Introduction
This chapter maps the theoretical terrain of social capital theory by examining its assumptions and the ways through which it influences democracy and democratization. In so doing, the chapter commences by situating social capital in the framework of political culture in a bottom-up approach, as opposed and complementary to top-down (mainly constitutional engineering), to understand transitions to democracy. Distinction has been made between democracy in its transitional phase and democracy in its consolidated form. In covering the bottom-up approach to democracy, major contributions of Robert D. Putnam , though in certain instances argued not to be entirely original, to the theory of social capital and functioning of democracy and democratic governance were devoted a substantial area in this chapter. In spite of the centrality of Putnamâs version of social capital theory in this book, both theoretical and empirical, criticism of Putnam has been addressed in some details. As Putnam, especially in his Making Democracy Work (1993), utilizes social capital in understanding the functioning of already democratic governments, it will be crucial to scrutinize the appropriateness of his theory to analyze democracy in its transitional phase, the way it is employed in this book. With the hope of originality in mind, the chapter concludes by a discussion of existing literature on the political developments of KRI to conclude that literature has left a significant room for students of social capital, political culture and civil society to provide an alternative insight into transition to democracy in KRI. Finally, a brief account of the methodology is presented.
Social Capital, Political Culture, Democracy and Democratization
Putnam indicates that the first use of the term social capital goes back almost a century. L. Judson Hanifan, a social reformer in West Virginia, first utilized the term to describe the social context of education. For Hanifan, social capital points to the âgood will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unitâ (cited in Putnam 2002, p. 4). Ever since, although social capital has been rediscovered several times by sociologists and economic scholars, the most systematic use of social capital in modern sociology is associated with the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the 1980s. Bourdieu (cited in Portes 1998, p. 3) defines the term as âthe aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of mutual acquaintance or recognitionâ. Later on, James Coleman puts social capital firmly on the intellectual agenda (Putnam 2000, pp. 19â20). He defines the term as âvariety of entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structureâ (Coleman 1990, p. 302). For Coleman, social capital manifests itself in three basic forms: obligations and expectations; information channels; and norms and effective sanctions (Coleman 1988, pp. 101â105). In spite of differences in theoretical underpinnings and variations of contexts in which they are employed, these definitions share the focus that social networks, solidarity and cooperation do matter for individuals and communities. The chapter will elaborate on the significance of social capital in the upcoming sections.
The collapse of socialist block in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Eastern Europe brought transition to democracy to the fore in sociopolitical literature. Ever since, a variety of explanatory approaches have been developed to explain this new wave of democratization in terms of its nature, directions and the factors that influence it. In this regard, existing literature has placed emphasis on political culture (Fukuyama 1996, 2005; Pratt 2005; Inglehart 1999), the elite behavior and political parties (Herbst 1997; Kohn 1997), economic factors (Haggard and Robert 1999), and external intervention (Diamond 2005; Whitehead 2005; Kurth 2005) to understand transitions to democracy. In this framework, theory of social capital has mainly been utilized by sociologists and political scientists to explain both obstacles of transition to democracy in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the decline of social cohesion and a sense of community in Western democracies (Badescu and Uslaner 2003).
Whitehead (2003, p. 27) suggests that âdemocratization is best understood as a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended processâ. It is a move away from tyranny and dictatorship toward building democratic institutions and consolidation of pro-democracy political culture . The move toward democracy, however, can hardly be a smooth and linear one. Challenges that face any democratization process can be enormous and may cause setback for the transition. Anderson and Stansfield (2004, p. 190) concluded that out of nearly 100 countries thought to be in transition to democracy , fewer than fifth has moved in a right direction. For them, majority of cases of transition has reverted to authoritarianism or stuck somewhere between authoritarianism and democracy. Furthermore, transition to democracy , from where it begins until it arrives in the consolidation stage, can take decades provided that it proceeds in right direction. Francis Fukuyamaâs model of democracy consolidation (cited in Anderson and Stansfield 2004) suggests that democracy to consolidate requires to emerge in four levels: in the most shallow level, democracy necessitates a normative belief from the part of people in the legitimacy and necessity of democracy; democracy then requires to be institutionalized in constitutions , elections, political parties and so on; in level three, democracy is based on a vigor civil society capable of mediating between primordial groups and the state ; finally and in the deepest level, a consolidated democracy involves a political culture in which civicness holds an exceptional significance. As democratization moves from the first level to the fourth level, it becomes progressively difficult, demanding and time consuming. In a similar vein, Linz and Stepan (1996, pp. 15â16), suggest that democracy cannot be defined as consolidated unless it is consolidated behaviorally, attitudinally and constitutionally. They insist that behaviorally no serious political force should attempt at overthrowing a democratic regime or to promote domestic or international violence in order to break away from the state. Attitudinally, the overwhelming majority of the people should, even in severe political and economic crises, believe that further political changes must emerge according to democratic parameters. Constitutionally, all actors in politics should believe that all political conflict must be resolved according to the agreed norms and standards of the constitution.
Broadly speaking, proponents of social capital theory insist that social capital affects democracy in two ways: first, it can assist in creating democracy in a country which is not democratic and, second, it can preserve and maintain an already existing democracy (Paxton 2002, p. 257). The leading argument for theorists of social capital asserts that âa dense network of voluntary associations and citizens organizations help to sustain civil society and community relations in a way that generates trust and cooperation between citizens and a high level of civic engagement and participation. It is suggested that associations create conditions for social integration, public awareness and actionâ (Newton 2001a, p. 201). On the whole, social capital is assumed to be a source which makes people trust one another, participate in voluntary organizations and facilitate their collective action . People could engage in more politicized social networks as a result of the abundance of trust. This, in turn, increases the possibility to develop critical discourses and social movements in the period of transition to democracy . Likewise, a positive role is attached to social capital for consolidated democracies. Social capital with its potential for mass political mobilization supposedly enhances the responsiveness and effectiveness of democratic political institutions.
Robert Putnam: Social Capital and Functioning of Democracy
This section reviews Robert Putnamâs contribution to the study of social capital and its association with democracy. This review focuses on his contribution as a transformation and a sizeable stretch in the conceptualization of social capital (Portes 1998). Putnam takes the theory of social capital further by establishing the explanatory value of social capital in understanding macro-level issues, including the functioning of democracy and democratic governance. Even though Putnam has not invented the concept (Putnam 2000, pp. 19â20; 2002, pp. 4â6), his works have largely stimulated recent research on democracy, civic engagement and social capital (Alex-Assenson 2002, p. 204). The inability of the competing theories of social capital (such as those put forward by James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu ) to influence civic engagement studies makes Putnamâs contribution to occupy a more central position in sociopolitical literature (Lichterman 2006, p. 531).
Putnamâs definition of social capital comes consistent across his works: in his monograph Making Democracy Work, 1993, he defines the term as âfeatures of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actionsâ (p. 167). In his later work Bowling Alone (2000), he introduces a more lucid definition of the term by stating that social capital involves âconnections among individualsâsocial networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from themâ. Likewise, in Democracies in Flux 2002, he asserts that social capital is about social networks and the norms of reciprocity which are associated with them (Putnam 2002, p. 8). The core idea of social capital theory is that social networks matter (Putnam 2002, p. 6) and they have value (Putnam 2000, p. 19). Social networks, in Putnamâs explanation of social capital, are central to the definition of the term (Khakbaz 2006, pp. 120â121).
Trust constitutes an essential ingredient of social capital. It is a by-product of involvement in social networks (Putnam 1993, p. 170). Putnam considers trust as the basis of any possible cooperation among social actors in different political, social and economic contexts. âTrust lubricates cooperationâ. The higher the level of trust in a community, the larger is the possibility of cooperation. Simultaneously, cooperation itself regenerates trust (Putnam 1993, p. 171). Putnam draws a distinction between trust and honesty based on personal experience and familiarity with specific people and trust in âthe generalized othersâ (Putnam 2000, p. 136). He calls the former thick trust as it relies essentially on strong and frequent social networks in which one is engaged. Moreover, this kind of trust is reduced to people whom one knows and with whom he or she has had previous personal experiences. The latter, referred to by Putnam as thin trust , depends implicitly on some background of social networks and shared expectations. This form of trust transcends the scope of our close social circles and extends to the wider society in which we live. Putnam argues that thin trust is even more useful as it extends our social networks to encompass the rest of the community (Putnam 2000, p. 136).
In addition, trust is subject to gradations of rational calculations.1 Putnam writes: âthe trust that is required to sustain cooperation is not blindâ. We do not trust a person or an agency merely because they say that they will do that. On the contrary, we trust them because we know their dispositions (character), available options and their consequ...