This book is a collection of chapters penned by practitioners from around the world on the impact that disinformation and fake news has had in both the online and social sphere. While much has been said about individual disinformation campaigns in specific countries, this book offers a panoramic view of how these campaigns are conducted, who they target, and how they are spread. By bringing together research on specific countries and international data mined from questionnaires and online studies, the understanding of the term 'fake news' is greatly expanded and the issues we face are brought to light. The book includes contributions by experts such asJean-Baptiste Vilmer (Macron Leaks), and includes case studies from Asia, such asSingapore and Myanmar, written in an accessible manner for the general interested reader, practitioners and policymakers in the field.
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Barbora Maronkova evaluates NATO’s strategy and implementation plans for countering hybrid warfare. This strategy comprises four main pillars: defence and deterrence with high readiness forces in place, cyber defence, enhancing resilience through national civil preparedness and the protection of critical infrastructure, as well as strategic communications to fight disinformation and propaganda. Maronkova underlines the importance of proactive communication between NATO members in order to counter the “systemic use of disinformation, propaganda and fake news”. This is particularly with regard to Russia, which has deployed a number of propaganda attacks targeting its immediate neighbours and NATO. Maronkova explains how these attacks have led NATO to develop new initiatives to counter Russian disinformation, including countering propaganda with facts and information to debunk recurrent falsehoods. She concludes by emphasizing the importance of proactive and transparent communication between NATO members in order to deter and defend against any threat which may arise.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent NATO’s official position.
End Abstract
All War is Based on Deception.
Sun Tzu
Many military historians argue that the emergence of hybrid threats is nothing new, as deceptive methods in warfare have been used as long as human kind. The deception was historically employed by the disadvantaged side, and was used in order to achieve both strategic and tactical advantages on the battlefield.
The twenty-first-century emergence of asymmetric, or hybrid, threats can be traced back to the first covert terrorist attacks conducted by non-state actors such as Hezbollah, followed by the Taliban in Afghanistan and the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Hoffman 2009).
The new stage in the hybrid warfare era began when a state actor, Russia, engaged in a well planned and executed series of attacks in the winter and spring of 2014 against its neighbour, Ukraine. This included the illegal annexation of Crimea by the “little green men” (i.e. Russian troops without insignia), a bogus referendum on the annexation, together with wide-spread propaganda and disinformation about attacks of Ukrainian nationalists on Russian-speaking citizens both in Crimea and Donbas, as well as a bogus distortion of modern history and cyber-attacks combined with energy blackmail due to Ukraine’s dependency on Russian gas supplies (Maronkova 2018a).
New characteristics of the modern version of hybrid warfare are technological advances of societies, globalization and the interconnection of key supply chains between countries. All of these have greatly enhanced the intensity of threats, requiring a complex set of answers to ensure efficient defence and deterrence.
NATO acknowledged this need immediately after the events in Ukraine in early 2014. At the Wales Summit on 5 September 2014, NATO Allies set out a number of areas for NATO to develop relevant policies as an effective response to hybrid warfare.
NATO describes hybrid warfare as a “wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures employed in a highly integrated design” (NATO Wales Summit Declaration 2014).
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared in March 2015 that NATO must be ready to deal with every aspect of this new reality from wherever it stems “[and] that means we must look closely at how we prepare for; deter; and if necessary defend against hybrid warfare”.
In order to be prepared, NATO must be able to observe and analyse what is happening; to see the patterns behind events, which appear isolated and random; and to quickly identify the actor or actors behind these events.
Just as hybrid warfare tactics are a complex web of interlinked actions, so must the counter-strategy of defence and deterrence be. Various areas such as cybersecurity, situational awareness and countering disinformation must be addressed.
At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO adopted a strategy and actionable implementation plans for its role in countering hybrid warfare. The primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted nation. NATO is prepared to assist an ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign. The North Atlantic Alliance and allies are prepared to counter hybrid warfare as part of a collective defence. The North Atlantic Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty1 (Warsaw Summit Declaration).
At its Brussels Summit on 11 July 2018, NATO made further advances in its hybrid warfare strategy by creating counter-hybrid support teams, which will provide tailored targeted assistance to allies upon their request. This follows an earlier decision to set up similar cyber response teams. The exact details of how these teams will operate are still under deliberation.
Hybrid warfare is by default complex and goes beyond national borders. This is why a comprehensive approach is pursued by NATO in working together with the European Union and its partner countries such as Finland, Sweden, Ukraine and others.
NATO’s response to hybrid warfare rests on the following four pillars:
1.
Defence and Deterrence in order to have high readiness forces in place and credible deterrence on land, air and sea.
2.
Cyber defence to protect NATO and individual allies from cyber-attacks.
3.
Resilience to enhance national civil preparedness and ensure protection of critical infrastructure.
4.
Strategic communications to fight disinformation and propaganda.
These pillars are linked together by regular exercises and increased situational awareness (Maronkova 2018b) (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1
Model of a counter-hybrid threats strategy
(Source Maronkova 2018b, NATO Amidst Hybrid Warfare—Case Study of Effective Strategic Communications. Presentation at the workshop Disinformation, Online Falsehoods and Fake News, Singapore)
Areas such as economy and trade, including energy, can be important elements of a national strategy for individual nations. For NATO, a political military organization, these areas remain outside its scope.2
According to NATO Secretary General, hybrid warfare is a test of a country’s resolve to resist and to defend itself. It can also be a prelude to a more serious attack; behind every hybrid strategy, there are conventional forces, increasing the pressure and ready to exploit any opening. NATO and its partners need to demonstrate that they can and will act promptly whenever and wherever necessary (Stoltenberg 2015).
New Approach to Strategic Communications
How NATO Counters Russian Disinformation and Propaganda
The new security environment requires new approaches to communication; it is of particular relevance for an organization such as NATO, which recognizes the importance of proactive communication with its members.
A significant element of hybrid warfare conducted by the Russian Federation against its neighbours—Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and the three NATO members in the Baltics—is a systemic use of disinformation, propaganda and fake news. From 2004 to 2014, Russia focused its propaganda attacks on its immediate neighbours; however after the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in the winter of 2014 and the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, NATO and its allies also became targets.
Individual experts, civil networks and non-governmental organizations have done plenty of documented research on Russia’s spread of propaganda across most of the NATO members states and partners. The purpose of this article is to highlight the ones that were specifically targeted at NATO, and in turn, NATO’s response to them.
The most widespread narratives deployed by Russian official, semi-official and unofficial channels regarding NATO are:
NATO deploys close to Russia’s borders, threatening strategic stability.
NATO broke its promise to not expand eastward.
Missile defence is aimed at Russia and undermines the strategic balance.
In a similar pattern, NATO enlargement process and its potential member states were targeted by Russian propaganda and disinformation. Amongst the most vivid examples are the following narratives:
“Montenegro is being dragged into NATO against people’s will”—this narrative was often used during the 2016–2017 period of accession talks of Montenegro to NATO. Russia has expressed its opposition to Montenegro’s membership to NATO and threatened with retaliatory measures towards the tiny Balkan country. These included official statements of Russian officials before and after the accession talks, Russian media reports about NATO forcing Montenegro to membership, support of Russian spy agencies to an unsuccessful coup d’ état attempt against the then Prim...
