1.1 Schumpeter: At the Origin of Political Economy
Joseph Alois Schumpeter has been one of the few critical minds that have tried to go to the core of economic science. In an essay he wrote more than a century ago, he observed that âthe science of economics, as it took shape towards the end of the 18th century, had grown from two roots which must be clearly differentiated from one anotherâ. The first root originated in the study of philosophy, specifically in that strand of philosophy which considered social activities as the fundamental problem, as the essential element of the world vision. The other root reflected the views of âpeople of various typesâ whose interest was focussed on actual, practical matters of their daily lives.1
Regarding the first stream of thought the social worldâuntil then accepted either as evident in itself and therefore not deserving special attention, or as a mystery explicable only in supernatural, religious termsâwas seen in a different perspective, as an intellectual problem to be dealt with natural, not supernatural, methods, based on empirical observation and factual analysis.2 For a true understanding of the social world, it had to be explained in rational terms, that is by means of a causeâeffect relation in human behaviour. Moral philosophy, as a unity that resulted from these reflections, included Theology, Ethics, Jurisprudence and Economics. âIn this organic unity one element affects all the others, almost every thought is of importance for Economics as wellâ. And at this point Schumpeter names Locke and Hume: âNever again was philosophy to such an extent a social science as at this periodâ.3
Regarding the other root, the interest in practical, daily matters meant that, differently from the first, it did not see human activity as, per se, problematic. Thinkers belonging to this second stream, on one side rich in business experience, were on the other side devoid of scientific background and reluctant to raise philosophical questions. One can understand whyâSchumpeter addsâsome excellent beginnings did not have any meaningful follow-up, because, if the immediate, practical problem had been solved, no need was felt of additional and deeper reflection. This sort of literature revealed its freshness and fruits in the direct observation of the social world, but remained fruitless beyond that. However, this âvulgarâ economy (the adjective is Schumpeterâs, and was previously used by Marx, however in a slightly different meaning4), based as it was on the reality of the business life, gave an important contribution to the rising political economy. Over time, mostly in England, the experience of practical life started being fertilized by a mental habit of a scientific kind: for instance, âGreat progress was made when the âbullionistâ conception was given up, and people realized instead that exchange rates and balance of trade were correlatedâ.5
This sort of cross-fertilization of practical behaviour and theoretical thinking assumed different character in different countries. In England, political conditions related to parliamentarism favoured an open debate in the public opinion and a pressing need for economic analysis. Elsewhere, autocratic governments discouraged these discussions of political economy. In Germany, the low level of a rational discussion on economics was the result of years of religious wars and reflected a lack of free discussion. There, the adoption of foreign models hindered any original development of economic science. On the other side, in no country as in Germany the State became the object of inexhaustible interest: the State as an essential factor of the process of civilization. âThe German not only thought much more about the State than anybody else did but he understood something quite different by the term âStateââŠthan Englishmen or Frenchmen [understood]â.
For the British, their story was about making society free from an oppressive monarch, while for the Germans it meant the affirmation of a strong State from a backward-looking feudalism. Administrative law took in Germany the same place that political economy had taken in England. In England, merchants discussed among themselves in the same way civil servants discussed in Germany. If in England they discussed about economy, this became economic theory; while in Germany this took the shape of political science of the economy. Schumpeter quotes a work by the German neo-cameralist Johann von Justi (1756), whose plan and aim are the same as Adam Smithâs Wealth of Nations (1776): not so distant in terms of time, but âas regards clarity and insight the two works are separated by the labours of a centuryâ.6 As valuable is von Justiâs book in the field of the technique of administration, in economic matters it lacks approaches and methods which were already well available. Von Justiâs practical judgements reveal common sense, but the analytical structure of his work is flawed. It has been recently observed by Werner Plumpe that von Justi shared with Smith the view that common well-being depends on the sound working of the market, but von Justi thought that it is up to the State the duty to channel properly the private interest so that the well-being can be reached by the market. Differently from the Scottish Enlightenment, in the German semantics the role of the State is of fundamental importance. While, according to Smith, the interest of the bourgeoisie was implicitly addressed to the common good through the free exchange on the market (the âinvisible handâ), the German tradition thought that the State must be the visible hand that creates that common good.7 In Germany, Law acquired the same standing that Economics was playing in Britain; and a doctrine of State economy meant that âthe individual problem is never an object of treatment for its own sake but only as part of the wholeâ.8 This systematic approach has characterized economics in Germany âto this [Schumpeterâs] dayâ, he writes. One may wonder whether this is true up to our own days.
Schumpeter saw well the philosophical roots of the economic science, that is the ideological framework that influences the theoretical choices of the economist, his âwordly philosophyâ, to use Robert Heilbronerâs words.9
What has just been said about the different attitude that the discussion on economic matters took in Britain and Germany, had a decisive influence on the development of the discipline of economics. The first attitude is focussed on an individualistic point of view, centred on the individual as a rational agent, and therefore assuming that any âunreasonableâ action should be seen as a philosophical curiosity if not an uninteresting aberration; the second turns to the State and sees public interest as not necessarily coincidentâsometimes in oppositionâto the private one.
These philosophies are the premise, often undisclosed, of every economic reasoning that goes beyond what Schumpeter defines as the âvulgarâ economy.10
However, if in their common philosophical origin we make a distinction between the two, it is easy to notice that the firstâthe vision centred on the rational individualâmet fruitfully with the vulgar economy, based as it was on the immediate self-interest in human actions; while the second made more complicated any relation between the rational State and the individual. Indeed, if we put society, or the State as its representative, as the embodiment of rationality, the individual actions do not deserve to be put at the centre of the analystâs attention. To the extreme, in a sort of ranking, the individual comes always second, after the State. From this perspective, the detachment of the philosophical root (which sees the State as the embodiment of rationality) from the individualistic approach (which looks at the specific person who aims to his personal satisfaction) is certainly wider.
We shall deal first with the approach based on the rational individual (Sects. 1.2â1.5), and then with the one centred on the rational State (Sects. 1.6â1.11). Our reference period in this chapter is mainly the nineteenth century.