European Integration and Disintegration

Essays from the Next Generation of Europe's Thinkers

Nick Cohen, Ayana Dootalieva, Nick Cohen, Ayana Dootalieva

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781000596472
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia del mundo

European integration is an ambitious goal that attempts to reconcile grandiose visions for the future of Europe with complicated national attitudes toward unity. The added complexity of political crises, which have characterized the European project from its outset, makes the success of the European Union far from guaranteed. Today, European unity is once again at an existential crossroad, with internal and external challenges threatening its integration. This volume uniquely brings together the novel perspectives of Europe's emergent generation of thinkers to analyze through interdisciplinary lenses these various disintegrative pressures. Students and scholars of Europe as well as those interested in the future of European cohesion will enjoy this volume, both for the interdisciplinary analysis it brings forth and for the window it provides into the thinking of Europe's next generation of leaders.

1 The Disintegration of the Center-Left Labor Consensus Lessons from the Labour Party’s Social Contract Failure

Adam Frick

DOI: 10.4324/9781003182344-2

1 Introduction

Since the Second World War, social democratic parties have been mainstays in Western European governments. The roots of social democracy can be found in labor movements, extending back far before the contours of contemporary Europe emerged. As labor movements grow and thrive, they in turn cultivate the social democratic ideology. The relationship between a certain sect of the population – in this case a broadly defined, sometimes changing but ubiquitous ‘working class’ – and a particular political party has long been a subject of study, in part because this relationship lies at the heart of political discourse within the history of Europe’s democracies. Both sides seek concessions from the other: political parties want their constituents’ support and advocacy, and the constituents expect legislation supporting them, their livelihoods, and general societal prosperity. Whether it is stated or implied, this is a form of contract between political party and constituent. As long as the political order is beneficial for those citizens opting into this type of social contract, they may find the benefit outweighs what has been given up in terms of alternative political opportunities. But when legislation stalls or political parties back down from promises, that contract may be broken; citizens – in this case, specifically workers – leverage their labor and will cease to uphold their end of the agreement, be it by finding another party to partner with or by attempting to change the societal structure through revolution.

Today, established democracies find themselves challenged by a rise in far-right, anti-EU parties. Often taking advantage of a frustrated working class unsure of where to put their political allegiance, this rise in far-right support has coincided directly with a loss in support for social democratic parties on the left or center-left. The current state of these social democratic parties is precarious: long-reliant on the working class in their respective countries, an increasingly globalized world and flattened Europe have presented troubles for these parties. Low-skill work that is able to be done remotely is outsourced to other countries; worker mobilization across the EU is causing an increasing number of jobs to be occupied by Europeans that cannot vote elsewhere besides their home country; and the volatility of labor markets – especially in wake of the COVID-19 pandemic – all contribute to a disgruntled working class, one that is frustrated with their supposed allies in social democratic parties. Without cohesion between social democratic parties and workers, the future of European integration is threatened, as workers will continue to shift their party allegiance to Eurosceptic, far-right parties. If the working masses turn against the EU and their allies and neighbors, then the entire continent’s social order and prosperity may be threatened.

In order to understand the mechanism and long-term effects of the breakdown of worker–social–democratic consensus, we can look instructively to the British Labour Party in the late 1970s. The Labour Party, while internally struggling over European Economic Community (EEC) membership as a party-wide policy stance, was simultaneously dealing with heavy, outside criticism of their ‘preferential’ relationship to union members, as opposed to the nonunion members of society. Their attempts at formalizing a social contract between themselves and the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) came not only at the same time as further European integration, but also during shakeups in the strength of industries at home, with a modernizing workforce and increasing diversity throughout the UK labor market, especially in white-collar jobs. Labour was confronted with a crossroad: should they stay true to their old union allies, who were made up of primarily male, public blue-collar workers, or adapt to the new British working class and listen to their vocal demands?

An amicable relationship between center-left, national political parties and a broadly defined working class is consistently sought after, if not required by social democratic parties in order to achieve electoral success. While Labour’s relationship with unions should be considered fairly unique in comparison to other European political parties, their up-and-down partnership with their working class voter base has similarities across the continent. As social democratic parties’ voter base continues to shed supporters to alternative options, Labour’s disastrous electoral collapses in 1979 and 1983 serve as cautionary tales for the price that comes with failing to adapt to a changing working class.

This chapter will follow the development and history of Labour’s attempt at a formal agreement between the party and unions from 1970 to 1983 in the form of the ‘Social Contract.’ Intended to be an explicit document, this outlined the exact concessions needed from Labour in order to enter a voluntary cap on union members’ wages. Concerned that the worker’s annual wage increases were a cause for rising inflation, the agreement not only hoped to assist the prosperity of the British economy, but also help the public image of Labour and their long-standing, occasionally imbalanced relationship with unions. As will be shown below, this Social Contract utterly failed to satisfy the changing demands of the British working class; its failure then led to nearly two decades in opposition for Labour.

Although the historical specificities are unique, there are broad contemporary lessons to extract from this specific attempt at a formal contract between party and the working class. Today, social democratic parties are experiencing a breakdown in cohesion between their goals and politics and the changing working class whose success they claim to prioritize. Without reflecting the make-up and ideology of their supporter base, these parties’ positions are threatened by the growing disconnect workers seem to have with them.

This chapter will first detail the political and economic situation that led to Labour’s attempt at a Social Contract. In the United Kingdom, the decade contained their entrance into the European Communities as well as their 1975 Referendum on membership of the EEC, resulting in a 2:1 yes to no ratio – a resounding confirmation that the general populace wanted integration. Second, this chapter will cover the fine details of the Social Contract, including the negotiations leading to enacting an agreement; how the policies were interpreted across the ideological spectrum; and what its eventual collapse demonstrates for how outdated European social democratic parties relate to workers. Finally, the chapter will cover how Labour’s relationship with all workers – not just those that were union affiliated – degraded swiftly during and shortly after the decade. As the party failed to update their visions of what a typical worker looked or acted like, the broad working masses began to resent Labour for not fighting for them with the same ferocity as they did union members – despite several opportunities to back nonunion workers in their struggles or strikes.

By piecing together a diverse number of perspectives from Labour and union leaders alongside existing academic works, I assemble an encompassing view on how Labour lost the confidence of workers, and what effect that has had on the party’s success. Although it is necessary to emphasize the uniqueness of Labour’s relationship with unions, the lessons learned from the complete collapse in coherency with their working class voter base can and should be viewed as a cautionary tale, one that stresses how powerful and decisive the working masses can be. The failure of the Labour Party to properly respond to their constituents must inspire introspection for other similar social democratic parties’ relationships with workers. Workers today are already frustrated with their purported representatives in their electoral systems, as mass worker defections to far-right parties indicates.¹ If this frustration continues, social democratic parties will continue to flounder, as Labour did, benefitting only the far-right just as they did neoliberal parties in the 1980s.

2 A New Deal: How to Repair a Fractured Relationship with Communication

To understand Labour’s situation in 1970, it is necessary for a brief historical overview of the party and their electoral successes – or lack thereof. At the turn of the twentieth century, unionized British workers realized they needed a representation of themselves and their interests in the UK Parliament. A long-standing organization, the TUC, passed a resolution in 1899 to form a Labour Party – a party by workers, for workers. Throughout their hundred plus years’ existence, Labour and the working class had what can only be described as a contentious alliance. Unions have consistently had massive influence over the party: not only are they responsible for a significant amount (and at times, most) of the party’s funding, they have historically held an important portion of votes for internal leadership elections as party affiliates. This has meant favor toward unions – be it by individual leaders or through Labour’s platform. Attempts at removing or reducing unions’ association by party leadership would lead to a corresponding drop in electoral viability and votes. Labour’s relationship with unions often comes under criticism by their Conservative opponents or the general British media, who accuse unions of running the party and, at times, gripping the nation with their alleged militancy or disregard for the prosperity of the British economy. Throughout the twentieth century, Labour has frequently fought for and sought out an agreement between themselves and workers, seeking to give the party legitimized power over their supporters in exchange for concessions, such as capping wage increases at a set annual figure, or by reducing strike opportunities that could have the outcome of making Labour appear badly in the eyes of their opponents and the media.

From their origins in 1899 through 1945, Labour failed to secure a majority place in parliament. They were close in 1929 with a minority government, but ultimately could not cross the final threshold and suffered an internal collapse shortly after. Their first chance at leadership came on 5 July 1945 with Clement Attlee leading the party to their first majority. Yet, even when experiencing success as a genuine national party in the post-war period, their electoral successes seemed less an endorsement of their policies and union allies and rather a rejection of other political parties. Wartime conditions during the Second World War proved to make the Conservative Party unpopular. Once the Second World War was brought home via Dunkirk and the failed Norway campaign, the Conservative’s firm grip on the electorate quickly faded; as historian Ross McKibben has said, “Labour would have won any election held after July 1940.”²

While the Social Contract was the longest standing attempt at a formal agreement between the TUC and Labour, it was not the first time the unions were forced into a wage cap despite their vocalized commitment against it. During the Attlee Administration, they were forced into an average 2.8% wage cap, far below what union leadership could have negotiated with leaders in their respective industries. In February of 1948, the cabinet proposed a national ‘wages policy,’ wherein guidelines were suggested for negotiated wage increases – against the long-standing wishes of the TUC that Labour needed to stay committed to their historically unfettered collective bargaining status.³ As economic conditions continued to worsen in 1949, protectionist measures for workers at home were failing to raise export prices and lessen international competition; one year later, in June of 1950, the TUC renounced their commitment to Labour’s policy, by a thin margin of 3.89 million votes for 3.52 against. This came just months after the February 23rd election, when Labour won a slim majority of just five seats. Due to the lack of TUC support and campaigning, Labour lost their subsequent election on 25 October 1951, yielding their majority to the Conservatives. As will be illustrated, Labour’s fights with unions during their times in governments would cost them electorally.

In the following elections, Labour not only failed to perform as expected, but demographic breakdowns proved their voter base was occupying an increasingly smaller share of the general electorate. In 1959, Gallup polls following a loss showed their support dropping among all demographics except the ‘very poor’ and the elderly; analysts predicted Labour would remain out of office until it reflected the interests of well-off, younger workers, women, and white-collar employees.⁴ Internally, the party remained split. The more moderate faction – led by party leader Hugh Gaitskell – felt it was time to become more of a national party, focused on a wider breadth of support and more centrist policies. On the opposite end, leftist Labour members felt a ‘catch-all’ approach was what led to their 1959 election failure, and that the party’s relationship with the working class was a high priority.⁵ These internal disagreements were persistent as the two wings of the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Lists of illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• List of contributors
• Introduction: European Unity, From Crisis to Integration: Perspectives from the Next Generation of Europe’s Thinkers
• 1 The Disintegration of the Center-Left Labor Consensus: Lessons from the Labour Party’s Social Contract Failure
• 2 State of Pandemic: Opportunity or Challenge for Far-Right Populist Parties? The Case of the Alternative für Deutschland Party
• 3 Decentralizing and Democratizing Identity Narratives through Regional Tourism: A Lesson from Catalonia
• 4 The Birth of the Maastricht Generation: The Role of Young Hungarians in Defending European Democracy
• 5 Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? RT’s Reporting on the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe
• 6 The New Ostpolitik: Nord Stream 2 and the Politics of German–Russian Gas Relations
• 7 Will 27 Become One? The Linkage between Europe’s Domestic and Foreign Politics and the Prospect of a Single EU Seat at the United Nations Security Council
• Index