Throughout all his writings, but in an especially systematic way in his Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos (Unamuno 1913b) [The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations (Unamuno 1913a)], Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936) attempted to defend a non-cognitivist Christian conception of religious faith by appealing to our (according to Unamuno, natural) longing for an endless existence. Unamuno’s religious faith consists primarily in our conceiving the world as a sort of personal conscious Being who suffers as we do and who asks for our love and compassion. In its turn, this religious understanding of the world determines our way of acting, of relating to the world (i.e., the practice of charity). And it is through our acting that we come to feel communed with the whole world, as if there were a personal loving relationship between us and the World, “de Dios a Dios” (“from God to God”), as it were (Unamuno 1913a, p. 172 [Unamuno 1913b, p. 201]). The aim of this essay is to provide a coherent and systematic analysis of Unamuno’s notion of religious faith and the reasoning he offers in defense of it, while pointing out some of the merits of his proposal, thus demonstrating why the study of Unamuno’s work might still prove useful and illuminating when discussing positions that are currently being defended and discussed by philosophers of religion.
Unamuno’s defense of religious faith starts with the claim that we all, without exception, suffer from what he named as “hambre de inmortalidad
” (“hunger for immortality
”). By affirming this “hambre de inmortalidad
”, Unamuno is not making the psychological, empirically contingent claim that we, human beings, desire for an endless existence, but the stronger, metaphysical claim that the most basic and natural inclination (or appetite
, if we are to use Spinoza’s jargon) of all singular things (i.e., not only human beings but also prima facie non sentient beings such as plants and rocks) is to increase their own singularity—which is tantamount, says Unamuno, to claiming that all singular things naturally and primarily seek an endless existence. Following on from the biographical introduction to Unamuno in Chap. 2, in which the most relevant events in his life are pointed out and his most well-known philosophical and literary works outlined, in Chap. 3 I will argue why we should read Unamuno’s “hambre de inmortalidad
” as referring to the metaphysical claim that all singular things naturally and primarily seek an endless existence.
The aim of Chaps. 4 and 5 is to analyze Unamuno’s argument for claiming that as a consequence of this “hambre de inmortalidad
”, we all long for the existence of the Christian God and His Salvation. As I will argue, Unamuno’s argument depends on accepting as an open metaphysical possibility (but not as a truth, as describing a fact that actually occurred) the Biblical testimony about the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, together with the claim that only the sort of endless existence involved in Christian Resurrection would succeed in preserving our personal identity after earthly death. With this, I will be pointing out one of the merits of Unamuno’s proposal that makes it still philosophically and theologically relevant today, which is his ability to formulate a non-cognitivist Christian conception of religious faith while preserving the traditional understanding about the divine nature of Jesus Christ and Christian Eschatology.
In Chap. 6, I will introduce Unamuno’s notion of the “sentimiento trágico de
la vida” (“tragic feeling of life
”), by which he refers to the irresoluble struggle
(“agonía”) we all, according to him, naturally and intimately feel between, on the one hand, our longing for the Christian God and His Salvation and, on the other, our incapacity to form the belief that this God exists on an evidential, rational basis.
In Chap. 7, I will analyze Unamuno’s reasoning for claiming that we are inevitably led to his notion of religious faith given our own anguished natural condition, the “sentimiento trágico de la vida
”. As we will see, Unamuno’s reasoning here takes the form of an argument from common consent: it is the anguish that the “sentimiento trágico de la vida
” arouses in us, together with our becoming aware that this anguish is naturally present in all singular things (in so far as all singular things naturally and primarily seek an endless existence), that moves us to Unamuno’s religious faith. Unamuno’s religious faith is, then, legitimated because of its natural foundation, as something we are all led to given our own natural condition. However, since this alleged universality of the “sentimiento trágico de la vida
”, and the anguish it brings with it, are grounded in the natural constitution of all singular things and not in the truth of any religious or theological statement, Unamuno’s religious faith cannot be equated with religious belief: it neither requires nor implies accepting as a truth the factual claim that the Christian God exists and that He is going to Save us. The “sentimiento trágico de la
vida” remains “trágico”, irresoluble; and it is precisely as a consequence of our incapacity to solve this struggle that we are lead to Unamuno’s religious faith—as Unamuno put it: “Peace of mind, conciliation between reason and faith, all of that—by the grace of a provident God—is no longer possible” (Unamuno 1913a, p. 354 [Unamuno 1913b, p. 300]).
In Chap. 8, I will argue that Unamuno’s notion of religious faith relies on the epistemological claim that the relation between world and subject, the direction of fit, goes from the subject to the world. It is this epistemological paradigm that enables us to make sense of the claim that despite not being a description
of how the world actually is, Unamuno’s religious faith is still a religious understanding of the world.
Last, in Chap. 9, I will link Unamuno’s notion of religious faith with recent contemporary fictionalist conceptions of religious faith. I will point out some of the merits of his proposal, demonstrating why the study of Unamuno’s work might still prove useful and illuminating when discussing positions that are currently being defended and discussed by philosophers of religions.
References
Unamuno, M. (1913a) 1972. The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations. In The Selected Works of Miguel de Unamuno (vol. 4), ed. and trans. Anthony Kerrigan, 3–358. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———. (1913b) 1966. Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos. In Miguel de Unamuno: obras completas (vol. VII: ‘Meditaciones y ensayos espirituales’), ed. Manuel García Blanco, 109–302. Madrid: Escelicer.
