Ethnic groupâs demands for increased autonomy or secession have been a cause for more than a third of all civil wars since the end of the Second World War. To simultaneously appease highly emotional separatists and maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity, governments often offer forms of self-government. The number of ethnic groups that have been granted meaningful autonomy rights has steadily increased since the end of the Second World War and has almost doubled after the fall of the Iron Curtain.1 However, territorial autonomy is obviously no panacea for regulating ethnic self-determination conflicts. Self-rule for the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, Mindanao in the Philippines, or Jammu and Kashmir in India has not led to peaceful interethnic coexistence between majorities and ethnic minorities, while autonomy reforms have significantly reduced ethnic tensions in other places, such as Gagauzia in Moldova or Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. How can this variance in outcomes be explained?
Despite increased scholarly interest in recent years, answers to the question of how and under what circumstances a conflictual relationship between ethnic groups can be institutionally transformed into a peaceful coexistence remain vague, and at times inconsistent. Previous research focuses primarily on the question of whether specific institutions, such as grand coalitions, veto rights, electoral reforms, or, most prominently, decentralization and the strengthening of subnational governance, are appropriate instruments to prevent or reduce ethnic tensions or whether they are destined to fail because of inherent weaknesses. Current autonomy research can be broadly divided into two camps: those who believe that autonomy solutions are a valuable option and those who do not. The proponents believe that the transfer of autonomy rights is a suitable solution for multiethnic societies and argue that territorial autonomy arrangements function as an institutional bargaining arena that enhances the chance of a peaceful conflict regulation.2 Post-conflict territorial self-government reforms follow the logic of separating groups by distributing political powers. This is expected to reduce the stakes of competition for state power and can even, as some argue, strengthen the rule of law and create good governance.3 First and foremost, autonomy reforms ensure official minority recognition and substantial self-government guaranteed for ethnic groups, which may dampen separatist desires. At the same time, territorial autonomy takes into account sovereignty and territorial integrity as key interests of a nation-state.
According to critics, proponents underestimate certain practical realities on the ground as such an institutional balance is often an unhappy compromise between ethnic groups that are pursuing higher levels of self-determination and central governments that are seeking to re-centralize powers.4 The highly asymmetric and exclusive character of territorial autonomy leads to a strong accentuation of ethnic differences. This, in turn, facilitates centrifugal activities, as empowerment equips ethnic leaders with necessary resources, strengthens social cohesion, and creates optimal conditions for collective action: âWhile [autonomy] provides national minorities with a workable alternative to secession, it also helps to make secession a more realistic alternativeâ.5 Establishing a local authority homogenizes on a sub-state level, when ethnic leaders who have endured exclusion become eager nation-builders themselves. Since autonomous territories are home to other ethnic minorities, further tensions and political instability are created. A common concern in both scientific and political discourses is that of a contagion effect. If the central state grants autonomy to a group, demands by other groups for self-determination will follow and ultimately will lead to the disintegration of the entire state.6
Although we find empirical evidence for some of the theoretical arguments, a too pessimistic view does not stand up to scrutiny. No empirical study, so far, finds a robust causal relationship between post-conflict autonomy reforms and the re-occurrence of violent secessionist conflict. Where autonomy reforms have been implemented to end ethnic conflict, many have succeeded in at least reducing violence to a manageable level. In the recent past, some authors have tried to rekindle the stalled debate between proponents and critics by taking a more nuanced view on the autonomy-conflict nexus. Daftary or Cederman et al. conclude that conflict regulation through autonomy does not fail because of the type of institutional reform, but rather because of its delayed implementation.7 Sirokyâs and Cuffeâs findings indicate that the probability of secessionist conflict is only high when groups have lost their historic special status.8 Abushov argues that the success of conflict regulation through territorial autonomy depends primarily on the nature of the intrastate conflict. He concludes that success is likely if autonomy serves to express cultural identity more strongly, whereas failure is to be expected when it comes to correcting historic injustices about the belonging of the territory.9 Anderson and Costa find the balance of power between different levels of government decisive.10 Danspeckgruber or Walsh highlight the necessity of domestic and international guarantees for the special status for overcoming the inherent lack of trust between groups and preventing instability.11 While these works provide for a differentiated perspective on the conflict-regulating potential of territorial autonomy, a general shift in the research interest âaway from the pros and cons [âŠ] towards an effort to explain what factors influence the stability and longevity of autonomy solutions has, however, not taken place so farâ.12
Can autonomies end intrastate conflicts between ethnic groups or does the granting of self-determination rights result in violent secessionist conflict? Research efforts to answer this general question have not provided conclusive evidence so farâbut only because this question cannot be answered as such. Since there are successful examples, such as the Ă
land Islands in Finland, Gagauzia in Moldova, or South Tyrol in Italy, as well as obviously failed cases, the discussion addressing the general role of autonomy solutions in ethnic conflicts is not a very fruitful one. The implementation of territorial self-governance does not necessarily lead to lasting peace, just like how violent conflicts are not an inevitable consequence. Both institutional successes and failures do not occur in a vacuum. They rather depend on both the right choice of institutional set-up, as well as favorable and unfavorable circumstances strengthening or weakening the implemented rules.