The book redefines the relationship between Greece and the United States in the 1970s. Greek–US relations have been a hotly debated issue. The collapse of the seven-year-long dictatorship in Greece and the subsequent political transition to democracy during the summer of 1974 signalled the beginning of a distinct period for bilateral relations. The period of military rule heightened anti-American sentiments and the widespread condemnation of Washington’s stance during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus led scholarly arguments about a radical change in Greek–US ties.1 Historians in the late 1970s and 1980s debated whether the Greek conservative governments from 1974 to 1980 pursued a policy independent of US intervention.2 Modern research renders this approach to be outdated.3 Greek foreign policy during the Cold War was more complex than has been previously argued as was the Greek–US alliance.
The United States ‘came’ to Greece after the end of the Second World War. In 1947 President Harry S. Truman called on the US Congress to authorise aid for Greece and Turkey to face the communist threat.4 Soviet pressure on Turkey and the Greek civil war became two of the earliest turning points that led to the Cold War. Support for close relations with both Greece and Turkey became one of the foundations of US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the following decades Athens and Washington shared a close yet turbulent relationship.
The United States progressively emerged as Greece’s closest ally. During the formative decades of post-war reconstruction and development the United States even became an integral element, otherwise known as a factor, in Greek modern politics. While its role in Greek politics has often been overstated, Washington played an important role. A number of recent works have presented a more detailed picture of post-war Greek foreign policy as well as relations with the Western superpower and the western alliance more broadly. These works emphasise Athens’ ability to pursue and secure its national interest to a greater extent than has previously been recognised.5
The book presents a much-needed reevaluation of Greek–US relations during the 1970s. It examines and analyses the bilateral relationship between Greece and the United States focussing simultaneously on both sides’ policies, strategies, and objectives for the first time. It argues that a diptych of national security and domestic politics shaped this Cold War alliance.
In the mid-1970s Greek conservative decision-makers perceived that their country faced a dual threat. As a member of the western alliance, Greece confronted a direct communist threat on its northern border. In addition, Ankara’s decision to resolve the Cyprus crisis with the use of military force transformed Turkey into another perceived threat. Greek–Turkish disputes dated back decades and the two Western allies had experienced periods of both tranquillity and tension. The Cyprus crisis of 1974 represented a turning point. Ankara deployed military forces twice, on 20 July and 14 August. The 14 August operation took place amid diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis. The Greek political leadership interpreted Turkey’s military operation as Ankara’s conscious decision to use force to resolve the dispute in its favour. This perception did not bode well for bilateral Greek–Turkish disputes about their common Aegean Sea border. The Greek conservative governments of the 1974–1980 period had to implement a national security doctrine that confronted both perceptions of threat.
In the meantime, domestic considerations influenced the Greek decision-making process. Strong national and nationalistic sentiments marked Greek internal and party politics in the post-Junta 1970s.6 US ties with the Greek military dictatorship, which public opinion regarded as the raison d’être for its seven-year-long grip on power, sparked a strong anti-American and anti-NATO movement. Washington’s passive public stance during the Cyprus crisis strengthened the anti-American movement. Turkish expansionism and irredentism over the Aegean fuelled national sentiment further. A significant portion of the electorate in the 1974 and 1977 general elections supported parties that objected to any negotiation with Ankara over the bilateral disputes. Similarly, the Greek opposition parties called for limiting Greek–US relations. The Greek governments could not ignore the public attitude without facing significant political costs.
Relations with Greece also served US security policy. Incorporating both Greece and Turkey into the western alliance represented a central pillar of US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ongoing Greek–Turkish disputes challenged US relations with both while the Cyprus crisis left NATO’s southern flank in ruins. The Republican administration, which dealt with the immediate implications of the crisis, considered a policy of equal distance as best serving US interests. The subsequent Democratic administration followed the same approach. The clash between the legislative and executive branches of US government about the limits of presidential control over foreign policy further complicated US relations with Greece.
The Cyprus crisis caused another conflict between the US Congress and the White House. Following the second wave of Turkish military operations in Cyprus the US Congress enacted an arms embargo suspending all US military assistance to Turkey despite opposition from the White House. The underlying reasons for congressional support for an arms embargo were complex and the relevant chapter below presents them in detail. The arms embargo, however, presented the United States as siding with Greece. Consequently, US domestic politics complicated the policies that both President Gerald R. Ford and his successor President James Earl ‘Jimmy’ Carter developed towards Greece. This monograph untangles their policies and strategies looking at the Greek and US decision-making process simultaneously.
Greek–US cooperation represented an unequal relationship between the Western superpower and a junior ally. Accordingly, the book belongs to the wider scholarship assessing the role of smaller states in the Cold War. Publications have predominately approached Greek–US relations in the early Cold War within a patron–client framework. This framework essentially assigns the client state, in this case Greece, the subservient role as being unable and unwilling to challenge the policy, decisions, and interests of its powerful patron, i.e. the United States, for fear of losing its support.7 Geopolitical considerations due to the bipolarity of the Cold War placed Greece firmly in the West, thus intensifying its necessary dependence on the United States.8 Consequently, the Greek conservative governments of the period could not pursue an ambitious foreign policy that aimed at independence from Washington’s patronage and guidance. For example, based on this interpretation of Greek–US cooperation Kassimeris concludes that ‘Greece was not only committed to the western alliance but also served it submissively—with the occasional outburst necessary to ease public opinion’.9 However, a close examination of Greek and US primary sources paints a different picture. Between 1974 and 1980 Greek governments challenged and influenced US policy towards Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.
Greek conservative governments during the period under review did not shy away from pursuing Greek national interests even if they clashed with US policy. Rather, Athens developed policies and strategies aimed at bringing Washington closer to Greek objectives. The research, therefore, c...