Introduction
On June 22, 2018, at a European Union (EU) high-level event on āClimate, Peace and Security: The Time for Actionā High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini urged that acting on climate change was to invest āin our own securityā (EEAS 2018). Only a few weeks later, on July 11, 2018, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) once again discussed āclimate-related security risksā and the Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed made clear that āclimate change is a real threat and it is proceeding at a relentless paceā (UNSC 2018). Finally, in January 2019 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Greta Thunberg, who has become famous for her passionate and inexorable climate activism and her role in starting the Fridays for Future movement, warned that āour house is on fireā and urged political leaders to immediately adopt measures to stop climate change (Thunberg 2019a).
These three examples are all part of a longstanding political debate that has highlighted the catastrophic consequences of climate change and linked the issue to a range of security concerns (Brauch 2009; Rothe 2016; Dyer 2018; Lippert 2019; McDonald 2013). This āsecuritisation processā (Buzan et al. 1998) already began in the 1980s when climate change first entered international politics and began to be discussed in relation to broader environmental security concerns (Floyd 2010, p. 75; Hardt 2017). Since then, the debate has expanded continuously and made climate change the undisputed focal point when it comes to linking changes in the environment to security concerns (Brzoska and Oels 2011, p. 51). Politically, these debates have not been without consequences. Even though the empirical and causal connection between climate change and security or conflict is contested in the academic literature (Scheffran et al. 2012b; Barnett 2000; Buhaug et al. 2014), the persistent linking of the two has nevertheless established climate change as one of the defining security problems of the twenty-first century in global politics (Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015; Rothe 2016; Lippert 2019; Dyer 2018; Dalby 2013b). Linking climate change with security thus has decisively transformed how political practitioners handle these issues and has legitimised numerous policies and practices (Floyd 2010; Diez et al. 2016; Oels 2012; UNGA 2009b; WBGU 2008; Scott and Ku 2018). However, despite the apparent consensus that climate change is not only an environmental concern, economic problem or a matter of justice but will very soon have tangible security implications, activists, political practitioners and scientists differ considerably when it comes to conceptions of security to make sense of climate change.
Some have predominately pointed to its ānational securityā consequences, for example, direct threats to the territorial integrity of states and the increase in violent conflicts. As a consequence, they have urged to integrate climate change into the planning of traditional security institutions to prepare for a future ravaged by climate-induced violent conflicts (CNA 2007, p. 6; CNA Military Advisory Board 2014, p. 21; Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015; Buxton et al. 2016; Briggs 2012). In stark contrast, others have emphasised the repercussions of rising temperatures for āhuman securityā, meaning the general deterioration of living conditions of poor populations mainly due to resource scarcity and an increase in extreme weather events (WBGU 2008, p. 1; see also GTZ 2008b, p. 8; Scheffran et al. 2012a). To handle the resulting problems, they have recommended lowering the vulnerability of affected populations by transforming problematic behaviour, to scale up adaptation efforts and to increase development aid (GTZ 2008a, p. 55; WBGU 2008, pp. 10, 115). Finally, many have refrained from concrete threat constructions and have instead depicted climate change as an overall āriskā that will gradually affect countless variables and in turn pertain a whole range of risk groups and areas around the world (adelphi 2012, p. 31; World Bank et al. 2013, pp. xviii, xx; Corry 2012; Lippert 2019; Oels 2011; Rothe 2011b). From this point of view, the appropriate response is to develop sophisticated risk management schemes to increase the resilience of risk groups and areas in order to eventually keep the overall risk at a tolerable level (Greenpeace MĆ©xico 2010, p. 57; World Bank et al. 2013, p. xvii).
Thus, despite the agreement that climate change is somehow linked to security problems, the exact nature of the threat, the affected referent objects as well as the political and normative consequences of handling climate change as security issue are far from clear. This is not only true for the political debate but even more so for the academic literature, which tries to make sense of the empirical āclimate security nexusā (Scheffran et al. 2012a) and the political consequences of linking climate change to security conceptions (Brauch 2009; Diez et al. 2016; Detraz and Betsill 2009; Corry 2012; McDonald 2013; Dyer 2018; Buxton et al. 2016; Rothe 2016). The aim of this book is to contribute to these debates by exploring how specific security representations of climate change have influenced political debates, policies and practices. It thus focuses on how to theoretically make sense of the diversity of security conceptions that are associated with climate change; how different discourses of climate change as security issue have come about in diverse contexts; whether and how they make a difference in terms of political consequences and what normative implications this has.
The Evolution of the Climate Security Nexus in Academic and Political Debates
Much of the alarming political debate on climate security is based on academic literature about the nexus between the environment, climate change and security (Buhaug et al. 2014; Brauch and Scheffran 2012; Lee 2009; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Hardt 2017). This research to a considerable extent draws on older works on environmental security and conflict originating in the 1980s and 1990s (Ullmann 1983, p. 134; Dalby 2009, p. 14; Deudney 1990; Deudney and Matthew 1999; Pirages 1991). It also stems from the theoretical debates about the ābroadeningā (e.g. not only states are considered as security threats) and ādeepeningā (e.g. new epistemological foundations of thinking about security and the consideration of new referent objects such as individuals) of traditional understandings of state or military security (Ullmann 1983; Booth 1991; Krause and Williams 1996, 1997; Mathews 1989). Empirically, this research focused on the questions whether and how environmental change could initiate or contribute to social, political or ultimately violent conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994) as well as lead to hundreds of millions of environmental refugees (Myers 1995). Notwithstanding the weak empirical evidence for any of these claims (Hartmann 2010, p. 235; Greenpeace 2007; Oels and Carvalho 2012), a range of different political actors eagerly adopted this argumentation to advance their political agenda.
At the beginning of these debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s, climate change was only discussed as one issue besides other environmental problems that were increasingly linked to security concerns and conflict. However, due to its global reach and overall magnitude, it soon became one of the key dangers. Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, several environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Oels 2012, p. 186; Myers 1995) picked up the security framing to raise attention for climate change...