way between fanaticism, on the one hand, and a bloodless rationalistic politics, on the other. The intellectual historian Dominique Colas (1997) notes, ââfanaticismâ once designated religious fervor and zealotry, [but] was later distinguished from âenthusiasm,â and thus came to encompass nihilistic or millenarian political violenceâ (9). As we will see in subsequent chapters, perhaps no thinker has done more to differentiate the concepts of enthusiasm and fanaticism and refashion the former into something like a political virtue than Immanuel Kant. While, for Kant, the fanatic is a âderanged person with presumed immediate inspiration and a great familiarity with the powers of the heavensâ (2:267), enthusiasm represents âgood with affect,â the âpower of the mind to soar above certain obstacles of sensibility by means of moral principlesâ (5:272, 271). Kant held enthusiasm as a good mix of affect and politics, while fanaticism denoted a mixture that lacked proper balance. By the early nineteenth century, Germaine de StaĂ«l (1813) would argue in a similar vein, âMany people are prejudiced against Enthusiasm; they confound it with fanaticism, which is a great mistakeâ (388). Similarly to Kant before her, StaĂ«l maintains, âFanaticism is an exclusive passion, the object of which is an opinion; enthusiasm is connected with the harmony of the universe: it is the love of the beautiful, elevation of the soulâ (360). Clearly, if one wishes to understand fanaticism, it is necessary to study its fraught historical relationship with the related concept of enthusiasm.
Why Study Fanaticism?
Given the great variety in meaning and uses associated with the term fanaticism, it is reasonable to ask how one could hope to get at the meaning of this concept; indeed, is there any there there at all? As well, one might ask the related question: Why bother? Why is a project seeking to âget atâ the meaning of such a âstretchedâ and overworked concept like fanaticism important? A further potential criticism of this project could include the claim that, indeed, there is really no there there and that fanaticism is little more than a slur used to silence critics of the status quo (see Toscano [2010]). As we will see, while fanaticism is most often understood in a negative light, this does not mean that the concept is without positive content or analytic leverage. The concept of fanaticism, rather, even despite successive changes throughout human history, has maintained enough coherence and consistency that it can be tracked and understood in various historical contexts.
Despite these potential objections, a work of this type is important for several reasons. While much scholarship has been devoted to the detailed study of enthusiasm and the history of the debates surrounding this concept,4 relatively little scholarship has focused on the concept of fanaticism, and even less from political theorists. Not only is the contemporary literature on fanaticism underdeveloped but hardly any attention has been paid to its political variant. As Joel Olson (2009), one of the few political theorists to study political fanaticism, notes, âFanaticism presents one of the most important political problems since September 11, 2001. Curiously, however, this subject has largely evaded scrutiny by political theoristsâ (82). Psychoanalysis, and later psychology more broadly, was first brought to bear on this concept, primarily between the 1960s and 1990s (Rudin 1969; Haynal, Molnar, and PuymĂšge 1983; M. Taylor 1991). While much was gained by this approach in terms of analytic rigor, these studies tended to treat fanaticism in a decontextualized manner, as an ahistorical phenomenon. Thus, fanaticism was treated, in many respects, as an immutable a priori concept impervious to the effects of vastly different times and places in which it makes an appearance. While the next wave of scholarship, now intellectual-historical in method (Colas 1997), was much improved in this regardâpaying close attention to the context and intellectual milieu in which instances of fanaticism emergedâthis literature, perhaps precisely because of its detailed approach, tended to obscure the unique political modality of this concept and the context of its emergence, which, as we will see, occurred around the time of, and largely in reaction to, the French Revolution. A study of fanaticism that takes square aim at the conceptâand especially its political modalityâis thus sorely needed.
Recognizing both the continuity and change in a complex concept like fanaticism (or enthusiasm) means that, to fully understand these real phenomena in political life, we must unearth their long and tangled histories. Works like this oneâwhich aims to uncover the hidden history of fanaticism and illuminate its reemergence as a modern political conceptâare in good company in this endeavor. In studying the concept of fanaticismâwith special attention to its understudied political modalityâI join a conversation with other scholars whose recent work in political theory examines closely related concepts and thus aims to help flesh out the rich âconceptual webâ of concepts that populate our political world today. These related concepts include extremism, cruelty, messianism, passion, as well as opposing concepts like moderation, compromise, prudence, civility, humility, and toleration.5 This work, therefore, is part of a much broader current in contemporary political theory that aims to more deeply understand the political world we inhabit by more clearly understanding the concepts which constitute it. I maintain that this is a necessary project if we are to engage in politics in a meaningful way. For this reason, the political theorist James Farr argues, âthe study of political concepts now becomes an essential not an incidental task of the study of politicsâ (Ball, Farr, and Hanson 1989: 29).
Indeed, some important work has been done to lay the groundwork for a history of the concept of fanaticism. The French intellectual historian Dominique Colasâs magisterial 1997 work Civil Society and Fanaticism: Conjoined Histories is perhaps the best example. Providing an exhaustive compendium of the history of the idea of fanaticism, it pays special attention to its developmental tension with the oppositional concept of âcivil society.â While the exclusively political variant of fanaticism is largely lost in this workâand thus composes the focus of the current volumeâColas provides a valuable defense of this way of doing the history of concepts. Arguing against those who might reasonably ask what ancient understandings of fanaticism have to tell us about modern and contemporary manifestations of this concept, Colas (1997) defends the utility of analyzing what he calls âthought systemsâ and âthe long cycles in the history of political thoughtâ (xvii, xv). Colas maintains that âsuch a study, both genealogical and structural, of the denotations and connotations [of these concepts] seems to me indispensable if we are to understand the widespread, even inflationist use of the term[s] todayâ (xv). Koselleck (2016) offers a similar methodological view, claiming that fundamental âbasic concepts have remained in use since they were first coined in classical antiquityâ and that studying their history of continuity and transformation can give us insight into âhistorical structures and major complexes of eventsâ (31â32). Indeed, the school of Begriffsgeschichte, founded by Koselleck, has itself produced important histories of the concept of fanaticism, both in the German (Conze and Reinhart 1975) and French (Sleich 1986) contexts. While all of these works reveal important distinctions in their particular methodological approaches, all maintain that central âfoundational conceptsâ inhere in the history of human social and political existence, with histories that can be unearthed, traced, and interpreted. This work aims to build on this foundation, examining in particular the political transformation of this concept around the time of the French Revolution while also providing a critique of those today who try to reclaim this concept as a political virtue.
A study of fanaticism is also pressing given the times in which we live. Far from merely a matter of historical concern, there are, today, movements all over the world that seek to unite the City of God and the City of Man, movements of men and women who know the Truth and seek to instantiate it, by violence if necessary, come what may. The collapse of fascism and communism in the twentieth century hardly betokened a liberal end of history, as some predicted. Rather, fanatics of all stripes have reemerged as a global political force under various banners. Indeed, fanatical approaches to politics abound today: resurgent neo-Nazism, populism, small left-wing extremist groups, as well as the continued t...