Buddhism has a history of adapting to cultures where it takes root and has subsequently developed in diverse ways. It should not be surprising, therefore, that a version of Buddhism would arise in conjunction with feminist philosophies. No articulation of a method or lens to ground Buddhist feminism as an identifiable subset of feminist or Buddhist philosophy, however, exists. Perhaps the constitution and tenets of both Buddhism and feminism defy projects that search for conceptual unity or systematic practices, which are hallmarks of Western philosophical thought. The major schools of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana, reveal practical and philosophical divides. Further splintering of Mahayana Buddhism into Zen, Pure Land, and Tantric models adds to the multiplicity of Buddhism.
Feminism, too, is far from a monolithic disciplineâthough the critique that white bourgeois women dominate feminist philosophy endures. Even among the dominant cast of Anglo-European women, scholars can distinguish strategic and philosophical differences between liberal feminists, radical feminists, and sexual difference feminists. By adding their voices, black and Latina women have further diversified and enriched the field. Though growing, the list of feminists who invoke Buddhist philosophy and practices is relatively short.
Scholarship on Buddhism and feminism tends to fall into two camps. Either scholars gauge the compatibility of the philosophies, which does not always result in a match. Or they employ specific Buddhist ideas in order to enhance particular feminist principles. Anthologies developed through sociological and anthropological approaches are also on hand. They tend, however, to compile life lessons that arise from the experience of Buddhist women rather than work to create a philosophical foundation for Buddhist feminism.
Despite the complexities of both Buddhism and feminism, efforts to define a Buddhist feminist philosophy may not be an exercise in futility. Scholars largely acknowledge the plurality within their discipline, but they also seek out certain unifying features that allow for discussions about Buddhist and feminist philosophies, respectively. The belief in the Four Noble Truths (which will be discussed in a later chapter) and the commitment to compassion, just to name a couple, can be found in all Buddhist traditions. Feminists, for their part, may argue about causes and strategies but they agree that the oppression and subjugation of women remains a problem. Recognition of general features of each leave open, I believe, the possibility of determining a foundation for the interdisciplinary philosophy of Buddhist feminists by locating a common lens or tracking a recurring theme that appears when Western feminists turn to Buddhism.
The identification of American Buddhism, for instance, serves as precedence for the surfacing of particular traits from interactions between different schools of thought. Just as scholars have come to identify the outlines of American Buddhism through patterns, one can also begin to see patterns emerge in the ways Western feminist thinkers make use of Buddhist ideas and practices. Indeed, there are connections between American Buddhism and those who want to build a bridge between Buddhist and feminist thought. Works by Sandy Boucher (1993), Christopher Queen, and Duncan Ryuken Williams (1999) show that political engagement, democratization, and an emphasis on meditation practice are common features of American Buddhism. Because American Buddhism allows for greater inclusion of women and seeks to apply Buddhist philosophy toward political change, it shares some key goals with feminist movements. It should not be surprising that there is overlap between the groups. Rita Gross, who many consider a pre-eminent thinker of Buddhist feminism, points out that women constitute a substantial segment of American Buddhist practitioners (Gross 1992, 219).
Although American Buddhist communities work to enact various political changes , feminists within the sangha (Buddhist community) also seek to employ Buddhist philosophy and practices in the struggle against patriarchy in particular. Despite a turn toward greater political engagement by Buddhists, many male gurus and leaders do not put great effort into the emancipation of women. The current Dalai Lama, in response to this reality, calls for more women to take positions as leaders. Having women in leadership roles could help counteract male perspectives within Buddhist culture and institutions. He seems also to imply that female leaders would do more to address the oppression of women or, at the very least, current leadership has not done enough to address patriarchy within Buddhism (Cook 2017).
So, what have feminist leaders who also happen to be interested in Buddhism done through their work? My search to identify patterns of Buddhist feminism began with a curiosity about what Western feminists found interesting and useful in Buddhism. Approaching the project in this fashion reveals certain Western biases. For instance, many Western feminists focus on the disappearance of the Buddhist nun lineage. Women in Southeast Asia, in contrast, value âprecept nunsâ or mae chii. Mae chiis are not the equivalent to a monk, as a nun would be, but they follow rules or precepts that distinguish themselves from laywomen, such as refraining from sexual activity. Theravada women believe this position and lifestyle can also lead to enlightenment and are, generally, not as concerned with obtaining an equivalent status to monks. A Buddhologist who picks up on feminist themes in Buddhism may very well find different patterns of thought that link Buddhism and feminism that has nothing to do with official roles or status. Nevertheless, the use of patterns in developing Buddhist feminism may be helpful precisely because there is not a need to totalize such thought. Identifying patterns allows for nuance and differentiation between thinkers and the acknowledgment that other paths for creating Buddhist feminist philosophy may exist. Still, patterns can give rise to distinguishable characteristics that would make the field more intelligible to other scholars.
Patterns for Buddhist feminism, I suggest, include an emphasis on relationality, attention to the body, and the call to recognize anger. The first two patterns can be seen in many works of feminist scholars, whether or not they are interested in establishing a Buddhist feminist philosophy or think such a discipline is even possible. Anne Klein (2008) and Erin McCarthy (2010) work to explain and bolster the relational nature of the self through feminist and Buddhist philosophy. In contrast to the autonomous subject that canonical Western philosophers promote, feminists argue that the self should be thought in relation to others and the society in which the subject develops.
The Buddhist concept of âno-selfâ has helped to reinforce the value of understanding relationality in feminist thought. The privileging of relationality has allowed feminists to open a pathway to plurality as well. Many feminists who identify as Buddhist also identify with another religious tradition, allowing for a spirituality that connects cultures. Jan Willis (2008), bell hooks (2016), and Luce Irigaray (2004, 187) feel no need to fully embrace Buddhism or Christianity in a manner that excludes the other.
Feminists who engage with Buddhism also emphasize the practice and meditation, rather than knowledge of sutras or scripture, as a means to rethink the body.1 Sue Hamilton argues for a neutral understanding of the body as a means to fight against the patriarchal strain in Theravada Buddhism (Hamilton 2000). Often caught within a dualistic system that inextricably links women and the body and codes them both negatively, the move to explore Buddhist philosophy and meditation, therefore, is not an attempt to ignore intellectual concerns but, rather, a way to provide a more positive framing of the body.
The connection between feminists who turn to Buddhism in order to understand anger and their attempt to address it is less visible than the aforementioned patterns. It should go without saying, however, that the relative silence on the part of Western philosophers surrounding anger has not led to the extermination of anger in the world. If this strategy of discounting and ignoring anger has not worked, a question remains. What is the purpose of continuing on this path? I believe that analysis of Buddhism and feminism together show that an avoidance of anger is an effective means to protect the privileged subject of Western philosophy. Buddhist dealings with anger provide an explanation for why Western philosophers would want to circumvent such an analysis: a defense of the independent self. A Buddhist feminist philosophy further reveals, I suggest, that the self who gains the most cover through the refusal to discuss anger is the privileged white male subject.
The second chapter is an investigation of the role of anger in the philosophies of those who still have a great influence on the way contemporary scholars think about anger: Aristotle and Seneca.2 Despite Aristotleâs allowance for anger in response to injustice, his philosophy seems only to address men as injured parties and subjects who can rightfully act with the backing of anger. His philosophy reveals, therefore, the connection between the discourse on anger and the privileged male subject of Western philosophy. When a case is made for the recognition or erasure of anger, it often coincides with the description of the canonical male philosopherârational and able to resist all ill effects of anger.
That Western philosophers focus heavily on the reactions of men in response to anger and often gloss over womenâs anger is a sign that the female subject is of little concern to them. In other words, the erasure of female subjectivity is implicit in gestures to vanquish anger. Accordingly, one should take particular note of the ways that philosophers have traditionally excluded women and the anger women feel from their treatises on the emotion. Denial of womenâs anger and female subjectivity provide feminists, of course, with only more reasons to feel aggrieved.
Feminist philosophers reveal a tension when we speak about the suffering of women under patriarchy while trying to play by the rules of philosophy, which has largely unfavorable views of emotions in general and womenâs anger in particular. Because some Western philosophers may now recognize that women have plenty about which to be angry, gestures to deny or ignore womenâs angerârather than actual outbursts of anger from feministsâmay be the greater cause of linking feminism and anger together. Despite clichĂ©s about angry feminists,3 it is not the case that anger is a major theme in every feminist work or that all feminists openly express feelings of anger. Female philosophers, who already find themselves at the margins of the discipline, may be reluctant to analyze and explore anger. Because there is still a stigma attached to anger and the recognition of it, feminists may fear that such a move will only reinforce stereotypes about the irrational and emotional woman who is incapable of theoretical work.
Because Western canonical philosophers often cast women in the role of angry and overly emotional bein...