Public access television has been described as âthe most interesting and controversial experiment in democratic control of the mediaâ in US history (Kellner ),1 as Americaâs Electronic Soapbox (Linder ),2 and an electronic public space (Aufderheide ).3 For others, however, it has not always been as successful. One critic held that âthere has been a schism between the promise of access, and its actual implementation and receptionâ (Fuller ).4 It has had some major successes but has been the subject of disdain for its poor-quality amateur programs as parodied in the fictional version of Wayneâs World. Bill Kirkpatrick observed in 2001 that the media largely portray access âas a forum for social deviants, murderers, sociopaths, and losers.â5 Reservations and shortcomings aside, it no doubt represents the greatest achievement of popular democratic initiatives within the mass media. It became one of the foremost expressions of the idea that media are public property and that broadcasting and cablecasting entail public obligations to empower citizens. At its best, public access television created a participatory public space in which those who lacked the resources to enter the commercial market were given voice, views not heard in broadcast media were aired, and critical discussion of public issues was facilitated. It has not always lived up to its promise, but there have been many significant achievements.
Yet these achievements are under siege: public access television in the United States has undergone a severe decline. The number of stations and the amount of funding has decreased. A recent study by the Buske Group and The Alliance for Community Democracy comparing funding between 2005 and 2010 found that in âover 100 communities from 14 states, PEG centers have become endangered or closed down entirely. Forty-five channels in California alone have been closed, twelve in Los Angeles.â6 Other centers have faced serious cuts, with an average funding drop of 40% annually.7 Many long-time operators who have built successful public access operations have been terminated and the operation of access channels has been limited. Others have had service shut down altogether.
One prevalent argument in policy discussions and municipal deliberations views the decline of public access as an inevitable consequence of the evolution of technology. For these critics, public access has been rendered obsolete by the rise of Internet technologies. Videos can be posted on YouTube, Facebook, or other social media instead of public access television. The ease of making and disseminating videos for these media means, according to these critics, that public access is no longer needed. The abundance of Internet outlets means that opportunities for free expression are available without public access.
For technological optimists, this decline is not a bad thing. It results from the changes in public and mass media brought about by the Internet. The optimist believes that technology is an unreserved good: new media technologies spread democracy in their wake. The Internet public is the most democratic one found thus far.8 Digital technology extends the capacity to be a media content provider to anyone with an Internet connection and high-speed broadband. The rapid and expanding flow of information will give all a chance to participate. Some radical and progressive theorists see the Internet as creating new publics or superseding the standard idea of a public altogether.9
This optimism is often based on a utopian vision of the power of technology. Historian Fred Turner has shown how Stuart Brand, creator of the Whole Earth Catalog, and his associates created a vision of a cybernetic utopian community based on a view of the âglobe as a single, interlinked pattern of information.â Brand wrote his Whole Earth Catalog against the backdrop of a world threatened by nuclear destruction; in that context, his countercultural vision of a networked society driven by small-scale technology provided a deeply comforting alternative vision of a unified world for those affected by the cold war and the Vietnam conflict.10 However, by the later 1980s and beyond, the cybernetic utopia became closely linked to neoliberal libertarians, who, while they shared an anti-state philosophy, rejected most of Brandâs countercultural ideas.
Skeptics, however, contest this utopian vision of the Internet. They point to the fact that the Internet and social networks have become a source of information overload and a home for trolls, flamers, and ranters: conditions that do not encourage reasoned discussion. For these critics, the current generation, which has grown up on the Internet, is largely ignorant of history, civics, geography, and even math skills. Internet culture fosters the creation of isolated individuals who lack creative spark.11 For others like Ben Agger, the Internet encourages emotional oversharing and inappropriate self-disclosure. Users âdivulge more of their inner feelings, opinions, and sexuality than they would in person or even over the phone.â12 He thinks oversharing blurs the boundaries between public and private and reproduces pathologies of the self that create unhappiness. Rather than create ties between others, such revelations damage the capacities for genuine ties. Others note that the commercial character of Internet social media limits the free speech of participants. The ability of Internet providers to gather information poses a serious threat to privacy and free speech.
The late political theorist and social critic, Benjamin Barber, suggested a more balanced assessment.13 He wanted to avoid the Scylla of unjustified utopian optimism and the Charybdis of dystopian pessimism. Barber proposed a Jeffersonian vision of the relation of technology and society. Technologies, especially technologies of communication, need to be embedded in strong democratic institutions that develop capacities for citizens to be full participants in democratic processes. Barber, however, is skeptical of the possibilities of realizing his strong democratic vision in todayâs American society.
The Limits of Technological Determinism
Assertions about the inherent possibilities of new technology invoke the theory of technological determinism. This is the view that technological developments and the technological structure of media are the main drivers of sociohistorical development. In its strongest form it holds that technology is an autonomous, independent force that shapes social life. The uses of technology are largely determined by the inner structure of technology itself and not the social relations in which it is embedded. Technological progress initiates a unidirectional process of change which determines social life. Social institutions must adapt to the imperatives of technology. Technology is an emancipatory power that creates freedom by changing our relationship to nature and promoting democracy. There are other less rigorous versions of the determinist position usually called soft determinism. These allow for a certain amount of social influence. They think that technology is still the central determining force, but that social forces have some sway in the outcomes of technology.
Neither of these forms of determinism, however, provides an adequate understanding of the relation between technology and society. Technology is not prior to, nor independent of, society but is a social product shaped by social forces in important ways. The adoption of innovative technologies is only effective when accompanied by changes in institutions and social relations and even modes of production.14 There is no direct or automatic link between technological development and increasing democratization or social freedom. David Noble, in his work America by Design, showed that the linkage of technology and advanced capitalism as a system of social production was based not just on technology, but on social/political elements of production which were initiated by new work relations and included expertise in social relations.15 Social change, as Louis Coser reminded us many years ago, is a matter of conflict and struggle.16
Similarly, the use of technologies can be the result of contested relations between social groups or the interests of dominant social groups. For example, the rise of modern media from the newspaper to the telegraph, to the radio, to the Internet was shaped by important social groups such as the rising commercial classes who required information on trading (newspapers); industries like railroads and others that needed long-distance communication (telegraph); military needs f...