Propositional and Doxastic Justification

New Essays on Their Nature and Significance

Paul Silva Jr., Luis R.G. Oliveira

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781000568851
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Epistemology in Philosophy

This volume features original essays that advance debates on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how these debates shape and are shaped by a range of established and emerging topics in contemporary epistemology.

This is the first book-length project devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Notably, the contributors cover the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification and group belief, credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. They also consider state-of-the-art work on knowledge-first approaches to justification, hinge-epistemology, moral and practical reasons for belief, epistemic normativity, and applications of formal epistemology to traditional epistemological disputes. Finally, the contributors promise to reinvigorate old epistemological debates on coherentism, externalism, internalism, and phenomenal conservatism.

Propositional and Doxastic Justification will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, metaethics, and normativity.

Part I Foundational Questions

1 The Plenitude of Justification and the Paucity of Knowledge¹

Robert Audi

DOI: 10.4324/9781003008101-3

1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented (online) at the Australian Catholic University’s Dianoia Institute of Philosophy and I benefited from that discussion. For specific comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to Annalisa Coliva, Garrett Cullity, Rachel Dichter, Richard Feldman, Anna-Sara Malmgren, and Luis Oliveira.

Justification for believing—propositional justification—is wide in its scope and uncountable in its instances. I have justification for a multitude of propositions obvious in my environment: that the ceiling is not 102 feet high, that my chair is not teetering from an earthquake, that the piano is closer to me than the sofa, and many other propositions. I also have justification for believing indefinitely many propositions in the series, 1.1 is larger than 1, 2.11 is larger than 2, 3.111 is larger than 3, and so on. The number of propositions in this series that are justified for me—an alternative phrase for ascribing propositional justification—seems uncountable. I doubt that I believed any of these propositions until I (comprehendingly) considered them in framing these examples. When I did believe them, it was justifiedly—that is, I had doxastic justification for each proposition. It is widely held that what we justifiedly believe is based on something constituting a justifier for it—hence, that doxastic justification for a proposition requires propositional justification for it.

Many difficulties beset attempts to analyze any of these notions, but it is widely assumed that whatever knowledge is, it requires doxastic justification. This chapter will concentrate mainly on the relation between the two kinds of justification, particularly in one major case that helps to clarify both notions: memory. Among the difficult questions to be addressed are these. How does memory yield propositional justification? What is the scope, extent, and magnitude of the propositional justification it yields? What kinds of factors explain how memorial justification that is propositional can yield, for the propositions in question, doxastic justification or knowledge? And how is remembering—conceived as entailing memory knowledge—related to propositional memorial justification?

Varieties of Justification

Doxastic justification, as the term “doxastic” should indicate, is a property of actual beliefs; having it is equivalent to justifiedly believing something. Propositional justification, by contrast, is, in the standard usage of the term, a property of persons (or anyway beings with minds) in relation to propositions. The former is important because beliefs that entirely lack it are defective in a certain way. Moreover, by and large—and, on some views, necessarily—they do not constitute knowledge. Both kinds of justification may be viewed synchronically or, since their status can change over time, diachronically. (Here I’ll assume reference to a single time unless otherwise indicated.) Doxastic justification may be conceived roughly as justification that a belief has in virtue of being based on at least one set of elements that constitutes adequately strong propositional justification for S at the time.² Let us consider the main locutions important for understanding propositional justification.

2 I have explicated the basis relation crucial for understanding doxastic justification in Audi (1986), and though the main focus there is inferential justification, much of the account of inferential justification holds also for non-inferential justification, e.g. for which many (though not all) of the same conditions hold.

The locution “p is justified for S” is a philosopher’s phrase, usually explained in terms of the broad notion of having justification for a proposition, p, in a sense that does not entail believing p.³ The locution can mislead by giving the impression that a proposition can be justified simpliciter. But there may be no single notion of a proposition’s being justified simpliciter. Granted, one can ask whether there is any justification for believing something, say that New York City will someday be submerged. But this is a request for some set of true propositions—evidence, in one sense of the term—that objectively supports p and would constitute some degree of propositional justification for anyone who believed the proposition and had a certain kind of capacity to see how they support p.

3 Though the notions of propositional justification and doxastic justification apply to de re and other non-propositional beliefs, such as believing a plane to be landing, they will not be explicitly considered here. What emerges concerning propositional beliefs, however, can be readily applied to those cases.

Would it be better, then, to focus analytical attention on “S is justified in believing p,” which does not entail actual belief but does ascribe to S the right normative status? There are a few cases in which believing is not entailed by a proper use of this attribution, but they are a small proportion. To see that there is no entailment, imagine someone’s saying to a friend, “I’m surprised you don’t believe your student will pass—you’re certainly justified in believing that given the record.” It may be that the locution captures the notion of propositional justification where actual belief is ruled out, as in the case just given, but not invariably otherwise. “They’re justified in believing that” normally presupposes actual belief. Saying they would be justified does not presuppose it, but this terminology would not serve us well because of difficulties in specifying the relevant hypothetical conditions.

It may be that the best way to capture propositional justification is to begin with locutions of the form of “S has justification for (believing) p.” This is of course both indefinite as to possession conditions—those that indicate what is covered by “having”—and also as to how much justification is in question. We cannot eliminate either case of indefiniteness by shifting to “S has a justification for p,” though this may seem to imply (but need not imply) sufficient justification, a degree implying overall (thus undefeated) justification for believing p. It does appear, however, that if S is justified in believing p—in the sense in which that does not imply actual belief—this does entail that (other things remaining equal) S would not merit criticism for believing p on account of lacking sufficient justification. In any case, possession conditions are still left indefinite. They will be the main concern of Section 3.

At least one other way of conceiving propositional justification should be considered before we proceed. Is having propositional justification for p simply having evidence for it? If I have propositional justification and have a normal grasp of what justification and evidence are, then it may be natural for me to say, in reference to my justification, that I have evidence. But suppose I have just a memory impression that I told someone about a deadline. If you doubt that I did and ask if I have evidence for this, I would hesitate to claim this impression as evidence, even if I think it justifies my claim. If, by contrast, I had a recent diary notation indicating the intention to tell the person about the deadline, I would regard that as some evidence that I did so. Perhaps this difference is pragmatic: I simply do not want to call such weak, impressionistic justification, especially given its privacy, evidence. Another question is whether only propositions are, strictly speaking, evidence. I doubt that and, if so, then even the diary entry is not evidence, though the proposition that I have it would be. Perhaps we can say this: first, that if p is genuine evidence for q, it follows that p is true, and, second, that the proposition that there is evidence for p entails (even if no one has the evidence) that there is at least one true evidential proposition that supports p.⁴

4 The term “evidence” is used variously but if we allow for the crucial “evidence of the senses,” phenomenal states will count, and they are surely among the basic grounds of propositional justification. For extensive discussions of evidence see Conee and Feldman (2004).

Does the counterpart point hold in the same way for saying there is justification (even if no one has it) for p? That there is evidence that a tumor is cancerous entails that there is some true supporting proposition, such as that an X-ray indicates cancer. This evidence constitutes some justification for p. No one need have it but possibly someone could, so it could propositionally justify p (to some degree) for someone. But recall the memory impression that I told someone about the deadline: this can provide propositional justification for me even if its content is false and so does not constitute evidence. In virtue of a memory impression that I told someone about a deadline, I may have justification for believing that I did, but this impression may be false and its propositional content may fail to be genuine evidence. There is, however, corresponding, if very weak, evidence: the true proposition that I have the impression.

A useful comparison here is the notion of a reason. I can have a reason for believing p, in the form of q, which I believe on highly credible expert testimony, though q is false. Then q is not evidence for p (though some would call it misleading evidence). It would also be a mistake, however, to say here, “There is a reason for p, namely q.” This locution is used factively: we may properly withdraw it if we find that q is false. One may now ask whether we do not also withdraw the claim that there is justification for p when we find that q is false. We likely would if we find there is no objective support for q. But suppose q is well evidenced, as where several experts testify that an X-ray indicates cancer. Here q, though false, has external objective justification. The difference is apparently that the proposition constituting the justification, q, can be false, whereas only true propositions constitute genuine evidence. Such free-floating justification will not be my concern. If S has it, S also has propositional justification of the person-relative kind I am exploring, but propositional justification for S (for p) is perspectival. Such justification may or may not be externally and objectively adequate—justification there is, for anyone—and so not person-relative. Propositional justification for S may entail S’s having presumptive evidence, but it does not entail having the genuine article.

There are philosophers who take justification to be equivalent to rationality. I have argued that these are different and that, where both terms apply, the notion of rationality is more permissive.⁵ This issue may be set aside here given the plausible assumption that whether or not rationality and justification are equivalent, we should understand a proposition’s being rational for S and S’s rationally believing it quite analogously to the way we should understand p’s being justified for S and S’s justifiedly believing p.

5 I have argued for this in (among other works) Audi (2011, 2015). See also Siscoe (2021).

Justification and Knowledge

One reason for the importance of propositional justification is that there has long been a case, likely still accepted by many philosophers, that knowledge is built from, or anyway rests on, justified true belief. This (doxastic) justification must be sufficient and the belief constituting knowledge must be based on the justifier(s), but these conditions are often met. Suppose, however, that (as I have argued elsewhere⁶) knowledge is possible without the knower’s having justification. Then propositional justification will not be necessary, at least on the highly plausible assumption that it is entailed by doxastic justification.

6 Most recently in Audi (2020, ch. 6).

If justification should be necessary for knowledge, however, might we then say that given enough propositional justification for a true belief, one can know that p—at least as far as meeting the propositional justification requirement goes? One obstacle to a positive answer is the lottery problem. For any number of tickets in a fair lottery, a loser is in the same epistemic position as the winner, who clearly cannot know that the ticket the winner holds will lose.

A related question is this: Can’t we have propositional justification for p but be unable to see how the justifying element(s) support(s) p? If so, then although we would justifiedly believe p if we believed it on that basis, we are not in a position to have propositional justification in the usual sense in which we are when we have justification for p (or, especially, are justified in believing it).

Such cases also show that, even where p is true, having justification need not put one in a position to know. Imagine someone who knows enough logic to understand a proof of p from q, r, s, and t, which the person justifiedly believes and which provide premises for a clear and cogent proof of p. Does this “possessed” justification for p guarantee being in a position to know that p—if that implies being able to come to know now without outside help? This is doubtful. The person might need Socratic leading questions to find the proof. Compare saying someone is in a position to stitch up a wound—having all the tools, good light, medicines, and so on—but lacks the ability to stitch it up. Perhaps the distinction we need—though it is not sharp—is between being in a position to know that p and being able (perhaps even ready) to learn that p. In any case, few philosophers would doubt that justification is important even apart from its importance for understanding or achieving knowledge.

Having Justification

However we explicate propositional justification, we need an understanding of what it is to have it—of its possession conditions. There is quite a variety of such conditions.

We have already seen the possibility of having propositional justification by virtue of meeting doxastic conditions: by having justified beliefs whose contents adequately support p, say as evidential premises. Adequate support may be entailment or strong probabilification. My space does not permit an account of these types of support, but examples will indicate that the justified supporting beliefs in question may or may not constitute knowledge. Some of the examples will also suggest some roles knowledge may play in producing doxastic justification. We must, however, explore whether propositional justification for p may derive, not from having doxastic justification for propositions that support p—a kind of premise-based justification—but from having only propositional justification for such supporting propositions.

Consider the proposition that an applicant will be admitted to a PhD program. If I have read through the file, I may have propositional justification for several propositions citing strong merits of the applicant. This might imply my poss...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Contributors
• Introduction
• Part I Foundational Questions
• Part II Reasons, Basing, and Justification
• Part III Other Attitudes and Justification
• Part IV New Horizons for Justification
• Index