Licensing regimes which regulate the use of animals generally implement a process whereby an individual must be deemed to comply with a particular set of regulations in order to be granted, and retain, a license to keep or use animals in a particular manner. The set of regulations will differ dependent on the specific use that the licensee intends to put the animals to. This book considers the efficacy of the common regulatory model of the licensing regime as a means of regulating animal use in England, with a particular focus on wild animals and the regimesâ ability to ensure animal welfare needs are met. This book aims to address the gap in available information on the practical application of a number of pieces of legislation, whose provisions create licensing regimes: the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 (ZLA 1981), the, now repealed, Welfare of Wild Animals in Travelling Circuses (England) Regulations 2012 (WWATC 2012) and the Animal Welfare (Licensing of Activities Involving Animals) (England) Regulations 2018 (AWR 2018), introduced under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (AWA 2006).
1.1 A Common Legislative Approach
Given the ever-changing landscape with regard to animal use, perceptions of animals, and scale of industries and practices which involve animals, it is perhaps not surprising that animal law takes on a number of different forms and frameworksâfrom Acts which prohibit particular practices1 to measures which impose a specific duty of care on the person responsible for the animal in question to treat that animal in a humane manner and avoid the infliction of unnecessary suffering.2
A common framework for laws pertaining to the regulation of animal use is the licensing regime. For example, the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (ASPA 1986) requires that licenses must be sought and awarded in order for the licensee to be allowed to carry out painful experiments on animals3 and, likewise, the Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995 set out conditions relating to certificates of competence and licenses which must be sought and granted prior to being permitted to carry out the slaughter of animals for food.4 Both of these statutes could reasonably be considered to be seeking to protect animals from âunnecessary sufferingâ (during experimentation and at the time of slaughter), rather than being designed to promote the welfare of an individual animal within the more modern and holistic context of the Five Freedoms, a concept which will be examined in detail in Sect. 5 in Chap. 2 of this book. Some licensing regimes have, as their main purpose, something other than the protection of animals but include provisions which nonetheless impact upon animal welfare. An example is the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 (DWA 1976), which is predominantly concerned, as the title suggests, with protecting the general public from harm but includes some basic provisions which are intended to protect animal welfare, albeit in a fairly rudimentary manner.5 The licensing regimes under specific consideration as part of this book are some of those concerned with the protection of animals, and wild animals kept or used in captivity in particular, namely those implemented by the ZLA 1981, the WWATC 2012 and the AWR 2018. These pieces of legislations demand (or in the case of the, now repealed, WWATC 2012 demanded) that a license be sought and granted in order to carry out the practice of operating a zoo and operating a traveling circus with wild animals, and carrying out particular activities involving animals (both wild and domesticated). Licensees are subjected to an inspection regime to allow monitoring of compliance with legal standards. If standards are not deemed to be met on inspection, the license may be refused, suspended or revoked (in the case of WWATC 2012 and AWR 2018) or the establishment, or part of it, might eventually be closed down if it is governed by the ZLA 1981.
During the passage through Parliament of the AWA 2006, it was stated by the then Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, Margaret Beckett, that âThe powers for licensing and registration [included in the Bill] will replace a range of statutes regulating such activities as performing animals, pet shops, riding schools and dog-breeding and animal-boarding establishmentsâ.6 The specific legislation earmarked for replacement as part of this initiative were the Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925 (PAA 1925), Pet Animals Act 1951 (as amended in 1983), Animal Boarding Establishments Act 1963 , Riding Establishments Act 1964 and 1970 and Breeding and Sale of Dogs (Welfare ) Act 1999, Breeding of Dogs Act 1991 and Breeding of Dogs Act 1973. Section 13(8) of the AWA 2006 grants explicit powers to the appropriate national authority to repeal these Acts and introduce replacement legislation under the same section of the AWA 2006. In 2013, the WWATC 2012 became the first licensing regime introduced using powers granted by the AWA 2006 and the promised repeal of the remaining legislation outlined by Beckett came into effect five years later on the introduction of the AWR 2018, which covers dog and cat boarding, horse-riding establishments, dog breeding, pet shops and the use of animals in performance and exhibits.
1.2 The Special Case for Wild Animal Welfare
While it is undeniable that domesticated animals are used by humans in far higher numbers than wild animals, this book focuses largely on if and how the law protects wild animals. The reason for this is that many animal advocates argue that a special case should be made for wild animals when kept under the control of humans. Domestication of species occurs over tens of thousands of years and changes animals genetically from their free-living or âwildâ forbears. The process of domestication has resulted in animals who, when all other things are equal, can live alongside and with humans without their being âkeptâ by humans being detrimental to their welfare in and of itself. There are arguments surrounding, for example, the riding of horses, and whether or not this is detrimental to welfare, but the general consensus is that a pet dog, for example, will not suffer if they are well cared for. The same cannot be said of, for example, a tiger or a lion âkeptâ by humans. Whether the tiger or lion be in a zoo, in a circus, in private ownership or in the wider entertainment industry, animal advocates argue that animal welfare needs for wild animals, who have not been domesticated over millennia simply cannot be met when they are held captive.
These arguments are based on the fact that wild animals would inhabit countries, climates and environments very different to those that can be provided when kept under human control in England. An elephant, for example, would traverse hundreds of miles of home range and live in large matriarchal groups of up to 50 individuals in Africa and Asia. Many species of monkey live in forest environments within complex, multi-generational social hierarchies. They have a very specific diet, long childhoods and extremely high levels of cognition which make them perfectly adapted to the challenging and varied life that they would naturally live in their natural habitat.
Many advocates for wild animal welfare argue that these elements of life for wild animals are of fundamental importance, as is their ability to live in freedom. The principle of an animalâs right or desire for freedom will be explored in Chap. 2, but there are very strong arguments to suggest that for some, if not many or all wild animals, the very fact of being held captive can be seriously detrimental to their welfare. As such, it could be argued that animal welfare laws which, by their very nature, require animals to be kept by humans, are somewhat irrelevant for wild animals if their welfare simply cannot be met when held in any form of captivity. Discussion in this book will include how laws might be reimagined and revised in order to meet welfare needs of wild animals, as well as domesticated animals.
1.3 The Purpose and Scope of this Research: Filling the Information Gap
The limited analysis of animal welfare law and its scope that has been carried out to date has, in general, been largely from a theoretical standpoint, with philosophers and lawyers considering the legal nuances of existing legislation and its application. Discussion on this subject is often focused around whether the law goes far enough, or too far, in its consideration of animals and whether or not it is eno...