Hezbollah

A Regional Armed Non-State Actor

Hadi Wahab

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781000594133
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica mediorientale

This book examines Hezbollah's transition from a domestic into a regional armed non-state actor (ANSA). Taking its point of departure in Hezbollah's historiography on the military and political levels in Lebanon, it focuses on the participation of Hezbollah's troops in Syria's sect-coded civil war.

Initially limited, Hezbollah's intervention in the Syrian conflict gradually increased into a full-scale engagement across vast swathes of Syrian territory, with Hezbollah instrumentalizing its sectarian (Shi?a) identity to justify its engagement. Sect-centric narratives and victimhood were a mere tool for what was a geopolitical confrontation, and Hezbollah's involvement launched it to becoming a regional ANSA. The book outlines that this transition was only plausible because of the interplay between three factors: Hezbollah's sectarian mobilization and instrumentalization of its sectarian identity; the shift into a quasi-army combining classical with guerrilla tactics and formations; and its embedding as a partner in the axis which now extends from Beirut to Tehran. It was in 2018 that a set of conditions, impossible to reproduce, allowed Hezbollah to reach its culmination on both the domestic and regional theatres. This book shows that ANSAs are playing prominent roles in the regional order in the Middle East.

Meticulously researched, Hezbollah is a comprehensive study ideal for upper-level undergraduates and above with an interest in Middle East studies, Middle East politics, and international relations.

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781003268826-1

“Ours is not a world at peace. It is a world of Civil War”¹ Ungluing violence from the Middle East is challenging. For far too long, this region has been a sphere where ideological, social, economic, and political projects were periodically produced and reproduced. It is the chrysalis “the chrysalis of three of the world's great religions,” the land of the holy wars where empires have risen and fallen, the region where “every form of domestic and international order has existed, and been rejected, at one time or another.”² “The region is arguably the epi-center of world crisis, chronically war-prone and the site of the world's most protracted conflicts.”³ Of course, conflicts are not an exclusive feature of the Middle East but the latter has always been volatile and seldom stable. Amid a changing world order throughout the 20th century, the region has endured seismic ordeal such as the “Tripartite Aggression War” conducted by Israel, France, and the United Kingdom against Egypt; the Lebanese Civil War; the first and second Gulf Wars; and many others. Among the myriad events that engulfed the 20th-century Middle East, three were paramount to the regional order: World War I and its aftermath, namely the Sikes-Picot agreement and the de facto states that were implemented; the 1948 declaration of the State of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli wars; and the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its regional implications.

A prey for domestic, sub-regional, regional, and international powers and competing ideologies and agendas, the Middle East has had no scope for harmony and any peace process is somewhat bound to fail. The only salvation is through a peace agreement which consists of “non-interference” in other state affairs – one that is similar to the 1648 peace of Westphalia in Europe. However, too early in the 21st century al-Qaeda's draconian attacks on 11 September 2001 against American targets culminated in the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 and was followed by the Arab Uprisings less than a decade later. This destabilization of the region has shown firsthand why a Westphalia for the Middle East is unlikely to happen. These latter instances caused the biggest waves of unrest with short- and long-term ramifications. Not only did they destabilize the region but they also led to the resurgence of sectarian narratives and counter-narratives and sect-coded conflicts. Accordingly, the rise of sectarianism became a vital topic in the study of the modern Middle East.⁴ Amid this chaos, the power vacuum caused by the decrease in states’ influence made them prone to contestation between regional powers in their bid to fill the void and tilt the balance of power in their favor. Pursuing an increasingly assertive foreign policy, these powers instrumentalized sectarian identities and adopted sectarian mobilization agendas in a biting game to limit the influence of their rivals: while Sunni regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar supported Sunni groups, Iran sponsored primarily Shiʿa groups – the latter state also supported Sunni Palestinian groups such as Hamas. However, there is no doubt that Tehran's narratives and policies are Shiʿa-centric.

This contest deepened the Sunni-Shiʿa schism and the confrontations in countries such as Iraq and Syria were falsely framed as “sectarian” while these were in fact sect-coded conflicts driven by a geopolitical contest between domestic, regional, and international powers. The Iran–Saudi Arabia rivalry has mostly contributed to this divide and exacerbated these identity-shaped conflicts. “The intersection of sectarian identity and Arab-Iranian rivalry has seen regional strategy instrumentalizing markers of sectarian identity to foster sectarian solidarity and mobilization by portraying geopolitical issues as existential threats confronting all Sunni and Shiʿa.”⁵ Sectarian solidarity has served as a dichotomization process of “us” vs “them” and created a sense of victimhood by demonizing the sectarian “other.”

Having said that, the traditional powers in the Middle East are barely operative. States’ weakness and failure shifted power to a new operational level which functions through “influence peddling and proxy warfare,” and regional powers delved into alternative encounters: the proxy confrontations.⁶ These dynamics provided more room for the rise of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) which have thrived in the Middle East since the 20th century and helped shape the regional order. For instance, the US and its Middle Eastern allies adopted a proxy confrontation agenda to counterbalance the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s by supporting Islamist fighters who later formed the Salafi-Jihadist group called al-Qaeda. Subsequently, the latter had shown ruthless hatred toward the US and marked it as its primary target. The most vivid example was illustrated in the lethal 9/11 attacks which caused the death of thousands of Americans. Next, George Bush's administration launched a campaign against al-Qaeda by invading Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 in order to remove Saddam Hussein's regime. If we fast-forward to 2014, a group of terrorists occupied vast territories in Iraq and Syria and announced the reign Da‘esh (ISIS). This incident had “the biggest impact on the territorial construction of the Middle East.”⁷ The emergence of a Sunni jihadist organization that spread hatred against the sectarian “other” and also against Sunnis who refused to obey it and slaughtered people on account of “apostasy” facilitated the counter-mobilization of fighters to join anti-ISIS armed groups. These were mainly Shiʿa-centric Iraqi factions which formed al-Hashd al Sha’bi (Popular Mobilization Forces [PMF]), with the assistance of Iran, and to a lesser extent, Hezbollah, to thwart Da‘esh's further expansion. It is worth noting that although these groups were predominantly Shiʿa, they were also joined by Christians, Yazidis, and Turkmen.⁸ In the ensuing months, ISIS's mischief-making took the world's attention, reduced the US and its western allies interest in bringing Assad's regime down and pressed them to train, arm, and equip the Kurds, namely the People's Protection Units (YPG), in Iraq and Syria in order to fight ISIS on the ground. Besides, it established an international coalition which focused on launching aerial attacks against ISIS. More often than not, states contesting for international and regional influence have adopted a proxy warfare paving the way for the emergence of ANSAs. Not only does such proxy warfare provide geopolitical gains but also gives the sponsor state more room on the negotiation table and plausible deniability had any covert operation been discovered.

This book surveys the role of perhaps one of the most iconoclastic ANSAs in the Middle East: Hezbollah. From Beirut's suburbs to southern and western Lebanon, the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is reflected through the display of Shiʿa-specific symbols and banners and Iranian figures. While sectarian identity serves as a marker of group solidarity, in states of high sectarian heterogeneity sect-centric groups and citizens have adapted to this status quo. For our purposes, Hezbollah in Lebanon is one obvious example. On 16 February 1985, in its open letter addressed to the world, Hezbollah officially announced itself a resistance, not only against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon but also of Palestine.⁹ In parallel, Hezbollah had pledged allegiance to wilayat al-faqih, a pan-state Islamist concept implemented by Ayatollah Khomeini, the late spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the umma (nation) – explained in chapter 2. Antonio Gramsci treated the issue of “The Political Party” by explaining how foreign states intervene in other countries to back a certain party – for the state's own calculations, of course, rather than that of the party. However, Gramsci goes on to say that “parties avoid even the ‘justified’ appearance of playing somebody else's game, especially if the somebody is a foreign State.”¹⁰ This is not the case for Hezbollah, as well as most Lebanese parties and groups, which always seek foreign support in order to execute their domestic agenda and at the same time, serve as a tool for the sponsor state. In addition to their clear politico-religious allegiance to Iran, Hezbollah blatantly avows that its financial support comes from Tehran.

Accordingly, Hezbollah had emerged in the early 1980s as a domestic organization bellicose and eager to fight the Israelis through guerilla tactics – hit-and-run with small units. In the ensuing decades, it witnessed intellectual, military, and political transformations.

• First, Hezbollah's overall policy shifted due to alterations in the regional and international order from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the American-supremacy era, coupled with the shift toward a more pragmatic environment within Iran. This new behavior was being shaped during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) and became more obvious after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the increasing influence of more moderate figures led by Ayatollah Khamenei, the new supreme leader. In other words, national security interests became more important than ideology.¹¹ In parallel, Hezbollah seemed to have grudgingly realized the inconveniency of creating an Islamic State in a multisectarian society such as Lebanon and, therefore, from rejecting the Lebanese system and debunking it, Hezbollah caved to the status quo. As this leitmotif faced facts on the ground, Hezbollah sought to adapt by pursing an “openness policy” and decided to run for the parliamentary elections in 1992 on cross-sectarian lists.¹²
• Second, during that decade, Hezbollah engaged twice with the Israelis: the July 1993 Operation Accountability and the April 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath. Not only did the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fail to bring Hezbollah to its knees, but provided it with more credibility and endearment in the Lebanese and Arabs’ eyes. All in all, the 1990s witnessed attacks and counter-attacks between Hezbollah and the IDF. Subsequently, on 25 May 2000, Israel departed from south Lebanon and Hezbollah was credited for the liberation, although other groups had also fought the Israelis in earlier stages.
• Third, the departure of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) from Lebanon in 2005 pressed Hezbollah, for the first time, to participate in the government in order to fill the power vacuum left behind.
• Fourth, in July 2006, a new war erupted between Hezbollah and the IDF which lasted for 33 days and transformed Hezbollah into a shrewd military force.
• Fifth, and most important, Syria's Civil War which embedded Hezbollah as a partner in the Axis that extends from Iran to Lebanon, via Syria, and more recently Iraq, and shifted it from a domestic to a regional ANSA.

The term “Axis” deployed in this book has been in fact dichotomized: while George W. Bush, the US president, had called it the “axis of evil,” Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's secretary-general, and Iranian leaders dubbed it the “axis of resistance.”¹³ According to Marissa Sullivan,

the Axis of Resistance is an Iran-led alliance of state and non-state actors in the Middle East that seeks to confront Western interests in the region, namely those of the United States (US) and Israel. Historically, this alliance has included the Assad regime in Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah. In recent years, Iran has also cultivated Iraqi Shiʿa militants as the newest members of this alliance.¹⁴

By and large, Hezbollah's fate is pegged to Iran and the latter's sponsorship is paramount for the former's endurance. This relationship is mutually beneficial: while Hezbollah implements Iran's agenda and provides it with regional leverage and in return, Iran helps Hezbollah stand against Israel and amplify its domestic, and more recently, regional clout. In conjunction with Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah spearheaded the bolster of Palestinian factions since early 1990s, and in post-Saddam Iraq it participated in assisting and training Iraqi Shiʿa groups in order to fight the US and increase Iran's influence. Establishing such armed groups by Iran had served its assertive foreign policy agenda. However, most important, and m...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Background, Emergence, and Religious and Political Allegiances
• 3 Lebanon: Hezbollah's Den
• 4 The Geopolitical Contest and Hezbollah's Sect-Centricity
• 5 The Transition: A Regional Armed Non-State Actor
• 6 Hezbollah's Paroxysm: What Next?
• Index