1 Introduction
Philosophers of religion have long been concerned with the existential question of whether God exists. I take it that even those with only a tertiary knowledge of the field will agree. There has been much written on the arguments for the existence of God including the cosmological argument, ontological argument, teleological argument, and arguments from meaning and value. On the other hand, much has also been written on the arguments for the non-existence of God, including many different versions of the problem of evil (i.e. logical and evidential), and arguments from divine hiddenness. In recent years, many philosophers of religion have shifted the language about the existential question to ask whether the belief that God exists in rational. This is often paired with non-evidential approaches to religious epistemology, particularly what is known as Reformed epistemology. Likewise, analytic philosophers of religion have also explored more theologically oriented topics, including the nature of faith, worship, and the divine attributes. This book does not defend a specific answer to the existential question of whether God exists. My project is silent on this question.
This book is concerned with a different question about God (and indeed as weâll see, I want to apply this question to different conceptions of the divine too). Namely, I will be examining the axiological question of whether God has (or would have) a positive, neutral, or negative value impact on the world. What value difference does (or would) God make? This question has only recently garnered attention from philosophers. Indeed, Guy Kahaneâs 2011 paper, âShould We Want God to Existâ is the one that started the debate.1 While I will explore a variety of answers to this question, I most interested with offering the strongest possible argument for anti-theism, the view that it is better for God not to exist. Thus, itâs most accurate to understand this book as primarily concerned with answering the following question: what are the strongest arguments for the view that it would be better for God not to exist? I will say more about why this is my approach later. But briefly, I think this is a somewhat counterintuitive answer and that it can be quite informative to try to defend it. Doing so paves the way to see new connections between religion and ethics. After spending time answering this question I will shift focus to expanding the debate beyond monotheism.
This introductory chapter is designed to serve two purposes. First, it is meant to give a general overview of some of the issues that need to be addressed before exploring specific answers to the axiological question about God. It is not intended as an in-depth summary of the literature on the axiology of theism by including all of the arguments that have been offered for various positions. Klaas J. Kraayâs (2018) chapter, âInvitation to the Axiology of Theismâ provides a masterful version of such a summary and I wonât repeat his work here.2 Second, this chapter is intended to provide enough information (including being explicit about some of my assumptions) that the reader can take this book as a standalone work. Iâm thus trying to provide enough information here that the reader doesnât need to look elsewhere in order to understand whatâs contained in the chapters that follow this one.
2 What Is the Axiological Question?
At first glance it might seem that the axiological question doesnât need much by way of explanation. However, there are numerous clarifications required. These include, minimally, what sort of God one is asking the question about and whether the axiological judgments are meant to be understood as objective judgments or as preferences. Iâll take each in turn.
2.1 Which God?
An issue sometimes overlooked by contemporary philosophers of religion is how solutions to certain problems change depending on which conception of God one has in view. Minimally, when I say âGodâ in this book, I refer to one being who is omniscience, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. This God exists necessarily (in every possible world) and is the creator and sustainer of all that is contingent.3 This is consistent with philosophers who say they are working with a traditional, classical, or bare conception of theism.4 Likewise, this conception is intended to be consistent with the three major monotheistic traditions in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Thus, in the following chapters when I refer to God, I intend what I say to be consistent with the three major monotheistic traditions. I realize complex issues are lurking nearby. For instance, in Bayesian probability theory the more complicated a theory is the less likely it is to be true. If this is right, then bare theism is more likely to be true than Christian theism. Yet consider the evidential problem of evil which holds that it is more likely there are instances or gratuitous evil than that there is a God. On the assumption that the co-existence of God and gratuitous evil are incompatible then this argument shows it is more likely than not that God doesnât exist (Rowe 1979).5 However, some argue that it is easier for the Christian theist than the bare theist to respond to the evidential problem of evil. This is because the Christian theist is entitled to appeal to various Christian doctrines to answer the challenge (e.g. the fall, original sin, Satan, etc.). Thus, even though Christianity is a far more complex theory than bare theism, it might be more probable than bare theism (at least with respect to the evidential problem of evil). An entire book (if not an entire lifeâs work) could be spent analyzing how different conceptions of God interact differently with various problems in the philosophy of religion. My reason in saying all this is simply to acknowledge that this is a real phenomenon which I hope to be somewhat sensitive to throughout this book.
2.2 Objective Judgments: Worlds
Axiological judgments can be construed in a number of different ways. The most common way of understanding such judgments in the literature is that they are about comparative judgments about different possible worlds. These judgments are intended to be objective. Kahane says:
Which possibilities are we considering or comparing when we ask whether it would be good and better if God exists and bad, and worse, if He does not? We are not asking theists to conceive of Godâs deathâto imagine that God stopped existing. And given that theists believe that God created the universe, when we ask them to consider His inexistence we are not asking them to conceive an empty void. Except for a number of exceptions that I will make explicit, I will understand the comparison to involve the actual world and the closest possible world where [God does not exist (or for the atheist one where God does exist)]. (Kahane 2011, 676)
Thus, the comparison in question is meant to be between a world with God and the nearest possible world without God.
2.3 Preferences
Another way of understanding the debate is that it is about individual preferences. Rational preferences are subject relative in a way that comparative judgments are not thought to be relative. Rational preferences might not always line up with objective axiological judgments. There hasnât been a large exploration of this distinction, at least in the axiology of theism literature.6 Consider that someone who is suicidal may recognize that the best place for her is in a psychiatric institution. Itâs rational for her to prefer to be there inasmuch as thatâs the best option for her to receive treatment for depression. However, a better state of affairs is likely one in which there are no psychiatric intuitions because they arenât needed (imagine a world where humans just donât have mental health problems). This situation is perfectly intelligible; rational preferences and objective value judgments donât always align. However, for the sake of simplicity unless I explicitly state otherwise, I will proceed as if such judgments align. However, we will see that in certain places this distinction turns out to be quite important.
3 What Are the Possible Answers to the Axiological Questions?
There are numerous answers to the axiological question about God. However, thus far the literature has focused primarily on two main answers. The first is pro-theism, which holds that Godâs existence is (or would be) good. The second is anti-theism, the view that Godâs existence is (or would be) bad. There are other less frequently explored views: Agnosticism represents the position that we currently arenât in a good epistemic position to answer the axiological question. Neutralism holds that Godâs existence has no value impact on the world. Finally, quietism says that the axiological question is in principle unanswerable.7
There are further ways of subdividing the above general answers. Wide axiological judgments are about overall world value. Narrow judgments are about the value of specific states of affairs within the world. Personal judgments are with respect to individuals. Impersonal judgments are those which do not make reference to individuals. These cut across each other so there can be wide per...