Liberal Italy and Tsarist Russia: A Weak Relationship?
After Unification , the ruling Italian liberal class pursued an ambitious policy to transform Italy into one of the great powers in Europe. Such a goal, however, was in sharp contrast to the weak position of the new state: Italy was a poor and backward country. Its unification, in contrast with the almost contemporary creation of the German Empire, had been the outcome of favourable international conditions and cunning diplomatic moves rather than glorious military achievements. On the contrary, Italian armed forces had suffered humiliating defeats, especially during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 at Custoza and Lissa. Last but not least, in the early days of the new Italian state its leaders had to face serious economic problems, difficulties in creating a central administrative structure and the threat of widespread banditry in the south, similar to guerrilla warfare, which was supported by the former Bourbon regime and the Holy See.1 In spite of these difficulties the Italian unified state survived, and even launched some initiatives to exert its influence in the Mediterranean Sea and in the African continent. By 1881, the Italian authorities realized that the state’s already difficult position was being made even weaker owing to its isolation in the context of Bismarck’s “European balance”. In 1882, Italy joined the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, although it was obvious that Italy was the junior partner and that its involvement in the international system created by Bismarck was mainly an outcome of the German Chancellor’s plans. Moreover, during the 1880s and 1890s, Italy’s attempt to take part in Europe’s “scramble for Africa” was frustrated by military defeats at Dogali and Adwa.2 Things began to change in the new century as a consequence of Giolitti’s reform policy and his effective leadership. Italy experienced its first industrial expansion, Italian state structures were strengthened and its political system became closer to those of the French and British liberal democracies rather than the traditional authoritarian systems of the three conservative European Empires.3 Although Italy was still a full member of the Triple Alliance, the relationship between Rome and the future members of the Triple Entente greatly improved, and secret agreements on colonial issues were signed with Britain and France. The relationship between Italy and Imperial Russia was perhaps the least relevant for Rome’s foreign policy, and in St Petersburg Italy was still regarded as a minor international actor. It was not only an obvious question of geographical distance, but Russian culture, society and history were definitely less known and considered as less interesting and even backward by Italian intellectual and political elites in comparison with these aspects of Britain, France and Germany. From an economic viewpoint, the German Empire, France and Britain played a leading role. Moreover, there were no definite reasons for a conflict or for international agreement. At least until 1905, Imperial Russia was more interested in expanding its influence in Asia, while Rome focused its attention on northern and eastern Africa. In only a few years, however, there were some significant changes. In 1909, Italy and Russia signed a secret agreement, the so-called Racconigi Treaty, which demonstrated that, in spite of being members of two opposing alliances, Rome and St Petersburg now shared some common aims as far as the future of the Ottoman Empire was concerned, especially in terms of safeguarding the status quo in the Balkans. The treaty had an obvious anti-Austrian character, which was mainly the consequence of the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. The act was regarded as negative and frustrating, both by Rome and St Petersburg.4 It is worth noting, however, that the Racconigi agreement, signed during the Russian Emperor’s visit to Italy, had been underwritten in a Piedmontese country mansion belonging to the King of Italy, since the Tsar had to avoid major Italian cities for fear of mass demonstrations by parties on the Italian left. The Socialists, the Republicans and the anarchists lined up against the representative of what much of Italy perceived as the most reactionary and backward European political regime. In fact, during the past decades the Italian peninsula had become a safe refuge for some Russian opponents to the Tsarist regime.
In 1915, in spite of its previous commitment to the Triple Alliance, Italy joined the Triple Entente in the war against the Central Empires. Rome’s involvement in the conflict would lead to a different relationship between Italy and Imperial Russia, and Italian authorities paid increasing attention to the Russian situation. As a member of the Entente, Italy could not ignore the Russian domestic events that would lead to the October revolution and its immediate aftermath.
This chapter, mainly based on Italian diplomatic documents, aims to examine the way in which the Italian authorities reacted to the Bolshevik rise to power, as well as Rome’s policy towards the new Communist regime until the end of the war.
Russia and Italy: Uneasy Allies in the First World War Until the Outbreak of the October Revolution
At the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, the Italian authorities chose neutrality, although Prime Minister Antonio Salandra and Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino started secret negotiations with the Central Empires and the Entente at a very early stage, to verify which nations offered more concessions in return for Italy’s entry into the war.5 As is generally known, the talks with the Entente, which had started in February 1915, ended positively with the signature of a secret London treaty on 26 April the same year. It is significant that the negotiations were held in London, between the Italian Ambassador to the Court of St James, Marquis Guglielmo Imperiali di Francavilla, and the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. The Italian Government regarded Britain as the most powerful member of the Entente, a nation with which Italy had always maintained friendly relations, while France, although known as the “Latin Sister”, was not perceived to be so important. Russia was too far away, and the Russian government had been the most difficult partner in the Entente. During the negotiations, St Petersburg opposed, sometimes successfully, Italy’s ambitions to expand its influence in the Balkans to the detriment of Serbia, which Russian authorities regarded as its main ally in the area.6
During the early years of the conflict, Italy appeared to be interested in a limited war against Austria-Hungary; only in 1916 did Rome declare war against Germany. Russia, contrary to Britain and France, was directly involved in military operations against the Habsburg Empire, while Italy was interested in Russia’s military contribution to the war, which would influence the fortunes of the Italian army. Contacts were thus established to coordinate Italian and Russian military offensives, although such attempts seldom led to positive results.7 Italy’s knowledge about the Russian domestic situation, as well as its foreign policy, was mainly the outcome of dispatches and reports from the Italian Ambassador in St Petersburg (Petrograd from 1914). He was the marquis Andrea Carlotti di Riparbella, a diplomat of the old school, who had been posted to St Petersburg in 1913. Carlotti was a Russophile, and between 1914 and 1916 he showed great confidence in the Russian Army, the well-known, but actually fairly ineffective “Russian steam-roller”. In 1917, his attitude towards the February/March revolution was positive, and he seemed convinced that the situation would lead to the creation of a liberal regime, which would ease the relations between the Western allies and Russia. Although Carlotti was aware of the difficulties that the Kerensky government had to face, he sent reasonably optimistic reports to Rome. He appeared to be mainly interested in the ongoing Russian military contribution to the Allied efforts.8 Other information sources were the consuls assigned to some Russian towns and members of the Italian military and economic missions that operated on Russian soil after 1915, who usually held less optimistic opinions.
Italy’s Early Reactions to the October Revolution
In a telegram sent on 27 October 1917 to Foreign Minister Sonnino, two weeks before the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, Carlotti expressed a positive evaluation of the internal situation, especially on the relationship between the Petrograd Soviet, where the Bolshevik influence was fairly strong, and the Kerensky government. He concluded that “it is premature to draw definite conclusions ...