Five times during the interwar period, the Bishop of Oxford asked his clergy what efforts they were making to deal with religious apathy and a range of social problems. If eighteen South Buckinghamshire parishes are any guide, the question nonplussed its recipients, or was deemed unworthy of reply; three quarters of clergy failed to respond on the form returned to the Bishop. Most others answered, in effect, âwhat we do alreadyâ. The vicar of Langley, Buckinghamshire, perhaps unwilling to give no reply, ventured plaintively: âwhat can be done?â1
Twenty-five years later, in the adjacent parish of Colnbrook, another highly experienced clergyman was struggling with attendances at the four Sunday services. Despite efforts to encourage increased attendance, not only were congregations âpainfully smallââbarely into double figuresâbut all were elderly and declining. However, after facing a 1962 Palm Sunday congregation numbering precisely one, he concluded it was no longer âwhat can be doneâ, but that he must do something. Services were incomprehensible and boring to ordinary people: âthe enemy in fact, is boredom. Give [the ordinary man] a service he can understand, and really enjoy taking part in, and he will comeâ.2 The changes he madeâvisiting and consulting parishioners, trying to make preaching and worship more accessible and focusing one service to be more appealing to young familiesâwere clearly welcomed by many previously not attending the church, as shortly afterwards the family service had a regular congregation of one hundred.3 Why had he not made these apparently modest changes earlier? Writing of his experiences two years later, he warned: âany incumbent who considers doing something along [these] lines ⊠will run into bitter opposition from those older members of the congregation who dislike change of any kind; and the more successful his efforts, the more bitter the opposition may becomeâ.4
The decline in adherence to formal religious institutions during the twentieth century is often attributed to external factors such as industrialisation, urbanisation, the increasing role of the state in welfare, education and local government and the âmodernisationâ of thought and attitudes. The institutions themselves can often appear as passive bystanders in the face of massive demographic and social change. But were the churches, their ministers and congregations, powerless to influence either specific events or the direction of travel? This book is concerned with examining whether they could and did; and with what measurable effect.
It is also based on the conviction that most peopleâs experience of organised religion in this period was both personal and local: experience of a local church and its minister; or of family, friends and acquaintances either linked with a church or with reasons why they were not; or personal events where organised religion was either found to be helpful and relevantâor not.
This area of historical debate has been informed by local studies extending back at least sixty years. These have mainly focused on large towns and cities, particularly in the industrial north and several London boroughs.5 However, these were generally communities established well before institutional religious decline became evident, and most studies end in the early twentieth century, with very few examining the mid to late twentieth century.6
The interwar years saw Great Britainâs economic centre shift from areas dominated by heavy industry towards the South. New industries located themselves close to the major markets of London and the south-east rather than close to natural resources. As the balance of employment shifted, major economic migration ensued, prompting growth of new towns in the south-east, and the outward spread of the London conurbation. Further impetus was given to these trends in the 1950s through the Greater London Plan.
The economic and demographic consequences posed enormous challenges for all institutions, and the Christian churches were no exception. In 1935, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Lang, described âthis problemâ as âone of the greatest ever presented to the Church of England in the course of its long historyâ, estimating that perhaps half the population was not being properly served.7 The challenges extended to churches of all denominations, and would subject their responses to such demographic change, and wider changes in social life and cultural attitudes, to rigorous practical examination.
This book has three primary aims, thereforeâto investigate the âagencyâ of organised religious institutions, practitioners and participants in their own fortunes; to do so over an extended period, from the end of the nineteenth through the first three quarters of the twentieth century; and to ground the analysis in a local study of one of these fast growing areas of the country.
While the examples above were from the Church of England, others could be quoted from other denominations, and this book examines all churches and churchmanships, where records allow. The extended time period allows trends to be discerned that cannot properly be observed within shorter timeframes. It focuses not only on the formal ministry, but also on church members and congregations: those who were committed and welcoming, and those who were not. It also considers the churchesâ engagement with local society and culture, the message they presented and how it changed over time away from what one churchwarden described as the weekly obligation âto give 60 minutes to God, and to put up with what you do not like when you get to churchâ.8 Wherever possible, the conclusions are supported by data and quantified analysis, to avoid broad generalisations. The book explores whether cause and effect can be discernedâwhether, on all the levels to be examined, human agency can be seen to have had a material effect, either positively or negatively, on the outcomes known as secularisation.
1.1 Secularisation
The marginalisation of mainstream religious belief and practice in England over the last century and more is part of a wider debate about the reduction in the social significance of religion,
or secularisation, defined by one of its major proponents as:
the sequestration by political powers of the property and facilities of religious agencies; the shift from religious to secular control of various of the erstwhile activities and functions of religion; the decline in the proportion of their time, energy and resources which men devote to super-empirical concerns; the decay of religious institutions; the supplanting, in matters of behaviour, of religious precepts by demands that accord with strictly technical criteria; and the gradual replacement of a specifically religious consciousness⊠by an empirical, rational, instrumental orientation; the abandonment of mythical, poetic, and artistic interpretations of nature and society in favour of matter-of-fact description and, with it, the rigorous separation of evaluative and emotive dispositions from cognitive and positivistic orientations.9
Many aspects of secularisation are contested. A recent survey argued: âthe absence of agreement on its definition, characteristics, timing, causes or applicability to particular p...